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ABSTRACT: 
 
This thesis examines the nature of ‘gaming’ in the police service and the extent to 
which it distorts policing priorities and performance measures. Performance 
Management, which formed an integral part of New Public Management, was 
introduced gradually to the police service in England and Wales during the 1990s. 
The Police and Magistrates Court Act 1994 gave Chief Officers of Police greater 
freedom on how they spent their budget allocation but there was an expectation that 
this would result in increased efficiency and improved performance. The Police 
Reform Act 2002 continued this trend by empowering the Home Secretary to set 
annual performance targets which the Police Service was expected to deliver. 
Performance management systems provided the means by which efficiency could be 
measured thus enabling central government to exert pressure on police forces to 
improve performance in the areas prioritised. However, for such improvements to be 
real, not just illusory, it was necessary to ensure the dysfunctional effects of ‘gaming’ 
behaviour were guarded against. Controlling such behaviour presents a challenge for 
those responsible for the regulation and governance of the service. This thesis 
examines the impact of Performance Management on ‘gaming’ behaviour and vice 
versa within the police service. It identifies and presents evidence on the nature and 
extent of ‘gaming’ and its impact on police behaviour. The limited effectiveness of 
the regulatory bodies in addressing ‘gaming’ are also reviewed and inadequacies, both 
strategic and operational, identified. 
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Accountability. 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS: 
 
 
 
The research for this thesis has been supported by the University of 
Birmingham’s Institute of Local Government Studies (INLOGOV). 
 
 
 
I owe a great debt of gratitude to my wife Jeanette who has lovingly reassured me and 
offered valuable advice throughout the process. The support of my daughters Jennie 
and Lorna is also appreciated. To my mother and father whose experience of 
performance management in manufacturing provided a depth of understanding which 
was difficult to obtain from other sources.   
 
 
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to Professor John W. Raine and Doctor 
Andrew C. Coulson, my supervisors, for all their valuable guidance and helpful 
discussions throughout the preparation of this thesis and Professor Marian FitzGerald 
for her advice and guidance. 
 
 
I would also like to extend my thanks to those interviewees who provided information 
and interpretations of the material under scrutiny; the Police Forces throughout 
England and Wales which responded to my requests for information; the Home Office 
personnel who provided statistical data and advice; and all those officers and staff 
who have provided ‘pointers’ during the course of this study. The co-operation of the 
Information Commissioner in disclosing the correspondence between ACPO and his 
office is also acknowledged.  
 
 
 
Thanks are also extended to Steve Rose and Andy Brumwell for their mapping skills 
which contributed to the presentation of the data. To Doctor James Hutchinson and 
Doctor Malcolm Arnold for their valuable assistance on the statistical analysis of the 
data collected and examined.     
 
 
 
The contribution of data supplied by Her Majesty’s Government’s Statistical Office; 
the Home Office and the West Midlands Police is also acknowledged. 
 
 
 
All maps presented within this thesis are reproduced from the Ordnance Survey 
mapping with the permission of the Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office 
Crown copyright. Unauthorised reproduction infringes Crown copyright and may lead 
to civil proceedings. West Midlands Police Licence No. 100022494 (2004). 
Reproduction was authorised for the appendices to Patrick (2004).   
 
DEDICATION: 
 
To my good friend Keith Alexander Duncan:  
5th August 1953 – 7th January 2009 
 
 
 
 
Detective Inspector West Midlands Police 
 Anti Corruption Officer  
An inspiration to us all 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lest We Forget 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Oh what a tangled web we weave, when first we practise to deceive” 
 
(Sir Walter Scott) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“In our country the lie has become not just a moral category, but a pillar of the 
State.” 
 
(Solzhenitsyn) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“First they came for the Jews and I did not speak out – because I was not a Jew. 
 
Then they came for the Communists and I did not speak out - because I was not 
a Communist. 
 
Then they came for the Trade Unionists and I did not speak out – because I was 
not a Trade Unionist. 
 
Then they came for me – and there was no-one left to speak out for me” 
 
(Martin Niemoller) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CONTENTS:                                                             Page                                
 
Personal Statement                                                                                   
 
Chapter 1: Introduction       1 - 23 
 
Chapter 2: Literature Review.                                                      24 - 94 
 
Chapter 3:  Methodology.                                                                   95 - 107 
 
‘CUFFING’ 
 
Chapter 4: Crime Recording and ‘Cuffing’.                                    108 - 143 
 
An introduction to crime recording, ‘cuffing’, and the National Crime Recording 
Standard (NCRS)   
 
Chapter 5: ‘Cuffing’; A Renaissance.                                                  144 - 184 
 
The re-emergence of ‘cuffing’ in the guise of ‘false reporting’ policies; the case is 
presented. 
 
‘NODDING’ 
 
Chapter 6: ‘Nodding’: A very productive partnership.              185 - 223 
 
An exploration of the extent to which suspects and police officers collude in 
enterprises designed to improve the detection rate.  
 
‘SKEWING’ 
 
Chapter 7: ‘Skewing 1’; ‘what gets measured gets done’.                  224 - 269 
 
Chapter 8: ‘Skewing 2’; The Geographical redeployment of resources to match 
priorities.                                                                                      270 - 303 
 
‘STITCHING’ 
 
Chapter 9: ‘Stitching’: Preventing lack of evidence acting as an impediment to 
performance                                                                                        304 - 320                                  
 
Chapter 10: A Review of the role of the Police Regulatory Bodies.     321 - 396                                  
  
Chapter 11: Conclusions                                                                   397 - 415   
  
Appendices:                                                                                          416 - 464 
 
References:                                                                                            465 - 489 
 
PERSONAL STATEMENT: 
  
 
I joined the West Midlands police in 1975 and served as a constable in Birmingham 
city centre police division until 1982 when I was promoted to an inner city sub-
division as sergeant. In 1987 after a period in the force training department I was 
posted to Coventry as an Inspector. In 1989 I was seconded to the Lanchester 
Polytechnic, Coventry and undertook a first degree in Applied Social Science. I 
returned to the Force in 1991 and after a very short spell in the Force Control Room I 
transferred to the police personnel department. In 1995 I was promoted to Chief 
Inspector and was posted the police sub-division responsible for the policing of the 
Balsall Heath neighbourhood of Birmingham where residents had formed ‘vigilante’ 
groups in response to the high levels of crime prevalent in the area at the time.  This 
experience raised questions about the relationship between the community and the 
police and the way the police carried out their functions. This period also saw the 
introduction of Performance Management as part of the New Public Management 
Reform programme and I was able to experience and study the impact of this change 
from a practitioner’s perspective. In 1999 I undertook duties as a Detective Chief 
Inspector for the same area and was able to gain another perspective on the changes 
brought about by Performance Management.  In 2000 I was posted to the force 
community safety bureau with responsibility for crime reduction and partnerships at a 
strategic level.  This role provided yet another perspective on the Government’s 
attempts to reform the Police Service. In 2004 I completed an MSc (by research) on 
the Balsall Heath Community Action and retired from the Police Service in 2005.       
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CHAPTER 1  
 
INTRODUCTION: 
 
 
The introduction of Performance Management as part of central government’s 
attempts to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of policing occurred gradually 
from the 1990s onwards in the light of a number of government reports. The Sheehy 
Inquiry (1993) recommended the introduction of performance management 
techniques linked to performance related pay and a de-layering of police ranks in 
order to facilitate greater flexibility and innovation at the operational level where the 
organisation interacted with its environment. The Posen Inquiry (1994) looked at the 
services provided by the police with a view to privatisation. A White Paper (Cm 2281, 
1993) examined the role of Police Authorities and concluded that the governance 
arrangements resulted in the “entanglement of responsibilities that leads to uncertain 
lines of accountability” (HMSO 1993b). 
 
The Police and Magistrates Act 1994 resulted from these reports and represented a 
significant milestone in the reform of the governance arrangements for the Police 
Forces of England and Wales. The Act both empowered and constrained Chief 
Officers of Police, freeing them to decide how to spend their budget but holding them 
to account for improvements in performance. Prior to this Act, Chief Constables had 
to seek approval from the Home Office for changes to the establishment (number of 
officers and support staff) and rank make-up of their force. Accompanying the Act 
was a new framework of key performance indicators set by the Home Secretary which 
incidentally led to the comparison of Police Forces.  The Act also ended the direct 
control of policing by local government through the end of Police Committees and the 
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establishment in their place of new Police Authorities constituted of a mixture of 
elected local councillors; government appointees and magistrates. Whilst the new 
Police Authorities were still made up of a majority of councillors, the Act was 
designed to provide opportunities for the Police Service to embrace modern 
management techniques relatively unfettered by local political interference.  
 
The essentially managerial ethos of the Police and Magistrates Court Act 1994 was 
sustained in the Police Reform Act 2002, which empowered the Home Secretary to 
set annual policing objectives that Chief Constables were charged with delivering. 
The Home Secretary could dictate to Chief Officers of Police and Police Authorities 
their priorities and hold them to account for delivery against set performance targets. 
The Home Secretary was also empowered to instruct a Police Authority to dismiss a 
Chief Officer of Police if they were deemed to be underperforming.   The Police 
Reform Act 2002 also established the Police Standards Unit (PSU) which provided 
the Home Secretary with the means to intervene in the direction of forces considered 
to be under-performing. Underpinning these governance mechanisms were a variety 
of performance measurements, predominately based on data traditionally recorded by 
the police on crime levels and detection rates, although the use of survey based 
measures such as the British Crime Survey (BCS) was enhanced and developed, (see 
Collier 2005 for a comprehensive account of the development of police performance 
indicators). This use of Performance Management as a control mechanism formed 
part of a wider process of public services reform involving, among other aspects, the 
transfer of private sector operating and management methods to the public sector 
(McLaughlin et al 2001). This transformation had been evolving since the 1980s and 
is usually referred to, in academic circles, by the encompassing term New Public 
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Management (NPM) which, in its original form at least, placed particular emphasis on 
efficiency and value for money: 
  
“this would be realised through; increased emphasis on achieving results 
rather than administering processes; the setting of explicit targets and 
performance indicators to enable the auditing of efficiency and 
effectiveness; the publication of league tables illustrating comparative 
performance; the identification of core competencies; the costing and 
market testing of all activities to ensure value for money; the 
externalisation of non-essential responsibilities; the establishment of a 
purchaser-provider split; the encouragement of inter-agency co-
operation; and the re-designation of clients as ‘customers’ (McLaughlin et 
al 2001:303). 
 
Whilst the objectives of improving efficiency and accountability appear 
commendable, concerns about what it all meant for public services, including the 
police, were widespread. That said, NPM and Performance Management have had a 
profound impact on the development of the police service (as on most public services) 
in England and Wales (Hood 1991).  
 
However, the objective of improving police efficiency was a contentious subject when 
the Police Service, as we know it today, was established in the 19th century and it is 
worth returning to those early debates in order to explore more fully their relevance to 
more recent reforms, some of which have proceeded without full public debate on 
their likely effects and outcomes (Blair 2005).  Performance Management is linked to 
control and direction; which impacts on policing style (Alderson 1979); which is 
closely associated with public acceptance of the police and which in turn impacts on 
police effectiveness (Goldsmith 2004; 2005). It is therefore important to understand 
the interconnectivity of these issues in order to review the impact of Performance 
Management on the Police Service. One key issue concerns the increase in central 
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government control of the police. Emsley (1983) provides an historical account of the 
key issues raised during the early debate on the establishment of what is referred to as 
the New Police founded in 1829. Primary amongst the concerns of those opposed to 
the establishment of the police service was the threat it posed to civil liberties: 
 
“Our constitution can admit nothing like a French police; and many 
foreigners have declared that they would rather lose their money to an 
English thief than their liberty to a Lieutenant de Police” (Quote from the 
Daily Universal Times: Emsley 1983:28)   
 
 
So efficiency as an objective is not without negative consequences as it could lead to 
the curtailment of civil liberties, as the police relentlessly pursue an objective to detect 
and prosecute every infraction of the law no matter how minor and demand ever 
increasing extension of their powers in order to achieve this objective. Therefore the 
birth of the ‘New Police’ was greeted with a great deal of suspicion as it was feared 
that it would increase the state’s ability to enforce, through coercive means if 
necessary, its will on the populace (Bittner 1970; Stead 1977; Critchley 1970 & 1978;   
Emsley 1983 & 1991). Yet there was little meaningful political debate on the issue 
immediately preceding the enactment of the 1994 Act.  The solution to the threat of 
increased state control, through a national police force, in the 19th Century was a 
separation of powers between the Chief Constable; the Local Authority and the Home 
Secretary. Whilst Lustgarten (1986) maintained that this led to conflict and a lack of 
clarity over who was responsible for what, which was only partially resolved by the 
Police Act 1964, it did ensure a level of flexibility and local control. This enabled 
local elected politicians to shape the style and nature of policing to meet local 
requirements and priorities and ensure the balance was maintained between police 
behaviour and the acceptance of their authority by those they were empowered to 
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regulate: Goldsmith (2005) argued that an overly oppressive style of policing could 
alienate the citizens the police were there to protect and Neyroud and Beckley (2001) 
were of the opinion that effective policing was minimal policing, thus subscribing to 
Johnson’s concept of ‘optimal policing’: 
 
“Neither quantitatively excessive (to the detriment of alternative social 
values and objectives) nor qualitatively invasive (to the detriment of 
public freedoms) and which satisfies conditions of public accountability, 
effectiveness and justice for all” (Johnston 2000:180)  
 
 
However, Bailey outlined the difficulties involved in achieving this balance:  
 
“…the public questions police authority, argues about police intrusion, 
and is prepared to fend off police action by legal means…It wants to keep 
the police at bay, is resentful of contact and fearful of pervasive police 
intrusion into community life. But the public does not want to share 
responsibility for social control with the police either. Crime is a police 
matter. (Bailey 1982:5) 
 
Two distinctive models of policing are referred to in the literature on policing: A 
‘crime fighting model’ (Waddington 1999; Rogerson 1995; Neyroud & Beckley 
2001) characterised by a focus on reducing crime by identifying and prosecuting 
offenders; and an ‘order maintenance model’ (Alderson 1979) where social harmony 
and self control are the objectives. This second model of policing is closely associated 
with the concept of ‘policing by consent’ (Brogden 1983) or ‘community policing’: 
 
“In community policing there is a concern for developing personalised 
forms of control, an extension of an informal, differentiated moral system 
in which the officer acts as if he or she were a member of the community 
and not as an officer of an external police system, an absolutist legal 
system and an authoritative state. “ (Manning 1993:429) 
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Lord Scarman (1981) maintained that over subscription to a ‘crime fighting model’ of 
policing contributed to the outbreak of civil unrest in the inner cities in 1981. His 
Inquiry led to the introduction of measures, such as local consultative committees, 
designed to re-connect the police with local communities in an attempt to ensure that 
police responses were proportionate to the problems being encountered thus 
maintaining community trust and confidence. The Scarman report (1981) had a 
marked impact on the police service and led the Metropolitan Police to be renamed 
the Metropolitan Police Service as part of a drive to re-brand itself in an attempt to 
transform itself from a police ‘force’, with an emphasis on ‘crime fighting’, to a 
police ‘service’ with a focus on ‘community’; local accountability and ‘order 
maintenance’ (Butterfield 2005). This change was influenced by a report by Wolff 
Olins (1989), which Neyroud and Beckley (2001:23) suggested reflected a ‘crisis of 
purpose’ affecting the police service at this time.  
       
Reiner (1994); Waddington (1999:137) and Wilson et al (2001:89-96)  noted that the 
other issue to have a significant impact on policing in the 1980s was the ‘miscarriage 
of justice’ scandals which led to the introduction of the Police and Criminal Justice 
Act 1984 (PACE). Neyroud and Beckley (2001:10) linked a subscription to a ‘crime 
fighting model’ of policing to the occurrence of particular forms of police malpractice 
involving the inappropriate use of informants and the fabrication of evidence.  PACE, 
like the recommendations made by Lord Scarman, was aimed at reinforcing public 
trust and confidence in the police, which Goldstein (2005) maintained contributed 
towards police effectiveness.  
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So policing in the 1980s saw some fundamental questions being raised about the 
nature and form of policing and, as is evident from the above brief review, reiterated 
some of the debates which preceded the establishment of the police service in the 19th 
Century.  It is also apparent that many of the issues surrounding police accountability 
and policing style remained unresolved prior to the introduction of New Public 
Management to the police service.  However, Hopwood noted Performance 
Management systems and those that controlled them had the power to influence the 
nature of the service being delivered: 
 
“those with the power to determine what enters into organisational 
accounts have the means to articulate and diffuse their values and 
concerns, and subsequently to monitor, observe and regulate the actions 
of those that are now accounted for” (Hopwood 1984:178) 
 
Loveday (1993; 1994 & 2005) consistently argued that the 1994 Act and the demise 
of Police Committees led to an unhealthy concentration of power in the hands of 
central government and would lead to central priorities taking precedence and 
influencing policing at the local level. Rogerson (1995) maintained that the use of 
Performance Management as a means of central government control would result in a 
shift back towards a ‘crime fighting model’ of policing and Butterfield (2001) 
observed the return to a ‘crime fighting model’ of policing in the Metropolitan Police 
(the Met.), which he ascribed to the impact of New Public Management.   
 
The literature reviewed above indicated that policing style, public confidence, police 
effectiveness and police governance arrangements were linked and therefore 
suggested that any shift in power within the tripartite arrangement was likely to have 
an impact on the preferred policing model adopted by forces. This research focused 
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on the impact of Performance Management on the behaviour of police officers. By 
determining the changes to behaviour it was possible to link those back to the changes 
in the governance arrangements and make informed comments on those. Whilst 
Performance Management was aimed at altering policing behaviour with a view to 
increasing efficiency and effectiveness the early ‘grounded’ part of this research 
suggested that police officers were employing unethical practices designed to meet 
targets set by central government. This suspicion was subsequently confirmed by 
(HMIC/West Midlands Police Dec1998; HMIC 1999).  De Bruijn (2001 & 2007) 
refers to such behaviour as ‘gaming’:  
 
“A public organisation increases its production in accordance with the 
system’s criteria, but this increase in production has no significance or 
has a negative significance from a professional perspective” (De Bruijn 
2001:21) 
 
Likierman (1993) maintained that comprehensive and reliable measures of 
performance were an essential requirement of performance management systems and 
Bevan and Hood (2006) reiterated the need to ensure such systems were not 
compromised by ‘gaming’. Loveday (1999) commented that without effective ‘game-
proofing’ or quality control it would be extremely difficult to determine whether the 
apparent improvements in performance were genuine or otherwise.  However, Yin 
(1994) identified that the reliability of data collected by the police had been 
questioned by academics since the 1960s and Young (1991) maintained that crime 
statistics in the United Kingdom were manipulated by the service for its own political 
purposes; crime levels would be suppressed and detection rates increased when the 
service wished to allay public fear of crime and/or market the service’s ability to 
control crime. Conversely, Young (1991) and Taylor (1999) argued that recorded 
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crime levels were also increased, by relaxing the measures in place to artificially 
suppress them, as the Police pursued increased investment in the service.   
 
Whilst HMIC (1999) identified that ‘gaming’ was having an impact on performance, 
the means by which the phenomenon could be conceptualised and then quantified 
presented some challenges. LeGrand (2003) and Bevan and Hood (2006) identified 
the types of responses to be expected of managers faced with performance 
management systems and used Weber’s ‘ideal type’ methodology to ascribe particular 
characteristics to different types of manager. Whilst these ‘ideal types’ enhanced 
understanding of the phenomenon of ‘gaming’, methodologically it presented some 
difficulties as managers would be unlikely to admit to behaving in a dysfunctional 
manner. Interviewing colleagues or subordinates also created problems of reliability 
and placed interviewees at risk of retaliatory action. Statistical profiling of managers 
suspected of directing ‘gaming’ behaviour did offer the potential to pursue the 
‘individual manager’ approach further. Establishing the statistical patterns which 
indicated ‘gaming’ to the presence of particular managers could present a means of 
progressing this approach. However, ascribing identified changes in the statistical 
patterns to individual managers could prove difficult to establish evidentially, 
particularly in an environment in which managers work in teams and personnel 
constantly change. For these reasons this approach was not pursued further.          
 
Jackson (2005) provided a useful categorisation of three distinct types of ‘gaming’, 
each based on a different organisational outcome:  
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1. Definitional gaming “where organisations aggregate data in a misleading 
form so as to exaggerate their performance to external bodies”  
2. Numerical gaming “occurs where the organisation itself makes decisions on 
the misleading definition of the performance indicator”  
3. Behavioural gaming “is the deepest form of gaming. It occurs where 
individuals in an organisation meet targets not by changing the figures or the 
way the figures are aggregated but by changing their behaviour”.  
                                                                                                 (Jackson 2005:31-32)   
   
Whilst this categorisation immediately seemed conceptually helpful, on further 
reflection its utility was felt to be limited on account of considerable overlaps between 
the different types of ‘gaming’. The description of  ‘definitional gaming’ was also felt 
to be too narrow and somewhat misleading as much of police ‘gaming’ behaviour 
involves the interpretation of legal definitions of offences or particular interpretations 
of the rules appertaining to the performance measures, as opposed to purely 
aggregating data. Therefore much of the ‘gaming’ encountered involved the 
exploitation of loose definitions to legitimise ‘behavioural gaming’.   
 
Establishing the scale of ‘gaming’ behaviour will help to clarify whether the 
phenomenon is organisational or not.  This question introduces the research to the 
wider debate on the nature of police deviance ‘per se’, (Newburn 1999; Miller 2003). 
Peter Neyroud, in his evidence to the Select Committee on Public Administration 
(2003), referred to police ‘gaming’ as ‘administrative corruption’ and police ‘gaming’ 
behaviour is encompassed by Klienig’s definition of corruption (1996a) which 
focuses on the motivation behind the behaviour as the determining factor on whether 
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the actions are considered corrupt or not.  Newburn’s (1999) literature review of 
police corruption confirmed the academic consensus that police corruption was 
organisational as opposed to individual in nature. However, Sewell (1999) 
demonstrated that there was still uncertainty as to whether it was the ‘bottom up’ 
product of ‘street level bureaucrats’ (Lipsky 1980) ‘easing the load’ or deliberate 
managerially-driven action designed to achieve organisational objectives. Ericson 
(1981) identified ‘organisation hypocrisy’ as a feature of police management, as 
senior officers tolerated or even encouraged ‘behavioural gaming’ and this trait was 
referred to by Holdaway (1983); Smith & Grey (1983) and Young (1991). Whilst 
Pfeffer & Salancik (1978:150) noted the legal difficulties of holding managers 
accountable for the actions of their staff, Lustgarten (1986); Paine (1994) and 
Braunstein (1999) all maintained that senior police officers were responsible for 
curtailing such behaviour. Establishing the scale of ‘gaming’ behaviour should 
provide an indication of the effectiveness of senior officers in curtailing the 
phenomenon. Access to internal police documentation, facilitated by the provisions of 
the Freedom of Information Act 2000, provided an insight into the actions of senior 
officers.    
 
However, the employment of Performance Management systems as a means of 
holding Chief Officers of Police to account for their force’s performance places senior 
staff in a dilemma when it comes to the control of ‘gaming’, as overly zealous 
scrutiny designed to curtail it could have a detrimental impact on their performance.  
The factors which might encourage them to ensure probity would be their own 
internal value systems; characteristics LeGrand (2003) associated with those 
managers he referred to as ‘Knights’; and the threat of exposure and sanction posed 
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by the inspection and regulatory regime. This in turn places a responsibility on the 
inspectors and other regulatory bodies to ensure that proper levels of probity are 
maintained.   As such, they play a crucial role in ensuring the effectiveness of the 
Performance Management system as a whole. If they fail to identify and eradicate 
‘gaming’ at an early stage the competitive advantage it confers on those managers,    
who have successfully learnt to ‘game’ the system, or who ignore the ‘gaming’ of 
their subordinates, referred to as ‘Knaves’ by LeGrand (2003), will result in these 
‘gaming’ practices evolving and spreading. This process of the spreading of tactics 
was described by Collier (2005) as ‘competitive isomorphism’ and he noted that one 
means of spreading ‘practice’ between forces was through the promotion of managers 
deemed ‘successful’. It therefore seems feasible that, if left unchecked, managers 
engaging in ‘gaming’ behaviour would progress to the highest managerial positions 
within the service. 
 
However, effective regulatory action does not only have consequences for the 
reported performance of service managers, it can also reflect badly on the 
performance of the government. Governance systems based on Performance 
Management confer not only greater control but also greater responsibility on the 
Minister responsible for the service. Jackson (1993) identified the risk, reliable, 
relevant and quantifiable performance information posed to Ministers as it could 
indicate a failure of government policy, something politicians may seek to avoid, 
particularly if they have been in power for some time.  This in turn amplifies the need 
for truly independent inspectors and regulators as the activities of HMIC; the Audit 
Commission; the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC); the Police 
Standards Unit (PSU), in curtailing ‘gaming’ could have a negative impact on 
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quantitative performance measures in turn reflecting badly on the Home Office. 
Whilst these regulators are officially deemed independent they are still a part of the 
machinery of police governance and as such are close to the function of Government 
(Bevan & Hood 2006). The terms of reference, lines of accountability, direction and 
sources of funding are therefore important considerations when assessing the role of 
the regulators. The independence of some of the regulators is also further brought into 
question by a statutory responsibility to improve efficiency as opposed to focusing 
purely on standards of probity, a factor recognised by HMIC in their report on police 
integrity (1999). Bevan and Hood (2006) suggest that these tensions between 
regulators and central government have hampered the audit and inspectorate functions 
and allowed ‘gaming’ to persist: 
 
“As the existence of gaming becomes more generally recognised, failure to 
fill this hole [audit] invites the cynical view of the target regime as a 
‘Nelson’s eye’ game, in which central government colludes with those who 
game targets, by seeking improvements in reported performance only and 
not providing the organisational clout to ask awkward questions about 
the robustness of those reported improvements.”  (Bevan & Hood 
2006:534)             
 
However, whilst Bevan and Hood presented a convincing argument in relation to the 
NHS they neither quantified the extent to which ‘gaming’ actually distorted NHS 
performance data nor provided substantive evidence of collusion between the 
Government and those responsible for service delivery other than the fact that the 
audit arrangements didn’t quantify the extent of ‘gaming’ which was known to be 
widespread from the literature referred to (Bevan & Hood 2006): 
 
“Central monitoring units did mount some statistical checks on 
completeness and consistency of reported data, but evidence of gaming 
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was largely serendipitous and haphazard, emerging from particular 
inquiry reports or anecdotal sources” (Bevan & Hood 2006:530).  
 
The performance of official regulators is an area where there has been relatively 
limited academic research. Day and Klien (1987) noted the differences between an 
audit or inspection function which dealt with pure probity issues and one which 
involved making value judgements on efficiency and effectiveness. HMIC (1999) also 
commented on the changes a move to becoming a determinant of ‘best value’ meant 
for their organisation. Docking (2003) argued that a loss of public confidence in the 
police complaints system led to the establishment of the Independent Police 
Complaints Commission, but she did not evaluate the actual workings of that system 
which led to the reform. Lustgarten (1986) did however argue that the application of 
criminal standards of proof in internal police disciplinary proceedings, in comparison 
to commercial disciplinary proceedings where a lesser standard of proof was utilised, 
did make police regulation difficult.  By examining the official documents completed 
by the various police regulators, some published and others accessed via the 
provisions of the Freedom of Information Act 2000, it should be possible to gain an 
insight into how effective the various police regulatory bodies have been in 
addressing police ‘gaming’. 
 
The literature on police behaviour (Van Maanen 1973; McCabe and Sutcliffe 1978; 
Holdaway 1983; Young 1991; Rogerson 1995; HMIC 1999; Neyroud & Beckley 
2001; Wilson et al 2001; FitzGerald et al 2002; Miller 2003; Chatterton & Bingham 
2006; Neyroud, P. and Disley, E 2007; & Chatterton 2008), some of it proceeding the 
introduction of Performance Management in its current form, indicated behaviours 
consistent with that which would be considered ‘gaming’. From this literature, 
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expanded upon in later chapters, it was possible to identify a typology of ‘police 
gaming’ which composed of four distinct types of behaviour: the obtaining of 
evidence against suspects by unlawful means (Stitching); the unjustified suppression 
of recorded crime (Cuffing); the skewing of resources toward measurable outcomes 
(Skewing); and conspiring with offenders to obtain detections by unethical means 
(Nodding).       
 
This ‘typology’ was used to assess the relationship between various performance 
measures and the types of ‘gaming’ practices identified.  
 
These ‘gaming’ practices are outlined in turn and are categorised by the use of 
common terms, including colloquialisms used by police officers, to refer to the 
various types. It was the intention to use these categories as a means of encapsulating 
the essence of the ‘gaming’ behaviour referred to. They are each described in turn: 
 
‘Cuffing’: This refers to practices designed to prevent reported crimes appearing in 
the official recorded crime accounts. The term ‘cuffing’ stems from the magician’s art 
of making objects disappear up the cuff of their shirt (Young 1991).  
 
 
‘Nodding’: This refers to the practice where a suspect, usually a convicted offender, 
indicates the crime he/she has committed by pointing out or ‘nodding’ at the scenes 
where an offence has occurred (Wilson et al 2001). This type of behaviour can 
involve a degree of collusion between officers and suspects as offenders are offered 
various inducements to admit outstanding offences.  
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‘Skewing’: This refers to the practice of skewing resources and efforts in favour of 
outputs which are the subject of performance indicators at the expense of other 
organisational objectives (i.e. ‘what gets measured gets done’).  
 
‘Stitching’: Short for ‘stitching them up’, this refers to behaviour designed to ensure 
a successful conviction or other procedural means of disposal (e.g. police cautions or 
fixed penalty notices).    
 
The identification and categorisation of this typology facilitated an assessment of the 
impact of performance management on the various types of police ‘gaming’ 
behaviour. 
  
The challenge was to find a methodology or methodologies which indicated the scale 
of the various types of police ‘gaming’.  If the ‘gaming’ behaviours identified were 
limited to isolated incidents then their impact on overall performance would be 
limited and the utility of the performance management system relatively unaffected. If 
however they were widespread and significantly distorted the data on which the 
performance of police forces was judged then the value of Performance Management 
could be undermined and the system rendered dysfunctional. This in turn could have 
an adverse impact on police accountability; public trust; and police effectiveness. 
Whilst Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary (1999) maintained ‘gaming’ practices 
were largely confined to small pockets, Burrows et al (2000) suggested that at least 
‘cuffing’ had re-emerged as problematic as a result of the introduction of Performance 
Management. It was decided to examine the performance profiles of police forces 
identified by official documents or media reports to have experienced different forms 
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of ‘gaming’. The aim was to compare the recorded crime levels or detections data 
before and after the ‘gaming incidents’ or ‘events’, which the documents or media 
reports referred to, in order to gauge the scale of the ‘gaming’. For example, if an 
official report identified ‘cuffing’ in a particular force and recorded crime increased 
by twenty per cent after the report it could be inferred that ‘cuffing’ had been 
suppressing the level of recorded crime by twenty per cent prior to remedial action 
being taken. If a consistent statistical pattern could be established in relation to a 
number of forces which had experienced similar ‘events’ involving the uncovering of 
‘gaming’ behaviour , then the impact of gaming could be quantified.  So if all the 
forces where ‘cuffing’ had been uncovered experienced a twenty per cent increase in 
recorded crime, after remedial action was taken, it could be implied that ‘cuffing’, if 
re-introduced, could result in a twenty per cent reduction in recorded crime.  By the 
application of the same logic a sudden reduction in recorded crime may indicate the 
introduction of ‘cuffing’.  The methodology employed to assess each gaming type is 
expanded upon in the chapter on methodology.  
 
Whilst the methodology was primarily quantitative, the ontological assumption was 
broadly hermeneutic, accepting that the behaviour observed and quantified was the 
product of the belief systems of the individuals who made up the collective, in this 
case police officers in England and Wales. As such the thesis accepts that the 
behaviour subject of the research is not the product of some universal law and can be 
changed by the actors involved.  The research complies with Weber’s methodological 
approach of observing the phenomenon (e.g. the movement of peasant tied workers 
from East to West Germany (Weber 1919) or the involvement of Jews in the 
provision of early banking services (Weber 1913) and then seeking an explanation 
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from those involved or their history. In the case of the East German peasants it was 
the lure of freedom provided by wages, despite the fact that they were economically 
worse off than when working as tied labour. In the case of the Jews it was Christian 
and Muslim religious beliefs which barred their followers from charging interest on 
money lent.  Judaism placed no such encumbrance on its followers and thus enabled 
them to provide a valued service to the other religious communities.  
 
The epistemological assumption was that valid knowledge arises from interpretation 
of the evidence uncovered. In this thesis the participation of the author in the research 
provides a subjective assessment of the events and behaviours being observed. Whilst 
this may be a valued feature of qualitative research, as valid knowledge arises from 
the interactions between researcher, and researched, it could be considered a 
weakness as researcher bias could distort the findings. The measures taken to 
overcome this potential failing are outlined in the chapter on methodology.       
 
The methodological assumption is that the research design is appropriate, as 
identifying and quantifying the behaviour under study is a preliminary step towards 
understanding the nature of the phenomenon. 
 
So to recap, the objective of the thesis has been to identify the nature and scale of 
‘gaming’ in the police service and, in doing so, to acquire an insight into the causes of 
this behaviour and the effectiveness of the countermeasures put in place to counter its 
occurrence. This could be encapsulated in the loose overall research objective: 
 
 19
“The purpose of this thesis is to identify the nature and scale of ‘gaming’ 
behaviour in the police service in England and Wales and to explore why 
such behaviour persists.” 
 
 
THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE THESIS: 
 
The introduction of Performance Management to the police service in England and 
Wales has represented a major change for policing and as such needs to be subjected 
to academic scrutiny. Van Maanen states: 
 
“The police are quite possibly the most vital of our human service 
agencies. Certainly they are quite possibly the most visible and active 
institution of social control, representing the technological and 
organisational answer to the Hobbesian question of social order, the dues 
ex machina. Through their exclusive mandate to intervene directly in the 
lives of the citizenry the police are crucial actors in both our everyday and 
ceremonial affairs, and, as such, deserve intensive and continual study for 
their role and function in society is far too important to be taken for 
granted or, worse, ignored” (Van Maanen 1974:82). 
 
However, much of the world of policing is hidden, partly because of the operating 
methods which need to be withheld from those who may seek advantage from such 
knowledge in pursuit of further criminal ventures, and partly because of the inward-
looking tendency of the police service: 
 
“Despite the liberal mythology of the police as “citizens in uniform”, the 
reality is that they are set apart by the authority that they wield” 
(Waddington 1999:117). 
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Insights into the nature of policing have been provided by ethnographic studies, such 
as van Maanen (1973; 1974), and through anthropological studies by serving officers 
Holdaway (1983); Young (1990). However the gradual adoption of governance by 
Performance Management to the police forces in England and Wales came after the 
revealing studies of Holdaway (1983) and Young (1990). Although it has been the 
subject of  some academic study (Likierman 1993; Rogerson 1995; Smith 1995a; 
Wilson et al 2001; Fitzgerald et al 2002; Neyroud and Beckley 2002; Butterfield 
2001; Carmona & Gronlund 2003; Collier 2005a; 2006a; 2006b, Chatterton & 
Bingham 2006  Chatterton 2008) its full impacts have yet to be assessed. 
 
“The evidence of the impact of these changes on such a key role is sparse 
and appears to be totally absent in a high profile organisation such as the 
police service.” (Butterfield 2001:46) 
 
“Studies of policing at the managerial level are few, although there have 
been studies on professionalisation” (Collier 2005:2) 
 
“In England and Wales policing has had a symbolic significance, and it is 
legitimate to raise concerns about the relentless drive for performance 
and targets. It is as yet too early to have a clears picture of the effect that 
the performance culture will have on the relationship between the police 
and the public, or what the knock on effect will be on crime and crime 
detection” (Wilson et al 2001:43)  
 
Young (1990) also noted the need for vigilance in relation to police practices which 
would now be considered ‘gaming’: 
 
“There is still a need for social enquiry to break through defensive 
structures and reveal how practices such as the sleight of hand described 
above, have been varied, revised, and handed on for new generations. The 
praxis which the police have developed in reconciling their claim to follow 
the rule of law with the pragmatic necessities of ‘doing the business’ must 
still be questioned, for they are structurally a potentially authoritarian 
institution which remains largely hidden.” (Young 1991:328) 
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Chatterton & Bingham (2006) and Chatterton (2008) carried out qualitative studies of 
the impact of Performance Management on the police service and as a result of these 
findings the Police Federation of England and Wales called upon the Government to 
commission quantitative research on the subject: 
 
“We see these studies as the start rather than the end of the journey: they 
provide robust and accurate qualitative evidence about the state of 24/7 
response policing and General Office CID at this point in time. What is 
now needed is a quantitative confirmation of, or challenge to, this 
evidence which is more in the purview of Government or senior police 
management to undertake rather than ourselves.” (Chatterton 2008:iv) 
  
 
An evaluation of the impact of Performance Management on the police service in 
England and Wales will therefore enhance current understanding. On the issue of 
‘gaming’ in particular, this thesis expands current knowledge about the nature of the 
phenomenon. By establishing the scale of ‘gaming’ practices it should be possible to 
provide an answer to the question explicit in Loveday’s statement that: 
 
“Information on performance should allow both the public and service 
providers to judge the efficiency and effectiveness of each service.  
Alternatively it may encourage services to manipulate data to achieve 
targets.” (Loveday 1999: 6)  
 
The research also offers the opportunity to further the debate on whether police 
‘gaming’ behaviour is organisational in nature and influenced by ‘bottom up’ or ‘top 
down’ pressure (Sewell 1999) by seeking to attribute the ‘gaming’ behaviour to 
managerial action. If significant changes in the performance data can be attributed to 
managerial action then this should indicate the extent to which managers control the 
behaviour of the officers under their command. This approach is based on the 
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arguments of Black (1970) and Kitsuse and Cicourel(1963) that whilst police data on 
crime levels is an unreliable measure of the phenomenon it purports to measure it is a 
valid indicator of police organisational behaviour.  
 
 
Examining the actions of the regulators in relation to known incidents of ‘gaming’ 
should confirm or falsify  Bevan & Hood’s theory that ineffective regulation is a 
major factor in the persistence of ‘gaming’ practices in the public services (2006:530).  
 
THESIS STRUCTURE: 
 
Following this first chapter (introduction), the next chapter focuses on the literature 
which provides an understanding of the evidence gathered during the early ‘grounded’ 
part of the research and helps shape and direct the later phases of the research which 
conform to a more analytical inductive approach. The literature (and official reports) 
on New Public Management in general and Performance Management in particular 
are explored; followed by an examination of  theories on ‘gaming’, leading to a 
review of the literature on police practices which could be considered to be ‘gaming’.  
This is then considered in the context of what is known about police deviant 
behaviour or corruption. An examination of the limited material on the role played by 
those charged with regulating the police concludes the literature review.  
 
The research questions; research design; and methodology are discussed in chapter 3. 
Chapters  4 – 9 in turn explore the four types of ‘gaming’ identified as practiced in 
policing, referred to here as ‘cuffing’; ‘nodding’; ‘skewing’; and ‘stitching’.   In 
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chapter 4 an introduction to crime recording procedures is provided, ‘cuffing’ is 
discussed in detail and the variables which enable such practices to persist identified. 
The measures introduced by government to control such behaviour are also outlined. 
In chapter 5 the robustness of the control mechanisms introduced to curtail ‘cuffing’ 
were tested by charting the introduction ‘false reporting’ policies which it is argued 
heralded a re-emergence of ‘cuffing’. In chapter 6 the means by which the detection 
rate can be influenced by ‘gaming’ practices are outlined. This chapter focuses on 
‘nodding’ and seeks to quantify the effect such practices have on the important area of 
performance. In chapter 7 the impact of ‘skewing’ is examined by looking at the 
prevention and investigation of serious crime. The ‘skewing’ theme is continued in 
chapter 8 by examining the deployment of police resources. In chapter 9 ‘stitching’ is 
examined and evidence of its continuance presented. Chapter 10 provides an insight 
into the performance of those charged with controlling ‘gaming’ behaviour. This 
includes Chief Officers of Police; Police Authorities; and the various regulatory 
bodies. Chapter 11 draws overall conclusions on the various findings; provides a 
reflective assessment of the methodology employed; and makes recommendations for 
future research.             
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CHAPTER 2 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW: 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION: 
 
 
The ‘grounded theory’ approach i.e. building theory from empirical evidence resulted 
in a constant review of the research findings against the relevant academic literature 
and official documents as explanations for the behaviour were sought. It was clear 
from the author’s position as a manager within the police service that the introduction 
of Performance Management was a major catalyst for change but the potential 
benefits were being skewed by ‘gaming’ behaviour. It was therefore considered 
necessary to understand the rationale behind the introduction of Performance 
Management and gauge whether or not it had achieved its objectives.  The 
introduction of Performance Management can be understood as one part of a series of 
reforms to increase Central Government control of the police in order to improve the 
efficiency of the service. It was therefore appropriate to review the literature on New 
Public Management (NPM) and Performance Management which formed an integral 
part of NPM.  Reviewing the academic work on the dysfunctional effects of 
Performance Management referred to as ‘gaming’ and how these might be overcome 
was also undertaken. Gaining knowledge of police perverse practices and how they 
were likely to manifest themselves led to a review of the criminological literature on 
police ‘gaming’ which was largely located within the more general subject area of 
police deviance and corruption. The role of the regulators of the police in controlling 
such behaviour became of interest as the research progressed. However very little in 
the academic literature was identified, on the way these bodies actually operated, 
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other than general theory on the role of auditor/inspectors as part of governance 
processes. 
 
2. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT AND ITS 
INTRODUCTION TO POLICING: 
 
New Public Management is a general term used to refer to a number of reforms 
transferred to the management of the public sector from the private sector and viewed 
by Hood (1991) as one of the most striking international changes in public 
administration. These reforms included: a move from producer orientation to 
customer sovereignty (Hancox et al 1988: 37-48; Harrow & Shaw, M. (1992) 
including where appropriate the option for the customer to choose between a number 
of providers (Dixon et al., 1998); changes in the structure by which public services are 
delivered (Ferlie, 1992; Mark & Scott, 1992; Ferlie and Pettigrew 1996);  a 
requirement for public service managers to develop new skills and competencies 
(Talbot, C. 1994); and privatisation of some functions traditionally delivered by the 
public sector (McLaughlin et al 2001). Driving this change programme was a belief 
that the public service providers had become inefficient (Chartier, 1985; Odum et al 
1990; Barzelay 1992, Sheehy 1993), Tullock and Eller (1994) suggesting this was due 
to the lack of any automatic disciplining mechanism, such as that present in a market 
dominated environment, and this absence had permitted self-serving behaviours by 
bureaucrats, their clients and the politicians who govern them.  
 
Underpinning these reforms was the assumption that efficiencies would result from 
the introduction of practices from the commercial sector and public services could be 
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provided in a more cost effective way. In order to gauge whether improvements had 
occurred measurements were required and by measuring performance comparisons 
could be made between different service providers in the same sector in order to 
determine which was the most efficient: 
 
“This approach views public agencies as problem-solving and programme 
delivery mechanisms conceptualised as ‘open systems’ within which 
measurable ‘inputs’ are used in a ‘production process’ generating 
‘activities’ to produce measurable ‘outputs’ that have an ‘impact’ 
(produce costs and benefits). They thus generate measurable objective-
related ‘outcomes’ that measure given and known ‘organisational 
objectives’ that are compatible with given and known ‘government policy 
objectives’. (Breton, 1974)  
 
The objective was to make improving performance the main focus of management in 
the public sector Chartier, (1985), Odom et al (1990) and Barzelay (1992) and the 
police service was no exception: 
 
“The main process the Government uses to ensure that the changes take 
place is that of managing performance. This is achieved through a series 
of processes that include performance indicators, objective setting and 
personal appraisal systems.” (Butterfield 2001) 
 
Whilst the primary focus of NPM and Performance Management was on improving 
efficiency this doesn’t appear inconsistent with the democratic principles of holding a 
public servant to account for delivering a service, providing a means of making the 
performance of public servants transparent in complex societies where judgments 
based on observation are no longer possible: 
 
“So both service quality and improved productivity have been goals for 
many jurisdictions.  Some politicians and some civil servants believe that 
such improvements will also help governments to redress the falling levels 
of citizen trust (and therefore legitimacy) which many surveys seem to 
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show across Western Europe and North America.” (Bouckaert & Pollitt 
2006:8) 
 
 
3. POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
The issue of public ‘trust’ is particularly important for police services as public 
confidence and trust in the police secures their support: “When the public views 
police as legitimate (or trustworthy), public co-operation with police in ways that 
assist effectiveness is more likely”: (Goldsmith 2005:444) as Uhr commented: 
 
“Democratic governments rest on popular consent: accountability helps 
to sustain democracy by generating informed consent. [. . .] In many 
cases, accountability strengthens public trust by confirming the 
competence and integrity of these power-holders. In other cases of lapsed 
or broken accountability, the reverse can occur, weakening public 
confidence in power-holders. Thus accountability is important to 
democratic societies in providing opportunities for those who govern and 
manage our affairs to account for, explain and justify their use of their 
offices of power and influence. (Uhr, 2001:446)   
 
The introduction of Performance Management doesn’t appear inconsistent with a 
desire to improve public trustworthiness which Six maintained consisted of four 
elements: ‘ability, benevolence, dedication and ethics’ (Six 2003:448). As 
Performance Management was about improving service provision and accountability 
then it should reduce the drivers which undermined public trust: 
 
“The major sources of distrust in government are promise breaking, 
incompetence, and the antagonism of government actors toward those 
they are supposed to serve” (Levi 1998: 88). 
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It was also hoped that the provision of relevant information on the performance of 
those responsible for delivering public services would generate public interest in local 
government arrangements as a whole: 
 
“Strengthening accountability, defined as providing more information in 
the hope that this could generate public pressure for greater efficiency 
and economy” (Day & Klein 1987). 
 
However this assumes that the electorate are sufficiently motivated to take the time to 
access and digest the performance information made available to them: 
 
“There is an additional problem of persuading the customers to take any 
interest in performance measures or their interpretation” (Smith 
1995:135). 
 
  
Docking also found little public interest in data on police performance: 
 
“Feelings were mixed about whether information was wanted about how 
well the police were performing (many expressed no interest, those that 
were interested expressed concern over how performance would be 
measured and about the usefulness of statistics). What interest there was 
related to performance information at the very local level and it was felt 
that this should be linked to policing priorities.” (Docking 2003:vi). 
 
Performance measurements were also viewed as a means of facilitating government to 
improve its own performance enabling ministers to enhance the quality of their 
decisions, based on an ability to assess objectively the outcomes of their decisions: 
 
“So that government could (1) be held accountable for its use of resources 
to meet public purposes (reporting); (2) allocate resources for public 
purposes (budgeting); and (3) get better at using resources for public 
purposes (productivity). (Williams 2003:653) 
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Performance measurement also enables government ministers to take a more strategic 
role as they can provide those managers responsible for the delivery of the service 
greater freedom on how the service is delivered but at the same time maintain control,  
via the performance information systems, thus moving from ‘rowing’ the service 
through the detailed bureaucratic process of rule making to ‘steering’ via the data on 
performance: “further centralising the “steering”, while decentralising the ‘rowing’ of 
the police” (Cope at al 1997:448). However this greater control increases overall 
responsibility for policy outcomes, a factor which Jackson (1993) suggested may 
influence the design of performance management systems: 
 
“But a moment’s reflection soon produces a realization that while 
political leaders are keen to introduce systems which will ensure 
operational performance is measured and evaluated, they do little to 
enable evaluation of the strategic performance of public services.  To do 
so would be to evaluate the effectiveness of policies and therefore, to put 
into the public domain politically sensitive information that would be 
used to judge, in the political arena, the efficiency and effectiveness of the 
whole policy-making process.” (Jackson 1993:12) 
 
The centralisation of control and direction also appears at odds with one of the 
objectives of NPM i.e. the flexibility to respond quickly to changes in the operating 
environment through smaller delivery units and flatter organisational structures:  
 
“vertically flatter so that problem-solving decisions, especially in relation 
to service delivery, can be made at points that are closer to clients so as to 
reduce performance-sensitive decision response times to simplify co-
ordination and to reduce communications distortions; less formalised, to 
give staff more discretion in satisfying idiosyncratic needs.” (Dixon et al. 
1998:167-8)   
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Loveday (2005) suggested the involvement of local politicians was necessary if local 
issues were to be taken account of, quoting former Chief Constable of Bedfordshire 
support: 
 
“Unless there is to be a massive democratic deficit it is essential that the 
police service is so structured that it has a clear relationship with local 
government”(O’Byrne, 2001:136) 
 
Whilst Loveday was advocating a return to something akin to the original tri-partite 
arrangement, with Local Authorities providing the counterbalance to the shift in 
power towards central government considerable scepticism was voiced, during the 
development of New Public Management, of local government’s claim to represent 
local people: 
 
“it is almost an article of faith within local government that the local 
council is accountable to and held accountable by the local electorate” 
(Banham 1984). 
 
The Audit Commission (2003) also found that public trust in local authorities was low  
and Docking recorded, during her focus group study of public perceptions of police 
accountability, that: 
 
“There was some scepticism about the role of members nominated by 
local authorities, with more approval of the concept of independent 
members” (Docking 2003:vi). 
 
This central vs. local accountability argument reflects the political dimension to 
performance management systems and Hopwood (1984) highlighted the power 
conferred on those who set the service priorities and targets. Jackson also noted: 
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“Performance-monitoring systems have important hidden dimensions 
below the water-line of indicators and measures. These include the logical 
foundations and values upon which the whole system rests. Weakness in 
these areas, along with a lack of appreciation of the different values that 
lurk in the depths of the performance-monitoring system, results in severe 
implementation problems.” (Jackson 1993:9)   
 
 
4. PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT AND POLICING STYLE 
 
Rogerson (1995) warned that top down centrally driven performance management 
regimes could impact on the nature of local policing: 
 
“Performance measurement may threaten the operational independence 
of chief constables and alter the style of policing from that of service to 
enforcement.” (Rogerson 1995:25) 
 
 
Indications of this trend were noted by Butterfield (2001): 
 
 
“Subsequently the cancellation of the PLUS programme1 and the 
introduction of elements of NPM appear to have created an environment 
that is taking the MPS back from a Service ethos towards that of a force”. 
(Butterfield 2001:108)   
     
  
However the government appeared committed to ensuring local communities 
continued to be able to hold their local police to account and the value of local 
consultation was acknowledged in the White Paper ‘Building Communities, Beating 
Crime, 2005: 
 
“The Government wants to build on community engagement initiatives 
already under way and ensure that all communities have the same 
opportunities to have a real say in the way they are policed, get more 
                                                 
1 The PLUS programme was the name given to the Met initiative to transform itself from a force to a 
service by becoming more publicly accountable. 
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involved if they want to’ and hold relevant agencies to account locally.” 
(Home Office, 2005). 
 
Congruent with this approach to ensuring local responsiveness was the Government’s 
commitment to ‘Neighbourhood’ policing’. The Neighbourhood Policing Strategy 
utilised the Problem Oriented Policing or Partnerships (POP) approach to crime 
reduction (Goldstein 1979 & 1990; Eck and Spelman 1987; Shapland et al 1994; 
Leigh et al 1996 & 1998; Tilley 2002) which was based on a ‘bottom up’ approach to 
crime reduction (Waddington 1993, Nutley & Davies 2000; Wagenaar 2005).  This 
approach and the provision of dedicated teams of neighbourhood police officers was 
supported by ACPO (Baggott 2002) and endorsed by the Audit Commission (Smith 
2002). 
 
However, studies of Community Policing have shown that police agendas, not 
community agendas, have dominated and POP has emerged as something at variance 
with Community Oriented Policing (COP) (Van den Broeck, 2002).  Davies (1986) 
found there was a danger that the police would use public consultation not to listen to 
the problems identified by the community but to convince the public of their 
diagnosis of the problem and legitimate their preferred solution.  Van den Broeck 
(2002) supported Trojanowics and Bucqueroux (1990) in identifying that POP was a 
‘top down’ strategy which involved the police defining the problem and proposing the 
solutions, public involvement being more symbolic or superficial than substantive. 
COP on the other hand was ‘bottom up’ and inclusive, the community, through their 
representatives, taking an active role (Van den Broeck, 2002): 
 
“POP continues to rely on formal social control agents (the police). 
Community contribution to neighbourhood safety remains 
underdeveloped and hence, this approach inspires or supports very little 
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informal social control. In contrast, COP, or the “community-orientated 
policing pillar”, can be understood as explicitly based on informal social 
control” (Van den Broeck, 2002:180) 
 
 
Skogan (1990) maintained this was due to the police emphasis on a ‘crime fighting’ 
role and Mastrofski (1998) noted this was also influenced by a lack of ability to 
analyse citizen-provided data. 
 
The Neighbourhood Policing initiative in England and Wales was still being 
developed as part of the National Reassurance Policing Programme and although the 
initial pilots were found to be successful Quinton and Morris (2008) noted the 
national implementation (2005 -2008) had yet to demonstrate similar positive results. 
A survey of BCU commanders sponsored by the Police Superintendents Association 
in 2003 suggested the tension between national and local priorities may act as a 
barrier to the successful implementation of Neighbourhood Policing: 
 
“Commanders could find national targets frustrating especially if Home 
Office priorities did not match local needs. An example would be the push 
towards street crime when this was not an issue in the BCU and where 
resources that were needed for tackling burglaries had to be diverted into 
street crime.” (BRMB 2003:97) 
 
McLaughlin et al (2001) concluded from the research available at the time that Crime 
and Disorder Reduction Partnerships were also concentrating on government 
priorities, vehicle crime, burglary and violent crime (Phillips et al., 2000) and that the 
priorities set tended to be the easily measurable (Hughes, 2000, Hughes et al., 2001). 
 
“This clearly reflects the priorities of central government and the 
recommendations of the Audit Commission. It is also likely that these 
targets represent more easily achievable reduction targets than those 
associated, for example, with domestic violence and hate crimes, the 
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targeting of which may result in an increase rather than reduction in 
recorded crime in the locality”. (McLaughlin et al 2001:311) 
 
 
5. PERFORMANCE MANAGEMENT: CONTROL VS LEARNING  
 
Jackson (1993), Rogerson (1995) and Jackson (2005) acknowledged that performance 
management could be used for control purposes or to facilitate evaluation and service 
improvements through learning: 
 
“Performance monitoring need not be used only as a means of 
organisational control, as it undoubtedly is in the classical and scientific 
management paradigm. In the strategic-management perspective the 
information generated by the performance monitoring system is a means 
of organisational learning.” (Jackson 1993:10)     
 
However, Jackson (2005) noted the fundamental differences between the two 
functions: 
 
“Learning requires disaggregated rather than aggregated data, a 
structure that is bottom up not top down, a no blame culture so that 
failure is not hidden, use of performance indicators to encourage not stifle 
debate, a stakeholder approach, conceptualisation not just measurement, 
acknowledge rather that disregard for ambiguity, mixed methods and a 
link to action planning and implementation.” (Jackson 2005:35) 
 
The emphasis on learning appeared appropriate to a service like policing where the 
effectiveness of different style of policing was still being debated (Neyroud & 
Beckley 2001) and there appeared to be a general lack of knowledge of ‘what 
worked’. Bailey concluded that “most police forces in the world quite literally do not 
know what they are doing” (Bailey 1983). Research by Kelling et al (1974) failed to 
establish the deterrent value of police patrol and Pate et al (1976) found levels of 
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patrol had little impact on crime levels in the US cities they studied. Wilson & Kelling 
(1982) found similar results in relation to foot patrols. In the United Kingdom similar 
findings led the Audit Commission to conclude that traditional foot patrols were 
‘grossly inefficient’ in terms of measurable reductions in crime (Audit Commission 
1996). Likewise Bieck (1977) and Cordner et al (1983) found that ‘response policing’, 
where officers responded to reported crime with the intention of catching the 
criminals in the act, was hardly effective either. Greenwood’s study in the US also 
found detectives to be less effective than their media image might suggest:  
 
“only about three per cent of all index arrests appeared to result from 
special investigative efforts where organisation, training or skill could 
make any conceivable difference” (Greenwood 1980:36)  
 
Steer (1980) found similar results in the UK and studies on the effectiveness of 
forensic science indicated this accounted for a small percentage of crimes detected. 
Maguire (1982) found that only 0.5% of household burglars were directly detected as 
a result of fingerprint evidence and Manning (1980) concluded that the general 
academic consensus was that the police have only a limited impact on crime rates. 
This was contested by Sherman (1993) who pointed to the apparent success of 
policing  crime ‘hot spots’ as evidence that policing activity could have an impact 
although even he accepted that the impact was limited. Such a conclusion raises the 
question about what does actually affect crime levels and the apparent effectiveness of 
policing: Mawby (1979) found that the public were a main player in the detection of 
crime and this was reliant on their confidence to report offences and identity 
offenders.  
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The Implementation of the National Intelligence Model (NIM) (National Criminal 
Intelligence Service, 2000) which is based on an intelligence led approach, as opposed 
to what Flood (2004) described as a craft, intuitive or convention based approach to 
policing2, appears consistent with Jackson’s evaluation and learning approach to 
performance measurement.  However, Collier (2006a) noted that top down 
performance management priorities were dominating local police behaviour not 
bottom up NIM type evaluations. He also noted the ‘Narrowing the Justice Gap3’ 
performance indicators were causing the police to focus on obtaining detections as a 
means of demonstrating improved performance. Reiner (1994) had already questioned 
the validity of the NPM reform programme which he maintained was undermined by 
a fundamental misconception that the ‘rational deterrent model’ of policing worked. 
He described the ‘rational deterrent model’ as follows: 
 
“if properly organised, policing can have a significant impact on crime 
levels, deterring crime in the first place by uniform patrol, and detecting 
criminals efficiently after the event if crimes do occur.” (Reiner 1994:754) 
 
Some years earlier John Alderson the Chief Constable of Devon and Cornwall, had 
also warned his ACPO colleagues that mooring themselves exclusively to crime 
statistics as a measure of success would ultimately prove unsustainable: 
 
“Trapped as they are in the world of criminal statistics as proof of their 
efficiency, the police need to break out and seek other measurements of 
their success” (Alderson 1979:7).  
 
 
 
                                                 
2 Traditional police methods partly involved passing knowledge based on experience from one 
generation of police officers to the next and developing skills based on experience. 
3 This is the government’s initiative to improve the efficiency of the Criminal Justice system by 
increasing the number of offenders brought to justice and reduce the number of unsuccessful 
prosecutions. 
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This uncertainty over desired outcomes and causality creates difficulties when 
designing performance management systems: 
 
“The appropriate number of indicators will be particular to the 
organisation and its aims. It will also need to take into account the 
diversity of its operations.” (Likierman 1993:16) 
 
In a case study on the Balsall Heath area of Birmingham (Patrick 2004a & 2004b) it 
was noted that conforming to a bottom up, community led, approach to policing had 
delivered government policy objectives: 
 
“local residents transformed a traditional red light area into a safe and 
attractive neighbourhood, with increased legitimate activity, reduced 
insurance premiums and increased property values.” (Home Office July 
2004:63) 
   
However when measured against the Home Office’s own performance indicators, 
based predominantly on detection rates at that time, the police command unit emerged 
in a poor light , as one of the worst performing BCUs (HMIC/West Midlands E3 BCU 
Inspection 2004:6). This would suggest the performance targets set by the 
Government were not aligned with the desired policy outcomes. In effect knowledge 
of causality was lacking.  
   
Likierman (1993) had advised that for performance management to work effectively 
and avoid the tendency towards ‘what gets measured gets done’ (ibid 1993:15) it was 
necessary to devise measures which were sufficiently comprehensive and Hood 
suggested it should be possible to identify core elements that included the 
disaggregating of organisations into smaller units with an emphasis on performance 
rather than procedures (1991:3-19). However system theorists, such as Waldrop 
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(1992) and Kauffman (1995), advocated a more holistic approach to measuring 
organisational performance:  
 
“First, complex systems should be understood in a holistic manner. Key to 
understanding complexity is that it is anti-reductionist. The complex 
whole exhibits properties that are not readily explained by an 
understanding of the parts. (Kauffman, 1995, vii)”   
 
The UK Government’s adoption of the Police Performance Assessment Framework 
(PPAF), a form of balanced scorecard approach (Carmona & Gronlund 2003), 
appeared to recognise the problems inherent in the diversity of the policing function, 
as the Home Office Minister for Policing John Denham articulated: 
 
“To try to make (performance data) available to the public in a way 
people understand… You cannot measure the performance of a police 
force through one or two statistics – because it is everything from 
reassuring the public to fighting crime to helping to reduce crime, to 
looking after witnesses. So we are trying to have a performance 
framework that captures the whole breath of policing activity” 
(Mulraney, Police Review 29 Nov 2002:18). 
 
However, the criteria for PSU ‘engagement’4 were determined by performance on the 
reduction and detection of volume crime alone, thus subscribing to Reiner’s ‘rational 
deterrent model of policing’, (Reiner 1994:754). The narrowing of police activity was 
noted by both Butterfield (2001) and Collier: 
 
“the Police Standards Unit emphasis on iQuanta data on crime and 
detection skews police performance from the broader issues to an 
obsession with performance on that measure alone”(Collier 2006a:11). 
                                                 
4“For a force to be considered for ‘engagement’, its performance data across a range of measures, 
including crime reduction, will have been flagged to the Steering Group, over a minimum of two 
successive quarters (a six month period), indicating either that it is performing at or near the bottom of 
its peer group for selected measures or has shown a significant decline in performance over the two 
periods”. (www.Homeoffice.gov.uk/about-us/freedom-of-information/released-information (August 
2005)     
 39
 
De Bruijn (2001:14) identified that performance measures become of less value when 
an organisation does not have sole or sufficient control over the environment in which 
it operates. Field (1990) noted factors such as economic prosperity had an impact on 
crime levels and Wilson et al (2001) pointed out that the police do not deliver crime 
control strategies in isolation from other agencies, being reliant on a number of other 
agencies such as the judiciary; prisons; probation; and youth offending teams for the 
successful outcome of enforcement type strategies alone and social services, health 
providers, local authorities and commercial organisations to support offender 
diversion and crime prevention strategies:     
 
“The police should never be expected to separate fighting squirrels or to 
untangle knitting, but successful policing has much deeper foundations 
than the immediately and obviously measurable. Crime and disorder are 
problems for society as a whole, and the police are only one part of the 
solution.” (Wilson et al 2001:45) 
 
Van den Broeck (2002) also warned that there was a danger that crime levels would 
be defined as a criminal justice problem, diverting attention from the underlying 
social causes, such as deprivation: 
 
 “Consequently, criminality, instead of, for example, unemployment 
becomes a major criterion in the allocation of financial resources to the 
neighbourhood. Hence insecurity in the neighbourhood becomes a self-
fulfilling prophecy: it has to be unsafe since it receives policy 
attention.”(Van den Broeck 2002:184). 
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Whilst McLaughlin et al (2001:307) argued that Performance Management systems 
can encourage collaboration between agencies as organisations seek ‘win win’ 
situations. Wilson et al (2001:85) and Jackson (2005:33) suggested that it may 
encourage parochialism as individual agencies pursue their own objectives in isolation 
from others.   Fiske & Ladd (2000) went as far as suggesting that it may even result in 
organisations withholding information on ‘good practice’ in order to maintain a 
competitive edge.   
 
Neely (1999) and Gewirtz (2002), also argued that Performance Management could 
restrict innovation to those realms where narrowly defined outcomes alone become 
the only measures of success thus stifling innovation  and devaluing professional 
skills. Goldsmith (2004) commented on the ‘deskilling’ impact of Performance 
Management on policing:  
 
“Matters of professional judgment and discretion risk becoming relegated 
to the margins of determinations of what is good policing. In the process, 
the craft knowledge and experience of serving officers, as well as the 
accumulated knowledge of other observers and scholars of policing, may 
receive inadequate consideration.  This dilution or selectivity of the 
knowledge base obviously undercuts the kind of epistemic independence 
discussed earlier as being important to intelligent accountability.” 
(Goldsmith 2004:25).            
 
Bevan & Hood (2006:519) identified that Performance Management may motivate 
staff towards continuous improvement allowing their roles to be clarified and Osborne 
& Gaebler (1992:146), noted that it allowed employees’ efforts to be quantified and 
rewarded. In some cases rewards may be in the form of reduced inspection (Ayres and 
Braithwaite 1992; Cabinet Office 1999; Hampton 2004).  However, De Bruijn (2001 
& 2007) argued that if performance incentives, in the form of financial rewards, are 
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transmitted to the lower ranks of an organisation in such away that the individual 
professionals are able to calculate the financial benefits associated with each output 
there is an increased risk that perverse effects will occur:  
 
“Performance measurements may produce perverse effects and these 
effects will be greatest when the incentive is placed on the level of the 
individual. When a production target is imposed on the lowest level of the 
organisation – the individual professional – this means that all the units in 
the organisation are subjected to these perverting effects. They will 
therefore manifest themselves very strongly.” (De Bruijn 2001:73)  
 
O’Neill (2002) and Jackson (2005) maintained that Performance Management could 
demoralise staff and Butterfield commented on the dehumanising impact on police 
officers “reducing workers to the level of efficiently functioning machines” 
(2001:112). Likierman (1993: 16) and Wilson et al (2001) noted that one outcome of  
staff dissatisfaction could be the exposure of ‘gaming’ to the media with damaging 
consequences for the reputation of the organisation concerned. 
 
 
6. ‘GAMING’: 
 
In the preceding section the general issues involved in developing performance 
management systems and maximising their potential were discussed and their 
relevancy to the police service highlighted.  In this section the threat posed by 
‘gaming’ behaviour is considered both generally and with specific reference to the 
police. 
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De Bruijn (2001 & 2007) refers to the avoidance tactics employed by those subjected 
to the intrusive impact of performance management as ‘strategic behaviour’ or 
‘gaming the numbers’. This type of behaviour is designed to meet performance 
measures by the most expedient means despite the fact that the means may well defeat 
the object of Performance Management. In effect, outputs are produced which do not 
contribute towards the desired outcomes. DeBruijn supports R.J. in’t Veld’s (1996:36) 
theory that performance indicators are subject to the Law of Diminishing 
Effectiveness: 
 
“Once a system of performance measurement has been designed and 
introduced, the perverse effects will in the long term, force out the 
beneficial effect. 
 
The perverted system of performance measurement developed in this way 
are nevertheless resistant.” (BeBruijn 2001:41)  
 
DeBruijn (2001) provides a number of examples of the behaviour in question: The 
filtering out of cases by Dutch Prosecutors at the police station prevented a number of 
potentially unsuccessful cases being included in the performance returns, thus giving 
the appearance that the service had been successful in reducing the number of cases 
dropped (Hoolgand 1998): The increase in arrests achieved by the FBI by targeting 
deserters from the armed services, was a soft easy way of improving performance 
(Wilson 2000).    
 
Likierman (1993); Jackson (1993); De Bruijn (2001 & 2007); and Jackson (2005) 
identified that a major determinant of ‘gaming’ is the purpose performance 
measurement fulfils; if it is for a control function then the risk of ‘gaming’ increases; 
if it is for learning purposes: “a tool for improving the practical operations of the 
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organisation, motivating staff and participants and helping external agencies to 
understand the work of the organisation”, (Jackson 2005:35) and the members of the 
organisation perceive it as such, the likelihood of perverse behaviour is reduced. 
When used as a top down mechanism for control purposes there is a risk that the 
resulting information or data produced will have been distorted to such an extent that 
it is likely to be misleading. This can result in those in charge of the organisation 
losing touch with what is actually occurring within the organisation and become 
increasing dependent on the information systems which cannot be relied upon to 
provide the means by which they can ‘steer’ the organisation: 
 
“Performance measurement is aimed at making public organisations 
perform and account for their results. The result might be that the system 
forms a layer of rock in the organisation between management and 
professionals. It deprives directors of insight into the activities performed 
at the bottom level of the organisation. What is treacherous, however, is 
that the system suggests that they have a detailed insight into them. The 
quality of managerial interventions suffers from it.” (DeBruijn 2001:51)   
 
The deliberate skewing of activity towards achieving narrowly defined performance 
targets, identified by Likierman as problematic, could be one form of ‘gaming’: 
 
“An important factor in setting targets, we have found, is that the whole 
of resource in a particular area should be covered by targets. If an area is 
not so covered there is scope for performance to be manipulated by 
misallocating costs to areas where no penalty is incurred to the advantage 
of an area where performance is measured.” (Likierman 1993:16)    
 
Likierman (1993) and De Bruijn (2001) also indicated that improvements in 
productivity achieved at the expense of quality would be another form of ‘gaming’.  
 
“Quality has proved notably difficult to measure, and great care needs to 
be taken to give it proper weight.” (Likierman (1993:17) 
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Jackson (2005) categorised three types of ‘gaming’; definitional gaming, ‘numerical 
(data) gaming’ and ‘behavioural gaming’ (Jackson 2005:30-34). 
 
 ‘Definitional gaming’ involves the aggregation of data on performance (De Bruijn 
2001:24) for the purposes of portraying the organisation in a favourable light to 
external agents. This requires the definition of success to be constructed in such a way 
that favourable data, or the way the data is presented, supports the image those 
collecting the information wish to create. Jackson uses the example of a regeneration 
initiative aggregating outputs and attributing all of these to the interventions funded 
by the external funding agent. In the case of ‘definitional gaming’ the organisation is 
aware of the real underlying data and makes its own decisions on this richer and more 
reliable information. 
 
‘Numerical (data) gaming’ involves the organisation itself relying upon manipulated 
data, thus becoming a victim of its own trickery.  Jackson cites the manipulation of 
hospital waiting times as one example where the distortion of the data impairs 
managerial decision making (Jackson 2005:32).  
 
The third category, ‘behavioural gaming’, involves changes in the behaviour of 
individuals making up an organisation in order to give the impression of improved 
performance, the re-allocation of resources to activities which provide outputs in 
return for minimum investment is one form of this type of ‘gaming’, which would 
include the ‘what gets measured gets done’ approach discussed earlier.  
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Jackson (2005) went on to list the detrimental effects of all three types of ‘gaming’: 
demoralisation of staff; discouragement of innovation; short termism; disregard for 
quality; and local optimism or parochialism.  
 
   
7. POLICE GAMING BEHAVIOUR: 
 
In this section the types of ‘gaming’ behaviour associated with the police service are 
reviewed.  The impact of such practices on police performance measures have been 
known to academics for some time. The reliability of police recorded statistics on 
crime levels came into question in the 1960s when criminologists (Goldstein J.1960 
and Goldstein H 1964) started to take an interest in police behaviour and the use of 
police discretion and Maguire noted:  
 
“Criminal statistics had to be analysed as the product not of a neutral 
fact-collecting process, but of a record-keeping process which is geared 
first and foremost to organisational (primarily police) police aims and 
needs”. (Maguire 1994:242)  
 
This led Yin to caution against reliance on criminal statistics collected by official 
agencies: agencies: 
 
“nearly every social scientist, for instance, is aware of the pitfalls of using 
the FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports – or any other archival records based 
on crimes reported by law enforcement agencies.” (YIN 1994:84). 
 
Although the term ‘gaming’ is rarely heard in police circles, the behaviour is 
encompassed by terms such ‘fiddling the figures’ (Waddington 1999); doing the 
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business’ (Young 1990); and ‘good housekeeping’ (Chatterton 2008). The literature, 
primarily; Holdaway (1983) who outlined behaviours involving the fabrication of 
evidence; Young (1990) the methods employed by officers to under-record reported 
crime; Chatterton (2008) the concentration of effort on ‘easy to solve’ crimes; and 
Wilson et al (2001) on collusion, designed to improve detection rates, between police 
officers and offenders.  From this material, and the evidence which emerged during 
the research, it is possible to identify four types of behaviour with specific 
characteristics which can be categorised under the headings; ‘Cuffing’; ‘Nodding’; 
‘Skewing’ and ‘Stitching’ described briefly in the introduction.  
 
 
8. ‘CUFFING’ 
 
This encompasses ‘gaming’ practices designed to give the impression that crime 
levels are lower than they actually are. The methods employed by British police 
officers to suppress the recorded crime rate were exposed by Young (1990). In this 
revealing anthropological study Young (1990) explains the nuances of a form of 
‘gaming’ which he refers to as ‘cuffing’ in reference to the magicians art of making 
something disappear ‘up the sleeve or cuff ’. This can be achieved in a number of 
ways: Failing to believe a victim’s account and therefore declining to investigate it: 
Recording the details in an alternative crime recording system e.g. an unofficial 
register: Recording the crime but not issuing it with a crime number therefore 
escaping the statistical returns: Recording the theft of property as simply ‘lost’.  A 
variation on ‘cuffing’ is the misleading under-categorisation of a particular crime, 
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usually from a more serious crime type to a lesser one e.g. robbery to theft from the 
person or attempt burglary to criminal damage, a feature noted by FitzGerald et al: 
 
“in focus groups with police officers we were told that the burglary 
targets meant that theft from garden sheds and outhouses was now being 
recorded as theft rather than burglary, and attempted burglaries – even 
where premises were entered but nothing was taken – were entered as 
criminal damage.” (2001:140). 
 
Another variant on this theme involves the de-categorisation of crime reported and 
recorded by the police. This practice involves a senior supervisory officer reviewing a 
case and deciding that a crime had not after all occurred or, that the crime report had 
been created in error. The Home Office’s ‘counting rules’ are quite stringent on the 
conditions under which this procedure can be applied. However HMIC/HMcpsi (2005 
& 2007) uncovered various misinterpretations5 of the rules when they tried to 
establish the reasons for the low conviction rate for rape offences. ‘No-criming’, as it 
is often referred to in police circles, rates for the different forces sampled varied from 
4% to 47% of reported rapes: 
 
“failure to adhere to the relevant HOCR (Home Office Crime Recording) 
criteria is not only skewing recorded crime figures for rape but is also 
undermining the ability to gain accurate understanding of attrition” 
(HMIC 2007:44). 
   
 
The un-reliability of police recorded crime data for inter force comparison purposes 
led the Perks Committee (Home Office 1971) to introduce ‘counting rules’ in order to 
encourage consistency between forces. However different interpretations of these 
                                                 
5 HMIC/HMcpsi (2007) indicated that this was due to genuine misinterpretation as opposed to wilful 
deception. However the rules were straightforward and the misinterpretations all resulted in the 
appearance of improved performance. 
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rules continued to be a feature of police recording behaviour; McCabe & Sutcliffe 
(1978); Steer (1980); Bottomley & Coleman (1981); Ekblom & Heal (1982); 
Farringdon & Dowds (1985); Burrows (1986); Burrows & Tarling (1987); Farrington 
& Burrows (1993); HMIC (1996); Coleman & Moynihan (1996) and Burrows et al 
(2000) all reported under-recording of various types of reported crimes.  The situation 
described by Burrows et al (2000) was akin to thirty four police forces all using 
different currencies in an environment in which the exchange rate was unknown: 
 
“Across all the cases reviewed, 47 per cent of crime allegations were 
eventually recorded as crimes. In one force this proportion rose to 55 per 
cent, but in another it was as low as 33 per cent. This proportion is 
consistent with that found in the mid-1980s, suggesting that developments 
like computerisation and increased management control have not 
increased the proportion of allegations 'crimed'.” (Burrows et al 2000:vii) 
 
 
 The scale to which such discrepancies or differences in interpretation of the rules 
could make to recorded crime rates was evident from Farrington and Dowds study 
into Nottinghamshire Constabulary’s high crime rate in comparison to its 
demographically similar neighbours, Leicestershire and Staffordshire:  
 
“It is reasonable to conclude that between two-thirds and three-quarters 
of the difference in crime rates….reflected differences in police reactions 
to crime, while the remaining one-third reflected differences in criminal 
behaviour …The research shows once again the difficulties of interpreting 
official statistics. Almost certainly, Nottinghamshire has never been the 
most criminal area in the country.” (Farrington & Dowds. 1985:70-71)  
 
Burrows et al (2000) also noted that the recording rate for different offences also 
varied: 
“The likelihood of any allegation being recorded as a crime varied 
considerably according to the nature of the alleged offence. Property 
crimes are consistently more likely to be recorded than personal offences 
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(mainly allegations of violence). Amongst property offences, allegations 
relating to burglary and thefts of (or from) vehicles are more likely to be 
recorded than allegations of vandalism.” (Burrows et al 2000: vii) 
 
HMIC (2000) indicated that on average 24 per cent of the crime recorded in force 
command and control incident logs went unrecorded in the corresponding crime 
systems. This was as a result of differing crime recording practices. The Home 
Office’s Review of Crime Statistics (Simmons 2000) drew a similar conclusion.  
Burrows et al (2000) maintained that the operation of officer’s discretion at the point 
of reporting was the cause of the variations and this was linked to the use of an 
‘evidential’ crime recording standard where victims had to convince an officer that an 
offence had occurred: 
 
“The clear implication from this is that the exercise of ‘police discretion’ 
is the primary reason for the recording shortfall: the police will often 
apply an evidential standard to allegations of crime made to them,” 
(Burrows el al 2000:ix) 
 
 
For Burrow’s et al (2000) the problem lay in the inappropriate use of officer 
discretion which led to a failure to record and investigate a victim’s complaint they 
noted that the introduction of performance management was causing a resurgence of 
‘cuffing’: 
 
“ a recent ‘expose’ by Channel 4s’ ‘Dispatches’ programme, for example, 
has suggested that both the ‘cuffing’ of crime and the ‘fabrication’ of 
admissions by offenders have achieved a renaissance (The Guardian 18 
March 1999). Both practices have been resurrected, it is argued, in 
pursuit of both demonstrating falling levels of overall crime, and 
improving clear-up rates” (Burrows et al 2000:5). 
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“Forces assertions that the recording shortfall is minimal – appear in the 
light of the findings of the ‘call tracking’ exercise – to be substantially at 
odds with actual practice” (2000:58). 
 
However the concerns of Burrows et al (2000) regarding the scale of the problem 
were not supported by HMIC: 
 
“Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary has conducted many detailed 
scrutinies of crime recording systems and is satisfied in general there is 
little evidence that, today, these practices are in any way widespread. 
There are, though, still pockets of unethical crime recording which need 
to be eradicated to ensure the public has confidence in police performance 
figures” (HMIC 1999:19). 
  
The implications of ‘cuffing’, like other forms of police deviance, on police/public 
relations was highlighted in Rosenbaum et al’s (2005) research into the reactions of 
those who called on the police for assistance: 
 
“Residents may expect that calling the police for assistance will result in 
positive interaction and outcomes; but, if these expectations are not 
fulfilled, disappointment and negative attitude changes may follow” 
(Rosenbaum et al 2005:359)  
 
 
The failure of officers to accept a victim’s account of a crime, record and investigate 
it, are likely to have a negative impact on the victim. Rosenbaum et al (2005:359) 
maintained negative experiences created a ‘ripple effect’ which shaped the view of 
others who have not had direct contact with the police thus magnifying the damage to 
the reputation of the service. Skogan (2006) and Bradford et al (2008) reported similar 
findings.  
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Rosenbaum et al (2005) also noted members of minority groups associated poor 
outcomes of contact with the police with their minority status. A number of other 
studies also found that minority ethnic recipients of police bad behaviour assumed 
that the treatment they receive was motivated by discrimination (Small 1983; 
Cashmore & Troyna 1982; Bowling 1993; Bayley and Mendelsohn 1969; Furstenberg 
& Wellford 1973; Tuck & Southgate 1981; Skogan 1994; Field 1984; Waddington & 
Braddock 1991). These earlier findings were supported by Foster et al (2005): 
 
“The strong feelings of mistrust among BME communities and the 
expectations of discrimination formed a lens through which the actions of 
individual officers were understood. Thus poor service, aggressive 
communication styles or inappropriate behaviour were often perceived as 
racially driven” (Foster et al 2005:67).  
 
Whilst Smith and Gray (1983) had difficulty confirming that the poor treatment of 
victims they observed was the direct result of racial discrimination they concluded: 
 
“Racial prejudice is presumably one of a number of factors conducive 
towards bad behaviour by police officers, but it is probably not a 
fundamental one. Police behaviour is best explained by the structure of 
rewards and constraints within which police officers operate; only at 
exceptional times (such as the riots of 1981) does retribution against a 
particular ethnic group become an end in itself for police officers.” (Smith 
& Gray 1983:111)   
 
 
Coleman & Moynihan (1996) noted discrimination was one of number of factors 
which influenced an officer’s decision to record and investigate a crime: 
 
“The situational context: covering issues like offence seriousness, the 
weight given to complainant's preferences, and influences such as the race 
or demeanour of the complainant.” (Coleman & Moynihan 1996) 
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Young (1990) also maintained the victim’s social status was a variable affecting the 
likelihood of their reported crime being recorded and investigated by the police:   
 
“Detectable crimes were always welcomed, while those which might result 
in ‘a body’6 or had been committed against some important local person 
would be recorded ‘to avoid the wheel coming off’” (Young 1991:323) 
 
However, much of the ‘gaming’ described by Young  (1990:317) was invisible to the 
members of the public involved and in the absence of any intrusive scrutiny in the 
1950s helped create ‘a perception of social comfort and security’: 
 
“By such straightforward omissions in recording, the incidence of ‘crime’ 
was kept artificially low and although the victim still reported the crime 
and saw the particulars written down on a message pad, the lost register 
or some other document, it never became a crime statistic. How the report 
was recorded was considered immaterial to the injured party, but was 
crucial to the institutional presentation of social reality. (Young 1991:319)  
 
 
The Government’s response to the problem of inconsistent recording procedures was 
to negotiate acceptance of a single crime recording standard. This resulted in the 
adoption of the National Crime Recording Standard (NCRS), introduced in April 
2002. After an initial monitoring period, April 2002 to April 2003, during which the 
ratio between incident rates and recorded crime were assessed by the Home Office 
and the increases in recorded crime for each force closely analysed by Simmons 
(2003), the Audit Commission were commissioned by the PSU to carry out data 
quality checks on all forces in England and Wales. Simmons (2003) reported that 
significant progress had been made and compliance rates were good. The Audit 
                                                 
6 An identified suspect who could be arrested and result in the crime being detected. 
 53
Commission data quality checks (Audit Commission 2004; 2006; 2007) suggested 
force’s compliance with the NCRS remained good and concluded that the data 
compiled by the police was generally reliable. 
 
The other strategy adopted by government to monitor crime levels, and particularly 
crime which Hough and Mayhew (1983) discovered was not reported to the police, 
was the employment of a separate system based on a public survey in order to gauge 
the true levels of crime and its impact on citizens. The British Crime Survey (BCS) 
was first conducted in 1982:  
 
“The main rationale for the survey-and in particular its expensive 
repetition at regular intervals- is that, by asking samples of the public to 
describe crimes committed against them within a given recent period, the 
vagaries of crime-reporting behaviour and police recording behaviour are 
neatly avoided, and the responses can be grossed up into an alternative 
fuller – and hence, by implication, more valid- picture of crime and its 
trends in Britain.” (Maguire 1994:261)   
 
 
However, the BCS has its limitations; it excludes victims under 16 years of age; only 
covers householders; is ‘statistically’ unreliable7 in relation to offences which are 
relatively rare e.g. sexual offences (Maguire 1994:263-267); impose artificial limits 
(five in the case of the BCS) on multiple victims (Glenn 1988); and problems of 
statistical significance occur when applied to smaller geographical areas (Maguire 
1994).   
 
    
9. ‘NODDING’ 
                                                 
7 The sample size of those respondents indicating that they were victims of such offences is too small 
to make statistically reliable estimates about national incidence rates. 
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This section reviews the literature on the practice of ‘Nodding’ which refers to the 
‘gaming’ practices aimed at boosting the detection rate through mutually beneficial, 
although unethical and sometimes unlawful, agreements between offenders and police 
officers; ‘you scratch my back I’ll scratch yours’ type arrangement. 
 Young (1990) maintained the detection rate was the primary measure of police 
effectiveness: 
 
“The crime detection role of the police gains further weight from the fact 
that it appears, at least superficially, the easiest to evaluate in objective 
terms. It is possible to compare crimes recorded and cleared up, the 
offenders brought to justice and convicted from one year to the 
next…detection becomes a touchstone in judging police activity.” (Young 
1990:287)     
 
Some ‘gaming’ practices, designed to improve detections, typically involve various 
degrees of collusion between police officers and suspects. Whilst such collusion is 
similar in many ways to ‘plea bargaining’ between prosecution and defence lawyers it 
has one significant difference; it is unlawful and may well constitute a conspiracy to 
pervert the course of justice. The illegal and clandestine nature of such practices has 
limited research on the subject. Likierman (1993) included one example to 
demonstrate some of the perverse outcomes to be avoided when designing 
performance management systems. The term ‘nodding’ is used by Wilson et al (2001) 
and derives from the action taken by a suspect when they point out or nod at the 
places where they have committed a crime or lots of other crimes which can be 
‘Taken into Consideration’8 or disposed of as a ‘Prison Write Off’9 : 
                                                 
8 Offences admitted by an offender can be ‘Taken into Consideration’ by a court when an offender is 
sentenced for a similar offence. There are rules governing the procedure which include sufficiency of 
evidence to support a charge if an offender refuses to accept the offence as TIC and a requirement to 
ensure that the offence TIC is not of a more serious nature than that charged. 
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“In most cases they were taken in a police car and asked to point out the 
houses or the premises they had burgled, a procedure known as ‘nodding’ 
because a prisoner customarily nods at the building he claims to have 
burgled.” (Wilson et al 2001:63)       
 
 
Whilst such practices may be a legitimate means of detecting crimes, many of which 
would otherwise have remained undetected. The offences would then typically be 
treated as offences Taken into Consideration (TIC) or ‘Prison Write Off’.  
 
However such practices have been the subject of abuse. The investigation into abuses 
in Nottinghamshire was conducted by Bedfordshire Police and demonstrated the type 
of ‘gaming’ associated with these procedures: 
 
“The Bedfordshire police discovered not only cases in which the offender 
had not committed the TICs that had been written off, but also that in 
some cases the offence which the offender had asked to be taken into 
consideration never happened in the first place. One man admitted to 37 
burglaries, five of which were committed against people who insisted that 
they had never been burgled and a further five of which had taken place 
when he was locked up in prison.” (Wilson et al 2001:63-64)  
 
 
The abuse of TIC procedures has long been the subject of criticism Ditton (1977) 
cited the comments of one Judge: 
 
 “Judge Smith said: a lad tries to get into 50 different cars, gets into the 
fifty-first, appears charged with it and 50 other offences to be taken into 
consideration.  All it can be thought to be doing is to improve the 
detection rate of the Northumberland Constabulary.  It is an abuse of the 
system whereby other offences are taken into consideration. I keep saying 
                                                                                                                                            
9 Offender serving a prison sentence can confess to offences which they committed prior to the 
commencement of their prison sentence. There are strict rules regulating the way the police should deal 
with these offences. The general rule is that if it is unlikely that a prisoner’s sentence would be 
increased by placing the matters before a court then they should not be charged and the police should 
record the offence/s admitted as ‘detected’.   
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it – no one takes the slightest notice of what I say.” (Newcastle Evening 
Chronicle 5th Feb 1977: cited in Ditton1979:39) 
 
‘Nodding’ involving ‘Prison Write Offs’ have also been the subject of abuse (Young 
1990; Liekerman 1993; HMIC 1999; Wilson et al 2001; Waddington 1999): 
 
“Nearer home was the notorious case of a member of the Kent 
Constabulary who encouraged those charged with some offences to 
confess to others which they had not committed in order to ‘improve’ the 
clear up rate. (Likierman 1993:16) 
 
The ‘prison write off’ procedure like TICs creates a situation in which negotiations 
between officers and offenders can occur: 
 
“In 1986, as sub-divisional commander I had an ‘injured party’ (the 
aggrieved party in a crime) complain about what he saw as complicity 
demonstrated by a detective in his case with a ‘regular villain’ who’d 
been ‘captured’ for the crime. As a somewhat puzzled member of the 
innocent public he felt excluded and wondered if this was ‘not just some 
jovial game between the police and the criminals’.  Both detectives in the 
case agreed this was the case, for the regular villain on a ‘bender’ 
(suspended sentence), who is willing to ‘clear his slate’ or ‘take a few off 
the books’ (admit outstanding, un-detected crimes) when he ‘gets settled’ 
(is sentenced and is settled in prison after initial assessments by the prison 
authorities), takes a main part in the drama in which he and the ‘real 
polis’ may have to re-enact again next year and the year after that” 
(Young 1990:270-271). 
 
 
 
Chatterton (2008) noted the increased use of TICs as an alternative to ‘prison write 
offs’. The officers interviewed by Chatterton raised concerns about the ethics and 
value of such practices: 
 
“The range of housekeeping activities in which members of the forces 
represented in the study were said to engage, tended to vary across the 
forces. ‘Cold prison’ visits to convicted offenders for prison write-offs are 
a thing of the past but taking a prisoner out of jail, after a DNA hit, to 
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identify other premises where they have committed burglaries is still 
practised. Detectives in some forces appeared to be much more cautious 
than those in others when engaging in this practice and claimed 
they would not be able to persuade their Crime Registrar to accept as 
detections cases which apparently others experienced no problem in 
getting through. Our docket squad produce somewhere between 25 and 
30% detection rate per burglary. They will respond to fingerprint and 
DNA hits but also trawl through the force system to look for 
offenders on bordering BCUs who have admitted offences and cold 
call them in prison before they are sentenced. [They] bring them 
out and see if they will admit any on us because they are obviously 
talking to police about admitting further offences.” (Chatterton 2008:49) 
 
 
 
10. ‘SKEWING’ 
 
 
A third type of police gaming involves police forces concentrating their efforts on 
activities which have a direct impact on government performance indicators at the 
expense of other service areas. This is categorised as ‘skewing’.  Rogerson (1995) 
indicated that the tendency for ‘what gets measured gets done’ would result in police 
forces investing less time and effort on non-enforcement type activities. However 
HMIC (1999) noted this tendency also manifested itself in a reduction in the effort put 
into solving more serious crime and adverse comment was made on the low priority 
given to the investigation of rape offences cited in the report on police integrity which 
indicated such skewing of activity was unethical (HMIC 1999). In HMIC O’Connor’s 
report (O’Connor 2005), recommending the amalgamation of forces, the lack of 
priority afforded to the investigation of serious crime, brought about by a focus on 
less serious volume crime, was cited as one of the main drivers for the proposed 
reform: 
 
“Partly, they arise from the national focus on volume crime over the last 
10 to 15 years, coupled with the development of a performance regime 
and regulatory / support infrastructure to complement that focus (for 
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example, the use of Compstat type mechanisms to hold BCUs to 
account).” (O’Connor 2005:8) 
 
 
HMIC O’Connor went on to note the differential impact this focus had on the most 
vulnerable members of society: 
 
“Some victims, whether “allegedly unattached minors” entering the UK 
and being placed in care who then disappear into prostitution, or the 
exposure of youngsters to poorly supervised sex offenders, have no 
obvious platform to argue the case for better policing. They, like others 
who receive inadequate protection from any of the protective services, are 
without a voice. The performance paradigm needs to change to 
accommodate ‘protection’ as well as crime control” (O’Connor 2005:7). 
 
 
Chatterton (2008) also found evidence of ‘skewing’:   
 
“The detrimental effects of the sanctions detection regime and the 
excessively rigid and bureaucratic approach to targets and performance 
management. A combination of these is having a pernicious and perverse 
effect on police operations. They are: diverting police priorities from 
serious crime to chasing minor offences; criminalising members of the 
public who are not criminals in the accepted sense; giving the public a 
false sense of security that serious crime is being detected with increasing 
effectiveness by the police; and undermining the discretion necessary for 
the impartial discharge of the office of constable.” (Chatterton 2008:iii) 
 
 
As with ‘cuffing’, the issue of police discretion was viewed as potentially problematic 
Chatterton (2008). However in this Chatterton suggests that, rather than too much 
discretion, the problem is usually one of too little. The use of police discretion in the 
way offenders are dealt with has attracted academic debate since the 1960’s.  
Goldstein(1960) stimulated debate on this issue in the 1960s by highlighting the fact 
that officers were routinely usurping the authority of the judiciary by using their 
discretion on who should and who should not be prosecuted for misdemeanours. This 
 59
use of discretion could well be justified by the police on apparently rational grounds 
e.g. the offence was relatively minor and best dealt with by an informal warning. 
However failing to arrest or prosecute a suspect because they had provided valuable 
information would be altogether more contentious.  For Goldstein (1960) the police 
were not constitutionally competent to make those decisions which he felt were 
properly the preserve of the judiciary. However, he did acknowledge that the practical 
difficulties of referring every minor infraction of the law to the judiciary for disposal 
(Goldstein 1960).  La Fave (1962 &1965); Goldstein (1964); Davis (1969 &, 1975) 
accepted that police discretion was both inevitable and in some cases desirable. 
Reiner (1994) concluded: 
 
“Translating general rules of law into enforcement decisions could not be 
mechanistic and automatic, but require a process of interpretation of the 
meaning of the rules, implying an inherently subjective element. The 
exercise of discretion was also desirable in principle, to avoid the 
oppressiveness of invoking the full panoply of criminal law to deal with 
incidents which were commonly regarded as not warranting this.” 
(Reiner 1994:723)  
 
 
However, the impact of racial discrimination on police decision-making again raised 
the whole issue of police discretion in the prosecution of offenders and a number of 
studies found high levels of racial prejudice amongst police officers; Lambert (1970); 
Cain (1973); Reiner (1978); Smith and Gray (1983); Holdaway (1983); Graef (1989). 
However, Black and Reiss (1967) and Reiss (1971)  studies, based on observations of 
officer’s behaviour, found that rude, hostile or violent behaviour by police officers 
was unrelated to the race of the suspects. Smith and Grey noted: 
  
“Police officers tend to make a crude assumption that suspects are black 
and to justify stopping people in these terms.” (Smith & Gray 1983:128) 
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Again whatever the motivation for the officer’s actions, research by Smith (1983); 
Skogan (1990); Jefferson and Walker (1992) has shown that adversarial contacts with 
police officers, in turn contribute towards hostility towards the police.  Enforcement 
of  immigration controls , and conflict over cannabis (Smith 1991); deployment of the 
‘sus’ (suspicious person) law (Brogden 1981); large scale disturbances at 
entertainment events involving black youth and police officers (Gilroy 1987); the way 
senior police officers defined the issue as a black/crime problem in the public debate 
(Lea & Young 1982; Benyon 1986; Gilroy 1987), and racial prejudice within the 
ranks of the police service, reflecting wider opinions held by working groups 
(Lambert 1970), have all been cited at different times as reasons for the decline in 
relationships between the police and the black community which culminated in large 
disturbances in the inner city areas of a number of cities in the 1980s.   
 
Lord Scarman (1981) who conducted an inquiry into the causes of the riots 
encouraged the use of police discretion in the enforcement of the law indicating that 
the pursuit of prosecutions at the expense of community confidence was not an 
efficient policing model.   
 
The other key way ‘skewing’ can occur is through the physical redistribution of 
resources. The government-inspired move to a more local Command Unit structure 
and the implementation of its Neighbourhood Policing strategy involved a re-
distribution of police resources as each defined geographical neighbourhood was 
allocated a dedicated team of police officers and PCSOs. The Audit Commission 
(1991) recommended that resource allocations should be based on a model including 
factors such as reported crime levels and calls for service. The distribution of public 
 61
resources had been the subject of academic study in the 1960s and 70 when the 
impact of social factors on the allocation of resources had been investigated.  Aaron 
Director maintained: 
 
“Public expenditures are made for the primary benefit of the middle 
classes, and financed with taxes which are borne in considerable part by 
the poor and rich….any portion of the society which can secure control of 
the state’s machinery will employ the machinery to improve its own 
position” (cited in Stigler 1970:1) 
 
However Lineberry (1976) failed to identify any measurable impact of class on the 
distribution of public resources in the US. He attributed this to the fact that public 
resources were distributed according to professional judgements as opposed to any 
more scientific or formulaic calculation. However, Hope et al (2004) noted social 
factors did influence crime reporting rates and calls for police service. They noted 
residents living in deprived areas were less likely to report minor offences or incidents 
to the police than those living in more affluent neighbourhoods.  It was not known 
how this factor would influence the distribution of police resources although it infers 
that demand-based formulas have the potential to skew resources in favour of more 
affluent areas. Chatterton & Bingham (2006) did highlight the negative impact of the 
Neighbourhood Policing model on the resources dedicated to ‘response policing’, i.e. 
the officers allocated to attend calls for public assistance, and the levels of service 
they provided. They attributed this to a redistribution of resources to the 
geographically based neighbourhood teams. However they did not specifically audit 
how the resources had been distributed.  
 
Although not directly related to the issue of ‘skewing’, Felson & Ouimet (2007) noted 
from their study in Canada that crime investigations were generally more difficult to 
 62
solve in more deprived areas. Whilst it could be inferred from their findings that 
overall police detection rates could potentially be improved by moving police officers 
to more affluent neighbourhoods they did not explore this possibility. However Gibbs 
& Haldenby (2006) noted that the police performance framework did not separate the 
data on urban areas for comparison purposes: “The Home Office has been reluctant to 
rank crime data for cities as one way of judging the performance of local forces”. 
They extrapolated the data on cities and produced their own league table 
demonstrating that police performance in large cities was poor, maintaining that 
locally driven policies would be more fruitful than national ones: 
 
“The findings suggest that the Home Office’s key target – that the crime 
in high crime areas should fall more quickly than in other areas – is 
insufficiently challenging. It is however, local rather than central 
initiatives that will have the greatest impact on crime” (Gibbs and 
Haldenby, 2006:12) 
 
   
However their research findings were challenged on a technical issue over the 
population figures they had used to calculate crimes per thousand, (BBC News: 
24.5.2006). This appeared to prevent further debate on the issues they were 
highlighting. Their research was interesting because it demonstrated that overall 
measures of force performance, as opposed to BCU performance, did not differentiate 
between urban and rural areas. So overall performance could be improved by 
transferring resources to rural or more affluent areas where crimes were often easier 
to solve. Likewise BCU performance could be improved by changing the boundaries 
of police command units to include neighbourhoods where crime levels were low, and 
in this context Loveday (2006:25), for one, noted the trend towards larger Basic 
Command Units (BCUs).  
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11. ‘STITCHING’  
 
The forth category of police gaming was ‘Stitching’, short for ‘stitching people up’, is 
a generic term used to encompass police behaviour designed to enhance the number 
of crimes apparently being solved by fabricating evidence against suspects or 
obtaining evidence by unlawful means. This could also include withholding evidence 
which could aid a suspect’s defence.  The most common objective of such unlawful 
behaviour would be the conviction of an offender at court and whilst such practices 
are a form of ‘gaming’, designed to improved performance based on conviction rates, 
they are not referred to in such terms in the literature.  Examples of this type of 
behaviour have been observed by researchers: Waddington (1999:134) cites an 
example of officers excluding evidence from numerous witnesses as to the drunken 
behaviour of man in order to keep the case simple for case preparation purposes: 
McConville et al (1991:25-26) outline the circumstances of a case where the evidence 
against a youth who had obstructed an officer was ‘enhanced’ to justify his arrest: 
They also cite an example where words were put into a suspect’s mouth in order to 
establish the element of criminal intent, ‘mens rea’, to substantiate an allegation of 
criminal damage (McConville et al 1991:70-71).  This type of distortion of the facts to 
meet legal requirements was referred to by Dixon (1997) as the production of 
‘legalized’ accounts; by Manning (1974:242) as ‘paper reality’; by McConville et al 
(1991) as ‘case building’ and by Waddington (1999:136) as the “Ways and Means 
Act”.  
 
Young (1990) outlined some of the practices officers would employ to trick a suspect 
into making a confession. These included officers purporting to be the suspect’s 
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solicitor or pretending to be a doctor thus being able to engage the suspect in 
unguarded conversation. Waddington (1999:136) cites the example of officers shining 
an ultra-violet light on the hands of a prisoner suspected of stealing property, which 
had been treated with a chemical die, and pretending that there was a clear chemical 
reflection. The suspect, believing the evidence against him was difficult to refute, 
made a full written confession. 
  
Holdaway (1983), a serving officer, exposed the inappropriate practices being used by 
officers to secure sufficient evidence to secure a conviction. This involved officers 
fabricating evidence or recording false confessions; a practice referred to as 
‘verballing’ (Holdaway 1983). Waddington  (1991) also noted that the use of 
oppressive interviewing techniques, involving violence or the threat of violence, was 
a feature of the miscarriages of justice most notably those involving the West 
Midlands Police Serious Crime Squad (Kaye 1991).   
 
The cause of such behaviours was attributed by Lustgarten (1986) to the adversarial 
nature of the English Criminal Justice system: 
 
“The English police take an avowedly partisan stance in a system in 
which partisan contest is supposed to produce truth. And the evidential 
barriers reinforce bureaucratic and resource imperatives of avoiding 
trials in the vast majority of cases by producing guilty pleas. This is 
impossible in the Continental systems, where the accused is not permitted 
to plead guilty. This gives the English police substantially greater 
incentive to seek to obtain a confession from the suspect; more generally 
and ominously, it would seem to be a constant pressure leading them to 
overstep their powers against those they “know” are guilty.” (Lustgarten 
1986:2)         
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Waddington linked this phenomenon to the fact that the police are required both to 
enforce the law and to protect the rights of suspects: 
 
“Thus, the common experience of police officers in liberal democracies is 
that they and/or their colleagues are responsible for impeding the success 
of their own goals by implementing safeguards designed to make 
conviction more difficult.  It is, therefore, unsurprising that officers 
attempt to circumvent these restraints.” (Waddington 1999:139).   
 
However HMIC (1999) stated that such oppressive means of obtaining evidence 
appeared to have receded with the introduction of the Police and Criminal Evidence 
Act 1984: 
 
“Despite there being a general feeling the rules are weighted too heavily in 
favour of the criminal rather than the victim of crime, this was not raised 
as an issue as frequently as might have been the case in earlier times, 
although some strong views to that effect were expressed. Whilst the 
Inspection Team concluded any bending of the rules is largely an activity 
of the past, broadly, it is seen by those still guilty of it as not being for 
personal gain but to protect society, and therefore not at the worst end of 
corruption. This is sometimes referred to as ‘noble cause corruption,’” 
(HMIC 1999:21). 
 
That view was challenged by an internal review of court acquittals by the Met. Police 
which uncovered evidence of intimidating and coercive interview tactics: 
 
“Two-thirds of the cases studied involving defendants who had confessed 
when interviewed but who had gone on to plead not guilty at trial, 
resulted in acquittal because of oppressive interviewing techniques 
(Guardian, 13 Sept 1999)”10  
 
Wilson et al (2001:94) also expressed some concerns about how effective the Act 
would be in preventing unauthorised contact with suspects: 
                                                 
10 This article appears to have been based on a leaked copy of the document.  
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“Still left scope for officers to have an ‘off the record’ ‘quiet word’ with 
suspects” and custody officers who were charged under PACE with the 
task of preventing such occurrences “would often collude with detectives 
by failing to record the visits.” (Wilson et al 2001:94).  
  
However the fact that the cases of oppressive interviewing techniques, referred to in 
the leaked report (Guardian 13.9.99), resulted in acquittals suggested the safeguards 
introduced by PACE and enforced by the courts were actually working effectively to 
some extent. However, it cannot be confirmed from the research evidence available 
whether such techniques are widespread or not.        
 
Whilst the fabrication of evidence to secure a conviction may or may not be in 
decline, not all means of obtaining detections are subject to the scrutiny of the courts. 
Cases which are not dealt with by placing the case before a court still offer the 
potential to employ ‘stitching’ practices. Tait noted, in his study of juvenile 
cautioning procedures in Australia, that lack of evidence was no barrier to detecting 
an offence through the use of a caution: 
 
“The assumption of guilt underlies the practice of cautioning young 
persons….Formal cautions are in effect an extreme form of charge-
bargaining: ‘All charges will be dropped if you admit your guilt.’” (Tait 
1994:61-62). 
 
Ditchfield (1976) also found that many cases dealt with as cautions would not 
normally have proceeded to court because of the minor nature of the offence however 
the administrative convenience of the cautioning procedure resulted in them appearing 
in the official criminal justice returns.  Chatterton (2008) cited an example where 
officers were being encouraged to use cautions inappropriately: 
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“An example provided by a detective manager who, exceptionally, had 
resisted pressure to caution a juvenile to gain a sanction detection 
illustrates the type of offence repeatedly described in the groups. ‘I have 
cases where a crime has come to me from HQ suggesting I review my 
decision. What was the last one? Oh, a complaint of assault. This young 
lad was running in a school corridor, aiming for his friend. He tripped 
over, missed his friend and bumped into a girl who pushed another girl 
into the wall and she banged herself and bruised her arm on the wall. 
There was no malice and it was not intentional but it had been crimed up 
as an assault on her. After I read it I wrote it off. I said, ‘we will not be 
cautioning this offence. Please advise as to his behaviour in the future but 
I do not consider myself in the business of criminalising children for 
basically messing about’. Many officers placed in that situation would 
have felt obliged to caution the juvenile. (Chatterton 2008:42-43) 
 
 
 
Chatterton (2008) cites another interviewee: 
 
“So we’re criminalising a lot of people and bringing them into the 
justice system who perhaps 10 years ago wouldn’t have entered it. 
You know, kids fighting in the playground, one of the children now 
will come out with a criminal caution. Ten years ago we probably 
wouldn’t have heard anything about an incident like that. If we had 
dealt with it there would have been no formal action.” (Chatterton 
2008:44) 
 
Wilson et al (2001) also referred to abuse of the ‘Detected No Further Police Action’ 
(DNFPA) procedures which were highlighted in Nottinghamshire, in particular, in the 
mid 1990s. Home Office Counting Rules allowed in certain circumstances for 
offences to be shown as detected without there being a judicial outcome such as a 
charge, or where an offenders details are recorded on the Police National Computer 
for citing as ‘convictions’ e.g. caution, or Fixed Penalty Notice. Such circumstances 
would include informal admonishments for minor offences issued by a police officer, 
reported crimes where the suspect died during the course of an investigation; the CPS 
deciding, despite the evidence suggesting guilt, that it is not in the public interest to 
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pursue the matter to court or of victims refusing or being unable to provide evidence 
at court. Offences ‘detected’ in this way are shown on local crime recording systems 
as ‘Detected No Further Police Action’ (DNFPA). The quality control comes in the 
requirement for senior police officers to sanction such disposals in writing, after 
satisfying themselves that offences have been committed and with the guilt of the 
offender being clear. Prior to 2003 some DNFPA cases could be authorised despite 
the suspect being unaware that an allegation had been made against them e.g. when 
the victim did not to pursue the matter and feared alerting the offender because of the 
possibility of reprisals. This rule was referred to as the ‘inflammatory consequences’ 
detection rule. It was abolished by the Home Office in April 2003:  
 
“This meant that detections in which the injured party had asked the 
police not to speak to a named perpetrator could no longer be counted as 
administrative detections.” (Dodd et al 2004:105). 
 
The abuses referred to by Wilson et al (2001) involved recording offences as solved 
DNFPA when there was insufficient evidence to support such an outcome: 
 
“The Home Office require that in order for crimes to be classified as 
DNFPA, there must be enough evidence to bring the charge, but this 
condition was omitted from Nottinghamshire’s rules, allowing the force to 
claim a very high clear up rate for certain crimes, in particular sex 
offences. The clear up rate for rape in 1996 was an ostensibly impressive 
98.6 per cent, but the Bedfordshire team discovered that, force- wide, 60 
per cent of all charges would not stand up. The figure for indecent assault 
was higher, at 75 per cent.” (Wilson et al 2001:64).  
 
 
Chatterton (2008) suggested that the use of Fixed Penalty Notices as a means of 
obtaining a ‘detection’ was also being abused by elevating minor disorders to more 
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serious public order offences that could be dealt with by Fixed Penalty notices 
resulting in the recording of sanctioned detections: 
 
“Easy ways of getting sanction detections? Get them to produce 
penalty notices for disorder. Currently disorderly people are being 
done for a Section 5 Public Order Act, oh and for harassment.” 
(Chatterton 2008:48) 
 
 
 
12. ‘GAMING’ AS A FORM OF POLICE DEVIANCE: 
 
Peter Neyroud, then Chief Constable of Thames Valley Police, referred to police 
‘gaming’ as ‘administrative corruption’ in the evidence he presented on behalf of the 
Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) to the Select Committee on Public 
Administration (2003). It is therefore of value to review the literature on police 
deviance and corruption in order to enhance understanding of the ‘gaming’ 
phenomenon. The literature on police deviance has tended to concentrate on the more 
extreme forms of illegal behaviour: 
 
“Police scandals are of three predominant varieties: corruption, such as 
accepting bribes; procedural abuse that perverts the course of justice; 
and the excessive use of force against suspects.” (Waddington 1999:121)  
  
 
For Herman Goldstein (1964;1975, 1977) the root of the problem lay in the way 
officers used their considerable discretion and he argued that managers should ensure 
officers were trained and provide with guidelines on how to use their discretion. 
However Manning (1977) maintained that the use of discretion made the police 
relatively immune to bureaucratic forms of control based on rules. That said Bordua 
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& Reiss (1966) noted the use of excessive rules was the preferred means of 
management for regulating officer behaviour.   Manning and Van Maanen (1977) 
maintained this tendency to try and create rules to cover every contingency resulted in 
a situation in which it would be difficult for officers to use their discretion or make 
appropriate decisions in the extremely complex and dynamic environment in which 
they operate: 
 
 “The view [among officers] is there are so many regulations, covering so 
many aspects of the job, that routine work will intrinsically require 
violation of one or more of the rules listed in the 10,000-paragraph 
General Orders. (Manning & van Maanen 1977:79) 
 
Smith and Gray note that compliance with these rules does not automatically result in 
officers enjoying the favour of their supervisors: 
 
“but they will not necessarily be praised, enjoy their work or achieve their 
career objectives if they keep to them.” (1983:169). 
 
 Smith maintained that there were three categories of rules to which officers operated:  
 
“working rules”, which cover the pragmatic way in which officers carry 
out their day to day work. “Inhibitory rules” which impede the 
“commonsense” outcomes officers feel morally justified in seeking to 
achieve, and are tempted to breach; and “Presentational Rules” which 
are the official officers’ interpretation of events which present the 
circumstances in such a way that they appear to comply with the formal 
rules which govern the social transaction” (Smith & Gray 1983; Smith 
1986).  
 
The difficulties in controlling police behaviour led Shearing (1981) to describe the 
police as a ‘deviant organisation’, and Holdaway’s (1978, 1979)insider’s account of 
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officer behaviour suggested that lower ranks were able to subvert formal policy with 
ease making a strong case for external control: 
 
“One of the basic themes running through this book….is that the lower 
ranks of the police service control their own work situation and such 
control may well shield highly questionable practices.” (Holdaway 
1979:12).  
 
Moreover consistency in the patterns of the behaviours observed (Holdaway 1979) 
suggested something more organised and institutionalised was governing behaviour, 
simply than the individual exercise of discretion.  In this respect Banton (1964) also 
noted that police officers tended to ‘under-enforce’ the law and his study of the use of 
discretion led him to conclude that actions were influenced more by moral values and 
the priorities accorded to different interventions which he suggested in turn were 
governed by the informal norms of the organisation.  These informal codes of conduct 
subsequently referred to as the informal culture or ‘police culture’ spawned a number 
of studies of police behaviour (Cain 1973; Chatterton 1976, 1979, 1983; Holdaway 
1977, 1979, 1983; Manning 1977, 1979; Manning P.K.  and J. van Maanen (1977); 
Reiner 1978; Punch 1979, 1985). Reiner identified the main characteristics of ‘police 
culture’ as: mission-action-cynicism-pessimism; suspicion; isolation/solidarity; 
conservatism; machismo; prejudice; pragmatism (Reiner 1992).  However, whilst 
Holdaway (1977) acknowledges managerial indifference in the form of turning a 
blind eye to the activities he tended to embed the problem of police deviance in the 
lower ranks. 
 
Kleinig (1996a, 1996b) developed the idea of police culture further suggesting that 
the exercise of discretion was not simply an individualist issue, i.e. varying from 
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officer to officer, but one that conformed to a pattern.  Kleinig called this influence 
“communal values” which he maintained served ends superior to the law and 
Waddington noted: 
 
 “If the exercise of discretion is guided by reference to basic community 
values, this implies that law is subordinate to these values; for if there is a 
clash between the two then we would expect communal values to 
prevail”(Waddington 1999:39) 
 
For Waddington this implied that officers seeking to achieve, what they believed to be 
‘justice’, in the form of a conviction, by tricking or forcing a suspect to confess were 
acting altruistically. Gibbons (1995) referred to this type of behaviour as ‘noble cause 
corruption’. 
 
Skolnick (1966) identified another area of police activity where the lines between 
informal police practice and legal rules became blurred. This involved the cultivation 
of informants and Skolnick noted informants were allowed to engage in illegal 
endeavours, unimpeded or actively supported by their police handlers in return for 
information relating to the activities of more ‘serious’ offenders. Livingstone 
expanded this theme: 
 
“When an officer arrests a mugger or a burglar, neither one has a stake 
in continuing the relationship, nor will the criminal have much to offer. In 
narcotics work, however, even the poorest street junkie may be able to 
offer something the cop legitimately needs: information that will 
eventually lead to an arrest of top-level dealers” (Livingston, 1996:424). 
 
The demise of the status of the CID and the shift in organisational emphasis from the 
need to secure convictions to obtaining sanctioned detections reported by Chatterton 
(2008) may challenge Livingston’s assumption that the mugger or burglar has nothing 
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with which to ‘barter’. Certainly Young (1990) noted the benefits in terms of 
detections (TICs and prison ‘write offs’) to be obtained from a suspect facing a 
custodial sentence. 
 
Manning and Redlinger (1977) argued that police organisations were putting their 
officers at risk of becoming corrupt by placing officers at what they referred to as the 
‘invitational edge of corruption’ (ibid pg.149). Whilst the use of police discretion in 
these circumstances was generally associated with victimless crimes involving vice or 
drugs (Sherman 1974). Sherman (1980a) maintained that officers appeared to exercise 
little discretion when enforcing serious offences of murder, rape etc, although that 
position was weakened by the findings of the MacPherson report (1999); the scandals 
involving collusion between drug dealers and law enforcement agencies in the 
Netherlands (Van Traa, 1996; Justice 1998); and the activities of the paedophile Marc 
Dutroux in Belgium (Neyroud and Beckley 2001:12).  However the ‘formal’ 
organisational element to police deviance was established: 
 
“in other words, bribery and corruption tend not to occur through 
individual greed, but in particular policing contexts in which distance 
between individual officers and suspects is diminished” (Waddington 
1999:125).  
 
The same point was reiterated by Miller in the Home Office-sponsored literature 
review of police corruption. “This suggests that corruption arises in a systematic way 
from the nature and context of policing.” (Miller 2003:18).  The response of offenders 
to this environment is less well documented in academic literature.  Smith (2006) 
suggests that certain criminals are driven by the same entrepreneurial objectives as 
legitimate businessmen and are likely to take advantage of any situation which 
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enables them to further their criminal enterprise and Miller noted that drug dealers in 
particular were actively seeking to become police informers in order to secure the 
‘protection’ this status afforded them: 
 
“It was widely believed by those interviewed that those involved in 
organised crime made it their business to target those within the police 
service. This was seen as essential to their criminal activities, as one 
investigator remarked:  ‘A good villain can’t operate without having a 
bent officer… it’s impossible’”. (Miller 2003:21). 
 
 
 
 
13. THE ORGANISATIONAL DIMENSION TO POLICE DEVIANCE 
‘BOTTOM UP OR TOP DOWN: 
 
 
 
Whilst the literature reviewed by Newburn (1999) and Miller (2003) concluded that 
police corruption was organisational in nature the concentration of research on the 
lower ranks created the view that operational police officers were immune from the 
influence of police management and that the inappropriate use of discretion was 
divorced from the actions of police managers:  
 
“The wonder is that senior officers are able to exert any control or 
influence over their subordinates; but they can and do” (Waddington 
1999:241). 
 
McBarnet (1978, 1979,1983), looked at police abuses of due legal process and argued 
that the positioning of police malpractice within the lower ranks, “the fall guys of the 
legal system taking the blame for any injustices (McBarnett 1981:156) abrogated 
senior officers, the judiciary and politicians of responsibility for such behaviours. 
Whilst the abuses referred to by McBarnett were largely addressed by the provisions 
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of PACE (Reiner 1991) and were generally viewed as corruption, be it ‘noble cause,’ 
other forms of malpractice including the ‘gaming’ practices outlined earlier would be 
less vulnerable to legal remedy. However they too are encapsulated by Kleinig’s 
definition of corruption:  
 
“Police officers act corruptly when, in exercising or failing to exercise 
their authority, they act with the primary intention of furthering private 
or departmental/divisional advantage.” (1996:166) 
 
 
Klienig is of the view that corruption is primarily an ethical problem, legal and 
procedural elements being of secondary consideration, the motivation behind the acts 
being the critical ingredient “motivated by the spirit of corruption” (1996).  Newburn 
who carried out a literature review on police corruption concluded: 
 
“In attempting to define corruption, attention must be paid to the means, 
the ends and the motivation behind the conduct; corruption need not 
necessarily involve illegal conduct or misconduct on the part of a police 
officer (the goals of the action may be approved); corrupt acts may 
involve the use or abuse of organisational authority; corruption may be 
‘internal’ as well as ‘external’, i.e. it may simply involve two (or more) 
police officers; and the motivation behind the act is corrupt when the 
primary intention is to further private or organisational advantage” 
(Newburn 1999:7-8).  
 
The evidence to suggest the involvement of senior officers in ‘gaming’ behaviour is 
limited. Kappeler et al (1994) noted that senior officers entered into an ‘unholy 
alliance’ with junior officers, tolerating illicit activities as long as they were effective 
and Diaz (1995) suggested senior officers manipulated performance information to 
give a favourable impression of the organisation.  However the evidence to support 
such involvement is scarce and unlikely to be committed to paper. A rare exception 
involving ‘cuffing’ was uncovered by Burrows: 
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“an unusual instruction issued by the Metropolitan Police- which in effect 
advised officers not to record a burglary (by assuming an ‘intent to steal’) 
if there had been nothing stolen on entry to a property” (Burrows 
2000:6)11. 
 
The example cited by HMIC (1999) of a Superintendent advising officers not to 
expend any more effort in the investigation of a rape than a vehicle crime was only a 
verbal instruction which is difficult to corroborate. Young (1991) provided a more 
comprehensive view of the involvement of senior officers in ‘gaming’ behaviour than 
that proffered by Simon Holdaway’s perspective.  Young acknowledged the 
involvement of the lower ranks, particularly detectives, in manipulating crime data as 
a form of ‘easing the load’,  
 
“The first detectives I encountered in the 1950s …..were mostly cynical 
hard-bitten men who were fully conversant with the local political nuance 
and the machinations of the police committee. All of them manipulated 
their workloads with practiced ease, ensuring their formidable social life 
was not interfered with. They alone determined what was to be recorded 
as a crime and what would not” (Young 1990:319). 
 
 
This type of behaviour is a trait associated with many ‘street level bureaucrats’ Lipsky 
(1980). However, Young also pointed out that senior officers were aware of such 
practices 
 
“It seems obvious that the acquiescence of many senior officers in such 
trickery is necessary. They had come up through the ranks and must have 
known of such practices, for they would have had to follow the normal 
strategies in order to succeed; and in effect it was impossible for them not 
to know of the practice…so ‘cuffing’ was the order of the day everywhere, 
but could never be acknowledged” (Young 1990:324).  
 
                                                 
11 The offence of theft and burglary involves an intention to permanently deprive the owner of their 
property. What the intention of the suspect was at the time the offence was reported would usually be 
unknown. Hence the reluctance to record the offence as a crime at the time it was reported. 
 77
This observation of senior management’s role in ‘gaming’ subscribes to LeGrand’s 
(2003) analysis of  Performance Management in which managers who actively engage 
in or acquiesce to such practices (Knaves) can become the dominant ‘type’ if allowed 
to continue their practices unchallenged.  Bevan & Hood (2006) expanded this theme 
identifying four types of strategies managers employ in relation to ‘gaming’:  
 
 ‘Saints’ who may not share all of the goals of central controllers, but 
whose public service ethos is so high that they voluntarily disclose 
shortcomings to central authorities. 
 ‘Honest triers’ who broadly share the goals of central controllers, do not 
voluntarily draw attention to their failures, but do not attempt to spin or 
fiddle data in their favour. 
 ‘Reactive gamers’ who broadly share the goals of central controllers, but 
aim to game the target system if they have reasons and opportunities to 
do so. 
 ‘Rational maniacs’ who do not share the goals of central controllers and 
aim to manipulate data to conceal their operations.   
(Bevan & Hood 2006:522-3) 
 
Neyroud and Beckley acknowledged that chief officers were not immune to 
corruption and their involvement in such behaviours had contributed to the 
circumstances which led to Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary’s inquiry into 
‘integrity’ (HMIC 1999). 
 
Young had earlier identified some of the negative traits described by LeGrand (2003) 
and Bevan & Hood (2006) in senior police officers suggesting that the most senior 
officers in the service had distorted crime data for their own ends as they alternated 
between the need to reduce crime levels to provide reassurance to the public about the 
effectiveness of the service or increase crime levels in order to justify continued or 
increased investment in police resources: 
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“the world of ‘crimes’ and ‘offences’ seems, at times, to be a response as 
much to problems of shoring up the police social formation as to actual 
social problems. In every case, powerful chief officers and others of the 
ACPO ranks at the pinnacle of police prestige have only succeeded by 
mastering the etiquette and norms of police practice” (Young 1990:258).  
 
Maguire’s review of recorded crime data (1994) supports Young’s contention that 
crime levels were subject to police control and that that control was linked to the 
political objectives of police leaders. Kettle (1980); Reiner (1983) and Taylor (1999) 
came to similar conclusions. Hal Pepinsky in his unpublished study on police 
behaviour in one British city (cited by Maguire 1994:259-260) observed how police 
varied crime data in pursuit of extra resources. The phenomenon Pepinsky observed is 
encapsulated by Young: 
   
“Almost overnight in some forces the detectives were encouraged to 
record as much crime as possible, although in others where the influence 
of social change perhaps had less pronounced effect, the ‘cuffing’ 
continued unabated.” (Young 1991:325) 
 
During their observations of police officers at work Smith & Grey (1983) noted that 
senior officers tended to turn a ‘blind eye’ to the dubious practices being employed by 
officers under their command:  
 
“There is often a conflict between informal objectives and norms of 
working groups of police officers and the formal objectives of the 
organisation. The authoritarian style of management that we have 
described in this chapter tends to make the gap wider, because managers 
become distant from working groups and do not try to persuade them to 
adopt objectives that fit with the organisation’s objectives. In extreme 
cases (we have quoted some examples) this leads to a double think 
whereby the manager expects a working group to break formal rules but 
expects the groups to be careful to prevent him getting to know about it.” 
(Smith and Gray 1983:314) 
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Ericson (1981:87) referred to this trait as “organisational hypocrisy”.  More recently 
Chatterton (2008) cited examples which suggested the internal data quality controls 
implemented by senior management were largely ritualistic: 
 
“The groups were highly critical of the perceived duplicity of higher 
police management who were accused of issuing grand statements about 
the importance of police integrity but of ignoring the threats to integrity 
presented by the pressure they put on officers to achieve sanction 
detection targets. Let’s also be honest about this, the Powers that Be know 
what’s going on. OK their guidelines go out and we have data accuracy 
teams that look at stuff to make sure that we don’t go over the cliff. 
However, it’s random and that’s deliberate because we’re in a 
performance culture and whenever you are in any performance 
culture... as soon as you jump on board that train you can’t get 
off it. It goes on year after year and it gets tougher and tougher. 
What people do under the performance culture they ‘housekeep’ 
but you can only housekeep to a certain extent and then the 
following year, particularly when you do well, you get even harder 
targets. You can’t housekeep like that any more and that gets you 
into a very difficult situation because you are on that train. You have 
got to do something else then and that is when it starts getting 
ethically and morally wrong. I think we’ve hit that stage now with the 
politics behind it all. Certainly as far as I’m concerned we have got 
to the stage now where it’s getting a bit dangerous because we’re 
obsessed with it. Everybody is obsessed with it. It’s not just our 
rank. We have to pass it down as well and when you get to the 
stage where all the middle management teams are spending 50% 
of their entire working life on, (I’ll keep calling it housekeeping 
because I like housekeeping rather than what it really is), 
housekeeping the statistics, I find that incredible.” (Chatterton 2008:46) 
  
 
 
Waddington provided some explanation for the behaviour exhibited by senior officers 
concluding that they were obliged to be hypocritical as they were responsible for both  
producing results and maintaining internal discipline:  
 
 “They are aware that subordinates cannot police “according to the 
book”, but they are obliged to maintain the fiction that policing is rule-
governed. This creates the contradiction that police organizations are 
both “punishment-centred bureaucracies” and also notoriously indulgent; 
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for senior officers and middle ranking supervisors often give the “nod and 
a wink” to their subordinates, especially if the latter are achieving 
“results”. (Waddington 1999:132). 
 
Miller noted the correlation between high performing officers and corrupt behaviour 
and suggested that “performance measures such as crime and clear up statistics” 
should be used as a means of detecting suspicious conduct in relation to individual 
officers (Miller 2003:38). Miller’s approach subscribes to Sherman’s (1978) ‘slippery 
slope’ theory of corruption that minor misdemeanours lead to more serious infractions 
(Sherman, 1978) i.e. officers involved in ‘administrative corruption’ are more likely 
to be involved in receiving bribes etc. However this theoretical position is tempered 
by Feldberg (1985) who argued that most police officers "have a clear idea when to 
draw the line between petty gratuities and bribery" (Ibid 1985:268). According to 
Edward Shev (1977), the hierarchical militaristic organisation of police departments 
created corruption. Shev believed that because authority moves from top to bottom, 
ineffective and corrupt ‘street cops’ are not removed from duty and end up being 
promoted and allowed to influence other officers. Miller (2003) also acknowledged 
that supervisors were more concerned with under-performing officers than those who 
were producing results:  
 
“A potential problem identified by some PSU (Professional Standards 
Unit) staff, was the failure of supervisors or managers to look closely at 
officers who appeared to be performing well; Supervisors’ attention goes 
to those who aren’t performing, not those who are.” (Miller 2003:20) 
 
This, if allowed to go unchecked, is the type of mechanism which turns ‘knights’ into 
‘knaves’ (LeGrand 2003) or ‘Reactive gamers’ and ‘Rational maniacs’ (Bevan & 
Hood 2006) to become the dominant ‘type’. Collier (2005) argued that ‘good practice’ 
spread from police force to police force partly through the promotion of those who 
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had demonstrated successful performance. Whilst Collier didn’t refer to particular 
‘gaming’ practices in his research findings, he agreed12 that his theory of ‘competitive 
metamorphism’ would apply equally to the spread of ‘gaming’. Chatterton (2008) 
cited one example of officers, seeking to improve performance through learning from 
‘higher performers’, found that the methods being employed by their more successful 
counterparts were dubious:  
 
“The groups were concerned that despite the alleged concerns about 
ethics in policing, current pressure from the management system is 
inducing more competitiveness and compelling people to engage in even 
more dubious practices: ‘We can’t be truly ethical about this because the 
rest of the BCUs aren’t and we’re not going to be the worse performing 
BCU. So as soon as you get a good performing BCU people from other 
BCUs go there to find out what they are doing that is going to benefit 
victims of crime on their area [sarcastic]. And nine times out of ten 
it’s not to do with best practice, it’s to do with how their 
housekeeping is better than our housekeeping. That’s the way of 
life.” (Chatterton 2008:46-47) 
 
 
The ease with which the officers, cited in Chatterton’s study, were able to identify 
such ‘gaming’ practices again raises questions about the role of senior officers.  
Newburn (1999) and Punch (2000) identified poor supervision as a basis for 
malpractice and Lustgarten was clear on the role of senior management: 
 
“it is for those in charge of the organisation to change its ethos and 
working atmosphere, career rewards and disincentives, so that its 
members come to identify their interests, individually and collectively, 
with the desired behaviour. Training and effective management 
supervision to reinforce its strictures would be a central element in any 
reform strategy. (Lustgarten 1986:127).  
 
                                                 
12 Conversation recorded in field notes. 
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Whilst acknowledging the influence of informal organisational cultures Braunstein 
maintained this was no excuse for ineffective management: 
 
“An organisation’s past and present influences, beliefs, myths and 
patterns of behaviour – is powerful in shaping member behaviour and is 
itself open to being shaped by its members and by its leaders. Because 
leaders have formal power to shape the working environment, including 
sanctions and rewards for behaviour, they have disproportionate power 
for their numbers. When police leaders and administrators tolerate 
unethical organisational culture they are derelict in their duties and 
responsible for the unethical action of their troops” (Braunstein, 
1999:123). 
 
Managerial inactivity in maintaining proper standards was not however unique to the 
police service and Paine (1994) noted similar attributes in other organisations which 
he condemned:  
 
“managers who fail to provide proper leadership and to institute systems 
that facilitate ethical conduct share responsibility with those who 
conceive, execute and knowingly benefit from corporate misdeeds” (Paine 
1994:106). 
 
However, Waddington noted that ‘operational hypocrisy’ protected senior officers 
from legal responsibility as they could claim lack of knowledge and point to the 
numerous rules and sanctions barring such behaviours as proof of their condemnation: 
 
“Thus, senior officers can maintain “deniability” while allowing 
subordinates to flout strict interpretation of bureaucratic and legal rules. 
This, of course, serves only to discredit those rules further, for when the 
proverbial “wheel comes off” officers expect to be sacrificed and 
scapegoated for actions that were previously tacitly tolerated.” 
(Waddington 1999:132)   
 
The legal problems inherent in establishing who is responsible for the actions of 
individual members of staff  is not restricted to police organisations and Pfeffer & 
 83
Salancik (1978) noted the difficulties in holding management responsible for the 
behaviour of their subordinates:  
 
“belief in personal causation of events is also lodged in our legal system.  
Organisations are typically not criminally liable, only individual 
managers are.” (Pfeffer & Salancik 1978:150). 
 
 
For Goldstein (1960) and Zander (1994) the concept of individual officer 
responsibility was perfectly acceptable as they subscribed to the view that police 
officer’s behaviour was subordinate to the rule of law which provided a powerful 
incentive to officers to comply with legal rules. Such a position was also supported by 
many senior police officers who believed that unethical behaviour was ultimately an 
individual characteristic: 
 
“Good ethical cops do not need a rule to tell them not to steal, be brutal or 
plant evidence. They will not anyway. And if they are predisposed to do 
these things they will regardless of what the ‘book’ says because they – 
like criminals on the street – often do not believe they will get caught” 
(Tyre 1999:133). 
 
 
It should be noted that many of the ‘gaming’ practices referred to are not the subject 
of criminal laws although they are regulated by police internal codes of conduct 
which can result in disciplinary procedures. However some forms of police ‘gaming’ 
potentially contravene Human Rights legislation e.g. failing to investigate a victim’s 
report of a crime (cuffing) or indicating an individual was responsible for a crime on a 
police data base when there is insufficient evidence to justify such an action 
(DNFPA).  Neyroud and Beckley (2001) were of the opinion that Human Rights 
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Legislation, encapsulated in the ACPO ‘audit guide’ on the Human Rights Act, would 
transform police behaviour:  
 
“At the heart of the Act lies the challenge of further enhancing the 
transformation of our Police Service – within a more defined human 
rights culture. We need to do our business effectively, ethically and as 
transparently as possible within the confines of operational restrictions. 
This will be actively reinforced through best value legislation, which 
focuses on performance in service delivery. Performance in this context 
will mean the service looking critically at our ability to be compliant with 
legislative frameworks, of which Human Rights and Freedom of 
Information will be central in informing all aspects of organisational 
activity.” (ACPO 1999) 
 
 
14. STRATEGIES FOR CONTROLLING POLICE ‘GAMING’ BEHAVIOUR: 
 
Neyroud & Beckley (2001:156-159) have suggested that police corruption needs to be 
tackled in the same way as any other criminal behaviour and have recommended that 
Eckblom’s (1999) crime science approach should be adapted and applied  to police 
corruption: 
 
“to intervene to disrupt the conjunction of criminal opportunity, either by 
changing the situational or offender-related precursors in advance of the 
criminal event, or by preventing them coming together.” (Eckblom 
1999:10) 
  
 They took the causal factors of police corruption identified by Sherman (1974) and 
listed them under three headings which corresponded with the three elements of 
Eckblom’s model. Under the heading ‘distil’ they listed the causal factors: discretion; 
peer group and managerial secrecy; status of the police role; community structure and 
organisational factors: ‘proximal’ factors were listed as: low managerial visibility; 
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low public visibility; association with law breakers and legal opportunities for 
corruption through vice policing: ‘reinforcing’ factors were listed as lack of effective 
corruption controls; social organisation of the corruption; and moral cynicism.  
Neyroud and Beckley’s approach implies that the implementation of such a strategy 
should be an internal matter. This however assumes that the senior echelons of the 
police service are not directing, encouraging or benefiting from the problematic 
behaviour. They do however acknowledge that the integrity of chief officers of police 
was not to be taken for granted: 
 
 “A series of chief officers – historically immune from such personal – 
involvement found themselves on the wrong end of very public discipline 
inquiries. Such was the level of national concern that the Association of 
Police Authorities pushed the Home Secretary for an inquiry into the 
recruitment and appointment of senior officers.” (Neyroud & Beckley 
2001:12)     
 
 
Establishing the source and causality of all forms of police deviant behaviour 
including ‘gaming’ is crucial if it is to be tackled effectively. For Goldstein (2005) 
this was essential if public confidence was to be maintained: 
 
“Suggestions of a return to, or the need for, greater self-policing therefore 
invite close scrutiny of police organizational and cultural characteristics, 
past and present, and how they can frustrate accountability.  In 
particular, we need to ask how they strengthen public accountability of 
and confidence in the police” (Goldsmith 2005:3) 
 
 
If  the argument put forward by Delattre (1989) and Tyre (1999) that corruption is an 
individual trait, then identifying those personal characteristics and recruiting and 
developing those who exhibit positive characteristics and weeding out those who 
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deviate becomes the strategy for the prevention of ‘gaming’ along with other more 
serious forms of corruption. However Newburn (1999); Neyroud & Beckley (2001); 
and Miller (2003) suggest many forms of corrupt behaviour are organisational in 
nature and officers ‘become’ deviant after exposure to organisational factors: 
 
“the consistency of the themes across national and criminal justice 
boundaries provides compelling evidence that the problems confronting 
policing are neither isolated nor simply ‘events’.” (Neyroud & Beckley 
2001:13):    
 
The re-occurrence of similar forms of deviant behaviour led Neyroud and Beckley 
(2001:10) and Braunstein (1999) to refer to this phenomenon as a ‘boom and bust’ 
effect: 
 
“scandal brings in its wake an attempt to ‘clean up’ the agency. Usually 
reforms ensue. However, as public attention to specific organisational 
problems inevitably wanes, other ethical issues arise, giving rise in some 
communities to apparently endless cycles of corruption and reform” 
(Braunstein 1999:124). 
 
For Neyroud and Beckley (2001) one solution to unethical police behaviour lay in a 
move away from a ‘crime fighting’ style of policing to a more locally accountable 
‘order maintenance’ model as advocated, some years earlier, by Alderson (1979), 
Scarman (1981) and Wolff Olins (1988). However a previous generation of senior 
police officers in the US, epitomised by police chief O.W. Wilson who was of the 
opinion that policing should be free from local influences which could result in the 
uneven or partisan application of the law (cited in Elliston and Feldberg, 1985), a 
position supported by Sir Robert Mark the Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police 
in his response to Lord Scarman’s recommendations. However whatever style of 
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policing was adopted Goldsmith (2005) argued that there was a need for external 
scrutiny of the police:  
 
“Certainly, the case made over the past two decades for new, stronger 
forms of external oversight and control of policing rested firmly upon two 
factors of relevance: the ineffectiveness of internal control mechanisms in 
rendering the police publicly accountable, and the attribution of 
responsibility for many failures of performance and accountability for 
those failures to characteristics of informal cultures within police 
organizations” (Goldsmith 2005:2) 
 
Again the reference to the informal police culture as the source of inappropriate police 
behaviour which Chan argued was a “convenient label for a range of negative values, 
attitudes, and practice norms among police officers” (Chan 1996:10). It also implies 
that Senior Officers would be unable to exert any control over the officers under their 
command, a view challenged by Waddington:  
 
“it perversely allows senior officers “off the hook”, for whom voicing 
platitudes about “overturning police culture” (Woodcock 1991) and 
hand-wringing over its malign influence have become substitutes for 
effective action…..Attributing policy failure to the unreasoning 
obstruction of those who implement it is an effective, albeit reprehensible, 
strategy for deflecting blame.” (Waddington 1999:107)   
      
Waddington (1999) cited the ability of senior officers to reform the police use of 
firearms (Fyfe 1979, 1982; Reiss 1980; Sherman 1980, 1983) and the way domestic 
violence incidents were dealt with (Edwards 1994) as evidence of their influence over 
officers under their command.  
 
For Holdaway (1983) and Braunstein the means of controlling unethical behaviour 
was transparency on the part of the police and greater public participation in their 
control: 
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“when the police prevent the process, limiting public input or substituting 
their visions for the public’s the police are acting unethically” (Braunstein 
1999:126) 
  
 
Certainly the complicity of senior officers or their lack of desire to curtail malpractice 
highlighted in the literature reviewed suggests that external regulation was necessary.               
The use of independent regulators in the form of auditors or inspectors with the 
professional knowledge and expertise to provide political leaders with an assessment 
of the behaviour of the professionals providing the service has a long lineage and 
Aristotle noted:  
 
“Some Officials handle large sums of public money: it is therefore 
necessary to have other officials to receive and examine the accounts. 
These inspectors must administer no funds themselves. Different cities 
call them examiners, auditors, scrutineers and public advocates” (cited in 
Normanton 1966). 
 
Auditors traditionally concerned themselves with ‘how’ state finances were 
administered in order to ensure they were spent in the appropriate manner. Their role 
expanded with the growth and professionalization of the public sector where the 
required level of expertise necessary for the management of such complex public 
organisations made it difficult for lay members to challenge the judgement of the 
professional managers. However in some professions separate lines of accountability 
were created, on the grounds that only their peers were qualified to judge the actions 
of fellow professionals. The legal and medical professions epitomise such a concept 
of peer accountability. Whilst such a position appears logical when trying to assess 
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the actions of an expert in a highly technical environment it is the antithesis of 
accountability in the democratic sense: 
 
 “it is incompatible with the concept of accountability as a series of 
linkages leading from the people to those with delegated responsibilities 
via parliament and the managerial hierarchy since it brings on stage a set 
of actors who see themselves answerable to their peers, rather than to 
demos” (Day & Klein 1987). 
 
Whilst the spread NPM principles in general and Performance Management in 
particular were designed to address this tendency towards professional independence, 
the role of the audit function was extended from the purely financial, ensuring money 
was spent as authorised, to commenting on efficiency and effectiveness.  In 1961 the 
Whyatt Report concluded: 
 
 “It is clear, therefore, that there is a growing consciousness that a point 
has been reached in the development of public administration in this 
country when some machinery should be devised which will enable 
Parliament to exercise supervision and control over the general 
administration of Government Departments as effectively as the House of 
Commons does through the Public Accounts Committee and the 
Comptroller and Auditor-General in the financial field.” (Whyatt 1961). 
 
 
The Police Service had been subject to government inspection in the form of Her 
Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary since 1856. Forces were subject to annual 
inspections in order to ensure that the relevant Local Authority was providing an 
efficient service and HMIC issued each force with a certificate of efficiency following 
successful inspection (Raine, 2008). HMIC also advised the Home Secretary on 
policing matters. In the 1980s the Inspectorate was rejuvenated (Wilson et al 2001:76-
77; Waddington 1999) and the Police and Magistrates Court Act 1994 extended their 
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role to include judgments on effectiveness and value for money, however they were 
conscious that they needed to maintain a role in ensuring probity and standards 
(HMIC 1999): 
 
“the core business of HM Inspector of Constabulary is to encourage and 
monitor continuous improvement by police forces, and the issue of 
integrity is very much part of that process. Through inspection and day-
to-day contact, Her Majesty’s Inspector is confident HMIC will 
increasingly monitor integrity, the systems and the investigative and 
corrective measures for maintaining it, and Inspectors will become aware 
at an early stage of any failings. In the same way forces are urged to keep 
in view the human side of policing, HMIC, in its new role as ‘best value’ 
inspectors, will not lose sight of this important responsibility” (HMIC 
1999:69). 
 
 
Whilst constitutionally independent of the Home Office HMIC are responsible for 
ensuring Home Office policy set out in Home Office circulars is followed. The 
Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) has also engaged with the police service in a 
regulatory role following the Macpherson Report (1999) into the circumstances 
surrounding the death of Stephen Lawrence and a number of reports scrutinising 
police behaviour in relation to discrimination have been completed (CRE 2004 & 
2005 Morris 2003) and the Home Office has sponsored research on the issue (Foster 
et al 2005).  
 
The Audit Commission, established under the provisions of the Local Government 
Finance Act 1982, has also extended to embrace the police service and a number of 
reports have been produced recommending improvements in efficiency and 
effectiveness. The Audit Commission were also commissioned to validate the 
reliability of the data on crime recorded by the police on behalf of the PSU in order to 
ensure the probity of the information on which judgements on police performance 
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were based. However Argyris (1985) pointed out the limitations of audit based 
approaches to ensuring probity: 
 
“the dream of many management information system designers is to 
design a tamper-proof, guaranteed-to-catch-the-culprit information 
system. If they succeed, they will also succeed in superimposing on 
defensive routines a control system that will call the individuals to new 
heights of creativity on how to bypass the threatening features of the 
information system.” (Argyris 1985:417).     
  
 
The limitations of an audit approach to controlling ‘gaming’ was also commented 
upon by Bouckaert and Pollitt (2006) who noted the lack of robust evaluation of the 
benefits of NPM in general and Performance Management in particular: 
 
“In practice, however, the steps taken to check whether these 
performance improvements have actually been realized have often been 
‘too little, too late’- and very light on independence.” (Bouckaert & Pollitt 
2006:14)  
 
Bevan and Hood (2006:534) went even further suggesting that the persistence of 
‘gaming’, in the National Health System in particular and public services in general, 
were due in part to a tendency for government and its regulators to turn a blind eye to 
‘gaming’. 
 
Many years earlier Young (1990) had highlighted the dilemma involved in exposing 
malpractice and indicated the likely consequences of publicising the extent and nature 
of the ‘gaming’ type behaviours he had outlined: 
 
“To admit that ‘bending’ and ‘fiddling’ the account is the norm would be 
to acknowledge the fact that irreverence, disorder, and potential chaos 
sustains an institution which is allegedly geared to prevent its occurrence. 
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Such a world is not one that police habitus is structured to contend with 
or even acknowledge; for any admission could easily reverse the direction 
of the application of power.” (Young 1991:390) 
  
 
Onara O’Neill (2002) also pointed out that over-scrutiny can imply mistrust and lead  
professionals to deceive those who seek to exert control over them. This deception in 
turn leads to greater levels of distrust: 
 
“Currently fashionable methods of accountability damage rather than 
repair trust. If we want greater accountability without damaging 
professional performance we need intelligent accountability”. (O’Neill, 
2002, 57-58) 
 
O’Neill went on to expand on the concept of intelligent accountability: 
 
“Intelligent accountability, I suspect, requires more attention to good 
governance and fewer fantasies about total control. Good governance is 
possible only if institutions are allowed some margin for self-governance 
of a form appropriate to their particular tasks” (2002:58).   
 
This theme is reflected in Power’s work on the auditing of organisational 
performance: 
 
“There are clearly many circumstances where we think that some 
checking and monitoring is justified and where it would be unreasonable 
not to learn from the experience of disappointed expectations.  What we 
need to decide, as individuals, organizations, and societies, is how to 
combine checking and trusting.  What kind of activities should be 
checked? How much explicit checking is enough?  How does checking 
affect those who are checked and when does the demand for monitoring 
become pathological?  Can the benefits of checking be clearly 
demonstrated? (Power, 1997:2) 
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Power was concerned that scrutiny mechanisms would become predictable and easy 
to circumvent: 
 
“the audit society is a society that endangers itself because it invests too 
heavily in shallow rituals of verification at the expense of other forms 
of organizational intelligence” (Power, 1997:123).  
 
He went on to suggest that checks should be random and that the use of 
‘whistleblowers’ should be encouraged by the regulators, a strategy endorsed by the 
Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) (2005:183)13.  Power’s approach appears 
consistent with internal reform involving police management in maintaining 
appropriate standards of behaviour and the official response, to the corruption 
scandals involving a number of Australian police forces, endorsed such a response: 
 
“The Commission is firmly of the view that the Service [NSW Police] 
should endeavour to move from the formal adversarial model to a more 
managerial or remedial model that places the responsibility on 
commanders at patrol or equivalent level to deal with complaints and 
matters of discipline. … The best platform for change does not involve the 
preparation of a new set of rules and regulations and the imposition of a 
more vigorous regime for their enforcement. Rather it involves the 
Service setting proper professional standards and then doing whatever it 
can to encourage its members, in a managerial way, to lift their 
performance. Unless this is achieved, no system of discipline or complaint 
management will ever bring about reform. At best it will be a safety net 
(Wood, 1997b, 330) 
 
 However Goldsmith concluded: 
 
“Ultimately we will need to trust our monitors and accountability systems 
to do the right thing” (2005: 465).  
 
                                                 
13 The IPCC are the designated appropriate body for police officers to make disclosures under the 
provisions of the Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998. 
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15. CHAPTER CONCLUSION: 
 
It is clear from the literature reviewed that for performance management to be 
successful as a means of holding the police to account it is essential that ‘gaming’ is 
controlled. The particular types of ‘gaming’ behaviour peculiar to policing have been 
identified. The different views on the causal factors behind such behaviours have been 
outlined. Whilst the current consensus of opinion suggests the phenomenon is 
organisational in nature the scale is unknown and role of senior management in its 
persistence is disputed.   
 
Establishing the existence and scale of current ‘gaming’ behaviour appears to be the 
key to making an informed comment on the role of police management and those 
bodies charged with regulating and governing the police service in England and 
Wales.           
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY: 
 
The review of the literature on Performance Management suggests that ‘gaming’ 
behaviours need to be effectively controlled if performance management systems are 
to deliver their full potential. The literature on police deviance indicates that police 
‘gaming’ practices can have a significant impact on performance measures although 
the extent to which these practices persist today is disputed, HMIC (1999) stating that 
they are confined to small pockets, Burrows et al (2000) that they are more 
widespread. The organisational nature of police ‘corruption’ is supported by the 
literature although the role of senior management in ‘administrative’ or ‘noble cause’ 
corruption is disputed (Braunstein (1999) vs. Tyre (1999). The regulatory framework 
appears extensive although there are few detailed studies on the effectiveness of the 
various regulatory bodies. 
 
The aim of this thesis is to explore those disputed areas in order to provide some 
resolution and examine the workings and impact of the regulatory bodies. The 
research questions can therefore be stated more fully as: 
 
“What is the extent of gaming practices that have developed in response to 
introduction of Performance Management?” 
 
“What has been the impact of the regulators on ‘gaming’ practices?”          
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The research design has been structured into three distinct phases and the 
methodology incorporates elements of both ‘Grounded Theory’ (Glaser & Strauss 
1967) and ‘Analytic Induction’ (Znaniecki 1934). Whilst the research relies heavily 
on quantitative data this is supplemented with elements of qualitative research. In 
addition it builds upon the author’s background as a practitioner. The study has 
involved a certain amount of ethnographic style research, in particular by drawing on 
the experience of other practitioners with specialist knowledge. In this way the 
research has explored and sought an understanding of the phenomenon in accordance 
with an interpretive hermeneutic approach. 
 
The first phase of the research design was primarily ‘grounded’ in the data and 
documents collected by the author as part of his day to day functions of a police 
middle manager. It could therefore be said that the evidence was gathered prior to the 
precise formulation of any hypothesis thus conforming to one of the major tenets of 
‘grounded theory’. As the data was being collected without any theoretical constraints 
it avoided the methodological pitfalls identified by Wax: 
 
“Strict and rigid adherence to any method, technique or doctrinaire 
position may, for the fieldworker, become like a confinement in a cage.  If 
he is lucky or very cautious, a fieldworker may formulate a research 
problem so that he will find all the answers he needs within his cage.  But 
if he finds himself in a field situation where he is limited by a particular 
method, theory, or technique he will do well to slip through the bars and 
try to find out what is really going on.” (Wax, 1971:10)      
 
That said the data being collected was not random but shaped by the author’s previous 
training in applied social science techniques and an academic interest in Performance 
Management. Whilst the positions the author occupied during the period covered by 
the research provided “a distinct opportunity …..to perceive reality from the 
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viewpoint of someone “inside” the case study rather than external to it.” (Yin 
1994:88), it does of course encounter the problem of researcher bias (Yin 1994: 87-
89) with the selection of documents and their interpretation potentially vulnerable to 
being shaped by the author’s own perspectives. Beck (1992) and Harris (2001) 
advocate that the author’s background and involvement in the research should be 
declared in order for the reader to place the research in context. For that reason a short 
resume of the author’s career has been provided at the start of the thesis. 
 
This ‘grounded’ first phase of the research, which was primarily confined to an 
examination of the West Midlands Police force, yielded information on a number of 
different forms of police ‘gaming’ behaviour.  These were consistent with ‘gaming’ 
practices outlined in the literature and enabled the behaviours to be categorised into a 
typology of four forms of ‘police gaming. As such the approach followed a method 
advocated by Burgess as it:   
 
“relies upon the researcher blending together personal experience with 
theories and data in order to make some contribution to our 
understanding of the social world.” (Burgess 1984:183)    
 
 
The development of a typology conforms to Weber’s concept of ‘ideal types’: 
 
“formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and 
by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete more or less present and 
occasionally absent concrete individual phenomenon…arranged 
according to those one sidedly emphasised viewpoints into a unified 
analytic construct” (Rogers 1969:17). 
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 This methodological tool makes explicit the “unique individual characteristics of a 
cultural phenomenon” (ibid.28) and enables the construction of a model which can be 
used to categorise and conceptualise the phenomenon under study. 
 
The thesis relies heavily on statistics and documents, linking known incidents or 
events involving ‘gaming’ practices to changes in the statistical profile of forces. The 
documents referred to explain the ‘gaming’ practices and explanation for interpreting 
the changes in the statistics. The patterns revealed in the performance data provide an 
indication of the scale of police behaviours in this regard.  Whilst the links between 
the two are generally self evident, it was considered important to reinforce the 
author’s interpretations by reference to third parties, who could provide a more 
independent perspective. This is approach, known as ‘investigative triangulation’ 
(Denzin 1970) guards against researcher bias. To this end interviews were conducted 
with two sets of West Midlands Police officers: one set being former police officers 
who had served in the West Midlands Police during the period 1994 – 2005.  
Three officers carried out specialist functions which provide them with an insight into 
the impact of Performance Management on specific force functions; a further 
interviewee provided a view of the changes from a general operational perspective. 
Their areas of expertise are outlined below:  
Interviewee D                                           Crime Policy 
Interviewee E                                            Child Protection 
Interviewee F                                             Operational 
Interviewee G                                             Diversity 
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These officers reviewed the evidence gathered by the author and filled in some 
knowledge gaps in relation to their specialist policy areas thus providing 
“corroborative evidence for his own observations and apercus” (Burns 1972:3). 
 
The second set of interviewees had all served in the West Midlands Police prior to 
1994. They reviewed and offered their interpretation on specific data sets and 
documents relating to the West Midlands Police over the period of the study.  These 
officers, all now retired from the police service, were selected because they were 
known to have specific skills and experience in the interpretation of performance data 
and/or audit/inspection.  Their areas of expertise are outlined below:  
 
Interviewee A                       Staff Officer: Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary 
Interviewee B                        Staff Officer: Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary 
Interviewee C                       Member: Association of Chief Officers of Police 
 
Two of the interviewees (A & C) had published academic works on the impact of 
Performance Management on the police service.  The author had had limited contact 
with these officers since they left the West Midlands Police, although knowledge of 
their career profiles did contribute to their selection and no doubt personal contact in 
the past contributed to securing their co-operation.    
 
The interviews with these three interviewees (A, B, & C) needed careful planning. 
The interviews were structured into two parts; a semi structured interview 
(APPENDIX A) was conducted in which their views on the impact of Performance 
Management on the police service in general and the West Midlands Police in 
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particular was elicited. The second part involved them responding to the data and 
documents collected by the author during the first phase of the research. In the initial 
interview none of these interviewees attributed the performance of the West Midlands 
Police to ‘gaming’ practices although all three indicated that they believed a 
subscription to performance management techniques had improved the force’s 
performance. That view changed once they had examined the evidence presented to 
them. A list of all the interviewees, their particular qualifications and the documents 
they reviewed are provided (APPENDIX B), a summary of the documents they 
reviewed is provided (APPENDIX C).   
 
All interviews were tape recorded (on the understanding that, although their personal 
details would be anonymised, it would be impossible to conceal completely their 
identity from those they had worked with in the past because their career profiles, 
skills and expertise identified them). All agreed to participate under those conditions. 
Retired officers were selected as this was felt necessary to avoid them feeling 
restrained by their employment status. Whilst, no doubt, it would also have been 
beneficial to obtain the views of currently serving chief officers on the documentation 
under review, this was considered infeasible and rejected as a research strategy 
because of the likelihood of responses being either defensive or unduly influenced by 
their position. However, public pronouncements by senior officers on some of the 
‘events’ or occurrences involving ‘gaming’ behaviours were used as a means of 
eliciting their explanations. This approach was similar to the rationale adopted by Van 
Maanen in his selection of rank and file officers as interviewees:   
     
“Not only do they make better informants (reveal more)…… Not only do 
they have less to lose objectively, but they are under less strain to appear 
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faultless to either their internal or external audiences” (Van Maanen 
1974:88). 
 
 
 
The second phase of the research conformed to an ‘Analytic Inductive’ approach 
following the steps listed by Robinson (1951:813):  
 
1. Definition of  the phenomenon to be explained:  In this case police ‘gaming’ 
practices linked to Performance Management – particularly ‘cuffing’, 
‘nodding’, ‘skewing’ and ‘stitching’. 
2. Formulation of a hypothetical explanation of the phenomenon:  The 
fluctuations in the statistical data, collected and examined during the first 
phase of the research, were hypothesised as being attributable to ‘gaming’. 
3. Testing of the hypothesis against the case: similar occurrences involving 
‘gaming, were identified and subjected to statistical analysis. It was 
hypothesised that patterns would be evident from an examination of the 
performance data. 
4. Reformulation of the hypothesis if the initial one does not fit the evidence or 
redefinition in order to exclude the particular case:  Only minor 
reformulations were necessary.  
5. Practical certainty is achieved with a small number of cases but negative 
cases disprove the explanation and require reformulation. Statistical patterns 
were evident in police forces known to have experienced ‘gaming’ practices in 
the past, prior to the commencement of the research. The patterns were also 
evident in those forces where ‘gaming’ practices were exposed during the 
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period of the study, thus supporting the hypothesis that ‘gaming’ practices 
persisted. 
6. The examination of cases, redefinition of the phenomenon and reformulation 
of the hypothesis is continued until a universal relationship is established: The 
consistency of the behaviours studied suggests that the phenomenon was 
influenced by social forces. However it was also evident that such behaviours 
could be changed and therefore were not the product of some all 
encompassing universal law in a ‘positivist’ context.     
(Robinson 1951:813) 
 
This second phase of the research involved reviewing Home Office, HMIC 
documents, media reports and academic articles in order to identify incidents 
involving similar types of ‘gaming’ experienced by the West Midlands Police. On-
line internet chat rooms used by police officers e.g. www.Policeoracle.com were also 
scanned to obtain evidence of ‘gaming’. Once ‘incidents’ or ‘events’ involving 
‘gaming’ were identified the statistical performance profile of the force concerned 
was examined in order to establish if a similar pattern associated with ‘gaming’ 
practices noted in the West Midlands Police performance data sets was discernible. 
The identification of similar statistical patterns in other police forces, known to have 
experienced ‘gaming’, helped establish the consistency and scale of the phenomenon 
and reinforced the interpretation of the statistical evidence from the West Midlands 
Police. The consistent nature of the patterns associated with ‘gaming’ behaviour 
provided ‘external validation’ (Burgess 1997:143-144).  
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The primary use of statistical data sources to measure police organisational behaviour 
as opposed to the level of reported crime or offences brought to justice conforms to 
the approach advocated by Kitsuse and Cicourel (1963) who maintained that recorded 
police crime statistics were merely ‘indices of organisational processes’ of little value 
in the study of the phenomenon they purported to measure. Supporting this approach 
Black (1970) concluded that recorded crime rates were ‘an aspect of social 
organisation’ of value only for the purpose of studying those who produced the data.  
 
Basic data on recorded crime and detections was initially accessed from the published 
Home Office annual crime bulletins. However the scrutiny carried out during the 
research required access to the unpublished specific data on individual offence types 
and access to the data on offences subject of ‘no criming’ procedures. The 
unpublished more specific data on how offences were disposed off by ‘detection’ type 
was also required. This data was made available by the Home Office under the 
provisions of the Freedom of Information Act (FOI) 2000. A number of other requests 
for unpublished documents were also made under the provisions of the FOI. Only a 
small number of requests were withheld under the provisions of the Act and in only 
one case was an appeal submitted to the Information Commissioner. The full details 
of this are referred to in the main body of the thesis.  
 
The introduction of a ‘false reported’ policy (designed to counter individuals seeking 
to report crimes that had not occurred in order to defraud their insurance companies) 
corresponded with a marked reduction in recorded crime in the West Midlands Police 
area. In order to establish if other forces had introduced similar policies and 
experienced similar reductions in recorded crime levels a letter was sent to all forces 
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requesting copies of any such policy; the date it was introduced, and any assessment 
of the nature of the problem it was designed to address. A ‘problem profile’ produced 
as part of the National Intelligence Model (NIM) process was anticipated from those 
force which had introduced the policy. It was also expected that the policy would be 
subject to some form of assessment under the provisions of the Race Relations 
(Amendment) Act 2000 which placed a duty of all forces to carry out an ‘impact 
assessment’ on all policies. The requests were made under the provisions of the FOI 
which enabled police forces to disclose the information required. The letters were sent 
in August 2006 and by April 2007 all the responses had been returned. Once the 
replies were received it was possible to observe if the introduction of the policy 
corresponded with a reduction in recorded crime. 
 
Exploring if improvements in performance were due to ‘skewing’ organisational 
effort away from the investigation of ‘serious’ crime towards less serious and often 
easier to solve crimes did prove difficult, partly due to inconsistencies in the recording 
and detecting procedures employed by the police over time.  However the research on 
crime recording procedures and detections rates had provided some understanding of 
the variables influencing the crime recording and detection rates. Sexual offences and 
child abuse were specifically chosen as the ‘serious’ crime types for analysis because 
neither happened to be subject to central government performance indicators until 
2005. Even then, forces’ performance grades were based on an assessment by HMIC 
as opposed to the number of such crimes recorded and/or detected. These offences 
were also chosen because they had been identified as vulnerable to shifts in priorities 
(HMIC 1999) - a point reiterated by Peter Neyroud, the chief executive of the 
National Policing Improvement Agency (The Times 13.11.2007). In anticipation that 
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inter-force statistical analysis would prove problematic, a factor identified by 
HMIC/HMcpsi (2007), it was necessary to rely heavily on the internal documentation 
appertaining to the West Midlands Police and on case studies which had occurred in 
this force area.   
 
The methodology employed to assess any physical re-deployment of police officers 
influenced by recorded crime data and/or government priorities, involved recording 
changes to constable establishments (number of constables allocated to each police 
command unit) over the period when the West Midlands Police was reorganised into a 
Basic Command Unit (BCU) structure in 1997. This was done by superimposing data 
on the number of constables allocated to each BCU on to maps depicting levels of 
deprivation and reported incidence rates for various crime categories. This provided a 
simple but very visual approach to analysis (Patrick 2004a and 2004c). Difficulties of 
accessing the equivalent data in other police force areas curtailed this methodological 
approach to the West Midlands Police area only.  
 
The unlawful nature of ‘stitching’ type behaviours makes it difficult to quantify from 
national statistics on detections. In this case some insight and quantification is 
provided from official documents examined as part of the research. 
   
 
 
The third part of the research involved a review of the performance of the various 
regulators. Examining the official documents relating to those forces which had been 
identified with various types of ‘gaming’ behaviours provided an insight into the 
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workings of the official police regulators. By identifying the action taken by the 
regulators is was possible to comment on their effectiveness in controlling ‘gaming’ 
in the police service. 
 
During the course of the research it was established that one Police Authority had 
challenged the introduction of a ‘false reporting’ policy. A Police Authority 
performance officer from this force was interviewed in order to establish the rational 
for their opposition. An experienced journalist14 was also asked to comment on an 
unpublished HMIC inspection report in order to gauge the reaction of the media to 
such information. The Fawcett Society, a charitable body established to promote the 
rights of women, made public the un-published results of Home Office research on 
the conviction rates for rape by police force area, during the research. An interview 
was conducted with a representative of the Fawcett Society in order to establish how 
they had accessed the data how effective they felt publication had been in pursuing 
the objectives of their organisation.       
 
It was anticipated that the ‘triangulation’ of different methodologies (Denzin 1970), 
provided ‘internal’ and ‘external’ validation (Burgess 1997:143-144). The close 
analysis of the experience of the West Midlands Police provided the micro level of 
analysis and interpretation which could then be used as a template on which to base 
further national analysis as statistical patterns were sought in other forces and 
nationally. 
                                                 
14 Chosen because he was resident in the West Midlands and willing to invest the time and effort 
reviewing the document which was too dated to be newsworthy. 
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The mix of academic and practitioner methodologies, the use of audit approaches and 
legal devices such as the Freedom of Information Act followed an approach 
advocated by Leeuw: 
 
“I believe that the strong points of evaluation (the methodology applied 
and attention paid to theories and theory-driven evaluations) with the 
strong points of audit (the orientation towards management, the focus on 
following the money, and the attention paid to documentary evidence) 
may lead to a new inter-discipline in the twenty-first century.” (Leeuw 
1996:69)   
 
The ethical issues involved in the collection of documentary evidence are overcome 
by the use of the Freedom of Information Act 2000. Whilst many of the documents 
used as data sources were already in the public domain some were not. These internal 
documents, after all, were never expected to be released to the public and the candid 
nature of their content is testimony to that. They are however legitimate sources of 
evidence under the Freedom of Information Act 200015. In any case the nature and 
consequences of the evidence uncovered would outweigh any ethical considerations 
in favour of protecting those responsible. In fact suppression of the evidence would be 
a much more serious breach of ethics.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 Copyright law does make their reproduction in full difficult however referencing their content is not problematic. (Copies of 
the full documents can, in any case, be obtained directly from the source organisations under the provisions of the Freedom of 
Information Act).  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
CRIME RECORDING AND ‘CUFFING’: 
 
An introduction to crime recording, ‘cuffing’, and the National Crime Recording 
Standard (NCRS)   
 
1. INTRODUCTION: 
 
For Performance Management to be fairly utilised as a means of control it is essential 
that the data on which it is based is both reliable and relevant. Indeed Bevan and 
Hood (2006) suggested the system used to capture the statistical information on 
performance must be ‘game proof’. In the case of the police service this involved 
designing a system which prevents the under-recording, ‘cuffing’ (Young 1991) or the 
over-recording of reported crime, (Farringdon & Dowds (1985); Wilson et al 2001)16. 
The evidence from the literature reviewed in chapter 2 suggests that ‘cuffing’ was the 
more prevalent form of ‘gaming’ in this area. The first step in designing the current 
system was defining unambiguously what constituted a crime and when it would be 
recorded by the police as such. This was necessary to achieve ‘a level playing field’, 
so that the performance of similar police forces and command units could be 
compared. Tight definitions and systems for capturing the data were required in order 
to prevent officers failing to record reported crimes or recording offences as lesser 
crimes (FitzGerald et al 2001). Legal definitions, e.g. the definition of theft is 
contained in the Theft Act, were used to categorise incidents as crimes according to 
the law which has been breached. However police officers are still required to use 
their expert knowledge to interpret the circumstances outlined by the victim into the 
                                                 
16 These are more related to the practices covered in the chapter on ‘nodding’ as they were designed to 
improve the detection rate: suspects admitting offences which had not been previously recorded.    
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legal framework which determines whether a particular incident is a breach of the 
criminal law and therefore constitutes a ‘crime’ which they will record and 
investigate. The use of police officer discretion at the point of contact with the victim 
was a potential weak point in the crime recording system as officers decided whether 
or not a crime had been committed or not. Curtailing the inappropriate use of officer 
discretion as a filtering device was therefore of paramount importance. Ensuring tight 
definitions also facilitated a robust auditing regime, another important element of a 
performance management system.  The interpretation and any clarification of the rules 
are overseen by the Home Office; auditing the reliability of the recorded crime data is 
the responsibility of the Police Standards Unit (PSU) which sub-contracts the actual 
auditing to the Audit Commission. In the past Her Majesty’s Inspector of 
Constabulary (HMIC) checked the reliability of recorded crime data as part of their 
scrutiny function however that responsibility was passed to the PSU in 2002.  In this 
chapter the current crime recording system is examined in order to determine the 
extent to which it is ‘game proof’. 
 
CHAPTER STRUCTURE: 
The chapter examines the threat ‘cuffing’ poses to the establishment of a crime 
recording system reliable enough for control purposes and explains the rationale 
behind the National Crime Recording Standard (NCRS). Other factors which 
influence recording levels are also identified and discussed.  
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2. THE THREAT POSED BY ‘CUFFING’: 
 
In the UK the accuracy of recorded crime data has been the subject of academic 
interest for a number of years: McCabe & Sutcliffe (1978); Steer (1980); Bottomley 
& Coleman (1981); Ekblom & Heal (1982); Farringdon & Dowds (1985); Burrows 
(1986); Burrows & Tarling (1987); Farrington & Burrows (1993);Young (1990); 
HMIC (1996); Coleman & Moynihan (1996); Waddington (1999); HMIC (1999); 
Burrows et al (2000);  Wilson et al (2001); and FitzGerald (2002).  The ‘gaming’ 
practices which lead to the intentional unwarranted under-recording of crime 
identified by these studies is referred to as ‘cuffing’ (Young 1990). This term is used 
in some of the literature to refer to the practice (Burrows et al 2000; Wilson et al 
2001). The ‘cuffing’ documented in the academic literature referenced above was 
facilitated by a subscription to an ‘evidential’ crime recording standard (Burrows et al 
2000) which required the victim to provide evidence of sufficient weight to convince 
an officer that a crime had actually been committed. For example a shopkeeper 
reporting a window smashed would have to establish that it had not been broken 
accidentally e.g. by a stone flicked up by a passing vehicle.  Or a person who had had 
their purse stolen from their shopping bag would have to prove that they had not 
simply lost it. Both these incidents are difficult to prove conclusively without 
witnesses and, in the past, might well not have been recorded by the police. Whilst 
opinions on the extent to which cuffing was still prevalent are divided; HMIC (1999) 
maintaining that it was minimal, Burrow’s et al (2000) that it was still a significant 
factor experiencing a renaissance associated with the advent of performance 
management. In order to standardise crime recording procedures throughout England 
and Wales the Government introduced the National Crime Recording Standard 
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(NCRS). It was hoped that this would ensure consistency across the country 
(Simmons et al 2003). 
 
3. THE GOVERNMENT’S STRATEGY TO DELIVER A RELIABLE AND 
CONSISTENT RECORDING SYSTEM: 
 
The National Crime Recording Standard (NCRS) was introduced in April 2002 in 
order to address the flaws identified (Wilson et al 2001) and was heralded by the then 
Home Secretary David Blunkett’s comment: 
 
“It is vital to measure crime accurately if we are to be able to tackle it 
effectively.”    (July 2001). 
 
 
The NCRS states: 
 
• Following the initial registration, an incident will be recorded as a crime 
(notifiable offence) if, on the balance of probability: 
• (a) the circumstances as reported amount to a crime defined by law  
• (the police will determine this, based on their knowledge of the law and 
counting rules), and 
• (b) there is no credible evidence to the contrary. 
(Home Office 2006: Appendix A) 
 
 
The NCRS aimed to underpin the performance framework and police forces with 
similar demographic characteristics and crime levels were placed in family groups 
enabling their performance to be compared against their peers and national averages.  
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The NCRS also aimed to enhance victim sovereignty by encouraging a victim 
focussed approach to crime recording thus enhancing trust in the police. An 
‘evidential’ standard usually resulted in the victim having to prove that a crime had 
occurred and in some cases endure rigorous cross examination from the investigating 
officer. However the NCRS did not remove officer discretion as the ‘balance of 
probabilities’ element still allowed the recording officer to make the final judgment 
on whether a crime had occurred or not: 
 
“NCRS can be seen as a shift towards a prima facie based model of crime 
recording, although it should be stressed that the NCRS does not imply 
pure ‘prima facie’ crime recording” ( Simmons et al 2003:3-4). 
 
Prior to the introduction of the NCRS in April 2002 there were two extremes of 
recording:  
 
“The ‘prima facie’ model, where details of allegations are accepted 
without scrutiny, and the ‘evidential’ model, where details require to be 
substantiated before a crime record was made” (Burrows et al 2000: vii). 
 
However the position of individual forces on the continuum between ‘prima facie’ 
and ‘evidential’ standards, prior to the introduction of the NCRS, was unknown. 
There was also a change in the interpretation of the NCRS during the period of this 
research. In October 2005 the Home Office advised that the ‘balance of probabilities’ 
criteria should only apply to ‘third party’ reports e.g. where a witness observed a 
crime and reported it to the police, in the absence of confirmation directly from the 
victim. This appeared at odds with documentation from the West Midlands Police 
which demonstrated that the ‘balance of probabilities’ standard was being applied in 
that force to all reports, including those made by the victim. However in September 
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2006, it was confirmed by the Home Office that the ‘balance of probabilities’ criteria 
should apply to all reports17.  It is not known exactly when, in the period between 
2002 and September 2006, or why this change occurred. (It was also noted that a 
change in personnel had occurred in the Home Office department responsible for 
overseeing the NCRS. In 2005 a senior Home Office statistician carried out the role of 
NRCS ‘guardian’; in 2006 the function was being discharged by a Police 
Superintendent on secondment to the Home Office). This change in interpretation 
confirmed that the individual officer to whom a crime was reported still had the 
discretion to record the crime or not. One of the interviewees in this research, who 
had a good knowledge and experience of the NCRS and its interpretation, was of the 
opinion that the ‘balance of probabilities’ standard was too ‘loose’ for control 
purposes: 
 
“The national document [NCRS] is a fudge….you are giving them a 
subjective standard, you are allowing them to assess subjectively if a 
crime has been recorded or not and of course what they will do is if it 
suits them is say well my belief is that there isn’t sufficient evidence to 
support and somebody else could say ‘there is’, so you end up back almost 
to where you were originally, if you wanted it to be.” (Interviewee D) 
 
 
Forces which had encountered problems involving crime recording procedures, 
tended to respond by adopting a ‘prima facie’ standard, e.g. Nottinghamshire and 
Greater Manchester Police (GMP) as Burrows et al noted: 
 
“Both of these forces have faced recent criticism (circa 1997) 18of their 
crime recording practices by HMIC19. In response both have invested 
                                                 
17 Field Notes of Conversations with staff at the Home Office RDS. 
18 Inserted by author 
19 Exact reference not provided in source document footnote comments “This also encompasses crime 
detections: in recent year, GMP has decided to abandon ‘post sentence visits’, leading its clear up rate 
to fall from 34 per cent in 1993 to 18 per cent in 1997 (HMI report)” (Burrows et al 2000:37)    
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heavily in reforming past practices. At GMP HQ, for example, senior 
officers are more ready to ‘own up’ to what they now view as malpractice. 
This interestingly included liberal use of the phrase “for want of 
prosecution”, to justify why an incident would not be recorded as a 
crime.” (2000:37). 
 
The West Midlands Police also adopted a ‘prima facie’ standard after HMIC 
uncovered ‘cuffing’ in the form of unofficial (separate) registers, referred to as,  
‘Miscellaneous Enquiry Registers’ in which various reported crimes were recorded 
(1999:20). On one command unit; 6 allegations of rape; 6 indecent assaults; 3 
indecent exposures; 4 abductions; 4 threats to kill; 12 assaults; 7 robberies; 40 arsons; 
13 attempted burglaries; 25 frauds; 21 thefts and 6 theft of, or from, motor vehicles 
had been recorded in the Miscellaneous Enquiry Registers between 1 April and 16th 
October 1998 (HMIC/WMP 1998:20). However not all the force’s command units 
were employing this method of improving their ‘performance’: 
 
“The E cluster20 Crime Bureau Register with over 1,000 entries appears 
to be mainly used for tracking correspondence and is cross-referenced 
with crime report/CRIMES number; only 5 of the 180 entries examined 
appear to be missing crime reports.” (HMIC/WMP 1998:21)       
 
HMIC went on to recommend: 
 
“It is vitally important that all allegations and subsequent investigations 
are auditable against the Force’s “Policy and Guidance” and that 
transparency is maintained thus ensuring the integrity of the system.” 
(HMIC/WMP 1998:21)   
 
One of the interviewees commented on these registers: 
 
                                                 
20 Command Units were grouped into clusters of two or three for administration purposes at this time.  
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“There were things like rapes, allegations of rapes and all stuff like that in 
there. But in all fairness it was because they were the type of things which 
were ‘in between’- there was no attempt to hide stuff. I don’t think.” 
(Interviewee F) 
 
Of particular interest was the methodology HMIC applied to identify the statistical 
patterns indicative of the presence of ‘cuffing’. This involved looking for the 
exception to the general pattern, a technique widely practiced in manufacturing to 
identify under performers or over performers who may be achieving high output at the 
cost of quality.  The low percentage of crime reports recorded and subsequently de-
classified by a supervisory officer as ‘no crime’ in comparison with other similar 
forces signified the likelihood, (subsequently confirmed), that reported crimes were 
being filtered out or ‘cuffed’ at an earlier stage of the recording process:  
 
“According to the Matrix Data the Force recorded 3,963 “no crimes” in 
1997/98. This represents 1.5% of all notifiable crime which is lower than 
the provincial (3.5%) and the most similar forces (2.2) averages. However 
the latest figures supplied by the Force states that in 1997/9821 only 458 
“no crimes” were recorded which equates to 0.2% of the total notifiable 
crimes” (HMIC/WMP 1998:25) 
 
 
 
Much in line with Collier’s theory of ‘competitive isomorphism’ (Collier 2005), this 
finding suggests the practice of ‘cuffing’ was spreading within the force It also 
suggested that the practice was primarily driven by the perceived need to achieve 
managerial performance targets. Certainly such procedures were likely to have been 
evident to the senior officers on the Command Units involved as the Miscellaneous 
Enquiry Registers were maintained by call handling administrative units under the 
direct supervision of management teams. The registers were brought to the attention 
of the staff officers by a junior member of staff: 
                                                 
21 This appears to be an error and should read 1998/99 
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“It was when they [HMIC staff officers] were talking to one of the 
operators asking why isn’t this crimed, that crimed, we can’t find them 
“well you’ll find them in the book on the side” what we used to call the 
M.O.B. book22 and they were maintaining a book of that sort in the ops. 
room.” (Interviewee D) 
 
The nature of the ‘gaming’ practices uncovered during the inspection were similar to 
those noted in Nottinghamshire Constabulary when a Superintendent reported the 
force to the Police Complaints Authority for investigation (Wilson et al 2001). 
However, unlike Nottinghamshire, the West Midlands Police was not subjected to any 
formal inquiry although the ‘gaming’ practices uncovered featured prominently in 
HMIC’s report on integrity (1999).  
 
 The West Midland Police force management team responded to the criticism 
vigorously requiring the management teams on those command units found to be 
using alternative crime registers to ‘back record convert23’ the crimes recorded in 
these books onto the official crime recording system. The force also adopted a ‘prima 
facie’ crime recording standard, enshrined in force policy, which meant that crimes 
reported by victims would be accepted at face value, recorded and only if found to be 
false as a result of further enquires, ‘no crimed’ if further enquires confirmed the case 
to be false. This policy was driven through by the Force Management Team and an 
audit regime put in place to ensure compliance. The subsequent increase in overall 
recorded crime in the West Midlands Police area (Fig 4.1) provides an indication of 
the scale of the under-recording prevalent prior to HMIC’s inspection (HMIC 1998). 
                                                 
22 Miscellaneous Occurrence Books were registers where incidents which weren’t subject of crime 
reports were recorded. These had been discontinued in the 1980s.    
23 The crimes recorded in the unofficial registers were transferred onto the official crime recording 
system. 
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(Fig 4.1)                                                  (Home Office Crime Bulletins 1997-2007) 
 
 
Examination of the recorded crime performance profiles of the West Midlands, 
Greater Manchester and Nottinghamshire forces shows the statistical impact of 
changes to the recording standard (Fig 4.2).  The Home Office carried out an 
assessment of the impact of the NCRS on recorded crime levels in individual forces 
throughout England and Wales by comparing the ratio of crime incidents to recorded 
crimes before and after the change (Simmons et al 200324). This document provides a 
valuable source of information with which to interpret the recorded crime profiles of 
the forces examined.  
 
 
                                                 
24 This monitoring exercise based on the ratios between reported crime incidents and recorded crimes 
was conducted between April 2002 and March 3003. Unfortunately it ended before the introduction of 
‘false reporting policies. 
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(Fig 4.2)                                                                         (Home Office 1998-2007) 
 
 
Greater Manchester Police introduced a ‘prima facie’ standard in 1997; West 
Midlands Police in January 1999; and Nottinghamshire in April 1999. A year earlier, 
in April 1998 changes were made to the counting rules. These changes were 
introduced by the Home Office and led to an increase in the number of offences being 
logged which in turn caused a rise in recorded crime levels nationally. The April 1998 
increase appears to explain the slight rise in GMP’s recorded crime rate and the 
combination of the 1998 counting rules and the adoption of  a ‘prima facie’ standard 
explains the larger rise experienced by the West Midlands Police. The impact of 
adopting a ‘prima facie’ standard appears to have had the least impact on 
Nottinghamshire where Wilson et al (2001) indicated the practice of ‘cuffing’ 
recorded crimes on to a parallel recording system was in use. However an HMIC 
inspection of Nottinghamshire in 2001 reported ‘minor problems’ with crime 
recording procedures (HMIC/Notts.2001:25). This may account for the sudden rise in 
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recorded crime in Nottinghamshire in 2001 although the reason given by Simmons et 
al (2003)25 for the increase does not mention the HMIC/Notts (2001) report:  
      
“Nottinghamshire believes that the NCRS has mainly affected violence 
against the person offences, which have been influenced by the guidance 
relating to third party reporting.” (Simmons et al 2003:68) 
 
GMP’s profile remained stable after the introduction of the NCRS in April 2002 
(Simmons et al 2003:34). However, the West Midlands Police recorded crime trend 
dropped significantly after the introduction of the NCRS and Simmons et al suggest 
the reduction may have been due in part to a lessening of their own previous standard 
when the NCRS was applied to violent crime combined with a genuine underlying 
reduction in crime (2003:88)26. The different impact on the three forces may also be 
due to variations in their interpretation of the standard; GMP and Nottinghamshire 
remaining closer to their previous ‘prima facie’ standard while the West Midlands 
Police relaxed their standard (Simmons et al 2003). The sudden fall in the recorded 
crime rates for these three forces between April 2004 and March 2005 may well 
suggest further changes to the crime recording standard being operated by each force 
and that will be explored further in Chapter 5r.  However, according to Simmons 
(2003), nationally the introduction of the NCRS did have a considerable impact on 
recorded crime levels: 
 
“…an overall NCRS impact of 10 per cent on the recorded crime statistics 
for 2002/03. In other words, the crimes counted in 2002/03 were 10 per 
cent higher than they would have been under pre-NCRS recording” 
(2003:17). 
 
                                                 
25 This report assessed the impact of the NCRS on all forces. 
26 There was also a change in the counting rules for detections: minor offences dealt with by way of 
informal warnings, HO Detection Rule D4, were no longer considered sanctioned detections.  The 
devaluing of these offences may have led to a reduction in the recording of them as crimes.   
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4. OTHER VARIABLES IMPACTING ON THE LEVEL OF ‘CUFFING’: THE 
RECORDING MECHANISMS 
 
  
A number of organisational elements or variables have an impact on the level of 
‘cuffing’ likely to occur. The crime recording standard itself is one variable; 
compliance levels another. However Burrows et al (2000) identified procedures 
governing the point at which a crime is recorded and the level of authority necessary 
to decide what should be recorded also influenced the level of ‘cuffing’. The 
procedural element is explored further in this section.  
 
Reports of crimes are generally received at an incident handling centre and an 
incident log created. If the incident relates to a reported crime an officer is detailed to 
attend, or if that is unnecessary, the incident log is passed to an administrative unit, 
the details taken over the telephone and a crime report created. As a general rule the 
earlier a crime is allocated a crime number in this process, the higher the recording 
levels. This is because officer discretion is reduced and audit procedures simplified. 
Burrows et al concluded: 
 
“Filing reports very quickly obviously enhances the value of crime 
pattern analysis, but it also brings with it the danger that reports may be 
made when no crime has occurred (which thus need to be ‘no crimed’), or 
may be incorrectly classified. On the other hand, delays in registering 
crime reports hinder trend and pattern analysis, and could lead to 
attrition – either because of human error or manipulation.” (2000:28) 
 
 
Up until the late 1970s CID officers were the gatekeepers of crime recording 
procedures and only on their authority could a crime report be recorded: 
 
“But it was a pressure and part of that pressure was the CID had primacy 
within the police investigations…. They were seen to be the owners of 
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crime and I think that has changed to a certain extent, there is a lot more 
passed to uniform officers.  So what happens then is you cannot sustain 
what is a conspiracy, or gentleman’s agreement, whatever you want to 
call it, which smoothes or round down figures, it can’t be done as easily, 
because you’ve not got a small select group of people watching their 
careers to keep the figures down. (Interviewee C).   
 
Whilst the CID no longer have a monopoly over what should and should not be 
recorded, the practice of officers having to gain the permission of a supervisor prior to 
recording a crime still persists in some places. This was evident from an entry made 
by an officer on the Police Forum website: One officer from Thames Valley 
complained that the early recording of crimes and the issuing of crime numbers by 
Enquiry Centre operators was limiting his discretion by requiring him to justify de-
classifying the report. This prompted the following response: 
 
“In the West Midlands we have gone the other way where we don’t crime 
anything unless you give the full circumstances to a supervisor who makes 
the decision to crime, consequently our crime figures are going down, so 
come the end of the year we can tell the public that through our policing 
methods there are fewer victims of crime.” (www.policeoracle.com/forum 
6.12.06)   
 
The use of supervisors in a quality control role is not unusual and Burrows et al 
(2000) identified a number of forces which curtailed the authority of officers for 
issuing crime numbers to small administrative units or supervisory ranks. However 
such approaches could of course equally be used to suppress recorded crime levels, as 
was the situation described by interviewee C. The quote from the West Midland 
Police officer also implied that the motivation was anything but quality control i.e. ‘so 
come the end of the year we can tell the public crime has gone down’.  
 
 122
The consequences of failing to record a reported incident as a crime requiring further 
investigation can result in evidence being neglected and opportunities to prevent 
further offences being missed. The following witness account demonstrates the 
consequences of this form of ‘cuffing’: 
 
“I am a single woman living alone in a terraced style bungalow who is a 
full-time wheelchair user living with Multiple Sclerosis. During the early 
hours of the morning in the autumn of 2003 two men attempted to break 
into my home whilst I was in bed. I immediately called the police and 
explained that because of my impairment I was unable to get out of bed 
but I could see the intruders in the garden. I had shouted to them that I 
had called the police, but they remained in the garden for around 10 
minutes until they heard the sound of vehicles – whereupon they ran. 
My window was damaged and cost £30 to repair.  
 
The Police did not record this crime, either as an attempt burglary or as 
criminal damage. In fact I did not speak to a Police Officer face-to-face or 
on the telephone about this incident except the initial 999 call. 
A few months later, early in the evening, one of my elderly neighbours 
was disturbed to find a burglar had entered her bungalow via the 
bedroom window. She came face-to-face with this burglar who was 
rummaging through her possessions. Although she was not physically 
harmed this lady suffered severe mental stress. She subsequently spent 
several months in hospital, and fearing to go back home during the 
winter-time, moved into a nursing home in September 2004. She died 6 
weeks later. 
 
Although an empirical link cannot be made between the burglary and 
attempted burglary I feel that there is sufficient evidence to question the 
effectiveness of the Police Service regarding this matter. My elderly 
neighbour was literally ‘scared to death’” (Statement from victim: living 
in Police Force graded ‘good’ (green) by the Audit Commission in 2003 
and 2004)  
 
 
Procedures which delay issuing crime numbers at the point of initial contact with the 
victim invariably involve an officer re-contacting the victim either by a visit or by 
telephone. This creates an ‘audit gap’ if crime numbers are issued, as it puts the onus 
on the police to contact the victim: Failure to do so would leave crime reports 
unresolved. The alternative procedure of creating an incident record without issuing a 
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crime number makes it much easier to finalise the incident if further contact with the 
victim is unsuccessful; incident logs being closed with explanations which would 
satisfy Audit Commission checks. The following example demonstrates the 
procedure; a report is received stating that a pushbike has been stolen from the 
victim’s house and he or she has gone out to look for it. It is unclear whether the 
offence is burglary or theft of pedal cycle. No officer is detailed to attend and the 
incident log is passed to an administrative unit to contact the victim and record the 
crime details if necessary. The member of staff contacts the victim’s home but the 
victim is still out looking for the bike. A message is left for the victim to contact the 
police station on his/her return. The incident log is classified as ‘miscellaneous other 
admin.’ The log is closed with the comment ‘message left for him to contact police on 
return, letter and closure as per current [BCU] policy’ (WMP Incident Audit 18.8.04). 
This example demonstrates that a requirement was being placed upon the victim to re-
contact the police; in effect an evidential crime recording standard, and that the action 
taken by the officer was supported by an organisational policy.  This example would 
have failed the Audit Commission data quality checks, and if uncovered, may have 
led to the auditor checking the Command Unit Policy referred to by the officer 
making the entry. However, many callers reporting minor crimes are received on non 
emergency numbers and are routed to crime recording centres thus avoiding 999 
control rooms and the creation of incident logs. When such procedures are in 
operation an incident log will only be created if an officer’s attendance is required. So 
no audit of incident to crime record is possible. Forces which route all calls, both 
emergency and non-emergency, to call centres which automatically create electronic 
incident logs are more likely to ‘fall foul’ of Audit Commission checks if the 
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incidents are not dealt with correctly. The following example involving the 
Metropolitan Police Service demonstrates this point.    
 
One incident came to notice during this research which demonstrated how particular 
crime recording procedures can result in ‘cuffing’. An individual27 trying to report a 
crime recounted the difficulties he encountered when trying to report a crime to the 
Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) which employed a ‘call back’ procedure. He 
contacted the incident handling room and gave details of the offence, clearly a crime. 
He was given an incident number, (a CAD number), and told someone would get back 
in touch. No further contact was made. He re-initiated contact and explained that there 
were likely to be problems in re-contacting him by telephone. He therefore asked to 
be put through to the crime recording desk. This was refused and he was given 
another incident number. He managed to contact the CID office which would be 
responsible for investigating the offence and the officer he spoke to accepted that it 
was an offence they would be allocated to investigate but they couldn’t take on the 
investigation until a crime number was issued. It took him three weeks to get a crime 
number and the case allocated for investigation; he concluded: 
 
“The most confusing thing about the process is the allocation of a CAD 
number which I am sure most complainants would accept as being the 
crime number…….I am of the firm belief that only complainants with a 
great deal of determination actually obtain a crime number.” (Email 
11.12.2006)  
 
 
Documents, archived on the MPS web site, revealed that the staffing levels in Crime 
Recording Centres (Crime Management Units CMU) were an issue for those charged 
                                                 
27 Private investigator known to the author. 
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with completing an ‘Impact Assessment’28 on Minimum Standards for Crime 
Management Units: 
 
“Regarding staffing levels it was agreed that the CMU was generally 
understaffed often with temporary staff on light duties” (MPS 11.8.2004) 
 
This under-resource could result in recorded crime levels being influenced by staffing 
levels in the crime recording centres. Recorded crime levels were in effect being 
influenced by the capacity of the organisation to record them. It was also 
acknowledged that the CMU supervisor acted as: 
 
“…a gatekeeper on a borough to ensure all crimes recorded on Crime 
Reporting System are classified and confirmed correctly” (MPS 
11.8.2004). 
 
Following up the hypothesis that under recording due to under staffing would be 
vulnerable to Audit Commission data quality checks a review of the MPS’s recorded 
crime profile and Audit Commission data quality checks was conducted. The recorded 
crime profile for the MPS (Fig. 4.3) shows a consistent decline in recorded crime 
from 2002/3 onwards with a 6.3% reduction between 2005/6 and 2006/7.  
                                                 
28 This appears to have been conducted as part of the Race Relations Impact Assessment (RR(A)A) 
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(Fig 4.3)                                                                               (Home Office 1997-2007) 
 
A review of the Audit Commission data quality grades for the MPS revealed the force 
was graded ‘poor’ in 2004 (Red) (Audit Commission Dec. 2004:34); improving to 
‘good’ (Green) in 2005 (Audit Commission 2006:57), but then deteriorating to ‘fair’ 
(Amber) in 2006 (Audit Commission 2007:8).  The specific results for 2006 are 
shown at Table 4.1.  
 
(Table 4.1)                                                       (Audit Commission/MPS 2007:12) 
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Such assessed deterioration in data quality is consistent with, and indeed, may account 
for, the reduction in recorded crime post 2005/6, (Audit Commission results being 
reported retrospectively). The Audit Commission report on the MPS also contains 
other warning signs:  the ‘poor’ (Red) rating for ‘no crimes’ is particularly 
noteworthy, given that this function is carried out by the CMU supervisors who are 
responsible for maintaining quality standards in the crime recording units. This rating 
is consistent with these managers carrying out a ‘gate-keeping’ function, as opposed 
to maintaining appropriate quality standards: 
  
“The standard of 'no criming' is poor having deteriorated from 'good' in 
2006: this function is undertaken at BCUs and whilst reasons for non 
compliance vary, a lack of knowledge of Home Office Counting Rules was 
apparent.” (Audit Commission/MPS:2007:9) 
 
Local policies were also uncovered which indicated an ‘evidential’ crime recording 
standard was being applied to some categories of crime: 
 
“Most crime recording SOPs that we examined were fully NCRS 
compliant, stressing the need for ethical and victim focused crime 
recording and providing detailed guidance for officers. However, we saw 
two examples of policies where allegations of thefts of mobile telephones 
would not be recorded if the victim/loser could not provide an IMEIIII 
reference, a means by which the telephone can be identified and disabled. 
Policies such as this are not compliant with NCRS. Whilst the Data 
Accuracy Team challenges such practices when brought to notice, and 
some policies are voluntarily referred for comment, there are no 
processes in place to ensure that crime recording policies are routinely 
checked for NCRS compliance.” (Audit Commission MPS 2007:15). 
 
However Burrows et al (2000) had more confidence in recording compliance levels of 
reports taken over the phone by crime recording centres than officers taking reports 
on a face to face basis: 
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“It seems plausible that crime allegations dealt with by telephone 
investigation are more likely to be accepted ‘at face value’ by the police. 
By comparison, it is inevitable that where police officers do attend crime 
scenes they will be in a position to be more discriminating about any 
allegations made” (2000:28)  
 
They went on to conclude when reviewing the recorded crime rate of a rural force 
which required officers to attend the scene of reported crimes and take a victim 
statement; they went on to conclude that: 
 
“If the hypothesis posed by the research team – that forces which attend 
more crime scenes will tend to record fewer crime allegations (or 
categorise offences more rigorously) – is credible, this factor is likely to 
influence that force’s low crime rate” (Burrows et al 2000:29). 
 
This suggests that forces with the capacity to send officers to all crime scenes would 
enjoy reduced recorded crime levels. However, this would create resource issues as 
officers would have to be available to attend the incidents. If such a policy were 
pursued without sufficient resources it is likely to result in victims having to remain 
available for long periods of time whilst officers become available to rendezvous.    
 
Inconsistency in recording procedures makes comparison of forces problematic 
(comparing ‘apples and pears’) and this fact was evident in the West Midlands Police 
response to Gibbs & Haldenby’s (2006) request for crime data which they intended to 
use to assess the performance of different forces:      
 
“Furthermore, police forces in the United Kingdom are routinely 
required to provide crime statistics to government bodies and the 
recording criteriais set nationally. However, the systems used for 
recording these figures are not generic, nor are the procedures used 
locally in capturing the crime data. It should be noted that for these 
reasons this forces response to your questions should not be used for 
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comparison purposes with any other response you may receive” (WMP 
Freedom of Information officer quoted in Gibbs & Haldenby 2006:29) 
 
 
Gibbs and Haldenby attributed this note of caution to a “reluctance to use data to hold 
police forces to account” (2006:29). However in view of the impact that different 
recording procedures would have on recorded crime rates, i.e. the level of ‘cuffing’, 
the advice appears valid.  
 
 
Another variable impacting on the incidence of ‘cuffing’ is the level of compliance 
with the NCRS. This, as has been noted, is linked to the crime recording standard 
being operated and the mechanisms by which reported crimes are recorded. One 
would expect higher levels of ‘cuffing’ in a force interpreting the ‘balance of 
probability’ nearer to an ‘evidential standard’, which also delays issuing crime 
numbers until an officer has attended the scene and decided whether or not to record 
the reported incident as a crime. The Audit Commission validate recorded crime data 
on behalf of the PSU.  Grades for individual force’s compliance with the standard are 
published annually and individual force reports can be obtained from the Audit 
Commission. Non-compliance can have a significant impact on forces’ performance; 
Nicholas et al noting the statistical differences in recorded violent crime rates between 
the ‘top nine’ performing forces, in terms of the Audit Commission data compliance 
rating (2004), and the other forces: the top nine experiencing a 22% rise in recorded 
violent crimes compared with a 6% rise for the other forces during the period 2004/05 
(Nicolas et al July 2005:75).   
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The Audit Commission compliance checks follow a model (Fig. 4.4) which identifies 
the likely areas where ‘unwarranted attrition’ may occur in the process from the 
victim’s reporting of a crime through to the crime report being recorded and 
investigated. The model aims to identify the types of behaviour highlighted by HMIC 
(1999) and an explanation of the audit and the procedural details is outlined by the 
PSU (Home Office Police Standards Unit May 2004). 
 
 
(Fig 4.4)                                    (Home Office Police Standards Unit May 2004:19)                   
 
The specific checks or ‘investigations’ expected to be undertaken by the Audit 
Commission inspectors and/or forces themselves are as follows: 
 
 Investigation 1:  incidents closed as uncrimed/Crime related incidents 
closed on non crime codes; 
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 Investigation 2: From incident log to crime system 
 Investigation 3: Crimes held in records of specialist units 
 Investigation 4: Application of Home Office counting rules on crimes with 
multiple victims 
 Investigation 5: No Crimes 
 Investigation 6: Classification of crimes within Home Office counting 
rules 
 Investigation 7: Review of lost property logs 
     (Home Office Police Standards Unit May 2004:3) 
 
The Audit Commission introduced these reviews in 2003, albeit initially, carrying out 
just two Investigations; Investigation 1: incidents closed as uncrimed/crime related 
incidents closed on non crime codes; Investigation 2: From incident log to crime 
system. Those checks involved a review of 72,000 records nationally; the compliance 
standard ‘requires that 90 per cent of crimes are recorded correctly’ (Audit 
Commission 2004:6). Seven crime categories were checked to ensure compliance: 
Disturbance: Domestic Violence: Racial Incidents: Violent Crime: Criminal Damage: 
Burglary and Vehicle Crime. Nationally it appears NCRS compliance standards have 
improved. However the British Crime Survey (BCS) included a note of caution: 
 
“The estimated recording rate of comparable reported offences decreased 
from 75 per cent in the year ending September 2004 to 70 per cent for the 
year ending September 2005. Recent results from audits however indicate 
that police recording standards have continued to improve during 2005” 
(Walker et al 2006:47). 
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More generally, Argyris (1985:417) has commented on how audit approaches to 
ensuring compliance to a control mechanism can be circumvented. He suggested that 
such audit approaches only motivate staff to greater levels of ingenuity in order to 
circumvent the control measures and indeed the Audit Commission identified some 
evidence of this type of behaviour in relation to police reactions to their audit checks: 
 
“In some forces, considerable resources have been devoted to the 
retrospective checking of records, and in a few cases this work appears to 
have been concentrated on records expected to fall within the scope of the 
Audit Commission’s review.” (2004:15)   
 
The checks or ‘investigations’ carried out by the Audit Commission have mainly 
concentrated on ensuring that incidents involving reported crimes were transferred to 
the crime recording systems. Other investigations had not been externally audited by 
the Audit Commission; forces having been encouraged to carry out 
checks/investigation 3-5 themselves.  
 
Compliance checks on ‘no crimes’ (Investigation 5): In 2004 the Audit 
Commission carried out checks of ‘no crimes’. This is another potential means of 
‘cuffing’ crime as police managers have the authority to ‘overturn’ the decision of a 
more junior officer to record a crime. This audit involved checking the decision 
making of operational crime managers, usually of Chief Inspector rank29. These 
officers supervised the officers responsible for recording and investigating crime and 
were in a position to influence the standards operating on a particular police command 
unit. The ‘no crime’ audit is in effect a ‘quality check’ on the officers responsible for 
maintaining compliance with the NCRS. The standards set by these supervisors 
                                                 
29 In the case of the MPS the Inspector in the Crime Management Unit carries out this function. 
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provided an example for the officers under their command to emulate. The audit of 
‘no crimes’ involved checking ‘no crimes’ against four criteria: 
 
 The crime was committed outside the jurisdiction of the police force in 
which was recorded. 
 Where following the report of an incident which has subsequently been 
recorded as a crime, additional verifiable information is available which 
determines that no notifiable crime has been committed. 
 If the crime, as alleged, constitutes part of a crime already recorded. 
 If the reported incident was recorded as a crime in error. 
 
(Home Office PSU May 2004:25) 
 
The second criterion ‘additional verifiable information’ is, in effect, a check on the 
work of those managers responsible for the day to day supervision of the crime 
recording systems. This is because supervisors are expected to justify their decision to 
de-classify a crime, in effect deciding that it didn’t occur. So if they fail to maintain 
proper levels of probity and ‘cuff’ crimes by inappropriately applying the ‘no 
criming’ rules this sets the standard for those under their command.  
 
The Auditors examined 10,000 records nationally and found 58 per cent of forces met 
the PSU compliance rate of 95 per cent. However, the Audit Commission found:  
 
“The most common source of errors was the category relating to the provision of 
additional verifiable information to demonstrate that a crime had not been 
committed, where 89 per cent of records were found to be correctly ‘no crimed’ 
The other three categories had accuracy rates of 95 per cent and above.” (Audit 
Commission 2004:14)    
 
Problems with inappropriate ‘no criming’ were also evident in the joint HMIC/HMcps 
review of rape: 
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“The most significant factor in altering detection rates is non-compliance 
with the HOCR criteria for ‘no criming’30 (HMIC/HMcps 2007:47). 
 
‘No criming’ standards also varied between police command units within forces; One 
Operational Command Unit (OCU) in the West Midlands only achieved a 37.50% 
compliance rating for the ‘verifiable additional evidence’ category with only four of 
the twenty one OCUs achieving a ‘green’ rating31 and one OCU ‘amber’ (Audit 
Commission WMP Audit 2004:11). However the overall grading for offences ‘no 
crimed’ was adjudged ‘amber’ because the critical category of ‘verifiable additional 
evidence’ was masked by better performance on the other criteria in this domain. The 
impact of the ‘no crime’ audit in 2004 may be responsible for a reduction nationally 
in the number of reported offences de-classified in this way from 176,347  in 2004/05 
to 142,030 in 2005/06.  The Audit Commission sought to encourage a ‘get it right’ 
first time approach to ‘no criming’:  
 
“This ‘criming’ and subsequent ‘no criming’ of incidents creates 
additional records and leads to additional work. While it may be seen as a 
way to encourage a more victim-focused approach in some cases, it is not 
an effective use of valuable police resources.”(Audit Commission 2004:15)  
 
A slightly different view was taken by HMIC when conducting their thematic report 
on Integrity in 1998 (HMIC/WMP 1998), when they used exceptional levels of ‘no 
crimes’ as an indicator of problematic behaviour; too low a  percentage seeming to be  
indicative of  the presence of ‘cuffing’. 
 
                                                 
30 ‘No Crime’ is a category applied to recorded crimes which have subsequently been un-crimed by a 
police supervisor who is satisfied that there is verifiable information that no crime was committed.  The 
grounds for reaching this decision should be recorded in writing on the case papers for auditing 
purposes.   
31The Audit Commission utilised three grades; Green (over 90% of records compliant); Amber (80-
90% compliant); Red (under 80% compliant)    
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A possible impact of the Audit Commission’s view on ‘no criming’ may have 
encourage officers to favour omitting to record a crime when they are unsure if an 
offence has occurred. The HMIC view would allow officers to make mistakes which a 
crime manager could then subsequently ‘no crime’ with an appropriate explanation, 
which could be audited. The response of one crime manager is clear from the 
following email to all of the staff under their command:32 
 
“The counting rules boil down to one simple test, on the balance of 
probabilities has a crime taken place or not? If YOU do not think it has, 
then YOU should not record it.  Either have the log endorsed accordingly 
or if need be submit a short report but do NOT record it asking for it to 
be ‘no crimed’. The only way I can no crime something that has been 
recorded is if new evidence has come to light showing that a crime had 
not taken place – I cannot simply overrule your decision once you have 
committed pen to WC 200.” (Email WMP 17.9.04) 
 
The impact of such an instruction elicited the following comment from one of the 
interviewees: 
 
“So they have stopped him putting the setting on the computer to say it is 
‘no crime’ unless there is sufficient evidence. So he finds that he is ‘horror 
of horrors’ dependent on his subordinates to do this work. So he just 
sends out a nudge between the lines. He is basically saying if you don’t do 
this I’m going to be very unpopular with you.” (Interviewee C) 
 
In addition to the checks carried out by the Audit Commission, forces were expected 
to carry out the following checks/investigations: 
 
Compliance Checks on incidents referred to specialist units (Investigation 3): 
Reported crimes can be ‘cuffed’ by referring an incident to a specialist unit for 
                                                 
32 This Command Unit’s Audit Commission rating for ‘no crimes’, additional verifiable information 
was ‘red’ (57.14%) (Audit Commission WMP July 2004:11)  
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investigation; they investigate the report and decide whether or not to record the 
incident as a crime. An example would be a reported of child abuse referred to a child 
protection unit for investigation; they would investigate the offence and may decide 
only to record the report as a crime if a prosecution was instigated. This creates delays 
and such systems can be exploited to ‘cuff’ crimes which do not result in some form 
of action sanction being taken against the suspect. The audit of incident reports 
referred to specialist units is designed to eradicate ‘cuffing’ in this area by 
discouraging the practice of passing details of an alleged crime to a specialist squad 
for investigation without first recording it and issuing a crime number, e.g.: 
 
“IP [injured party], sixteen year old girl, reports being assaulted by her 
father, bruising to her shoulder and legs: Miscellaneous other enq33. 
Passed to Family Protection Unit (FPU)” (WMP Incident Audit 18.8.04) 
 
Multiple Offences recorded as one offence (Investigation 4): ‘cuffing’ can occur 
by recording multiple offences against a number of victims which have happened at 
the same location at the same time as only one offence e.g. a bed-sit where a number 
of separate rooms are rented by different occupants should be recorded as separate 
burglaries as opposed to one burglary recorded in the landlord’s name. The audit 
involves checking to ensure that offences with multiple victims are recorded as 
individual offences.  
 
Recording offences as less serious than the facts support (Investigation 6): checks 
for evidence of downgrading a form of ‘gaming’ which has been evident in the past as 
police officers use their discretion to categorise a crime as a lesser offence: 
                                                 
33 This is a report which is not entered on the crime recording system and is similar to the unofficial 
system of crime recording uncovered by HMIC in 1998/99.   
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“Police discretion is not limited to failing or refusing to record offences 
brought to their attention, but extends to deciding how to record those 
offences, a process that allows considerable latitude. For example, damage 
to an exterior window might indicate an attempted burglary or simply 
criminal damage. ….. If there is pressure to give the appearance of 
reduced crime, there is scope for the creative categorisation of such an 
offence” (Waddington 1999:33-34). 
 
 
The National Statistics on ‘Burglary of a Dwelling House’ demonstrates the 
considerable reductions in burglaries which have occurred over recent years (Fig. 4.5) 
Interestingly these appear to be matched by the increase in the crime category 
Criminal Damage to a Dwelling (Fig. 4.6). However improvements in NCRS 
compliance may be responsible for the increase in offences of ‘Criminal Damage to a 
Dwelling’ being recorded. That said the BCS indicates the recording of burglaries 
with no loss (including attempts) remains low at 36% (Walker et al 2006:54).   
 
 
 
(Fig 4.5)                                                        (www.National Statistics.uk/ 2005) 
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(Fig 4.6)                                                        (www.National Statistics.uk/2005)  
 
The extent of ‘cuffing’ by recording attempted burglaries as criminal damage in the 
West Midlands Police was highlighted by a compliance audit of 315 crimes recorded 
as criminal damage to a dwelling between Oct. and November 2004 (WMP Burglary 
Audit 27.1.05).  The audit of 315 crime reports of criminal damage to a dwelling 
found that 37 had insufficient detail on them to establish whether they represented 
criminal damage or attempted burglary; 47 were judged to have been wrongly 
classified; 7 should have been recorded as burglaries; 39 as attempt burglary 
dwellings; 1 aggravated burglary dwelling and one criminal damage to a vehicle.  
When a sample of ‘Burglary Other Buildings’ (e.g. garages) was examined; of the 319 
reports checked: One should have been an attempt burglary dwelling: 8 burglary 
dwelling and 120 crime reports had insufficient detail on which to clarify the correct 
offence category.   
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This type of ‘cuffing’ by re-interpretation and classification of an offence to a lower 
category is likely to be influenced by the category of offences subject to government 
performance indicators e.g. reduction in burglaries could be achieved by  reclassifying 
attempts as criminal damage or burglaries of attached buildings, such as garages, as 
‘burglary other building’ e.g.: 
 
“Injured Party (IP) reports window smashed and lock tampered with: 
Criminal Damage to Dwelling” (WMP Incident Audit 18.8.04) 
 
“IP caught prowler in his garden and discovered 4 panes of glass broken. 
Offender offered to pay for the damage. IP reports the incident some time 
later: Officers attend and comment made on the incident log that the 
incident was a break in and the IP caught them in the act: Recorded as 
criminal damage.” (WMP Incident Audit: 18.8.04)  
 
Distraction burglaries, where the victim, is ‘conned’ into allowing the offender into 
their home, e.g. on the pretence of checking a meter etc or ‘sneak in’ burglaries, 
where no forced entry was made, could be classified as theft from a dwelling e.g. 
 
“IP reports known individual neighbour’s children have gained access to 
dwelling house on pretext of using the toilet. Cash stolen from bedroom to 
which they were not given access. Recorded as theft from a dwelling as 
opposed to burglary which is the correct classification in the 
circumstances” (WMP Incident Audit 19.8.04)  
 
Attempted theft from a Motor Vehicle was also an area where ‘downgrading’ to 
criminal damage can have a beneficial impact on performance e.g.  
 
“Two vehicles on the rear car park of hotel broken into: Rear passenger 
window of both vehicles smashed and the rear parcel shelf on one forced 
forward: Both recorded as criminal damage to a vehicle” (WMP Incident 
Audit 17.8.04)  
 
 140
The Government’s drive in 2001 to reduce street crime may also have resulted in 
robberies being classified as other offences e.g. 
 
“Three offenders entered store and snatched cash from till. Cashier 
grabbed some of the money back: Some form of violence appears to have 
occurred in the commission of this theft yet it is recorded as a theft from a 
shop not robbery” (WMP Incident Audit 18.8.04) 
 
“IP reports three youths attacking boy and girl. Known offender 
demanded money from victim: Recorded as wounding” (WMP Incident 
Audit 18.8.04) 
 
 
Recording reported crimes as lost property reports (Investigation 7): This check 
involves checking ‘lost’ property reports to ensure crimes are not being ‘cuffed’ by 
being recorded as ‘lost’ because a victim is unable to prove categorically the property 
was stolen; in effect meet an ‘evidential standard’, e.g.: 
 
“IP reports mobile stolen whilst in public house: Miscellaneous Property 
Lost” (WMP Incident Audit 18.8.04) 
 
Whilst the Audit Commission checks might at first sight appear comprehensive there 
are a number of limitations in reality:   
 
1. The compliance standard at 90% (95% for investigation 5) is low. 
2. The aggregation of categories and sub-categories e.g. within ‘no crimes’ can 
skew results.  
3. Aggregation of results across the force area can mask problems in a number of 
Command Units where particular key crime types may be critical to overall 
force performance e.g. robberies in a command unit policing a city centre. 
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4. The audit can be anticipated and problems rectified prior to the audit. 
5. The view on ‘no crimes’ may accord with the Audit Commissions overall 
view on efficiency but may have a negative impact on the overall objective of  
ensuring a victim focused approach to crime recording. 
6. The introduction of the ‘investigations’ on an incremental basis allows those 
so inclined to acclimatise by developing more inventive means of avoiding 
exposure. 
 
 
 
Whilst this may appear a very technical analysis with little relevance to every day 
lives it is worth ending the chapter with a case where ‘cuffing’ and its consequences 
are apparent: 
 
CASE STUDY:  N.M. BORN 27TH FEBRUARY 1987 – DIED 9TH FEBRUARY 
2003   
     
 
“On 7/02/03 an unknown female was discovered unconscious by a passer-
by in an alley way in Dudley. She was found to have multiple and 
extensive bruising and head injury………………On 09/02/03 N.M’s life 
support machine was switched off with the consent and in the presence of 
her mother. She was declared dead at 11.46 am. (Serious Case Review 
Torbay Area Child Protection Committee 2004:1) 
 
On 22nd October 2003 her boyfriend was convicted of her murder. 
 
N.M. was in the care of Dudley Social Services when she became involved in a 
relationship with her attacker. She was then returned to the care of her mother in 2001 
when the family moved to Devon where Torbay Social Services provided a family 
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support service.  However N.M. returned to foster care in Dudley in 2002 and 
resumed contact with her boyfriend.  He was known to have assaulted her on at least 
two occasions: 
 
“During November 2002 there were two witnessed incidents reported to 
the West Midlands Police of a man attacking N.M. She sustained injuries 
on both occasions, and on the latter occasion received hospital treatment, 
but would not disclose the identity of her assailant, although N.M. 
conceded to her foster carer that it was her boyfriend”  (Serious Case 
Review Torbay Area Child Protection Committee 2004:1)  
 
Whilst the Serious Case Review did not publish the fact that there was sufficient 
independent evidence, including CCTV images capturing one assault, to support a 
prosecution, they did make the following recommendation: 
 
“The West Midlands Police should enforce their policy and procedures in 
relation to pursuing criminal enquiries in personal injury cases where 
children, young people or vulnerable adults decline to give evidence 
against a suspected assailant.”   (Serious Case Review Torbay Area Child 
Protection Committee 2004:20) 
 
In the case of the assaults predating N.M’s murder neither were recorded as crimes, 
although they both met the NCRS criteria for third party reporting. Both reports were 
‘cuffed’ despite the fact that in the second case a security guard had witnessed the 
assault which had also been captured on CCTV. This evidence was sufficient to 
secure an additional conviction for assault occasioning Actual Bodily Harm (ABH) at 
the murder trial. However it cannot be implied that the murder could have been 
prevented had officers taken the appropriate action when the previous crimes were 
reported to them. 
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6. CHAPTER CONCLUSION: 
 
 
In this chapter the crime recording system operating in England and Wales has been 
reviewed to establish the extent to which the system was ‘game-proof’.  The evidence 
reviewed suggested imprecision, ‘looseness’ or ‘room for interpretation, still 
remained in the NCRS and the systems used to capture the data. This was in large part 
due to the retention of officer discretion inherent in the ‘balance of probabilities’ 
criteria and this presented an opportunity for ‘cuffing’. The lack of standardisation in 
the recording mechanisms also presented the opportunity to delay recording incidents 
reported as crimes and again could lead to ‘cuffing’.  These variables in turn present 
problems for those responsible for auditing the data as officers still maintain 
discretion on what, or what not to record as crimes. In such circumstances auditors 
rarely have sufficient evidence to challenge the officer’s interpretation of events. 
These variables indicate that the NCRS is still vulnerable to ‘gaming’ in the form of 
‘cuffing’ and the requirement to be ‘game-proof’ has not been achieved and this 
conclusion is amply captured in the following chapter.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
 
‘CUFFING’; A RENAISSANCE: 
 
 
The re-emergence of ‘cuffing’ in the guise of ‘false reporting’ policies; the case is 
presented. 
 
INTRODUCTION: 
 
In this chapter the level to which the NCRS was resistant to the threat posed by 
‘cuffing’ was explored. This was achieved by examining the impact of policies 
ostensibly designed to counter the bogus reporting of crimes for fraudulent insurance 
purposes. These are known as ‘false reporting’ policies. These policies were primarily 
designed to identify and prosecute offenders attempting to make false insurance 
claims. However, their impact on how offences, suspected of being reported 
fraudulently, were recorded provided an indication of whether the NCRS ‘balance of 
probability’ standard was being interpreted nearer the ‘evidential’ or ‘prima facie’ end 
of the continuum.  If a marked reduction in recorded crime occurred at the time the 
policy was introduced it could be attributed to large numbers of ‘false reporters’ being 
identified. If a ‘prima facie’ standard was being applied, suspected false reports would 
have been recorded as crimes, investigated, and then the original reported crime 
would have been ‘no crimed’. In theory, if no other factor was influencing the level of 
reported crime, the reduction in recorded crime would match the number of ‘no 
crimes’. If an ‘evidential’ standard was being applied, then it would be unlikely that 
the suspected false report would be recorded. In either case it was anticipated that 
there would be a marked increase in detections for ‘wasting police time’ or ‘attempted 
deception’. 
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As ‘false reporting’ policies appeared to contravene the ‘victim focused’ approach to 
crime recording advocated by the Home Office it was anticipated that the decision to 
introduce the policy would be based on sound evidence and its impact closely 
monitored. It was hoped that ‘problem profiles’ on ‘false reporting’, completed under 
the provisions of the National Intelligence Model, would identify the scale of problem 
and provide an assessment of how successful the preventive measures were. As the 
Race Relations (Amendment) Act applied to the policy there should have been a race 
relations impact assessment completed in relation to the policy. Again some form of 
analytical assessment was anticipated.               
 
The origins of ‘false reporting’ policies are outlined and their impact on the 
performance of the West Midlands Police is examined.   The extent to which ‘false 
reporting’ policies were being applied across England and Wales was established by 
the use of a survey utilising the Freedom of Information Act to gain copies of the 
pertinent documentation from those forces employing ‘false reporting policies. The 
documentation sought included details of the actual policy, the NIM problem profile 
on the extent of the threat ‘false reporting’ represented and any data on the impact of 
the strategy and tactics deployed to counter it. Copies of the Race Relations impact 
assessment on the policy were also requested. The performance profile of those forces 
identified was then assessed by examining the annual recorded crime data published 
by the Home Office. The object of this exercise was to establish if a reduction in 
recorded crime occurred at the same time as the introduction of the policy. The 
implications of the policy are then discussed. 
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1. THE DEVELOPMENT OF ‘FALSE REPORTING’ POLICIES: 
 
 
Anecdotal evidence of the false reporting of mobile phones as robberies emerged 
during the National Street Crime initiative34. This it was believed was fuelled by the 
nature of mobile phone insurance which required the owner to have been the victim of 
crime in order to claim a replacement phone.  This anecdotal evidence appeared to be 
supported by the research findings of Smith (2003) who examined the reporting 
behaviour of victims of personal robbery. Smith (2003) found that 16 per cent of 
those seeking to report a personal robbery did so over eight hours after the event. He 
also noted that those late reports were more likely to involve a mobile phone, and be 
made at the front desk of a police station rather than through an emergency call. This 
was raised as a curious finding by the Street Crime co-ordinating group worth further 
investigation (Tilley 2004:91).  Alternatively this behaviour could be the outcome of 
the low propensity of victims to report robberies to the police, Dodd et al noted: 
 
“It is estimated only 51 per cent of robberies and 57 per cent of theft from 
the person were reported to the police” (2004:38). 
 
 
So it is quite possible that offences which would otherwise have gone unreported 
were being reported legitimately in order to qualify, rightfully, for insurance 
replacements. However covert operations conducted by the National Mobile Phone 
Crime Unit (NMPCU) un-covered evidence of staff at mobile phone outlets 
encouraging customers who had lost their phones to report them as robberies in order 
to qualify for a replacement. The Home Office concluded:  
                                                 
34 In March 2002, in response to sustained and accelerating increases in annual levels of robbery in 
England and Wales, the Government launched the Street Crime Initiative (SCI). The initiative, which is 
ongoing, covers the ten police force areas that together accounted for 83 per cent of recorded robbery 
in 2001/02. These were the MPS, West Midlands, Greater Manchester, West Yorkshire, Merseyside, 
Avon and Somerset, Nottinghamshire, Thames Valley, Lancashire, and South Yorkshire. 
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“According to guidance produced by the NMPCU, estimates of the extent 
of false reporting range from less than 5 per cent of all street crime to as 
much as 25 per cent.  However, as described above, the research evidence 
is weak and these figures are largely based on anecdote.  They should 
therefore be treated with a good deal of caution” (Tilley et al 2004:91). 
 
Forces involved in the Street Crime Initiative reported high levels of ‘false reporting’;  
South Yorkshire Police claimed, “one in five ‘victims’ are lying when reporting a 
robbery” (Police Review 25th July 2003).  This view was re-iterated by others: 
 
“West Midlands Police has pledged to take firm action against people who 
falsely claim to be the victims of crime.  This followed research carried 
out in Coventry which indicated as many as 20 per cent of reported 
robberies could be false. In Birmingham City Centre in February, 12 out 
of 70 reported robberies were discovered to be false after officers had 
spent many hours examining CCTV footage”(WMP Annual Report 
2003/2004). 
 
 
Prosecutions for offences relating to false reports received high levels of publicity 
which created the impression the problem was widespread35.   The following factors 
were believed to be indicative of a potential ‘false report: 
 
• Late reporting to the police (several hours or days later); 
• Allegations reported over the phone; 
• No contact with the emergency services via the 999 system; 
• Discrepancies in the account given to the reporting and investigating 
officer; 
• Lack of independent witnesses to the crime; 
• Victim unable to give detailed description of the offender, or unable to 
identify them; and  
• Victim stating that they do not want any further action by the police, and 
they only want to report to get a crime number. 
• The type of property being reported stolen e.g. 
• Benefit money – in order to obtain emergency cash payments through 
the benefit system in the form of  Crisis loans; 
                                                 
35 BBC News 11/2/2004; 12/2/2004; 18/7/2005; 26/5/2006; 25/7/2006.  
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• Cash lost by children – reported stolen to explain the loss to a parent 
or guardian; 
• Student Coursework – in order to obtain an extension for a deadline; 
• Other high value items- wages, designer goods, passports  
(Tilley et al 2004:92)  
  
 
Whilst none of the above characteristics or ‘trigger factors’ were necessarily 
suspicious on their own, it was felt that the presence of three or more was worthy of 
further investigation as a possible ‘false report’. However using a non-emergency 
phone number is one trigger factor and it should be noted that Burrows et al (2000) 
found that “calls made direct to police stations account for between 40 per cent and 75 
per cent of forces’ totals” (2000:17) and police forces encouraged members of the 
public to use non emergency numbers when reporting minor incidents: 
 
“West Midlands Police are launching a new campaign, urging people to 
‘Put the Police in Your Mobile’. The campaign is designed to encourage 
people to put the force’s no-emergency number in their mobile, so they 
can have it to hand whenever they need it.” (Solihull Times July 11th 
2007) 
 
The late reporting may be due to a number of factors. The IP feeling unsafe at the 
location of the crime resulting in them waiting to return home before reporting the 
offence. If they have had their mobile phone stolen the ability to ring the police 
immediately would also be hampered. Giving an accurate description of the offender 
or account of the incident could be influenced by the trauma induced by the crime36. 
Eye witness account is also known to be problematic and Van Maanen provides an 
account of how the description of a suspect by two police officers can differ: 
 
“But David and I, the two who perhaps had the closest and longest look at 
the suspect, disagree and disagree spectacularly about how old he was, 
                                                 
36 Perceptual distortion is a phenomenon experienced by firearms officers involved in shooting 
incidents and accepted as a valid reason for discrepancies in their accounts of the incidents. 
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how tall he was, how much he weighed, and what he was wearing” (Van 
Maanen 1974:115) 
 
The fact that victims may well state they are only reporting the crime for insurance 
purposes may reflect their realistic expectations of the offender being caught (Walker 
et al 2006:47) rather than any desire to defraud their insurance company. The 
suspicions about young people are also contentious as young people are at the greatest 
risk of becoming a victim of crime, particularly where the theft of a mobile phone is 
involved: 
 
“Those under 18 constituted nearly half (48%) of all victims, with the 
peak at age 15 and 16” (Harrington & Mayhew 2001:47). 
 
“According to a MORI survey, 5 per cent of 11-16 year olds had a phone 
stolen last year. The less representative On Track survey put the figure 
higher still. This level of risk is well in excess of that for adults. The 
survey indications, too, are that the risks of having a phone stolen in a 
robbery or theft from the person are much higher for youngsters than 
adults”. (Harrington & Mayhew 2001:55) 
 
  
The reduction in recorded robberies during the period the ‘Street Crime’ forces were 
developing and employing tactics to address false reports appeared to correspond with 
the large percentages being quoted in the press. The West Midlands Police issued 
mock eleven pound notes outlining the ‘trigger factors’ and warning officers to be on 
their guard (www.west-midlands.police.uk).  It was therefore assumed reducing these 
false reports made a significant contribution to the overall reduction in robberies 
commented on by Tilley et al:  
 
“Two years into the initiative, figures for the year 2003/4 show that 
robbery is 24 per cent lower in the ten forces than it was in 2001/2 and 17 
per cent lower across England and Wales as a whole” (2004:2). 
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Nationally the reduction in robberies is apparent Fig 5.1 and in view of the large 
percentages of ‘false reports’ being quoted by police forces it appeared that the 
reduction in 2004/5 could be due to the prevention and detection of those seeking to 
report robberies falsely. 
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(Fig 5.1)                                                            (Home Office Bulletins 1999-2007) 
  
However it was specifically stated in the guidance that mere suspicion should not 
prevent the recording and investigation of the initial complaint as Tilley et al pointed 
out: 
 
“All allegations of street crime must be recorded……when indicators of 
possible false reports are present, the victim and secondary investigation 
should be encouraged to attend the police station, or be visited by a police 
officer at their home or place of work.” (Tilley et al 2004:93).  
 
 
If this requirement in relation to crime recording was complied with, then the forces 
reporting high incidence rates of ‘false reports’ should have recorded corresponding 
high levels of prosecutions for wasting police time and/or large numbers of recorded 
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robberies being re-classified as ‘no crimes’.   So for audit purposes a robbery would 
be recorded; investigated; and, if found to be false, the offender reported for wasting 
police time; a new crime report would be created for the offence of ‘wasting police 
time’ and the original robbery report re-classified as ‘no crime’: 
 
“My immediate reaction is: if the false reporting policy is legitimate then 
people are being prosecuted for some offence.” (Interviewee B 
 
 
 It was anticipated, that if the reduction was due to the prevention and detection of 
‘false reports’ then  something in the region of 20 per cent of all robberies would be 
re-classified as ‘no crimes’. However, when the ‘no crime’ data was examined for the 
year 2004/05, the first full year of data when the ‘Street Crime’ forces were operating 
‘false reporting’ policies, the percentage of robberies of personal property subject of 
‘no crime’ procedures were low: Nottinghamshire ‘no criming’ the highest percentage 
at  5.38%; South Yorkshire 3.17%; West Midlands 4.69%.  In 2005/6 the percentage 
of robberies of personal property subject of ‘no crimes’ decreased dramatically across 
all the ‘Street Crime’ forces e.g. Nottinghamshire 3.56%; South Yorkshire 1.41% and 
West Midlands 3.09%.  This may be have been the result of the campaign to deter 
‘false reporters’, although press releases made by police forces indicated the problem 
still persisted:  
 
“At least half of all reported crimes investigated by Reading’s Street 
Crime Unit are false claims, say police” (BBC News 12th Feb. 2004) 
 
“Robberies in Birmingham city centre have been reduced by a 
third……Investigation rates have revealed that about a third of reported 
robberies have been found to be knowingly making false reports” 
(Birmingham Post: 9th Nov 2005). 
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“Police say one in 13 reports of robbery in north Manchester are made up 
by so-called victims” (BBC News 22nd June 2007) 
 
 
An alternative explanation for this reduction in ‘no crimes’ may have been the impact 
of the Audit Commission which commenced compliance audits of ‘no crimes’37 in 
Dec 2004. This required police forces to justify their decision to ‘no crime’.   
However the ‘gap’ between reported levels of false reporting and ‘no crimes’ might 
have been due to suspected offenders being identified early and reported for the 
offence of wasting police time; the false robbery report not being recorded in order to 
reduce unwarranted paperwork.  This possibility will be explored in a later section of 
the chapter. The other alternative was that officers were using their discretion to 
decide that a report was false and therefore making no record.. The lack of significant 
numbers of robberies being ‘no crimed’ suggests filtering was occurring at the 
reporting stage38 e.g. being asked to attend the police station personally to report the 
crime, a practice the Audit Commission uncovered during their checks on the 
Metropolitan Police Service (Audit Commission/MPS 2007:15).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
37 Crime reports may be ‘no crimed’ if; the crime was committed outside the jurisdiction of the police 
force in which it was recorded; Following the report of an incident that has subsequently been recorded 
as a crime, additional verifiable information is available which determines that no notifiable crime has 
been committed; The crime, as alleged, constitutes part of a crime already recorded; The reported 
incident was recorded as a crime in error. (Audit Commission Dec 2004) 
 
38 This approach mirrors HMIC’s 1998 inspection of WMP when the lack of ‘no crimes’ was 
confirmed as indicative of  an ‘evidential’ crime recording standard and ‘cuffing’.s   
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2. THE IMPACT OF ‘FALSE REPORTING’ POLICIES ON THE WEST 
MIDLANDS POLICE: 
 
The West Midlands Police started developing policies to deter the ‘false reporting’ of 
robberies, particularly those involving mobile phones, during 2002/03 as part of the 
National Street Crime Initiative. The Operational Command Units (OCU) with the 
highest levels of robberies attended regular ‘Compstat’39 type meetings chaired by an 
Assistant Chief Constable and the issue of false reports was a regular agenda item.  
The policy was not incorporated into a written force wide policy until February 2004 
when a comprehensive ‘false reporting’ policy was introduced for ‘acquisitive crime’ 
i.e. burglary, street crime, and vehicle crime and extended to all OCUs. The force did, 
however, issue officers with an aide memoir printed on mock eleven pound notes 
outlining the ‘trigger’ factors and warning officers to be on their guard for potential 
‘false reporters’ (www.west-midlands.police.uk).  The impact on recorded robberies 
(Fig 5.2) demonstrates the impact the policy had on the level of recorded robberies 
when introduced to the OCUs with the greatest robbery problem in the summer of 
2003 and on the whole force when the policy was expanded in February 2004.   
 
                                                 
39 The term given to the meetings used in New York, by police commissioner Bratten to hold local 
police commanders to account for the level of crime recorded in their districts.  
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(Fig 5.2)                                                     (Home Office Crime Bulletins 1998-2007) 
                                            
When the policy was extended to acquisitive crime, which included, vehicle crime, 
burglary and robbery the impact on these key offence categories was also discernible,  
(Fig 6.3). There was nothing to suggest the policy was based on anything other than a 
genuine belief that there were a considerable number of individuals seeking to make 
false reports. However there was no objective independent research carried out to 
confirm the validity of that suspicion which interviewee C referred to as ‘wishful 
thinking’.      
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(Fig 5.3)                                                (Home Office Crime Bulletins 1998-2007) 
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An examination of the British Crime Survey trend data (Fig 5.4) shows that burglary 
and vehicle crime had been falling consistently during the period 1998 to 2006 so the 
downward trend in police-recorded crime is endorsed although the sudden reduction 
corresponding with the introduction of the comprehensive ‘false reporting’ policy is 
still significant.  
 
(Fig 5.4)                                                                                 (Nicholas et al 2007:19) 
 
 
 
An examination of ‘no crimes’ for robberies (Table 5.1) does not provide an 
explanation for the sudden reduction in recorded robberies, as the large percentages of 
‘false reports’ released to the media by the force were not matched by the percentage 
of ‘no crimes’. In fact the data shows a marked reduction in the number of robberies 
re-categorised as ‘no crimes’ after the Audit Commission audit of ‘no crimes’ in 
2004. This suggested crime managers were ‘no criming’ reports inappropriately. The 
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Audit Commission grades for the specific tests on ‘no crimes’ (Table 5.1) confirmed 
low quality control in this area in both 2004/05 and 2005/06.  
 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 
Recorded 
robberies  
13,322 10,249 10,371 8,905 8,867 
No 
Crimed 
435 496 542 438 283 
% of 
Robberies 
No 
Crimed 
3.16% 4.62% 4.97% 4.69% 3.09% 
Audit 
Rating ‘no 
crimes’ 
   Amber 
2004 
Red 
2005 
Audit 
Overall 
Grade 
  Amber 
2003 
Amber 
2004 
Green 
(Good) 
2005 
 
(Table 5.1)                                                                                   (Home Office 2006) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Observations of the Interviewees: 
 
 
The interviewees who examined the West Midlands Police total recorded crime 
profile (Fig. 4.1) and the related documents40 concluded that the sudden changes in 
recorded crime were the result of changes to the crime recording standard. They were 
also of the view that the introduction of the ‘false reporting’ policy signalled a return 
to an ‘evidential’ crime recording standard: 
      
                                                 
40 HMIC Inspection report 1999; False Reporting Policy; Incident Audit and E mail from Crime 
Manager  
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“So basically it has brought you back to the pre-ethical recording 
standard of 1998. What it’s done is to reintroduce the element of 
discretion and therefore the element of, for want of a better word, 
cheating that was there originally.” (Interviewee A) 
 
“All sorts of reasons for why crime changes and then comes back level but 
it’s all ‘froth’ because the same principle has reasserted itself in a 
different form” (Interviewee C) 
 
 
None of the interviewees suggested the reduction in recorded crime experienced after 
the introduction of the ‘false reporting’ policy was due to improved performance: 
 
“There is no way to explain this in terms of what West Midlands are 
doing in terms of policing that is substantially different from what 
everybody else is doing.” (Interviewee A)  
 
 
Examination of the West Midlands Police ‘false reporting’ document revealed an 
introduction stating the policy was based on research that had shown a proportion of 
reported street crimes, burglary and vehicle crimes were likely to be false (no 
reference was provided for the ‘research’). The offender’s objective of obtaining a 
crime number in order to legitimise a false insurance claim was explained. The policy 
also outlined the aims of the NCRS pointing out that a victim led approach means 
complying with a ‘balance of probability’ standard.  It then continued to outline the 
procedure to be followed when an offence was reported. A summary is provided as 
follows: 
 
 An incident log will be created 
 The issuing of a crime number or incident number to the victim over the 
telephone is forbidden 
 Arrangements for the victim to come into the police station or be seen by 
an officer are to be made  
 It is then stated reluctance to comply with the above conditions should 
not prevent a crime report being recorded over the phone 
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 When three or more ‘trigger’ factors are present a supervisor should be 
consulted 
 The supervisor will decide what further investigation is necessary and 
this may include a further witness interview 
 The ‘victim’ should be asked to sign a pro-forma explaining the 
consequences of making a false report before the interview 
 The crime number and log number will be withheld from the victim 
although they will be provided with the investigating officer’s details 
 The incident log should be marked with ‘crime number not disclosed’ to 
prevent any inadvertent disclosure the victim until the police are 
convinced it is not a false report. 
 
 
Whilst the policy complied with the ‘letter’ of the NCRS the impact was likely to 
result in a failure to record reported crime as an ‘evidential’ crime recording standard 
was applied: 
 
“What this is saying; it’s saying if you can’t actually tell the reporting 
officer face to face that something has been stolen and whose stolen it then 
that’s a good reason for the officer to say no crime’s been committed; 
that’s a false report.” (Interviewee A)  
 
Local press reports also indicated an ‘evidential’ standard was being applied: 
 
“Recently my son’s new mobile phone went missing while he was out. He 
thought it had been stolen. On returning home he phoned his number as 
he remembered the phone was definitely switched on. It was turned off. 
We contacted the police to report it and get a crime number as instructed 
by the insurance company. He was told that the fact that the phone was 
missing and now turned off was no proof it was stolen. The officer said 
my son would have to have seen the person steal his phone.” (Birmingham 
Mail 27.6.07pg.12)   
 
 
Delaying the issuing of crime numbers until after the victim has either attended a 
police station and been able to verify the legitimacy of their report or been seen by an 
officer is evident from the incident logs examined: 
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“Reported theft of motor vehicle: I.P. unable to produce log book and 
insurance certificate, therefore unable to establish ownership of vehicle: 
Info. Log placed on PNC (Police National Computer):  Classification 
Miscellaneous Other” (WMP: Incident audit 18.8.04) 
 
“IP reporting theft from motor vehicle: IP required to produce 
documents for vehicle in order for incident to be crimed: Crimed as theft 
from motor vehicle” (WMP Incident Audit: 18.8.04)   
 
One of the interviewees also related one example of the issuing of crime numbers 
being delayed: 
 
“It’s open to abuse, only today I was talking to a store detective who 
witnessed a known thief, well known character stealing property from his 
own store and wasn’t able to get from his office to the person to stop him.  
So he phoned up to report it and they [the police] would not give him a 
crime number over the phone.  They wouldn’t give him a crime number 
because they had to send an officer out to make sure it had happened” 
(Interviewee F).  
 
 
 
The author also reported a theft of hubcaps from his car whilst it was parked on the 
drive overnight (early 2005). Although only one ‘trigger’ factor was present when 
making the report (non 999 call), and while there was no intention to make an 
insurance claim, the details were not taken over the phone and a crime number was 
not issued, until an officer attended personally and the author had signed a statement 
outlining the consequences of making a ‘false report’. When asked why the officer 
had to attend the scene of such a minor crime it was stated that the OCU was 
investigating all vehicle crime in this way.  In this case the officer was available to 
attend very quickly and stated the OCU had sufficient resources to pursue this policy. 
However the ability to resource such a policy is likely to be an issue at busy times and 
there is a real danger that lack of resources could result in failures to make contact 
with victims and therefore result in crimes being unrecorded: 
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“If every crime reported by telephone resulted in an officer attending the impact 
 on police resources would be phenomenal.” (Interviewee B) 
 
The policy contains a number of potential contradictions; placing a requirement on 
officers to comply with the NCRS whilst at the same time encouraging them to be 
suspicious of victims; requiring officers to withhold crime number then telling them 
this should not prevent them recording a crime over the telephone: stating the policy 
is ethically victim focussed yet requiring victims to sign a disclaimer stating they are 
not lying. The policy, on the one hand, offers officers discretion when recording 
crimes but on the other reduces discretion by requiring them to justify to a supervisor 
why they have recorded an incident as a crime when a number of ‘trigger’ factors 
were present: 
 
“It is a judgment for the officer emphasising that it is for the officer to 
decide not the person reporting. It’s quite funny, quite strange, mixed 
messages…..I think the basis of them producing tick box lists saying does 
this fit the profile or not, although they very disingenuously say it is up to 
the individual officer. So there is discretion.  No there ain’t [sic]. Once you 
give a list to cops they will follow the list.” (Interviewee C) 
 
Such contradictions in the policy would of course enable senior management to 
escape responsibility if ‘cuffing’ occurred and something went wrong enabling them 
to place the blame on the operational staff.   The policy in effect justifies a return to 
an ‘evidential’ crime recording standard and the ‘cuffing’ associated with it. Like the 
‘evidential’ crime recording standard it enables ‘working rules’ to apply in the 
practical application of the policy whilst allowing ‘presentational rules’ to apply if a 
scandal ensued (Smith & Gray 1983; Smith 1986). Whilst senior officers are unlikely 
to admit that this was the desired outcome they should be aware that ‘cuffing’ is likely 
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to result. The policy also circumvents the audit checks conducted by the Audit 
Commission as it would be difficult for an auditor to challenge the decision of an 
officer, who after speaking to a victim, decided that the report, ‘on the balance of 
probabilities’ was false. The policy also appeared to comply with the Audit 
Commission’s own advice to ensure a crime has occurred prior to recording it thus 
avoiding inefficiencies and the need to ‘no crime’ reports.  
 
The presence of officer discretion in crime recording procedures creates the potential 
for discrimination. This factor was clearly evident in one of the incident logs sampled 
by the author when a victim was ‘allowed’ to report a theft from his motor vehicle 
over the phone, as opposed to coming into the police station with the required proof of 
ownership, because of his employment status. However the officer did record on the 
incident log the reason for this relaxation of crime recording policy.  The interviewees 
were also of the opinion that the policy was potentially discriminatory: 
 
“Yes the less articulate minority groups, people who could not 
communicate as well because of language difficulties, people you could 
make a judgement about on how they dress, age and gender” (Interviewee 
E).  
 
“This will particularly impact on the young people as it is they who are 
particularly at risk of the crimes covered by this policy.  It may also be 
seen as being targeted by ethnic minorities, particularly as the areas 
where it was introduced have high numbers of ethnic minority victims.” 
(Interviewee G) 
 
 
The policies compatibility with Human Rights legislation, which Neyroud and 
Beckley (2001) believed would address many unethical practices, is questionable as 
victims may have been denied access to legal redress for the crimes committed 
against them.  
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3. THE SURVEY RESULTS: 
 
 
It was hypothesised that the introduction of ‘false reporting’ policies indicated a move 
to an ‘evidential’ crime recording standard and if introduced by other police forces it 
would have a similar impact on recorded crime levels to that experienced by the West 
Midlands Police. In order to establish the extent of use of such a policy a 
questionnaire41 was sent to all police forces in England and Wales seeking to establish 
if and when a ‘false reporting’ policy had been introduced.  The questionnaire utilised 
the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act and requested copies of the policy; 
date introduced; offences to which it applied; and any analysis on ‘false reporting’  
completed as part of the NIM process. It was hoped that such analytical products 
would quantify the number of offences of ‘wasting police time’ caused by false 
reports. 
 
An hundred per cent response rate was achieved and ten out of the forty three forces 
surveyed indicated that they were operating some form of ‘false reporting’ policy.  
 
Specific Questions the Survey Sought to Answer:  
  
The survey was designed to identify those forces employing the policy and then 
examine its impact on performance. The specific questions it sought to elicit answers 
to are as follows: 
 
Q1. To What Extent had the Policy Evolved and Spread? 
 
 
                                                 
41 The questionnaire was circulated in July 2006.  
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Collier (2005; 2006a & 2006b)42 identified the sharing of ‘best practice’ between 
forces, mimetic isomorphism, and noted how the desire to avoid PSU engagement had 
introduced a competitive element to this process and concluded: 
 
“Police forces incrementally vary their structure and processes to be 
better than others, rather than merely mimic successful practices. 
However having achieved improvements, they share their learning with 
other forces before moving on to further improvement. This is a form of 
co-operatively competitive isomorphism.” (2005:9)  
    
 
It was assumed therefore that ‘false reporting’ policies would have been adopted and 
adapted by a number of forces. 
  
Q2. To what extent had the evidence base for the policy been expanded upon? 
  
 
It was hoped that NIM assessments of the problem would expand upon the limited 
evidence and cautious assessment produced by the Street Crime Initiative (Tilley et al 
2004).  However Collier concluded that NIM was subordinate to the requirements of 
Performance Management in the forces he conducted his research in. If his findings 
remained true then the survey would reveal little in the way of robust analytical 
assessment of the extent and nature of the problem of false reports. 
  
Data on ‘no crimes’ was released by the Home Office and this enabled comparisons to 
be made between the robberies ‘no crimed’ and the extent of false reports appearing 
in press releases.  
 
Q3. Has the potentially damaging impact on genuine victims been considered? 
                                                 
42 Collier’s research was based on field observations and interviews in a sample of four English police 
forces.  
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Rosenbaum et al’s (2005) research indicated the potentially damaging impact failing 
to meet the public’s expectations could have when they initiated contact with the 
police, a point made by one of the interviewees: 
 
“Those who are unaffected by it will not notice it, but those who are 
affected by it, when they are not making false reports will be annoyed by 
the inconvenience, the suspicion, and if they have previously reported 
crimes, the change.” (Interviewee G) 
 
There was also evidence from the literature, be it inconclusive, (Smith & Grey 1983) 
that racial discrimination could be an influential factor on officer’s discretion. It was 
therefore assumed that a policy which relied on officers using their discretion to make 
an assessment of victim’s ‘honesty’ would be subject to an Impact Assessment under 
the provisions of the Race Relations Amendment Act 2000. 
 
Having identified the forces which had introduced the policy it was possible to assess 
their recorded crime profiles, Audit Commission Grades and ‘no crime’ data, thus    
enabling exploration of the following questions: 
 
 
Q4. Has the introduction of the policy had a similar positive impact on 
performance as experienced by the West Midlands Police? 
 
Consistent patterns of reductions in recorded crime would support the interviewees’ 
assessments that the policy, not other factors, was responsible for the sudden 
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reduction in recorded crime. This in turn would support the view that the policy 
indicated a return to an ‘evidential’ crime recording standard. 
 
 
Q5. Has the Audit Commission’s data standards audit identified the forces 
operating ‘false reporting’ policies?  
 
Contact with the Audit Commission prior to the survey indicated that they were 
unaware of ‘false reporting’ policies. A review of crime recording policies had been 
conducted in the first audit in 2003 but no further checks of this type had been made. 
‘False Reporting’ policies were introduced after these initial checks. Assessing the 
audit compliance grades of the forces operating ‘false reporting’ policies was viewed 
as a means of testing the effectiveness of the Audit Commission compliance regime.  
 
 
3.2 Survey Results:  
 
 
Q1: The survey revealed that the following forces had adopted formal ‘false reporting’  
policies (Table 5.2). 
 
 
Force Date Introduced Scope and Applicability 
West Mercia Police August 2003 All property crime 
West Midlands Police  20 February 2004 Acquisitive Crime 
(Street Crime; Vehicle Crime 
and Burglary) 
West Yorkshire Police 3 September 2003 Street Crime and Volume Crime 
Merseyside Police 10 September 2004 Benefit Monies 
Cleveland Police 4 April 2006 Street Crime involving mobile 
phones and theft of benefit 
money 
Humberside Police 1 July 2004 Street Crime involving mobile 
phones and theft of benefit 
money 
Nottinghamshire 29 April 2004 Street Crime: extended to 
Burglary 2005 
 
(Table 5.2) 
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The following forces indicated some practice although no force-wide policy (table 
5.3): 
  
 
Force Date Introduced Applicable 
Avon and Somerset Circa 2003 Street Crime and Vehicle Crime 
(Bristol BCU) 
City of London Circa 2003 Instruction and posters relating 
to stolen and lost property 
British Transport Police May 2005 Theft of luggage and other 
personal property 
 
(Table 5.3) 
 
The research revealed that the policy on ‘false reporting’ had metamorphosed, in 
some forces, from a policy devised during the Street Crime Initiative to address  
bogus reports of  theft/robbery of mobile phones to comprehensive policies designed 
to deal with the false reporting of any property related crime. The policy had also 
been adopted by a number of forces indicating that a form of ‘co-operative 
competitive isomorphism’ had occurred thus supporting Collier’s assertion that forces 
share and evolve effective practice in order to remain competitive (Collier 2005). 
Whilst the number of forces adopting the policy was limited at the time of the survey 
it is likely to spread as it appeared to deliver a competitive advantage.  
 
Q2: Evidential Base for Policy: 
 
It was hoped that the responses to this question would provide the reasons why forces 
introduced the ‘false reporting’ policies. Some forces introduced the policy by 
referring to the evidential basis for the Policy however there was no consistency: 
West Midlands Police stated that research had shown a proportion of reported 
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offences were likely to be false: Cleveland noted that the main source on the scale of 
the problem was anecdote and the research evidence ‘thin’.   
     
Only two forces provided any form of analytical problem profile, the most 
comprehensive being provided by British Transport Police who had: 
 
 reviewed 68,000 crime records earlier in 2006 and found 2,000 reports 
that were of concern. 
 After a filtering and grading process 221 were highlighted as the worst 
examples of suspected false reporting. 
 These were subjected to further intelligence measures, including checks 
with the Association of British Insurers, and 211 target packages were 
created. 
 These were then ‘actioned’ and 211 individuals were seen. 
 These investigations resulted in 6 arrests.  
 The force still required victims to sign a declaration stating their report 
was genuine. 
 
 
Avon and Somerset reported that in 2004 their Bristol Command Unit suspected that 
some 30 per cent of all robberies reported in central Bristol were false; 13 per cent 
being confirmed as false. By November 2005 it was estimated that 6 per cent of all 
robberies were false. The decrease was attributed to a raising of the awareness of the 
consequences of making a false report; the issuing of fixed penalties for wasting 
police time and police officers and front office staff not issuing crime numbers 
immediately if a false report was suspected.   Avon and Somerset Constabulary 
reported that a search of their crime recording system revealed that between 2000 and 
2006 only 81 incidents had resulted in someone being prosecuted for wasting police 
time.  ‘No crimes’ in Avon and Somerset accounted for 74 robberies of personal 
property in 2003/04; 85 in 2004/05; and 60 in 2005/06, approximately 3 percent of all 
robberies of personal property.  
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None of the other forces operating a policy or employing some tactics to deal with 
‘false reporting’ supplied any data on the scale of ‘false reporting’ or the number of 
offenders reported for ‘wasting police time’. Nottinghamshire did disclose the 
percentage of reported robberies ‘no crimed’ as indication of the scale of the problem 
(3%).   
 
Two forces, City of London and West Mercia had ‘no crimed’ large percentages of 
robberies: West Mercia43 ‘no criming’ over 9% in 2002/03. and over 12 % of 
robberies in 2003/04: City of London ‘no criming’ 41.7% of robberies in 2003/04. 
However no NIM analysis had been conducted on ‘false reporting’ and no Race 
Relations Impact Assessment had been conducted so it was difficult to attribute the 
large number of robberies ‘no crimed’ to ‘false reports’ which subsequently resulted 
in a prosecution for ‘wasting police time’. Both forces experienced a reduction in 
robberies ‘no crimed’ after the commencement of the Audit Commission checks in 
2004. Other forces’ ‘no crimes’ data did not account for the large reductions in 
robberies or equate to the scale of false reporting quoted by the media. 
 
The lack of analytical assessments of the scale and nature of ‘false reporting’, 
conducted under the NIM process, supports Collier’s (2005) finding that NIM is not 
the dominant influence on police action. It may well be implied that the improvements 
in performance which followed the introduction of ‘false reporting’ policies 
influenced there adoption.      
 
 
                                                 
43 West Mercia have consistently  ‘no crimed’ over 5% of their total crime since 2001/02  which is 
above the national average of 2.6%  (Audit Commission 2004:13) City of London increased total no 
crimes from just over 4% in 2001/02 & 2002/03 to 7.19% in 2003/04; and 14.86% in 2004/05 reducing 
to 11% in 2005/06. 
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Q3. Compatibility with the Race Relations (Amendment) Act: 
 
Only one of the forces, which had introduced a ‘false reporting policy’; City of 
London, had conducted any Race Relations Impact Assessment on the ‘false 
reporting’ policy.  This related to the recording of reports of stolen passports where 
officers were required to withhold crime numbers from the victim until their identity 
had been corroborated. This action was deemed necessary to avoid the obtaining of 
duplicate passports for criminal purposes, including terrorism. For the City of London 
Police compliance with the NCRS was all that was necessary in order to meet the 
requirements of the Race Relations legislation.  
 
The respondent from Lancashire Constabulary, which had not introduced the policy, 
was of the opinion that the policy could be discriminatory:  
 
“Clearly the vast majority of reports of crimes made to the police are 
honest and accurate but occasionally false claims are made. The problem 
with writing a policy to address the false reporting of crimes is that these 
may be discriminatory towards or disadvantage those victims who are 
genuinely reporting a crime which happened. To place barriers to 
members of the public being able to report crimes or placing conditions 
on the recording of those crimes would be contrary to the National Crime 
Recording Standard even where police forces are aware that false 
reporting is most prevalent in respect of certain crime classes.” 
(Respondent from Lancashire Constabulary) 
 
 
None of the forces surveyed indicated any change to the recording standard brought 
about by an impact assessment on the policy. Only six forces indicated in their 
responds that they had conducted an impact assessment on their crime recording 
procedures: 
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“It is unlikely that the false reporting policy will be monitored in relation 
to any discrimination – it is likely to be monitored in terms of overall 
crime numbers and detections.  There is therefore no opportunity to alter 
it to avoid any unforeseen adverse consequences” (Interviewee G). 
 
Wiltshire Constabulary had completed an impact assessment on their crime recording 
policy and they sent a copy in response to the questionnaire. They had identified that 
the crime recording policy was important for race relations: “graded as having a High 
impact on the promotion of Race Equality”. Their assessment suggested the prevailing 
view was that the NCRS was a national standard endorsed by ACPO and therefore 
compliant with the RR (A) A. They went on to identify the positive aspects of 
compliance:  
 
“Accurate data supporting a NIM approach: Consistency of data for 
analysis purposes and future resource allocation:  A more victim 
orientated approach. From a diversity perspective this would lead to 
“equity in service delivery for all racial groups” (Wiltshire Constabulary 
Race Equality Impact assessment: 2006:4) 
 
 
There was no indication in any of HMIC baseline assessments on forces operating the 
policy to suggest the policy’s potentially discriminatory aspects had been considered.   
 
The lack of Race Relations Impact Assessments frustrated the potential to assess 
whether officer discretion, when dealing with victims of crime, was influenced by 
discriminatory factors. However, the absence of impact assessments on this policy did 
provide an indication of senior officer’s level of awareness and knowledge of Race 
Relations legislation. 
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Q. 4.  The Impact on Performance measured in term of Crime Reduction: 
 
The level of recorded crime (total recorded crime; robberies; and combined robbery, 
burglary and vehicle crime) was examined for each of the forces identified as 
operating ‘false reporting’ policies to identify if any reduction in recorded crime had 
occurred that corresponded with the introduction of the policy. ‘No crimes’ and Audit 
Commission grades were also examined to establish if the adoption of ‘false 
reporting’ policies had any impact on these indicators.  The data and observations on 
each of the forces which had indicated that they were operating some form of false 
reporting policy are contained in APENDICIES D-L. 
  
Three Forces, West Mercia; West Midlands and West Yorkshire all adopted 
comprehensive ‘false reporting policies’ between August  2003 and February 2004 
and applied them to acquisitive/volume crime, (including robberies; vehicle crime; 
and domestic burglaries, all Government priorities subject of performance indicators).  
No NIM type assessment supporting the use of a ‘false reporting’ policy was released 
by any of these three forces. However recent evidence from a self reporting survey 
conducted on behalf of the insurance industry found “one-in-ten of respondents 
admitted to having cheated their insurance company” (BBC News 14.6.07). That said 
the report also indicated that most insurance frauds related to inflated claims as 
opposed to totally bogus claims involving a report to the police, a point made by one 
interviewee: 
 
“I don’t think making up a burglary or making up a car theft, I don’t 
think that’s common place; no but when it’s happened you’ve had your 
laptop stolen from the back of your car, so you also stick in a claim for 
your SLR camera; your ipod all that stuff.” (Interviewee A) 
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All three of these forces experienced higher than the national average reductions in 
crime for these categories.  From 2002/3 to 2005/6 national recorded vehicle crime, 
burglaries and robberies reduced by 26%: West Mercia 29%: West Midlands 31%: 
West Yorkshire 47%.  If the policy is indicative of a change in the crime recording 
standard then a reduction in all crimes would have been expected. When the 
normalised44 annual per cent reduction of total crime for West Mercia; West 
Midlands; and West Yorkshire (Fig 5.5) were compared with the national trend and 
the British Crime Survey (BCS)45 trend over the period April 2001- March 2006, it is 
clear these forces were recording a reduction in crime at a greater rate than the 
national norm, with significant improvements occurring around the time of the 
introduction of comprehensive ‘false reporting’ policies.  
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Fig 5.5                                                    (Home Office Crime Bulletins 2000-2006)   
                                                 
44 The graphs show the reported crimes on a normalised basis. The reported crimes for all forces in the 
first year of the graph are represented by 100, and subsequent years’ reported crimes for each force are 
represented by the percentage of their first year. This presentation allows percentage comparisons to be 
made year on year and between forces.  
45  The BCS is a national survey which gives a better indication of trends in crime over time because it 
is unaffected by changes in levels of reporting to the police, and in police recording practices (Walker 
et al 2006:10). However the offence categories differ so it is of limited value in this context. 
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It is also noteworthy that the total recorded crime levels for these three forces returned 
to pre NCRS levels after the introduction of false reporting policies (Fig. 5.6). The 
national recorded crime trends and the national trend, minus the ten forces employing 
some form of ‘false reporting’ tactics or policy, are also shown.  The reductions in 
recorded crime experienced by the forces operating comprehensive ‘false reporting’ 
policies was considerably greater than the national, or the national minus the ten, 
‘false reporting’ forces. The reduction in the national trend may indicate a genuine 
reduction in overall crime levels or it may indicate a gradual or incremental, force by 
force, re-adjustment of the crime recording standard being operated by forces.   The 
fact that the reason for these variations could not be established conclusively 
demonstrated the weakness of the NCRS and failed to provide the confidence that it 
was not ‘game-proof’. ‘Cuffing’ to a greater or lesser degree could be the cause of 
these variations.     
Normalised trend from 1998 
- National against forces with comprehensive policy
70
80
90
100
110
120
130
140
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
National
National minus
10
West Mercia
West Midlands
West Yorks
 
(Fig 5.6)                                               (Home Office Crime Bulletins 1999-2006) 
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When the total recorded crime trend is examined for the forces operating some form 
of ‘false reporting’ policy, (City of London excluded because the crimes recorded are 
minimal due to the small size of the force), (Fig. 6.7) it can be seen that 
Nottinghamshire and Humberside experienced the greatest reduction in recorded 
crime during 2004/5 after introducing some form of ‘false reporting’ policy.    
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(Fig 5.7)                                          (Home Office Crime Bulletins 1999-2006) 
Merseyside was of interest as it didn’t follow the general trend, however this force 
was not included in Simmon’s et al’s (2003) assessment of the impact of the NCRS 
because of the peculiarities of the crime recording system it was operating and a new 
system was in the process of being introduced.  What also is of interest is 
Merseyside’s more recent reduction in total recorded crime in 2006/7 (Fig 5.8), an 11 
per cent reduction compared to the national reduction of 2.3 per cent. This coincided 
with HMIC’s observation that the force’s management were encouraging their 
officers to make full use of the NCRS 72 hour rule to ensure crimes were recorded 
correctly (HMIC/Merseyside 2007). This could be indicative of an ‘evidential’ crime 
recording being operated. 
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Merseyside Total Recorded Crime 1998-2007
0
20,000
40,000
60,000
80,000
100,000
120,000
140,000
160,000
180,000
200,000
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
To
ta
l R
ec
or
de
d 
C
rim
e
Merseyside
 
(Fig 5.8)                                          (Home Office Crime Bulletins 1999-2007) 
 
Also of note was the reduction in total recorded crime experienced by Cleveland 
Constabulary after the adoption of a limited false reporting policy in April 2006 (Fig 
5.9).  The sudden rise in recorded crime in 2005/06 corresponds with poor Audit 
Commission Results in 2003 and 2004. This would be suggest that recorded crime 
rose in 2005/6 as the force ensured compliance with the NCRS and then reduced 
again as it was found that the suspicion of false reporting legitimated a more 
‘evidential’ recording standard and also met the auditor’s requirements. (Cleveland 
being graded ‘green’ good by the Audit Commission in 2007). 
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(Fig 5.9)                               (Home Office Crime Bulletins 1999-2007) 
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When the trends for recorded robberies were examined the three forces with 
comprehensive ‘false reporting’ policies all experienced significant reductions in 
recorded robberies after introducing the policy, Fig. 5.10 shows the normalised 
percentage changes in recorded levels of robberies since 1998. Fig 5.11 shows the 
same trends for the forces with some form of ‘false reporting’ policy and practice 
applicable to reported robberies. Of particular interest is Humberside which was not a 
participant area for the Street Crime initiative but introduced a ‘false reporting’ policy 
in relation to robbery on 1.7.2004 which corresponded with a significant reduction in 
recorded robberies in 2004/05 than the ‘street crime’ forces which experienced a 
reduction in 2003/4 corresponding with the trialling of ‘false reporting’ tactics in 
2003/4. The same is true of West Mercia, again not a ‘street crime’ force, which 
experienced a marked reduction in robbery after it introduced a ‘false reporting policy 
(Fig. 5.10).   This again supports the proposition that the introduction of the ‘false 
reporting’ policy was the critical factor in reducing reported robberies.  
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Fig 5.10)                                            (Home Office Crime Bulletins 1999-2006) 
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(Fig 5.11)                                            (Home Office Crime Bulletins 1999-2006) 
 
All of the forces which had introduced the policy experienced improved performance 
in the offence categories to which the policy was applied thus replicating the 
experience of The West Midlands Police. However, an evaluation carried out by 
British Transport Police suggested that ‘false reporting’ might be less prevalent than 
originally envisaged and the benefits to be realised by trying to address the issue 
outweighed by the potential damage to relations with genuine victims:46  
 
“So to highlight all of these things implies there is a mindset that we are 
recording a lot of crimes that don’t occur.  The National Crime Recording 
Standard says a lot of these crimes do occur and the smaller number of 
crimes, where they are trying to fiddle us, we have to tolerate unless we 
have good evidence to the contrary.” (Interviewee B) 
 
Only one force, City of London, had extended the policy to reports of lost property, 
potentially a preparatory act to a false insurance claim. This suggests the motivation 
behind the policy was improved performance in reducing recorded crime not the 
detection of fraudsters: 
 
“Lets not get this reported as a crime, it keeps the figures down. That 
seemed to the emphasis” (Interviewee E).  
 
The compatibility of ‘false reporting’ policies and the NCRS demonstrates the 
weakness of a ‘balance of probability standard’.  The interviewees, supported by 
 the response from Lancashire Constabulary, were of the opinion that the policy  
did not concur with the spirit of a victim focused approach to crime recording: 
 
                                                 
46 BTP adopted a requirement for victims to sign a statement indicating the boa fides of their report. 
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  “Well if you put these all together the practical reaction would be to challenge  
 the victim and you would shift from a victim centred approach, ‘I believe 
you unless I can prove to the contrary, to I don’t believe you until you can  
prove that it had actually occurred.” (Interviewee B).  
 
 
 
However there is nothing amiss with a policy which seeks to identify potential 
offenders seeking to defraud their insurance companies, the problem comes when 
procedures or practices are introduced which delay or prevent the recording of a 
genuine crime that is reported. The audit gap between the high levels of ‘false 
reporting’, released in press reports by police forces and the low level of ‘no crimes’, 
suggests  reported crimes are not being recorded. This suggests the statistics reported 
in the press are derived from the deficit between reported incidents of crime and those 
which subsequently get recorded and issued with a crime number. Such procedures 
can be manipulated deliberately or innocently. However it is clear officers were still 
able to use their discretion to decide whether a crime had occurred or not and their 
decisions could be influenced by a belief that large numbers of people were making 
bogus reports. This can create a self fulfilling prophesy. Officers decide reports are 
false, the data then suggests the scale of the problem is large, thus fuelling further 
suspicion. This in turn justifies the need to retain officer discretion in the NCRS.  The 
small number of false reports resulting in prosecutions and/or no crimes suggests the 
sudden improvement in the performance of forces adopting the policy was not due to 
proactively identifying and prosecuting false reporters. Something else was improving 
the performance and that may be genuine improvements in performance although the 
most probable cause was a change in the recording standard.  Whilst those forces 
involved in the Street Crime Initiative showed reductions in robberies during the first 
year of the initiative 2001/2002, in contrast to those forces which were not part of the 
initiative (Cleveland and Humberside) which recorded increases, all forces showed 
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reductions, either immediately before or after the formal adoption of ‘false reporting’ 
policies. Certainly the development of ‘false reporting’ tactics during 2003/04 
corresponded with a national 11 per cent reduction in recorded robberies. This could 
have been due to the success of the Street Crime Forces in reducing ‘false reports’. 
However the discrepancy between the reported levels of false reporting and the 
number of robberies ‘no crimed’ questions this assumption. The possibility that false 
reports are subject to prosecutions for ‘wasting police time’ without the reported 
robbery being recorded also appears highly unlikely in the light of the low number of 
prosecutions disclosed by Avon & Somerset and BTP. The most compelling 
explanation was the operation of an ‘evidential’ crime recording standard or an 
interpretation of the NCRS ‘balance of probabilities’ standard which was similar, if 
not the same as an ‘evidential’ standard. The ‘evidential’ standard being legitimised 
by concerns about false reports and reported crimes ‘cuffed’: 
 
“Ironically the old system was saying we don’t believe you; the new 
system is saying, officially we don’t believe you.  See previously it was the 
CID who were the guardians of this unofficial knowledge. Now it’s 
everybody, its official!”  (Interviewee C).  
 
However this did not necessarily mean that forces without ‘false reporting’ policies 
were not operating an ‘evidential’ crime recording. The experience of Greater 
Manchester Police (GMP) was of interest. This force was a member of the Street 
Crime Initiative yet stated it had no ‘false reporting’ policy in response to the survey.  
Its total recorded crime profile (Fig 5.12) suggested something dramatic had occurred 
between 2003/04 and 2004/05 when a 12 per cent reduction in recorded crime had 
occurred.     
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Greater Manchester Police: Total Recorded Crime
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Fig 5.12                                                    (Home Office Crime Bulletins 1999-2007) 
 
In order to discover an explanation for this sudden reduction in recorded crime an 
interview with a performance officer at GMP Police Authority was arranged. This 
revealed that the force was operating ‘balance of probabilities’ standard for all reports 
of crime including those made by the victim. This is compatible with the change in 
the interpretation of the NCRS in 2006 outlined by the Home Office. The officer 
explained that the force was making considerable efforts to ‘police’ compliance with 
the standard, which may explain the rise in recorded crime in 2005/06. ‘False 
reporting’ policies had been discussed and found to be incompatible with the principle 
of a victim focussed crime recording system and posters emanating from the Street 
Crime Initiative were removed from police stations:  
 
 “In a couple of police stations we found one or two notices that were a bit 
persuasive, but they were taken down, like you must have your IEMI 
number or something like that. So I don’t think it was a cynical approach, 
people not just being aware of the implications of that.” (Interviewee H) 
 
 
The large variation between 2005/06 and 1998 can be explained by the fact that GMP 
adopted a ‘prima facie’ standard in 1997. The move from a ‘prima facie’ crime 
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recording standard to the NCRS ‘balance of probabilities’ standard for all reports is 
the most likely explanation for the sudden reduction in recorded crime between 
2003/04 and 2004/05.  
 
The limited information released by forces on the analytical basis for the policy 
suggests the policy was intuitively, not evidentially based. In fact the data on the scale 
of ‘false reporting’ provided by the British Transport Police evaluation suggested the 
evidence did not support the policy. Even accepting the difficulties likely to be 
encountered in investigating false reports the effort put into identifying 221 suspect 
cases worthy of further investigation from 68,000 reports doesn’t appear justified.  
However the marked improvement in performance does make the introduction of 
‘false reporting’ policies highly attractive and those forces without such policies or 
whose interpretation of the NCRS is closer to a ‘prima facie’ standard will find 
themselves in an uncompetitive position which may result in PSU engagement.   
 
Q5. Has the Audit Commission’s data standards audit identified the forces 
operating ‘false reporting’ policies?  
 
 
 
There was no identifiable trend in the Audit Commission’s data compliance grades to 
suggest those forces operating ‘false reporting’ policies were any less compliant than 
others, in fact West Yorkshire were commended on their commitment to the NCRS  
(Audit Commission July 2004:3). Nationally it appears NCRS compliance standards 
were improving however an examination of the BCS police recording trends indicated 
there were large variations in the recording rates for different offences: 
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“Comparing with the previous year, there have been reductions in the 
estimated recording rate for burglary (77% to 64%), bicycle theft (62% 
to 54%) and robbery (53% to 44%).” (Walker et al 2006:47). 
 
 
4. CHAPTER CONCLUSION: 
 
The evidence examined suggests the NCRS ‘balance of probability’ standard is too 
loose and is not ‘game-proof’. Variations in the interpretation of ‘balance of 
probabilities’ creates a continuum between those forces nearer to an ‘evidential’ 
standard and those nearer to a ‘prima facie’ standard, thus re-creating the situation the 
NCRS was designed to address. This definitional looseness has enabled the police to 
maintain discretion, legitimised by the concern about ‘false reports’, over what crimes 
enter the organisational accounts as ‘recorded crimes’ and created an environment in 
which ‘cuffing’ can flourish relatively unchallenged. This enables the police to 
maintain control over the primary indicator of their own success as they can still 
deflate or inflate recorded crime levels by adjusting the crime recording standard.  
 
Certainly those forces operating ‘false reporting’ policies are near the ‘evidential’ end 
of the continuum but they may not be the only ones operating to that standard. The 
improvement in performance experienced by the three forces adopting comprehensive 
‘false reporting’ policies gave them a competitive advantage over their peers which 
may be emulated by others as they seek to avoid the consequences of apparent under-
performance.  If levels of confidence in the crime recording systems were to be 
maintained (Gibbs & Haldenby 2006) the standard and the recording mechanisms 
associated with it need to be tightened. The evidence supporting the employment of 
‘false reporting’ policies remains ‘thin’; in fact the limited evaluations disclosed do 
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not justify the potentially damaging impact on victims, particularly those from 
minority ethnic origins. The interviewees were of the consensus that ‘false reporting’ 
policies were incompatible with a ‘victim focussed’ approach to crime recording. 
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CHAPTER 6:  
 
‘NODDING’: A VERY PRODUCTIVE PARTNERSHIP. 
 
 
An exploration of the extent to which suspects and police officers collude in 
enterprises designed to improve the detection rate.  
 
INTRODUCTION: 
In this chapter the practice of ‘nodding’ and its impact on the detection rate is 
examined. The term ‘nodding’ is used to describe forms of ‘gaming’ involving 
collusion between officers and suspects. This involves suspects admitting offences in 
return for favours or inducements. The term ‘nodding’ (Wilson et al 2001) comes 
from the movement of a suspect’s head as they point out or ‘nod’ at the places where 
they have committed an offence. Legitimate procedures provide suspects the facility 
to admit further offences either as ‘Taken into Consideration’ (TIC) when they are 
sentenced for another similar offence or as ‘prison write offs’ after they have 
commenced a custodial sentence and the offence admitted is unlikely to result in an 
increase in their sentence if they were charged and appeared before the court for the 
further offence. These two procedures were associated with ‘gaming’ type abuses 
(Young 1990; Likierman 1993; HMIC 1999; Wilson et al 2001). This chapter 
examines whether or not abuses are still occurring and provides an indication of the 
scale of the problem by reviewing the impact on the detection rate of forces where 
abuses have been uncovered. 
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CHAPTER STRUCTURE: 
 
The significance of the detection rate is outlined and the different categories of 
detections explained. The rules which facilitate ‘nodding’ are examined and the 
contribution they make to the overall detection rate calculated. A case study approach 
is then taken to examine the statistical impact on the detection rate of forces which 
have encountered problems with gaming behaviour involving ‘nodding’.  Alternate 
factors which may explain fluctuations in the detection rate are briefly explored. The 
impact of the types of detections associated with ‘nodding’ on forces’ rankings on 
national ‘league tables’ are demonstrated.     
 
 
1. THE SIGNIFICANCE DETECTIONS AND THE DETECTION RATE: 
 
 
The detection of crime represented by the detection rate reflects the popular crime 
fighting image of policing as officers track down and arrest criminals and then play 
out the court room drama involved in securing the ultimate goal of a conviction.  It is 
this aspect of policing which captures the public imagination embodied in popular 
fiction and drama and maintains the high professional and social status enjoyed by the 
detective: 
 
“The elite in the eyes of both the police and the public are the detective 
branches….The police are to be seen as professional soldiers in a war 
against crime, to be organised and equipped as such. The crime detection 
role of the police gains further weight from the fact that it appears at least 
superficially, the easiest to evaluate in objective terms” (Radzinowicz & 
King 1977:164)  
 
However the detection rate is only a statistical reflection of the drama portrayed in the 
popular media as it bears little relation to arrests and conviction rates. The detection 
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rate is composed of  a number of different forms of detections; charges; cautions 
(reprimands and formal warnings in the case of juveniles); fixed penalty notices 
(FPNs); offences taken into consideration (TICs); and administrative detections 
including informal warnings, prison ‘write offs’ and circumstances where the witness 
is unwilling or unable to support a prosecution. The reason for inclusion of different 
types of detections is well founded: Not all arrests result in any legal sanction as 
sufficient evidence may be lacking so they are excluded from the detection rate and 
could be seen as a police failure: many charges or summonses will not result in 
convictions as the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) decides there is insufficient 
evidence to proceed or the suspect is acquitted at trial.  These cases still remain 
counted as detections, subject to review by a supervisor, as the failure to secure a 
conviction may not be the product of police inefficiency e.g. pressure on the CPS to 
improve their conviction rate may incline them towards withdrawing cases where the 
prospect of conviction is uncertain: 
 
“We could not fail to recognise the volume of doubts and on occasion 
criticisms expressed to the effect that the CPS is thought to discontinue 
cases judged as borderline in an effort to ease the pressures on hard 
pressed lawyers. We consider that there may be some validity in these 
criticisms.” (Glidewell chapter 4, para. 32) 
 
That said the detection rate has attracted symbolic status as an indicator of police 
efficiency (Young 1990). It is also a performance indicator which is highly 
susceptible to ‘gaming’ or manipulation by the police themselves. Whilst ‘cuffing’ 
indirectly improves the detection rate by reducing the overall level of recorded crime 
on which the detection rate is based; detected crimes as a percentage of recorded 
crimes, ‘nodding’ is designed to improve the number of detections. 
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2: ‘NODDING’ TICS AND ‘PRISON WRITE OFFS’:     
 
The procedures governing the obtaining of detections as offences taken into 
consideration (TICs) or ‘prison write offs’ are designed to reduce paperwork and 
court time. In the case of TICs an offender is charged with a sample of the offences 
for which they appear before the court and to which they are pleading guilty and other 
offences to which they admit are presented to the court as TICs in order that the 
magistrate or judge can take them into account when sentencing. This allows the 
offender to avoid any outstanding offences coming to notice after sentencing leading 
to further court proceedings which may result in further penalties. The judge’s view of 
the total number of offences committed is usually offset by the remission given to the 
offender for showing remorse and a willingness to ‘clean the slate’ and start afresh.  
Prison ‘write offs’ occur when an offender serving a prison sentence admits further 
offences to the police. If these are unlikely to result in a further custodial sentence 
then the police can record the offences admitted as detected, subject to the approval of 
a senior officer.  
 
The problem lies in the potential for negotiation between officers and offenders as 
officers seek detections, thus improving their performance by securing admissions to 
offences unlikely to be solved by conventional means, and for the offender to ‘clean 
the slate’ and reduce the risk of further penalties: 
 
“We talk to people who are likely to have custody to get further 
admissions or TICs without further charges.  This improves our detection 
figures. The incentive for us is the number, for the burglar it’s that he 
doesn’t get a forensic hit and be arrested at the gate” (Collier 2006:7) 
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This creates a situation where an offender who is facing charge and likely conviction 
for one offence may have committed numerous offences.  The interviewing officer 
will be aware that the offender is likely to have committed a number of offences some 
of which may yield forensic evidence, enabling the offender to be prosecuted when 
the evidence comes to light. The offender is also aware of this.   If there was no 
pressure to achieve detections the officer would maintain the upper hand as he/she 
would be able to explain to the offender that they had an opportunity to admit more 
offences at that stage and thus avoid arrest and prosecution for outstanding offences 
which subsequently came to light. The choice is then left to the offender. If they fail 
to take advantage of this offer it could result in them being arrested after they have 
been released from prison for the earlier offence. This creates extra work for the 
police officers but does mean that the offender is then placed under certain restrictions 
when they are re-arrested, as they are again placed on police bail pending court 
disposal.  
 
The risk of ‘gaming’ lies in the potential for officers to offer some inducement to the 
offender to admit further offences. Such inducements could involve charging the 
offender with one of the less serious offences they have committed e.g. the value of 
property stolen was less than other offences or no violence was used in the 
commission of the offence, and then TIC the more serious offences. The result of such 
a deal would likely be a reduced sentence for the offender. Such a deal has obvious 
attractions for the offender and although such offers are illegal (attempt to pervert the 
course of justice) they are unlikely to come to light as they are made outside the 
restrictive environment of the formal interview where tape recording and defence 
solicitors may be present. If offenders do accept the offer to negotiate they are also are 
 190
entering into a criminal conspiracy and therefore there is little incentive for them to 
subsequently admit to such an undertaking. This is an example of an ‘invitational 
edge’ to corruption (Manning and Redlinger 1977) where organisational objectives 
tempt officers to engage in ‘behavioural gaming’. However, suspects may also try to 
initiate negotiations.  This was the case in an incident known to the author: A raid was 
carried out on a residential property and a large quantity of cannabis resin, consistent 
with drug dealing, was discovered. Also present in the house were a considerable 
number of car radios, presumably stolen, and exchanged for drugs in a barter type 
arrangement.   The suspect who was arrested and faced a lengthy custodial sentence 
then made the suggestion to the arresting officers offering to admit the theft of the car 
radios in return for the offence in relation to the drugs being ‘dropped’.  By offering 
to admit a significant number of these offences he was tempting the officers with a 
product which was of more value than the one detection for possession of illegal 
substances with intent to supply, relatively easy to achieve compared with detections 
for vehicle crime. The advantage to the suspect making the offer was his liberty and 
opportunity to continue his criminal business; the drugs offence would have resulted 
in a custodial sentence; the thefts from motor vehicles were more likely to attract a 
non custodial sentence. This is evidence of the type of adaptation associated with 
entrepreneurial behaviours, “the hallmark of entrepreneurial criminals is that they are 
adaptable and pursue changing market opportunities” (Smith 2006:15).  It also 
demonstrates that Livingston’s assumption that ‘intelligence’ about other criminal 
enterprises was the primary currency for exchange between offenders and police 
officers (Livingstone 1996) had expanded as detections became more valuable.  
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In the case of prison ‘write offs’ the incentive for prisoners to admit further offences, 
which would not increase their sentence, is mainly motivated by a desire to ‘clean the 
slate’. This prevents the likelihood of them being arrested after they are released from 
prison for an offence they committed before they started their sentence e.g. where 
forensic evidence comes to light at a later stage. The risk emerges when officers take 
offenders out of the prison and offer inducements in the form of meals, access to 
partners or alcohol in order for them to admit offences ‘nodding’.  These were the 
type of abuses referred to by Likierman (1993); HMIC (1999); Wilson et al (2001). 
 
The abuse of prison ‘write offs’ led the Home Office to designate prison ‘write offs’ 
as non-sanctioned detections. This meant they were excluded from the detection 
figures the Home Office gauged the forces’ performance on. A number of forces pre-
empted that decision; these included Greater Manchester Police (GMP), West 
Midlands Police, Northumbria Constabulary and Cleveland Constabulary. However it 
is known that West Midlands Police and Cleveland had encountered problems with 
the probity of their detection rates which may have motivated such a move.  West 
Midlands had instigated disciplinary proceedings against a number of officers up to 
Superintendent rank for abuse of prison ‘write offs’ and Cleveland had suspended a 
number of detectives (including Det. Supt. Ray Mallon) after receiving allegations 
from two prolific offenders. The Chief Constable of GMP made the decision to 
discount prison ‘write offs’ in 1995 (HMIC: GMP: 1996).  
 
However TICs remained ‘sanctioned’ detections and it also remained possible to 
‘convert’ ‘prison write offs’ into TICs by producing prisoners from prison for 
interview when investigating offences which had subsequently come to light as a 
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result of, for example, forensic evidence. If there was sufficient evidence to charge an 
offender serving a custodial sentence the CPS would be contacted to authorise the 
most suitable means of disposal. The CPS would take into account the sentence the 
offender was currently serving and the likelihood of that being increased by a further 
court appearance. Mostly they would decide that no increase would occur and it was 
therefore not in the public interest to proceed. Home Office Counting Rules still allow 
for offences dealt with in this way and any other offences which the offender is 
willing to have TIC to be categorised as ‘sanctioned’ detections. Both offender and 
investigating officer are aware of the likely outcome of these ‘post sentence’ TICs and 
the incentive for collusion and exploitation are increased. The performance data on 
detections does not differentiate between those TICs obtained prior to sentence, and 
therefore dealt with by the court, and those dealt with post sentence which have not. 
This denies the police service and the Home Office a true picture of police 
performance as measured by detections.  
 
The practice of ‘converting’ ‘prison write offs’ to TICs occurred in the West 
Midlands Police circa 1997-98 and corresponded with the categorisation of ‘prison 
write offs as non-sanctioned detections: 
 
“It didn’t kick in immediately, this fiddle, some OCUs [Operational 
Command Units] were quicker than others, other OCUs were slower and 
some wouldn’t touch it with a barge pole, quite understandably, but you 
are back into this performance culture. So what was happening, you 
would get, the traditional clear up methodology would be; admitted a 
load of offences in custody and they were put forward as TICs; Home 
Office Counting Rules will acknowledge at the point of admission 
provided they are on record as an admission you could clear them as a 
detection; that was the position our force took, they merely adhered to the 
Home Office Counting Rules; the problem was, and me and others were 
warning, there was a move towards not only a significant move towards 
TICs, where they used to be more ‘write offs’, then we switched almost 
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immediately, literally overnight to, the graphs showed it, write offs 
replaced by TICs, literally in opposite directions.” (Interviewee D) 
 
 
The observation made interviewee D that this practice had not been adopted 
universally by all the force’s Operational Command Units is demonstrated by Fig. 6.1 
which shows the number of TICs as a percentage of the total detection rate by 
command unit across the force during 1998/99. It is interesting to note that the low 
percentage rates recorded by the K1; K2 & F1 Command Units were all areas which 
had been involved in a previous scandal involving ‘prison write offs’.  
 
(Fig 6.1)                                                                          (West Midlands Police 1999) 
 
By 1998, according to official Home Office performance statistics, the West Midlands 
Police had transformed itself from the worst performing force to the best performing 
metropolitan force in the country. However in December 1998 the Force was 
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inspected by HMIC (HMIC/WMP Dec 1998). The inspection commented 
unfavourably on the over reliance on TICs and identified two problem areas; TICs 
which had been claimed as detections when they had not been accepted by the 
defendant at court, and no follow up action had been initiated 47; and the ‘conversion’ 
of ‘prison write offs’ to TICs:  
 
“it is recognised that there are potential pressure points within a 
performance culture and it is recommended that a system be adopted 
similar to that required under the Byford/Morris Rules for PSVs48 for the 
independent verification and authorisation of detections obtained by 
TICs, particularly those relating to further charges and TICs of persons 
already serving custodial sentences.” (HMIC 1998:36)  
 
 
The ‘conversion’ from ‘prison write offs’ to TICs was quantified by HMIC:  
 
“Detections from post sentence visits (PSVs), or ‘prison write offs’ has 
significantly decreased over the last three years from representing 45% of 
all detections in 1995/96 (equivalent to 33,103 detections) to 4.1% of all 
detections in 1998/99 (equivalent to 2,759 detections). This downward 
trend has continued into the current fiscal year and currently stands at 
only 0.9% of the total detections achieved in the first 6 months (equivalent 
to 412 detections)….  However, the most significant change has been the 
exceptionally large increase in the proportion of detections achieved from 
TICs which accounted for a quarter of the total detections in 1997/98”. 
(HMIC/WMP 1998:27-28)  
 
The audit of detections, conducted by HMIC staff officers, suggested collusion in the 
form of ‘deals’ was occurring between officers and suspects: 
 
“There are other examples where the more substantive and serious 
offences have been subject of TIC with ‘lesser offences’ being charged: 
Letter from subject in custody on remand suggests the possibility that 
                                                 
47 Home Office counting rules allow TICs to be recorded as detections at the point of charge. However 
the evidence to support TICs should be the same as that required to support a charge and if they are not 
accepted at court they should be made subject of charges.   
48 Post Sentence Visits are the means by which prison ‘write offs’ are obtained and the Byford/Morris 
rules govern how these interviews should be conducted. 
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some inducement may have been suggested to the subject regarding bail 
or interpreted by the subject in this fashion – Well what the f… happened 
to bail? I’m in court on Monday so if you could be there to get me bail I 
will come with you straight from the Courts and TIC all offences that I 
can remember” (HMIC 1998:34) 
 
In response to the criticism regarding TICs, the force management team required all 
Operational Command Unit management teams to review all TICs which had not 
resulted in a court record and to resurrect unresolved cases for further investigation. 
The subsequent reduction in detections by TICs in January 1999 (Fig 6.2) provides an 
indication of the scale of the problems associated with this form of detection prior to 
the inspection by HMIC.  
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(Fig 6.2)                                                                    (West Midlands Police 2005)  
 
However the ‘conversion’ of ‘prison write offs’ to TICs, which will be referred to as 
‘post sentence TICs’ to differentiate them from TICs presented at court, was not 
discontinued although the rules appertaining to ‘prison write offs’ were to be 
 196
applied49. Problems with this procedure came to light following the arrest of two 
officers in October 2003. The officers had ‘produced’ a suspect from prison in order 
to interview them about further offences ‘nodding’. The officers had entered a fast 
food outlet for lunch, (a practice strictly forbidden by force procedures), and the 
prisoner had been passed prohibited drugs by a relative. The force’s professional 
standards department acting on a ‘tip off’ had been keeping covert observations on the 
officers and their prisoner. All the parties were arrested. The press were alerted and 
although the story appeared in the local newspaper: 
 
“The arrests relate to an allegation that officers allowed a person in 
custody to gain access to illegal drugs from a third party who is not a 
police officer” (Birmingham Post 7.10.03) 
 
None of the officers were charged with any criminal offence. However the incident 
resulted in the force management team instigating a review of the procedures 
involving ‘post sentence TICs’. This review found the same abuses as the inspection 
conducted by HMIC (1998) some four years earlier: 
 
“In a few cases, defendants are admitting to offences that they could not 
have committed due to being in custody. Those cases are still being 
subject to TIC….More serious offences are often taken into consideration 
than those offences that have been charged. There are examples in which 
the values on the TIC schedules are consistently well below those on the 
crime reports. This would ‘minimise’ the offence in the eyes of the court.” 
(WMP Feb 2004:2)      
 
The motivation to improve performance was highlighted as the main contributory 
factor: 
 
                                                 
49 These are known as the Byford rules which require suspects to be made aware any admissions may 
be subject to court proceedings and place an onus on senior officers to make reasonable efforts to check 
that the offender was actually responsible for the offence admitted.  
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“It should be noted that there was widespread concern about the use of 
production prisoners with OCUs effectively competing to become the first 
to obtain the visit and thereby boost their own detection figures, even if 
the prisoner was being dealt with already by another OCU. Force records 
are being trawled to gain an advantage in such matters, with little 
organised collaborative effort” (WMP Feb 2004:2)  
 
Interviewee C made the following comment on the document: 
 
“It’s remarkable [the internal report50] for being so blunt but it is also 
remarkable in terms of describing the culture of a force. Why would there 
be competition between OCUs?  Clearly numbers have become more 
important than integrity.” (Interviewee C) 
 
 
Knowledge of these practices was also present within the force prior to the incident 
involving the arrest of the officers, referred to within the force as the ‘drugs for 
detections’ scandal: 
   
“the second approach, where people were serving time and interviewed 
regarding other offences and they were charged with a piddling little 
offence and then all the rest were TIC’d. There was clearly no interest in 
a court case because they knew if they consulted with CPS, as they were  
supposed to have done, as far as national policy was concerned, CPS 
would say ‘not in the public interest discontinue’ get your detection for 
the charge. If you’ve got someone doing years for burglary and they 
admit twenty others the chances are CPS would not progress on the 
grounds of no public interest; so sometimes they [TICs] were presented as 
part of the CPS decision making process or sometimes they were 
deliberately held back. So they would only see the charges; so because this 
person has signed the TICs and this person was subject of a charge the 
reading of the Home Office counting rules to take them into the TIC 
remit as opposed to the ‘write offs’” (Interviewee D) 
 
  
 
The force command team then introduced a policy requiring all Command Units to 
ensure that only detections which had been disposed of at court could be claimed as 
detections. This meant that offenders wishing to admit further offences during the 
                                                 
50 Author’s addition 
 198
period in which they were serving custodial sentences would have to appear before a 
court and face the risk of an increased sentence. This meant that officers so inclined 
could no longer manipulate the system in order to reduce the risk of further penalties 
for the offender. The reduction in TICs after October 2003 is shown in fig 6.2. The 
negative impact on the force’s overall detections and in particular the reduction in 
detections for key offences such as robbery burglary and vehicle crime experienced 
during 2004-5 is evident in Fig. 6.3. 
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(Fig 6.3)                                                  (Home Office Bulletins 2002- 200751) 
  
The reduction in TICs resulted in a significant reduction in the overall detection rate 
and placed the force in jeopardy of PSU engagement as they were second from 
bottom on the sanctioned detections ‘league table’52 (Fig 6.4).  
                                                 
51 The numbers of detections are calculated from the number of offences recorded and the percentage 
detected (the information provided in the bulletins). 
52 The fall in detections corresponded with the introduction of the ‘false reporting policy’ which in turn 
corresponded with a reduction in recorded crime levels and this no doubt helped prevent PSU 
engagement. 
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(Fig 6.4)                                                                          (Home Office PSU 2005:3) 
 
The significant reduction in detections also had a negative impact on the force’s 
showing in the ‘narrowing the justice gap’ performance indicator, introduced in 2003, 
which relied upon detections to measure police performance. 
 
 
However other forces are known to have experienced similar difficulties involving 
‘nodding’. In 2004 ‘nodding’ involving ‘post sentence TICs’ came to light in Greater 
Manchester Police when this force examined practices at its Stockport Division with a 
view to discovering good practice: 
 
“On one occasion, a criminal was able to see his new baby for the first 
time. He is alleged to have unwittingly signed documents in which he 
admitted to hundreds of offences he had not committed. Another man on 
remand was taken out of prison to and allowed to see his girlfriend. He 
allegedly confessed to 200 crimes he did not commit. (Carter: The 
Guardian 4.6. 2004).  
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In May 2006 Bedfordshire Police admitted similar problems involving officers from 
Luton in Bedfordshire who had provided inducements in exchange for 
admissions/detections: 
 
“Four police officers have resigned after being found giving remand 
prisoners special favours in exchange for false confessions. Some 
prisoners were allowed to have sex with their girlfriends – including once 
in a police car…others were allowed home visits, cigarettes and extra 
meals” (Metro News 16.5.2006). 
 
In June 2007 a similar scandal emerged, this time involving Merseyside officers 
(BBC 6.6.2007). The dismissal of the officers stimulated comments from fellow 
officers on the issue of TICs: 
 
“TIC’s are weak at best, they are no consolation to the victims and in no 
way shape or form to be considered justice and this is just an indication of 
the pressure on (foolish) officer to gain clear-ups and detections ….Clear-
ups are a paper exercise foisted upon us by a performance perfection 
related culture which stems from the Home Office.” 
(www.policeoracle.com/forum 6.6.2007)  
 
 
In order to establish if these incidents were isolated incidents or symptoms of a larger 
problem ‘the tip of an iceberg’, the data on detections from those forces known to 
have experienced problems with ‘nodding’ were examined. It was anticipated that 
similar falls in detections to those recorded by the West Midlands Police would be 
evident. 
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3. THE SCALE OF ‘NODDING’ AND ITS IMPACT ON THE DETECTION 
RATE:   
 
Detections and detection rates of forces known to have encountered ‘nodding’ 
problems involving the abuse of TIC and ‘prison write off’ procedures were 
examined. The forces chosen were Greater Manchester; Nottinghamshire; Cleveland; 
West Midlands; Merseyside; Bedfordshire Police and the Metropolitan Police 
Service53. The objective was to establish the extent to which these forces relied upon 
Prison Write Offs and/or TICs to improve their detection rate and quantify the impact 
of problematic incidents or ‘events’ involving ‘nodding’. Although the Met. had not 
been the subject of any known ‘scandal’ involving ‘nodding’ it was included for 
examination because of the allegations made in the Radio 4 Law in Action 
programme (BBC 5.6.07)). This report indicated that collusion of the type associated 
with ‘nodding’ may have been occurring.   
 
Earlier incidents tended to involve ‘prison write offs’ the later TICs. Analysis of both 
‘prison write offs’ and TICs were conducted because both are prone to ‘nodding’ type 
abuses. As has already been established administrative procedures can be exploited to 
‘convert’ ‘prison write offs’ into TICs. In order to provide a graphic illustration of the 
impact of known problems with ‘nodding’ type behaviour graphs showing the number 
of house burglaries (burglary dwelling) detected are shown. A more detailed analysis 
of these forces’ performance statistics is provided on Appendices M – T.  
 
                                                 
53 The exposure of ‘gaming’ in Kent Police in 1986 has been excluded because the necessary detailed 
data on the force’s performance from is not available from that time. 
 202
Greater Manchester Police (GMP) discontinued prison write offs in 1995 and HMIC 
commented on the statistical impact of that decision in their 1996 force inspection 
report:   
“HM Inspector fully appreciates the impact that this one decision has 
apparently had on operational performance, and he recognises efforts by 
the Force to explain the overarching need for integrity in processes.” 
(HMIC GMP 1996:16) 
 
GMP’s overall detection rate reduced from 32% in 1994/5 to 19% 1995/6 and 18% in 
1996/7 as a result of that decision (Fig 6.5): 
 
GMP and National Detection Rates
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
19
94
/5
19
95
/6
19
96
/7
19
97
/8
19
98
/9
19
99
/0
20
00
/1
20
01
/2
20
02
/3
20
03
/4
20
04
/5
20
05
/6
Year
%
 O
ffe
nc
es
 d
et
ec
te
d
National Detection rate
GMP  Detection rate
   
(Fig 6.5)                                                                         (Home Office 1996-2006) 
 
 
The impact of the decision to discontinue ‘prison write offs’ is significant, with 
GMP’s detection rate falling from well above the national average in 1994/5 to well 
below it in 1996/7. When the impact of the decision on the detection rate for 
individual crime types is examined the scale of the change is even more marked 
(Table 6.1 & Table 6.2).  
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(Table 6.1)                                                          (HMIC/GMP 1996:16) 
 
  
(Table 6.2)       (HMIC/GMP 1997:42) 
 
 
This information provides a statistical benchmark on the scale of ‘nodding’ and the 
abuse of ‘prison write offs’. The biggest impact of the decision to discount ‘prison 
write offs’ was on the detection rate for burglary dwelling and burglary other building 
(commercial premises; sheds, garages etc.) both of which reduced by approximately 
two thirds between 1993/4 and 1996/7 settling at 10% and 9% respectively. The other 
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big change occurred in relation to vehicle crime, theft of and from a motor vehicle 
which reduced from 29% of offences detected in 1993/4 to 8% in 1996/7 (Table 6.2). 
The impact on robberies was much less, falling from 24% in 1993/4 to 20% in 
1996/7. The impact on violence against the person is much less pronounced and the 
detection of sexual offences54 is not influenced by the change in policy. The 18 per 
cent overall detection rate; 9 per cent detection rate for burglary dwelling; and 8 per 
cent for auto crime in 1996/97 (Table 6.2) provided a benchmark for a large 
metropolitan police force which had addressed the dangers inherent in relying on post 
sentence detections in the form of ‘prison write offs’. There was no subsequent 
increase in TICs as a means of detection which indicated the conversion of ‘prison 
write offs’ to TICs did not occur post 1998; Fig. 6.6 demonstrates that TICs continued 
to represent a small percentage of the overall detection rate.   
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(FIG 6.6)                                                            (Home Office Bulletins 1999-200655) 
 
An examination of the detection rate for burglary (Fig 6.7) showed that GMP   
continued to remain below the national average.  
                                                 
54 The detection of Sexual Offences by Prison Write Off and TIC would be exceptional. 
55 Data on detections was extrapolated from annual Home Office Bulletins. 
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GMP & National Burglary Detection Rate
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 (Fig 6.7)                                                             (Home Office Bulletins 2002-2006) 
 
However a closer examination of the make up of the detection rate for Burglary 
Dwelling, Theft from Motor Vehicle and Theft of Motor Vehicle 56 was undertaken 
using data provided by the Home Office (Appendix M). This showed that the force 
did not rely on either Prison Write Offs or TICs in these key categories and its 
performance remained low in comparison to the national averages. There was an 
increase in TICs in these crime categories after the incident reported in the Guardian 
(Carter: The Guardian 4.6. 2004) which suggested post-sentence TICs were being 
sought by at least one Command Unit57. The increase in TICs also post-dates the 
involvement of the Police Standards Unit with the Force (2002/03; Home Office/PSU 
2005). This may indicate that this form of detection was being sought in order to 
improve the force’s performance and avoid further sanctions. 
  
Nottinghamshire Constabulary was also identified with abuses involving ‘nodding’ as 
a result of a formal complaint made by one of its own senior officers (Wilson et al 
2001) This suggested ‘nodding’ type abuses were occurring in Nottinghamshire 
                                                 
56 These offence categories were chosen because they are the offences most likely to be TIC.   
57 The GMP performance officer declined to comment on the use of TICs. 
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Constabulary up until 1998 (HMIC/Notts.1996:14; HMIC/Notts.1997:72; 
HMIC/Notts.1998:10).  The impact of the exposure by the Despatches Programme in 
1999 and the resulting remedial action is apparent (table 6.358): The detection of 
burglary dwellings reduced by fifty per cent between 1998/99 and 1999/00.  
 
(Table 6.3)                                                                            (HMIC Notts. 2000/1:27) 
 
The force responded to this exposure59 by discontinuing the use of ‘prison write offs’ 
and introducing a policy that prevented any TIC being recorded as detected until it 
had been dealt with as such at court60 : 
 
“Force policy indicates that TICs can only be shown as detected once the 
offender has appeared at court. The Counting Rules allow that such 
offences may also be shown as detected once the offender has 
unequivocally admitted the offence and has signed TIC forms to this 
effect. (HMIC/Notts 2001/2:25) 
 
                                                 
58 The impact on other categories of crime is not shown in the HMIC Inspection report.  
59 It would appear the response was stimulated by the media exposure in 1999 not the complaint made 
by Supt. Coles which would have been much earlier. 
60 Home Office Counting Rules allow offences TIC to be claimed as detections when the form is signed 
by the accused. This can result in offences which the suspect subsequently refuses to admit at court to 
remain counted as detections. This is area which can be exploited; the action taken by Notts. Police 
reduces the opportunity for ‘gaming’.    
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Like Greater Manchester its performance compared to national averages remained 
low. Nottinghamshire was also subjected to PSU engagement.  A fuller analysis is 
provided at Appendix N.  
 
The problems experienced by Cleveland Police came to public notice with the 
suspension of Detective Superintendent Ray Mallon in 1998. Allegations against 
officers working in Cleveland included providing suspects with drugs and drink in 
return for admissions, (The Observer, Sunday 17.2.2002 
www.mojuk.org.uk/bulletins/evil.html). This type of perverse behaviour is associated 
with ‘nodding’ involving the abuse of TIC procedures.  The Chief Constable 
responded to the revelations by committing the force to addressing the problems: 
 
“Custody areas should be amongst the safest places in the country. In 
Middlesbrough, they were a place where corrupt detectives supplied hard 
drugs. If one isn’t prepared to tackle this kind of issue with whatever it 
takes, one shouldn’t be a chief constable”. (The Observer, Sunday 
17.2.2002 www.mojuk.org.uk/bulletins/evil.html) 
 
 
 
The impact of the remedial action was reflected in a reduction in detections of 
domestic burglaries from 2,261 in 1996/97 to 1,121 in 1997/98 (Table 6.4).   
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(Table 6.4)                                                                      (HMIC/Cleveland 1999:20) 
  
The result of the action taken by the Chief Constable appears like Greater Manchester 
Police and Nottinghamshire to have had a lasting detrimental impact on the force’s 
performance (Appendix P). The force was also the subject of PSU intervention.  
 
 
The West Midlands Police experienced a scandal involving detections obtained by 
‘prison write offs’ in 1996 and this led to the decision by the Chief Constable to 
discontinue the use of ‘prison write offs’ as part of the performance framework. This 
decision was reinforced by the demotion of two detective superintendents who were 
involved in the scandal. However the conversion of ‘prison write offs’ to TICs 
compensated for the impact on performance: 
 
“If you look at specific clearance groups and a large chunk of detections 
were around TICs. They were converting prison write offs to TICs.” 
(Interviewee D: Crime Policy) 
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In December 1998 HMIC criticised the use of TICs, both pre and Post Sentence, 
(HMIC/WMP 1998; HMIC/WMP 1999). However the force continued to use post 
sentence TICs until October 2003 when the arrest of officers in connection with an 
incident in which drugs were supplied to a prisoner in their control led the force to 
introduce the same policy adopted by Nottinghamshire in 1999 i.e. only TICs 
accepted at court could be claimed as detections. The impact on the number of house 
burglaries detected is clear (Fig. 6.8). 
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(Fig. 6.8)                                                               (Home Office 2008) 
 
 
A fuller analysis is provided in Appendix Q. Unlike GMP, Cleveland, and 
Nottinghamshire the force avoided PSU engagement. This may have been the result 
of the fall in recorded crime which corresponded with the introduction of a ‘false 
reporting’ policy (see chapter 5). 
 
The scandal involving Bedfordshire officers and suspects became public in May 2006. 
If ‘nodding’ involving inducements was inflating the force’s detection rate through 
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the abuse of TIC procedures then a marked reduction in the detection rate would be 
expected to occur shortly after the matters came to light61.  The reduction in  
the number of house burglaries detected follows a similar pattern to the previous 
forces examined (Fig 6.9). 
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(Fig. 6.9)                                                                     (Home Office 2008) 
 
A fuller analysis is provided at Appendix R. This again demonstrates the extent to 
which this force was relying on ‘nodding’ type of practices.      
 
 
 
In June 2007 it became public (BBC 6.6.2007) that Merseyside Officers had been 
dismissed for offering inducements in return for confessions:  
 
“The charges related to six occasions between July 2004 and March 2005 
when a prolific offender was produced from prison to be interviewed 
about further offences. They included one incident where the man was 
taken from prison and allowed to visit his girlfriend and another where 
he was given alcohol……There was also evidence which suggests the 
                                                 
61 It is difficult to estimate when the investigations into the incidents started and there can be a 
considerable delay between an investigation and the matter becoming public, if indeed it actually 
becomes public knowledge. 
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officers may have primed the criminal to admit to offences that they had 
reason to believe he had not committed.” (IPCC 6.6.2007) 
 
The fall in the force’s performance after the incident was commented on by HMIC: 
 
“The force has seen a reduction of 9% in performance in the category of 
detections of domestic burglary (SPI 6b) in comparison with 2004/05 and 
is lower than the MSF average…….. The force has experienced a 6% 
reduction in performance in the detection of vehicle crime (SPI 6b) and is 
lower than the MSF average.” (HMIC/Merseyside Oct 2006:53-54)  
 
 
However whilst there was a fall in the overall number of burglary dwellings detected 
in 2005/06 (Fig. 6.10), corresponding with the reported incident, the reduction in TICs 
was not as marked as other forces which had experienced similar incidents. 
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(Fig. 6.10)                                                                   (Home Office 2008) 
 
This suggested some other means of recording detections obtained by ‘nodding’ type 
activities was being utilised. A review of the make up of Merseyside’s detection 
statistics offered an explanation. Detections categorised as ‘other’, which would 
include ‘prison write offs’, increased dramatically in Merseyside for the key offences 
 212
of Burglary Dwelling; Theft from Vehicle and Theft or Unauthorised Taking of a 
Motor Vehicle in 2004/05 then reduced significantly in 2005/6 (Fig. 6.11). Although 
these ‘other’ detections would be regarded as ‘non-sanctioned’ detections on Home 
Office performance tables they could be used for local marketing purposes to 
demonstrate an increase in detections. It could be that the force was using ‘prison 
write offs’ and the ‘gaming’ practices related to this procedure.  
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(Fig. 6.11)                                                                                (Home Office 2008) 
 
A fuller analysis is provided at Appendix S. 
  
 
Whilst there has been no reported scandal involving Met. Officers and the abuse of 
TIC procedures the complaint made by defence solicitors about officers conducting 
‘intelligence’ interviews with suspects without the presence of their solicitor indicates 
abuses involving ‘nodding’ could have been occurring:  
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“There are fears of a return to the bad old days when undue pressure and 
inducements in police interviews led to unreliable evidence being obtained 
that jeopardised prosecutions and convictions”. (BBC Radio 4 Law in 
Action 5.6.07)  
 
‘Intelligence’ interviews present an ideal opportunity for ‘deals’ to be struck (Wilson 
et al 2001), and the defence solicitors intimated as much on the programme. There 
was no indication from the documentation on the Met. Police web site or media 
reports to suggest that any major scandal involving Met. Officers and the abuse of 
TIC procedures had occurred. However it was anticipated that the suspicions voiced 
by the defence solicitor on the Law in Action programme would materialise in a 
marked increase in the use of TICs. The increased in the number of burglary 
dwellings detected by TIC is evident (Fig. 6.12). A more detailed analysis is provided 
at Appendix T. 
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(Fig. 6.12)                                                                                    (Home Office 2008) 
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4. IMPROVEMENTS IN FORENSIC TECHNIQUES AS A POSSIBLE 
EXPLANATION FOR VARIATIONS IN PERFORMANCE:  
  
Improvement in the detection of offences has no doubt been enhanced by 
developments in forensic science, most notably the advances in DNA recovery and 
identification techniques. Therefore the differences in the detection rates reported by 
the forces examined may have been due to greater investment in the recovery or 
management of forensic evidence. Examination of the forensic performance results 
published by HMIC in force baseline inspections failed to establish any correlation 
between investment and management of forensic evidence and improved detection 
rates in the crime categories Burglary Dwelling, Theft from Vehicle and Theft or 
Unauthorised Taking of a Motor Vehicle. The West Midlands Police had one of the 
most advanced forensic management systems in the country, FLINTS, which mapped 
scenes of crimes where forensic evidence has been recovered and enabled known 
offender’s crime patterns to be linked to the crime patterns in an area. Bedfordshire 
was also known to have had a good forensic management system in place. Despite 
this both forces experienced significant reductions in detections following ‘incidents’ 
involving ‘nodding’ and TICs. The documentation reviewed indicated that HMIC 
grades on the performance of forensic services were linked to the level of TICs not 
‘visa versa’ as the HMIC baseline assessment on West Midlands Police, completed 
after the ‘incident’ in October 2003, indicated: 
 
“At the end of 2004/05, the percentage of conversion of fingerprint 
identifications to primary detections has reduced 19% to 27.5%, placing 
the force sixth in its MSF group……. the percentage of DNA primary 
detections per match has improved slightly to 28.7%. However, this 
places the force seventh in its MSF group.”( HMIC/WMP Oct 2005:32) 
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Similar findings were evident in relation to Merseyside Police: 
 
“The force is performing poorly in comparison with MSF average for 
conversion of identifications to detections, e.g. 55.6% compared with 
81.1% MSF average for total DNA detections as a percentage of DNA 
matches and 30.6% compared with 71.8% MSF average for total 
fingerprint identifications as a percentage of fingerprint matches.” 
(HMIC/Merseyside Oct 2006:59)  
 
  
Whilst forensic evidence; fingerprints; and DNA, can provide valuable intelligence as 
part of an investigation and in some cases it can be the most crucial element in the 
case against a suspect, it is of less value in some types of offences where legitimate 
explanations for the suspect’s presence at the scene can be provided. In the case of a 
burglary dwelling it is less likely that the suspect will be able to provide a legitimate 
reason for the presence of their fingerprint or DNA at the scene. However in the case 
of a theft of motor vehicle they could claim they had accepted a lift in the vehicle, 
unaware that it was stolen or in the case of a theft from motor vehicle they had looked 
in the vehicle out of interest either before or after the offence had occurred. However 
forensic evidence can be used to justify the arrest and questioning of a suspect. Those 
suspects who are already serving a custodial sentence or are charged with a more 
serious offence are more likely to admit responsibility as this is unlikely to increase 
their sentence. Hence the link to TICs or ‘prison write offs’.  Whilst these detections 
of minor offences by TIC are worthless except for statistical performance purposes 
there is a considerable cost involved in examining stolen vehicles and vehicles which 
have been broken into and this cost is not borne solely by the police service. Victims 
also incur further expense as forensic examinations of stolen vehicles are conducted at 
private vehicle pounds which provide a safe environment for the forensic examiners. 
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The cost of the recovery of the stolen vehicle and its storage is the responsibility of 
the owner and vehicles are generally not released until outstanding accounts are 
settled. So victims bear the cost of what is essentially a ‘gaming’ exercise.                
 
5. THE IMPACT OF ‘NODDING’ ON NATIONAL LEAGUE TABLES 
 
The case studies demonstrated the connection between ‘gaming’ behaviour in the 
form of ‘nodding’ and the detection of offences by TIC. Whilst the graphs indicated 
that a fall in TICs corresponded with a reduction in the detection rate for certain key 
offences indicating that the necessary evidence was not available to charge suspects if 
they declined to accept offences as TICs.  
 
The next step was to look at the extent to which other forces relied on TICs and the 
extent to which TICs influenced forces positions on national performance tables.  
When forces were ranked according to their respective burglary dwelling detection 
rates (Table 6.562) four of the forces known to have encountered difficulties with 
TICs; Bedfordshire, Nottinghamshire, West Midlands and GMP, were ranked in the 
bottom five places; Cleveland 9th and Merseyside 14th.  
 
British Transport Police Burglary Dw. Total Det Rate 0 
Bedfordshire Burglary Dw. Total Det Rate 8 
Nottinghamshire Burglary Dw.Total Det Rate 9 
West Midlands Burglary Dw.Total Det Rate 11 
Greater Manchester Burglary Dw.Total Det Rate 13 
North Yorkshire Burglary Dw.Total Det Rate 13 
South Wales Burglary Dw.Total Det Rate 13 
London, City of Burglary Dw.Total Det Rate 14 
Cleveland Burglary Dw.Total Det Rate 14 
Avon & Somerset Burglary Dw.Total Det Rate 14 
Wiltshire Burglary Dw.Total Det Rate 14 
                                                 
62 British Transport Police is unlikely to feature in performance tables based on detecting burglary 
dwellings in view of the different nature of its policing environment. 
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Surrey Burglary Dw.Total Det Rate 14 
Humberside Burglary Dw.Total Det Rate 14 
Merseyside Burglary Dw.Total Det Rate 15 
Warwickshire Burglary Dw.Total Det Rate 15 
Durham Burglary Dw.Total Det Rate 15 
Kent Burglary Dw.Total Det Rate 16 
Thames Valley Burglary Dw.Total Det Rate 16 
Hertfordshire Burglary Dw.Total Det Rate 16 
Northamptonshire Burglary Dw.Total Det Rate 16 
Essex Burglary Dw.Total Det Rate 17 
Lincolnshire Burglary Dw.Total Det Rate 17 
Dorset Burglary Dw.Total Det Rate 17 
Cambridgeshire Burglary Dw.Total Det Rate 18 
Hampshire Burglary Dw.Total Det Rate 18 
Metropolitan Police Burglary Dw.Total Det Rate 18 
Devon & Cornwall Burglary Dw.Total Det Rate 18 
Suffolk Burglary Dw.Total Det Rate 18 
Staffordshire Burglary Dw.Total Det Rate 19 
Sussex Burglary Dw.Total Det Rate 19 
South Yorkshire Burglary Dw.Total Det Rate 20 
Leicestershire Burglary Dw.Total Det Rate 20 
Gloucestershire Burglary Dw.Total Det Rate 21 
West Yorkshire Burglary Dw.Total Det Rate 21 
Cumbria Burglary Dw.Total Det Rate 21 
West Mercia Burglary Dw.Total Det Rate 22 
Derbyshire Burglary Dw.Total Det Rate 22 
Norfolk Burglary Dw.Total Det Rate 22 
Northumbria Burglary Dw.Total Det Rate 23 
Cheshire Burglary Dw.Total Det Rate 24 
Gwent Burglary Dw.Total Det Rate 27 
Dyfed-Powys Burglary Dw.Total Det Rate 31 
Lancashire Burglary Dw.Total Det Rate 31 
North Wales Burglary Dw.Total Det Rate 42 
 
(Table 6.5)                                                           (Home Office 2007) 
When TICs are controlled for i.e. the detection rate minus TICs (Table 6.6) the 
rankings based on Burglary Dwelling detections change and although Bedfordshire 
remained the lowest ranking, Cleveland, West Midlands and GMP improved. 
Noticeable was the impact on the Met., which appears third from bottom on the 
rankings.   
British Transport Police 
Burglary Dw. Det. Rate minus 
TICs 0
Bedfordshire 
Burglary Dw. Det. Rate minus 
TICs 5
Metropolitan Police 
Burglary Dw. Det. Rate minus 
TICs 6
Warwickshire 
Burglary Dw. Det. Rate minus 
TICs 7
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Nottinghamshire 
Burglary Dw. Det. Rate minus 
TICs 7
Thames Valley 
Burglary Dw. Det. Rate minus 
TICs 7
Merseyside 
Burglary Dw. Det. Rate minus 
TICs 8
Cambridgeshire 
Burglary Dw. Det. Rate minus 
TICs 8
Leicestershire 
Burglary Dw. Det. Rate minus 
TICs 8
Avon & Somerset 
Burglary Dw. Det. Rate minus 
TICs 8
Greater Manchester 
Burglary Dw. Det. Rate minus 
TICs 8
Gloucestershire 
Burglary Dw. Det. Rate minus 
TICs 8
West Yorkshire 
Burglary Dw. Det. Rate minus 
TICs 8
West Midlands 
Burglary Dw. Det. Rate minus 
TICs 9
South Yorkshire 
Burglary Dw. Det. Rate minus 
TICs 9
Humberside 
Burglary Dw. Det. Rate minus 
TICs 9
Kent 
Burglary Dw. Det. Rate minus 
TICs 9
Lincolnshire 
Burglary Dw. Det. Rate minus 
TICs 9
Essex 
Burglary Dw. Det. Rate minus 
TICs 10
Devon & Cornwall 
Burglary Dw. Det. Rate minus 
TICs 10
South Wales 
Burglary Dw. Det. Rate minus 
TICs 10
Derbyshire 
Burglary Dw. Det. Rate minus 
TICs 10
Northamptonshire 
Burglary Dw. Det. Rate minus 
TICs 10
Surrey 
Burglary Dw. Det. Rate minus 
TICs 11
Dorset 
Burglary Dw. Det. Rate minus 
TICs 11
London, City of 
Burglary Dw. Det. Rate minus 
TICs 11
Wiltshire 
Burglary Dw. Det. Rate minus 
TICs 11
Hertfordshire 
Burglary Dw. Det. Rate minus 
TICs 12
North Yorkshire 
Burglary Dw. Det. Rate minus 
TICs 12
Cheshire 
Burglary Dw. Det. Rate minus 
TICs 12
Cleveland 
Burglary Dw. Det. Rate minus 
TICs 13
Hampshire 
Burglary Dw. Det. Rate minus 
TICs 13
Durham 
Burglary Dw. Det. Rate minus 
TICs 13
Northumbria 
Burglary Dw. Det. Rate minus 
TICs 13
Sussex 
Burglary Dw. Det. Rate minus 
TICs 13
Suffolk 
Burglary Dw. Det. Rate minus 
TICs 14
Staffordshire 
Burglary Dw. Det. Rate minus 
TICs 14
West Mercia 
Burglary Dw. Det. Rate minus 
TICs 14
Norfolk 
Burglary Dw. Det. Rate minus 
TICs 17
Lancashire 
Burglary Dw. Det. Rate minus 
TICs 19
Cumbria 
Burglary Dw. Det. Rate minus 
TICs 20
Gwent Burglary Dw. Det. Rate minus 21
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TICs 
Dyfed-Powys 
Burglary Dw. Det. Rate minus 
TICs 26
North Wales 
Burglary Dw. Det. Rate minus 
TICs 30
 PEARSON 0.9803
 RSQ 0.9611
  
total det rate vs TICs PEARSON 0.8022
 RSQ 0.6435
 
(Table 6.6)                                                 (Home Office 2007) 
    
Similar results were found when detection rates for theft of and theft from Motor 
Vehicle were examined. The presence of the forces which had experienced ‘nodding’ 
incidents involving TICs or ‘prison write offs’ in the lower end of the performance 
tables demonstrated the negative impact policies designed to ensure probity had on 
force performance.  There is therefore little motivation to introduce such policies and 
this may explain why such measures had been introduced in the wake of scandals as 
opposed to being employed more widely as a general preventative measure. In a 
number of cases senior officers acknowledged the damaging impact of such scandals 
on public trust in the police service: 
 
“Deputy Chief Constable Martin Stuart of Bedfordshire Police said three 
Luton Based Officers were ‘required to resign’ at the end of a 12-month 
inquiry….the honesty and integrity of our staff is vital to public 
confidence.” (Metro News 16th May 2006) 
 
Following the October 2003 incident involving West Midlands Police officers the 
assistant Chief Constable (Crime) publicly addressed the reversal of his force’s 
performance on detections by indicating that probity came at the cost of reduced 
performance: 
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“We have very rigorous and ethical methods of detection and set 
ourselves the highest possible standards. We will not record something 
until it comes back from court whereas other forces will record it as a 
detection from the point it has been signed for by the defendant.” 
(Birmingham Post 20.4.2005)  
 
He was explaining that the force no longer allowed TICs, post or pre sentence, to be 
recorded as detected unless the defendant/suspect had actually admitted them before a 
court of law. Of course this represented a risk of an increased sentence for suspects 
and not surprisingly they were reluctant to comply with the new arrangements. It also 
curtailed the negotiating position of officers seeking to offer inducements to 
offenders. His comment explicitly questioned the integrity of other police forces and 
by implication questioned the integrity of the West Midlands Police force, which had 
relied on such questionable methods since at least 1997.  This elicited the following 
comment from one interviewee: 
 
“Quite interesting that: He’s basically saying we’re more 
ethical…They’re less ethical, which is a bit naughty really.” (Interviewee 
C) 
 
 
The evidence presented in this chapter accords with the Assistant Chief Constable’s 
assessment of the relationship between detections obtained by TICs and ‘prison write 
offs’ and unethical behaviour. If  the statistical patterns examined in this chapter are 
indicative of ‘nodding’ one would expect there to be a higher risk of problematic 
behaviour in those forces with a high reliance on TICs and these would be most 
noticeable in the burglary and vehicle crime detection rates. The national increase in 
burglaries and vehicle crimes detected by TIC from 2003 to 2006 was evident from 
the data published in the Home Office Crime Bulletins (Fig. 6.13). 
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   (Fig 6.13)                                                                     (Home Office 2007)  
The increased reliance on TICs is, based on the evidence reviewed in this chapter, 
likely to indicate an increase in ‘nodding’. The national picture with high performing 
forces reporting high numbers of offences detected by TICs and a predominance of 
forces which had experienced problems with ‘nodding’ in the bottom end of the 
detection performance tables, reflected the statistical pattern experience by the West 
Midlands Police in 1998 (Fig.6.1) where the Police Command Units which had 
experienced a scandal involving ‘prison write offs’ appeared to be under-performing. 
However it was officers from the police command unit detecting the highest 
percentage of offences by TIC in the West Midlands Police in 1998 who were 
involved in the Oct. 2003 ‘incident’.   
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6. CHAPTER CONCLUSION: 
 
‘Gaming’ practices referred to as ‘nodding’ involving the abuse of  TIC procedures, 
both pre and post sentence and ‘prison write offs’ do not appear to have been 
eradicated and still have the potential to have a significant impact on force’s 
performance. The measures taken by the Home Office to prevent the abuse of ‘prison 
write off’ procedures had been rendered ineffective by the interpretation of rules on 
TIC which have in effect allowed ‘prison write offs’ to be ‘converted into TICs. This 
had enabled ‘nodding’ to continue. The potential such a form of ‘gaming’ has on 
overall force performance is evident from the evidence reviewed in this chapter.   
 
 
The inability of the performance systems to differentiate between pre-sentence TICs, 
and ‘post-sentence TICs, which have not been placed before a court, makes it difficult 
for senior police officers and their political masters to determine the extent to which 
this administrative device is inflating performance. The inability to differentiate 
between these different detection methods could result in high levels of investment in 
forensic evidence recovery and management techniques in return for detections which 
are of little real value. Their value lies in the statistical reflection of reality which they 
purport to represent. However the evidence examined suggested this is a distorted 
reality and the performance data may actually indicate the presence of dysfunctional 
behaviour in the form of ‘nodding’.  
 
The scale and the consistency of the statistical patterns observed in forces which have 
encountered ‘nodding’ incidents indicated that the behaviour was organisational. The 
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evidence also demonstrated that senior management can and have taken effective 
action to curb abuses, however that action appeared motivated by  specific ‘incidents’, 
some of which had become scandals.  The increased reliance on TICs by forces across 
the country indicates that managerial action to ensure probity in this area of activity is 
not universal. It is therefore anticipated that scandals will continue to surface either 
incrementally or in the form of a major media or political exposure as ‘nodding’ and 
the abuses associated with it becomes more widespread.   
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CHAPTER 7 
 
‘SKEWING 1’; ‘WHAT GETS MEASURED GETS DONE’: 
 
1. INTRODUCTION:  
 
 
Likierman (1993); Rogerson (1995); Wilson et al (2001); De Bruijn (2002); and 
Jackson (2005) all identified the tendency for performance management systems to 
result in a concentration of efforts on the activities subject of performance indicators. 
This factor is referred to as ‘what gets measured gets done’ and in this thesis the 
phenomenon is called ‘skewing’. In policing terms this would involve ‘skewing’ 
activity in favour of volume crime such as burglary dwelling, vehicle crime and 
robbery at the expense of other crimes perhaps less easily solved, less numerous in 
their incidence, and which were not given focus in the performance framework. Such 
a ‘skewing’ of organisational emphasis would represent a major shift in both the 
formal and informal organisational culture embedded in the belief that investigation 
and detection of serious crime should take priority over other considerations 
(Waddington 1999). The investigation and detection of serious crime had traditionally 
been given high priority by the police and it fits comfortably with the organisation’s 
preferred image of itself as a crime fighting force. Such an organisational alignment 
was underpinned by a subscription to what Klienig refers to as ‘communal values’ 
(Klienig, 1996) which sat comfortably with the public’s expectation that the police 
would investigate serious crimes thoroughly. Waddington provides a succinct 
summary of the organisational priorities prevailing in such a police service: 
 
“Homicide, rape, assault and theft will, in all but the most exceptional 
circumstances, tend to be breaches of basic communal values as much as 
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they violate the criminal code. It is amongst the legally petty offences that 
we find police exercising most discretion, for here there is far greater 
likelihood that the law and communal values will clash”. (Waddington, 
1999: 40). 
 
 
If the impact of performance management was so great that it eroded these core 
organisational values then one would expect to find evidence of a lessening of effort 
in the pursuit of more serious offences. Media and public scrutiny of serious offences 
such as murder; the kidnapping of children or terrorist atrocities would act as a 
deterrent against low investment in these ‘high profile offences’ (these offences are 
categorised as ‘level 3’ offences). However deterioration in performance in the 
control of less high profile but still serious crime such as firearms offences or other 
lethal weapons, rape, child abuse, and organised crime (‘level 2’ crime) would be less 
noticeable to the public. Indications of ‘skewing’ of this nature were identified by 
HMIC: 
 
“The drive for continuing improvements in detections should, however, 
be controlled to ensure high volume crimes are not unnecessarily pursued 
at the expense of proper investigation of more serious crime. There was 
evidence in one force that a divisional commander refused to allow his 
detectives to put more than minimal resources into a serious sexual crime 
investigation, preferring instead they concentrate their efforts on less 
serious crime such as car theft. This occurred because whether they 
solved a rape or the theft of a car radio, the division would only be 
credited with one detection.” (HMIC 1999:20)  
 
HMIC was particularly concerned that this type of behaviour might spread and require 
more rigorous monitoring. Child protection was added to rape as the type of offences 
susceptible to ‘skewing’: 
   
 “Work such as child protection and community and schools liaison 
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could be casualties in a force concentrating entirely on its performance 
indicators. HM Inspectors of Constabulary will consider the resources 
allocated to such vital areas in their role as ‘Best Value Inspectors”. 
(HMIC 1999:21)  
 
 
 In 2005 HMIC extended those concerns in their thematic report ‘Closing the Gap’ 
(O’Connor 2005) to encompass a wider range of serious crime, including ‘gun and 
gang’ related crime (level 2 crime).  This ‘skewing’ trend was identified by Chatterton 
(2008). Interviewees (A,B &C) indicated that they expected the police to curtail 
certain activities, in order to concentrate efforts on activities which improved 
performance, they stated the investigation of serious crime such as rape and 
investment in child protection would not be affected as a result of ‘skewing’: 
 
“You can’t cut back on the investigation of serious crime because the 
investigation of serious crime attracts public and media attention and 
sometimes political attention, so you can’t cut back on it. But what you 
might do is make an assessment of the number of serious crimes you have 
in a year and you may cut back on the total number of officers deployed 
in that area.” (Interviewee A)  
 
 
“As with all these issues they [rape and child protection] come up and they 
are top of the agenda and resources are pumped in. Why is its high 
profile?  Because it’s right to be high profile: It’s just right that that work 
is done, it cannot be neglected. But there is an element of public scrutiny 
through the media and public inquires because of the risk of things going 
wrong.  That is an area where you don’t need a PI because the 
consequences are disastrous.” (Interviewee C). 
 
This chapter sets out to examine what impact Performance Management has had on 
the prevention and detection of serious crime.  A short explanation of the 
methodology employed is followed by an examination of the performance data on 
minor offences. A review of the data on more serious offences is conducted and 
additional material is extracted from a number of case studies.   
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2. CHAPTER METHODOLOGY: 
 
 
The methodology employed in this chapter involved a review of the official 
government and HMIC reports to establish if there was evidence of ‘skewing’ 
reported in these documents. Official documents and published statistical data were 
also examined in an attempt to identify any trend indicating a reduction in 
performance in the control of serious crimes which may be due to ‘skewing’. This 
included a review of the data on gun and gang related crime. However, since this 
crime type is mainly confined to the metropolitan forces policing large urban 
conurbations, national comparisons are difficult.  The crime category sexual offences, 
encompassing serious offences such as rape and indecent assault, provided a 
geographically more evenly spread crime type with relatively large enough incidence 
rates to provide, in theory a reliable measure of a category of serious crime. This 
crime category was not subject of any specific government target or Statutory 
Performance Indicator SPI during the period this study was undertaken and therefore, 
if effort was ‘skewed’ in favour of crime types subject of government targets at the 
expense of non performance target crime, then performance on the detection and 
prevention of sexual offences was likely to suffer. Documentation on the West 
Midlands Police, including some case study material was used to explore the 
phenomenon of ‘skewing’ further and to provide some context and outcomes which 
could be expected to occur.  
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3. CONCENTRATING ON MINOR OFFENCES: 
 
‘Skewing’ in the form of the pursuit of minor offences was evident from a number of 
sources; Home Affairs Committee (2007:11-12); Police Federation Conference 
(2007); and Chatterton (2008). The benefit of formally investigating some minor 
offences are that they are easy to detect and involve the minimum of paperwork 
usually as a result of procedures which do not result in Court appearances e.g. Fixed 
Penalty Notices (FPNs), cautions or informal warnings. All of these necessitate the 
creation of a crime report which is then recorded as detected. Increasing the number 
of offences detected by this means can involve a reduction in individual officer’s 
discretion on how they deal with minor offences as they are ‘encouraged’ through 
incentives or sanctions to deal with such incidents by resorting to enforcement.. This 
would therefore reverse the tendency observed by Banton (1964) to under-enforce the 
law by dealing with incidents in ways which avoided law-enforcement outcomes thus 
reducing the generally accepted benefits of discretion identified by Reiner 1994) 
 
Although the prosecution of minor offenders may be justified by a commitment to a 
‘broken windows’ approach to crime control developed by Wilson and Kelling (1982) 
It also increases the strain on police resources as officers investigate minor complaints 
to a level where a detection can by justified or actively seek out minor infractions of 
the law, such as urinating in a public place or possession of cannabis:  
 
“Discretion was inevitable factually because the volume of incidents that 
could be regarded as breaches of the law would always outstrip police 
capacity to process them. So choices about priorities were inescapable.” 
(Reiner 1994:722) 
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The impact of ‘skewing’ was summarised by one officer’s submission to the 
Federation Conference: 
 
“Every borough is playing the game; those that are not are seen as under-
performing. Policing has completely lost its way. We only investigate 
crimes that matter in terms of performance data” (Police Federation 
2007)  
 
Other examples of ‘skewing’ were also cited at the Federation conference. These 
included the case of a juvenile who had raised money by carrying out a bogus 
collection for charity. Officers were assigned to visit every home the offender had 
collected money from in order to obtain a statement of complaint which could then be 
recorded as a detected crime (Police Federation 2007)  
 
The ‘skewing’ towards the enforcement of minor offences attracted critical comment 
from the Home Affairs Committee during their review of Police Finance (2007): 
  
“In the 12 months to March 2006, 5% of offences were official warnings 
for cannabis possession, 8% were PNDs and 25% were cautions. These 
figures demonstrate that the number of convictions is low as a proportion 
of overall police disposals. Recent Home Office statistics support this 
conclusion, showing that in 2005 there were only three convictions for 
every 100 BCS crimes” (Home Affairs Committee 2007:11-12)    
 
Dr Tim Brain Chief Constable of Gloucestershire defended his ACPO colleagues by 
stating: 
 
“It is important to note that forces are using centrally improved 
definitions, those approved and owned by the government. As such the 
force can hardly be criticised [for including PNDs, cannabis and other 
cautions]” (Home Affairs Committee 2007:12) 
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The Police Superintendent’s Association spokesperson stated: 
 
“In terms of offences brought to justice…the performance measurement, 
quite frankly, is in a mess in some parts of the country as to officers 
knowing exactly what they should be doing and what counts”. (Home 
Affairs Committee 2007:12) 
 
The Home Office Minister Tony McNulty conceded: 
 
“It is my job, with colleagues, to get to a stage where we do take stock of 
the use of PNDs, fixed penalty notices, et cetera, and how they fit, how the 
offences brought to justice target fits and how much of what we are doing 
in terms of targets on performance actually measure what they purport to 
measure.” (Home Affairs Committee 2007:13). 
 
The committee was sceptical of the apparent success of the Narrowing the Justice Gap 
strategy and concluded: 
 
“The Government’s key crime reduction target, ‘offences brought to 
justice’, is not a good indicator of success in relation to the types of crime 
which the public fear most……. There is a strong case for excluding 
summary justice measures from this target. Given that the rate of 
conviction remains low as a proportion of all estimated BCS crime, it is 
important that any revision of the target should place an increased 
emphasis on convictions.” (Home Affairs Committee 2007:16) 
 
 
Whilst the committee acknowledged the inherent difficulties in analysing such high 
level data they questioned the value of pursuing minor offences thus supporting the 
thrust of the Police Federation’s conference (2007). The impact of ‘skewing’ was also 
raised by Chief Constable of Surrey Bob Quick in a press interview who pointed out 
that police success measured by overall detection rates was ‘misleading’ as the 
number of offenders appearing before the courts and being convicted was falling: 
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“The Chief Constable warned that nationally the percentage of offenders 
being convicted by the courts had fallen from 60% to 47% in the last two 
years” (London Evening Standard 20.10.07).  
 
He maintained this was due in part to the ‘skewing’ of organisational effort towards 
detecting less serious offences which he stated benefited ‘the more capable criminals’.  
 
Neyroud & Disley supported his assertion: 
 
“pressure to meet targets encourages managers to focus on volume 
crime investigations which are less resource intensive, at the expense of 
proper investigations of more serious crimes.” (Neyroud and Disley, 2007: 
563). 
 
The point was reinforced by Professor Marian FitzGerald: 
 
“Ministers have attached increasing political importance to claiming 
detection rates are up and this means police are having to focus on minor 
offences where they can get quick wins in order to get the Government off 
their backs” (London Evening Standard 20.10.07) 
 
Improving the detection rate by actively seeking out minor offences to be solved can 
also have a detrimental effect on recorded crime levels, thus defeating the 
government’s objective of reducing crime. This dichotomy was illustrated during an 
interview with interviewee F, who had experienced first hand the impact of changed 
priorities on the investigation of shoplifting in a major city centre: 
 
“There was a change in emphasis from arrests to detections and trying to 
cut down.  We tried to get rid of the rubbish, juveniles and old prisoners, 
and stuff like that…..  This year (2006), April of this year, they made it a 
KPI [key performance indicator] for detections. What they didn’t realise 
was that it had been neglected for eighteen months and there was a lot of 
issues with security and the police and it had been allowed to fall away…..  
So suddenly they had an increase in figures, because people had just been 
kicking people out.  What happened then went ‘ping’ and there was a 
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major panic, a major panic, from the police and the Local Authority. It 
[recorded crime] just went up and up.” (Interviewee F) 
 
Whilst the pursuit of minor offences may be regarded as ‘gaming’ it does not breach 
any police discipline codes and as Dr Brain stated in his evidence to the Home Affairs 
Committee it is a legitimate means of delivering government objectives.  
 
The negative impact of performance management on the investigation of more serious 
crime was also referred to the federation by officers. One officer commented  that 
organised crime involving the theft of high value lorries was being treated as a low 
priority as efforts were being diverted into solving more easy to detect crimes (Police 
Federation 2007). Such a focus on easy to detect crimes was proffered as a factor in 
the lack of resources attached by Derbyshire Police to the investigation of the brutal 
beating and robbery of riding instructor Tania Moore (www.ipcc/TaniaMoore/2006). 
The report on the force’s handling of the case by the Independent Police Complaints 
Commission prompted the following media response: 
 
“A police force failed to investigate properly the violent robbery of a show 
jumper which led to her murder because its officers were busy inquiring 
into stolen chickens” (The Sunday Times 10th December 2006)  
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4. ‘SKEWING’ AND THE IMPACT ON THE PREVENTION AND 
DETECTION OF SERIOUS CRIME: 
 
 
Gun Crime: The rise in offences involving the use of firearms emerged rapidly after 
the UK government’s focus on performance management began to impact on the 
service in the mid 1990s.  Whilst there is no evidence to suggest the two are 
connected, the response to the emergent threat represented by the rise in what is 
commonly referred to as ‘gun and gang crime’ could be compromised by a focus on 
crime categories subject of performance indicators.  
 
Nationally the use of firearms in the commissioning of crimes rose significantly from 
1997 onwards with a reduction in 2004/5 (Fig. 7.1). However the data on injuries by 
firearm type shows that criminal firearm related injuries had quadrupled since 1998 
with a slight levelling off in 2004/5 (Table 7.1).   The incidence of firearms offences 
was concentrated in three police force areas; The Metropolitan Police Service; Greater 
Manchester Police and the West Midlands Police (Fig. 7.2).  
 
(Fig. 7.1)       (Coleman et al 2007:32) 
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(Table 7.1)                                                                             (Coleman et al 2007:36) 
 
 
 
(Fig. 7.2)                                            (Coleman et al 2007:38) 
 
However the response of the three forces to the emergent threat was different. The 
Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) created a large dedicated squad (Operation 
Trident) to deal with the issue. Greater Manchester Police also responded by 
committing their central dedicated specialist crime squads to controlling the threat. 
The commitment of the Met, GMP and also Avon & Somerset in responding to this 
rise in serious crime was acknowledged by HMIC in the thematic report ‘Closing the 
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Gap’ (O’Connor 2005) This identified that low level volume crime (level 1) and 
terrorist and criminals operating at the national or international level (Level 3) were 
receiving adequate attention from the law enforcement agencies although serious and 
more localised types of organised crime (level 2) were not receiving sufficient 
attention: 
  
“The exception has occurred around those forces e.g. Avon and Somerset, 
the Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) and Greater Manchester Police, 
where the dangers of violent organised crime have spilt onto the streets, 
albeit the spread of organised crime and terrorism is now raising a wider 
awareness and concern on these issues. (O’Connor 2005:9) 
 
It should however be noted that GMP and Avon and Somerset had been the subject of 
PSU interventions as a result of their poor performance on volume crime and the MPS 
was a poor performer, at he time of the report in 2005, on volume crime.  
 
This was in direct contrast to the West Midlands Police which had improved its 
performance against Government targets and by 1998 was the best performing 
metropolitan force in the country. However during the All Party Parliamentary Group 
on gun crime set up in May 2003, following the fatal shooting of Letisha Shakespeare 
and Charlene Ellis on 1st Jan 2003, it was evident that the West Midlands Police had 
not invested as heavily as the Met GMP and Avon and Somerset in the type of 
resources required to meet the threat of ‘gun and gang’ related crime. A doubling of 
the force’s dedicated firearms unit was the most obvious response and indication of a 
previous lack of investment in this area: 
 
“Assistant Chief Constable Nick Tofiluk, from West Midlands Police, said 
a further expansion of the force’s armed capability was already being 
undertaken, which would increase the number of specialist trained 
officers by 50 per cent” (Birmingham Post 6.11.2003) 
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Whilst the ACC denied that this increase was a direct response to the shooting of the 
two girls, the force’s lack of ‘proactive’ capacity to deal with serious crime was also 
evident from the fact that it had only two dedicated mobile surveillance teams, 
considered essential when combating serious criminals. This prompted the deputy 
leader of Birmingham City Council to offer to fund a third force mobile covert 
surveillance unit (Birmingham Post 30.6.03). The mothers of the two shooting victims 
also questioned the commitment of the force to dealing with ‘guns and gangs’: 
 
“Police had ignored the gangs as long as they only killed each other.  But 
this allowed them to become so powerful that nobody dared give evidence 
against them.  Now they were killing innocent people” (Birmingham Post 
3.7.03).   
  
Interviewee F commented on the increase in gun crime, which he was of the opinion, 
was related to a failure to control drug related crime in the force area: 
 
“Newtown, parts of Newtown there was the sound of shots weekly so it is 
only a matter of time when those shots are not going up in the air.” 
(Interviewee F) 
 
This officer also recounted his experience when he brought, what he perceived as a 
rise in the incidence of serious crime to the attention of the Chief Constable during 
one of his regular road shows designed to facilitated dialogue with his officers: (The 
officer provided this recollection of the experience, circa 2000/01.) 
 
 “[the Chief Constable] decided to visit stations and a certain senior officer 
[BCU commander] asked me to attend the meeting. I think his concern at 
the time was that he didn’t want all the people at the meeting who would 
just agree.” 
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“I went to this meeting on my own and the meeting was already in 
progress, and I didn’t have much to do with it until [the chief constable] 
commented on the level of crime and the success of the force. He 
particularly mentioned murders and gun crime.” 
 
[The interviewee and another experienced officer interjected at the 
meeting]: “We said what do you mean and of course he came out with the 
official figures which showed Birmingham to have a low murder rate and 
gun crime  but we were aware that the incidence of reported gun shots 
and people being seen with firearms was increasing monthly, which he 
disputed, so we quoted an example where shots were fired between two 
moving vehicles outside the police headquarters, which was about a week 
or so before the meeting- and we said well does that mean because no one 
was injured or killed it didn’t happen- and basically he didn’t have an 
answer to that.” 
 
“What came across to us was the fact that in our eyes what was 
happening on the ground showed a clear indication of an increase in 
culture in the use of firearms and possession of firearms and OK we 
hadn’t the actual murders or serious injuries compared with other cities, 
certainly not London, Liverpool or Manchester but it was there and for 
somebody of his rank to say all was sweet and happy and there wasn’t a 
problem at all was just horrifying. It showed a clear misunderstanding of 
what was going on.” 
 
“If you’re dealing with serious matters, logistically you can’t deal with 
lots of serious matters at the same time because you haven’t got the 
resources to do it – plus also you haven’t necessarily got the complaints.” 
 
“But when it then gets out of control then you get figures and you have to 
do something about it.” (Interviewee F) 
 
 
Interviewee F’s comments suggest that the force leadership’s perception of reality 
appeared to be distorted by what was measured i.e. the absence of adequate measures 
to capture the rise in serious gun related incidents had led to the problem being largely 
invisible to and therefore ignored by the senior officers. Following the deaths of 
Letisha and Charlene measures were introduced to record the reported discharge of 
firearms and this led to tactics being introduced to recover forensic evidence in the 
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form of spent cartridges and  bullets from the scenes in order that an intelligence 
picture and evidential base could be established.   
 
The West Midlands Police had reduced the number of its HQ squads which had 
concentrated on the control and investigation of serious crime and had vigorously 
followed a policy of curtailing the number of non uniformed specialist officers from 
1997 as it placed the emphasis on uniformed patrol and neighbourhood policing. This 
involved the senior management team dictating the number of specialist officers, 
including CID officers, which each Operational Command Unit (OCUs) could deploy. 
Child Protection Units which covered a number of OCUs were subject of the same 
conditions and the number of officers deployed to such units was controlled by the 
Force Senior Management Team. Murders were investigated by a dedicated Murder 
Investigation Unit (MIT) which retained a small core of dedicated staff and 
supplemented its staff numbers during the investigation of murders by calling on CID 
officers from OCUs which were clustered in groups in order to provide mutual 
support. The more difficult to investigate murders, such as fatal shootings, tended to 
occur in inner city areas thus putting a strain on the CID departments covering those 
neighbourhoods. 
 
The ‘skewing’ of focus towards less serious crime at the expense of more serious 
crime was not confined to the West Midlands Police.  HMIC had noted a similar trend 
during their inspection of Cleveland Constabulary in 2001: 
  
“Whilst it would be possible to ‘throw’ endless resources at the drugs 
problem, which is said to be endemic amongst those engaging in deviant 
behaviour, it still raises the question as to whether or not the Force has a 
sufficiently high profile at Force and district level in combating the supply 
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and distribution of illicit drugs. If the illicit drugs industry has a knock-on 
effect on volume crime, and it does, then the problem should be tackled 
robustly. Her Majesty’s Inspector acknowledges, however, that competing 
demands on resources requires a balanced approach to tackling volume 
crime and ‘premier league’ villainy. His view is that, so far, the balance 
has not been achieved in Cleveland. In making these observations, Her 
Majesty’s Inspector recognises that tackling ‘premier league’ criminality 
(organised crime, major drugs distribution syndicates and cross border 
crime) devours resources, and only brings persons before the courts in 
limited numbers that has no impact on crime performance data. Shifting 
resources to tackle the easier ‘hits’ (house burglary, car crime, etc), whilst 
neglecting premier league criminality, may boost the Force’s standing in 
any volume crime league list –but the penalty would be paid in later 
years. Major crime players, largely free from Force scrutiny and 
investigation, will have an impact on volume crime sooner or later.” 
(HMIC Cleveland 2001:2)   
 
 
Nottinghamshire was another force which experienced an increase in the number of 
shootings and gang related violence following efforts to improve its performance 
against government targets on volume crime. Again it is impossible to tell if the rise 
in ‘gun and gang’ related crime was the consequence of reducing the forces proactive 
capability to deal with those offences but it did impact on the Force’s ability to 
respond to the threat:  
 
“At this stage the focus was on volume crime – burglary, vehicle crime 
and robbery – where the force was making progress in bringing crime 
levels down. But policing is complex and multi-faceted, and while the 
force was striving to raise its game in these areas, organised criminality 
was gaining a grip in parts of the city, despite efforts to counter it by 
proactive operations.” (HMIC/Notts. June 2006:4). 
 
 
Evidence of ‘skewing’ was apparent from examination of the HMIC reports on the 
rise in murders experienced by Nottinghamshire Police.  This indicated a re-
distribution of the Force’s central pro-active capability, preceded the increase in 
serious crime thus reducing the Force’s capacity to respond to the threat.  
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“Resources were devolved to the BCUs Officers and staff were realigned 
with community beats and response teams.  Detective capacity at 
headquarters was reduced and this included the disbandment of the 
Force Drug squad. In March 2003 HMIC noted some aspects of the 
reorganisation had not been handled well and the challenges were 
exacerbated by a rise in serious crime, both in terms of drug-related gun 
crime and an abnormal level of murders committed in 2002.” 
(HMIC/Notts. April 2005 unpublished63)  
 
The strain on force resources caused by the rise in murders in Nottinghamshire was to 
result in the Chief Constable making his concerns public: 
 
“We are reeling with murders. We are in a long standing crisis situation 
with major crime and it won’t go away overnight.” (Chief Constable 
Steve Green the Times Newspaper 14th March 2005)  
 
 
 
Sexual Offences: Measuring changes in the incidence or detection rate of serious 
crime is problematic because the seriousness of the offence is difficult to extrapolate 
from the general offence category e.g. the category robbery would include armed 
robberies where a weapon is used and bullying where the threat of violence is used by 
one child to intimidate another into handing over their mobile phone. Officer 
discretion on the categorisation of the offence for recording purposes is another 
distorting factor. In order to overcome some of these difficulties the category of 
Sexual Offences was chosen as a proxy-measure for serious crime. Offences in this 
category are generally considered serious and although the incidence rate is small, in 
comparison with acquisitive crime, they do occur in sufficient numbers to facilitate 
statistical comparison and incidence is spread across all force areas.  
                                                 
63 This comment was taken from a draft of the HMIC April 2005 report released as part of a FOI 
request. 
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When the national detection rate for rape, the more serious offence within the sexual 
offences category, was examined it appeared that the fears expressed by HMIC in 
1999 had been confirmed. Fig. 7.3 shows the number of offences recorded and Fig. 
7.4 the detection rate. 
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(Fig 7.3)                                                                     (Home Office 2008) 
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(Fig. 7.4)                                                                    (Home Office 2008) 
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Whilst the data on detections for the discrete crime category of rape is not available 
prior to 2000 the reduction in the detection rate from 46% in 2000/01 to 25% in 
2006/07 was noticeable.  
 
The increase in recorded offences and the decrease in detections appeared to suggest 
‘skewing’ was occurring and a lack of focus on these offences was responsible for the 
declining performance. However the findings from previous chapters on crime 
recording and detection procedures cautioned against relying on the data. When 
HMIC sought to understand the factors influencing the low detection and conviction 
rates for offences of rape in 2002 and again in 2007 they were hampered by the 
unreliability of the police data available to them: 
 
“Failure to adhere to the relevant HOCR (Home Office Crime Recording) 
criteria is not only skewing recorded crime figures for rape but is also 
undermining the ability to gain accurate understanding of attrition” 
(HMIC/HMcpsi 2007:44).  “The most significant factor in altering 
detection rates is non-compliance with the HOCR criteria for ‘no 
criming’64 (HMIC/HMcpsi 2007:47). 
 
The variations in ‘no criming’ levels between forces also attracted adverse comment 
from the press: 
 
“Among the eight police areas studied, the rate of ‘no-criming’ varied 
hugely- from 4% to 47%” (The Guardian Newspaper 31.1.07).  
 
                                                 
64 ‘No Criming’ refers to the category ‘no crime’ that is applied to recorded crimes which have 
subsequently been un-crimed by a police supervisor who is satisfied that there is verifiable information 
that no crime was committed.  The grounds for reaching this decision should be recorded in writing on 
the case papers for auditing purposes.   
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The distortion created by such variations was to hamper Feist et al’s analysis of the 
low detection rate. They concluded that greater compliance with Home Office 
‘counting rules’ would have two effects: 
  
“First, it would lead to a reduction in the overall no criming rate and 
thereby contribute to an increase in the total number of recorded offences 
of rape. Secondly, a reduction in no criming would almost certainly 
contribute to the depression of the detection rate for rapes because the 
characteristics of those previously (inappropriately) no crimed offences 
are such that they are likely to have only a low chance of eventual 
detection.” (Feist et al 2007:82) 
 
 
Feist et al did attempt to control for some of the variables caused by differences in 
recording and detecting procedures and found that there had been a slight decrease in 
detection and conviction rates between 1997 and 2003/4 in the two forces they 
sampled (Feist et al 2007:83). 
 
However the overall national detection rate for rape over the period 1997 to 2006/7 is 
too unreliable to be certain that ‘skewing’ alone has resulted in a drop in the detection 
and prevention of rape and other sexual offences. Although the failure to improve the 
detection rate from 2005 onwards when the data is reported to be more reliable (Fiest 
et al 2007) does suggest ‘skewing’ may be occurring.  
 
One way of pursuing the suspicion that ‘skewing’ was responsible for the apparent 
deterioration in the detection of these offences was to compare the respective 
performance of different forces. If ‘skewing’ was occurring then high performing 
forces, measured by their overall detection rate, might be expected to be 
underperforming on the detection of sexual offences. If this wasn’t the case and then 
it might be expected to find that high performing forces would have a high overall 
detection rate and a high detection rate for sexual offences. The first step was to 
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review the trend data of force’s detection rates for sexual offences65 over the period 
2001-2005/06 (Table 7.2). 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Sexual Offences Detection Rate by force by year 
2001- 2005/6     
       
Numbers  2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 
Police force area and region Sexual 
offences 
Sexual 
offences 
Sexual 
offences 
Sexual 
offences 
Sexual 
offences 
Cleveland 
Detection Rate 
% 82 63 54 46 42 
Durham 
Detection Rate 
% 66 61 75 67 30 
Northumbria 
Detection Rate 
% 50 47 44 33 39 
Cheshire 
Detection Rate 
% 80 56 44 37 33 
Cumbria 
Detection Rate 
% 72 60 46 42 41 
Greater Manchester 
Detection Rate 
% 57 52 43 30 31 
Lancashire 
Detection Rate 
% 51 59 45 40 39 
Merseyside 
Detection Rate 
% 55 51 45 40 26 
Humberside 
Detection Rate 
% 37 37 30 28 31 
North Yorkshire 
Detection Rate 
% 67 53 51 48 38 
South Yorkshire 
Detection Rate 
% 68 49 50 36 28 
West Yorkshire 
Detection Rate 
% 63 52 37 31 25 
Derbyshire 
Detection Rate 
% 61 45 45 36 30 
Leicestershire 
Detection Rate 
% 43 33 32 27 28 
Lincolnshire 
Detection Rate 
% 63 35 37 39 30 
Northamptonshire 
Detection Rate 
% 68 53 55 48 31 
Nottinghamshire 
Detection Rate 
% 44 44 41 45 42 
Staffordshire 
Detection Rate 
% 44 51 48 38 27 
Warwickshire 
Detection Rate 
% 56 43 31 38 34 
West Mercia 
Detection Rate 
% 50 46 46 39 39 
West Midlands 
Detection Rate 
% 53 43 36 29 33 
                                                 
65 The overall sexual offences category is the only consistent force comparable measure published by 
the Home Office annually in its bulletin. Force results on individual sexual offence types such as rape 
are not published.  
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Bedfordshire 
Detection Rate 
% 40 40 27 36 27 
Cambridgeshire 
Detection Rate 
% 50 36 27 27 27 
Essex 
Detection Rate 
% 50 40 37 33 23 
Hertfordshire 
Detection Rate 
% 68 53 54 41 38 
Norfolk 
Detection Rate 
% 47 33 38 34 59 
Suffolk 
Detection Rate 
% 48 50 36 36 34 
London, City of 
Detection Rate 
% 55 50 30 38 36 
Metropolitan Police 
Detection Rate 
% 32 33 34 35 28 
Hampshire 
Detection Rate 
% 60 56 41 33 24 
Kent 
Detection Rate 
% 59 46 40 28 27 
Surrey 
Detection Rate 
% 43 40 42 33 33 
Sussex 
Detection Rate 
% 47 38 37 27 29 
Thames Valley 
Detection Rate 
% 41 33 31 28 30 
Avon and Somerset 
Detection Rate 
% 31 27 26 21 27 
Devon and Cornwall 
Detection Rate 
% 60 43 34 31 25 
Dorset 
Detection Rate 
% 49 41 29 28 29 
Gloucestershire 
Detection Rate 
% 62 39 35 34 29 
Wiltshire 
Detection Rate 
% 50 41 41 36 32 
Dyfed Powys 
Detection Rate 
% 92 91 45 43 36 
Gwent 
Detection Rate 
% 91 82 80 56 35 
North Wales 
Detection Rate 
% 50 35 41 38 29 
South Wales 
Detection Rate 
% 81 60 53 41 31 
ENGLAND AND WALES Detection Rate 49 43 39 34 31 
 
(Table 7.2)   (Highlighted forces have been subject of PSU intervention.)  (Home 
Office 2007) 
 
 
First to note on the force trend data at Table 7.2 is the considerable spread in detection 
rates in 2001/02 between the two Welsh forces, Dyfed Powys and Gwent detecting 
92% and 91% of sexual offences respectively and the MPS 32% and Avon and 
Somerset 31%. Whilst the wide variations in performance may be due to variations in 
recording and detecting practices and justified the need for the introduction of the 
NCRS and other controls, the general fall in forces’ performances is uneven, with the 
lower performers such as the MPS and Avon and Somerset only experiencing a 4% 
reduction in their performance over the period 2001 – 2005/06. This might suggest 
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that their adherence to a ‘prima facia’ crime recording standard and more rigorous 
detecting procedures was the cause of their previous low performance. Interestingly 
Nottinghamshire, widely regarded as the worst performing force in the country (The 
Times Newspaper 14.3.2005; Gibbs & Haldenby 2006), had maintained a better  
detection rate for sexual offences, which had remained above 40% since 2001. 
Examination of the performance of forces subject of PSU interventions66 (Table 7.3), 
suggests their performance on the detection of sexual offences had not been taken into 
account when the decision was made to intervene. It would also appear that PSU 
assistance has not improved their performance on the investigation and detection of 
sexual offences.   
 
Sexual Offences Detection rate by forces subject of PSU 
engagement   
       
Numbers  2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 
Police force area and region Sexual 
offences 
Sexual 
offences 
Sexual 
offences 
Sexual 
offences 
Sexual 
offences 
Cleveland 
Detection Rate 
% 82 63 54 46* 42 
Greater Manchester 
Detection Rate 
% 57 
                      
52* 43 30 31 
Humberside 
Detection Rate 
% 37 37 30 28* 31 
West Yorkshire 
Detection Rate 
% 63 52 
               
37* 31 25 
Northamptonshire 
Detection Rate 
% 68 53 55 48* 31 
Nottinghamshire 
Detection Rate 
% 44 44 41 45* 42 
Cambridgeshire Detections 50 36 27 27 27 
Avon and Somerset 
Detection Rate 
% 31 
                      
27* 26 21 27 
ENGLAND AND 
WALES 
Detection Rate 
% 49 43 39 34 31 
* = PSU engagement       
 
(Table 7.3)                                                                          (Home Office 2007) 
 
 
The utility of examining trend data was also devalued by the introduction of new 
offences to the crime category sexual offences in 2004/05. The variations in the rate 
                                                 
66 The Police Standards Unit were authorised by the Home Office to ‘assist’ forces with low crime 
reduction and detection rates for ‘volume’ crime (burglary, robbery and vehicle crime) 
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of ‘no criming’ between forces continued to be a distorting factor, although less so 
since 2003/4 when the Audit Commission commenced quality checks on ‘no crimes’.    
Accepting that the reliability of performance data has improved from 2003/04 
onwards (Feist et al 2007) and the distorting effect of DNFPA  controlled for by  
using the data on non-sanctioned detections only, it was possible to compare forces 
overall performance on detections with their performance on the detection of sexual 
offences for the year 2005/06 (Table 7.4). It was not possible to control for the 
variations between forces on their interpretation of the NCRS ‘balance of probability’ 
standard, which may have influenced the number of reported rape cases recorded by 
the police as rape67.  That said the forces operating ‘false reporting’ policies had 
already been identified and their results could be assessed in the light of previous 
findings.  The impact of ‘no criming’ was not controlled for in the data on sexual 
offences re-produced in Table 7.4. 
 
Comparison of 
Force Performance 
by overall Detection 
Rates and Detection 
Rates for Sexual 
Offences P      
       
Force overall Sanctioned Detection Rates compared with Detection Rates for Sexual Offences 
2005/06 
Ranked by Overall Sanction Detection Rate 
Ranked by Detection Rate for Sexual 
Offences 
Percentages   Percentages  
Police force area and 
region 
Total Sexual   
offences  
Police force area and 
region 
Total Sexual   
offences 
Metropolitan Police 18 28  Essex 26 23 
Northamptonshire 20 31  Hampshire 21 24 
Humberside 20 31  Devon and Cornwall 25 25 
Hampshire 21 24  West Yorkshire 26 25 
Nottinghamshire 21 42  Merseyside 25 26 
South Wales 22 31  Cambridgeshire 26 27 
                                                 
67 HMIC did not control for this variable in their 2007 report accepting that forces were recording all 
incidents of rape consistently. The improvements, indicated by the Audit Commission validity checks, 
were cited as the reason for this omission. Such optimism is to be questioned given the findings 
reported in previous chapters of this study.   
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Hertfordshire 22 38  Bedfordshire 23 27 
Bedfordshire 23 27  Kent 24 27 
South Yorkshire 23 28  Staffordshire 25 27 
Surrey 23 33  Avon and Somerset 23 27 
Avon and Somerset 23 27  South Yorkshire 23 28 
Durham 23 30  Leicestershire 29 28 
Greater Manchester 24 31  Metropolitan Police 18 28 
Kent 24 27  Sussex 26 29 
Warwickshire 24 34  Gloucestershire 29 29 
Cleveland 24 42  North Wales 29 29 
Merseyside 25 26  Dorset 28 29 
Lincolnshire 25 30  Durham 23 30 
Norfolk 25 59  Thames Valley 27 30 
Devon and Cornwall 25 25  Derbyshire 26 30 
Staffordshire 25 27  Lincolnshire 25 30 
West Yorkshire 26 25  Humberside 20 31 
West Midlands 26 33  South Wales 22 31 
Cheshire 26 33  Greater Manchester 24 31 
Cambridgeshire 26 27  Northamptonshire 20 31 
Derbyshire 26 30  Wiltshire 27 32 
Sussex 26 29  Surrey 23 33 
Essex 26 23  West Midlands 26 33 
North Yorkshire 26 38  Cheshire 26 33 
Suffolk 27 34  Warwickshire 24 34 
Thames Valley 27 30  Suffolk 27 34 
Wiltshire 27 32  Gwent 27 35 
Gwent 27 35  Dyfed-Powys 40 36 
Dorset 28 29  Hertfordshire 22 38 
Leicestershire 29 28  North Yorkshire 26 38 
Gloucestershire 29 29  West Mercia 32 39 
North Wales 29 29  Lancashire 29 39 
Lancashire 29 39  Northumbria 32 39 
Cumbria 30 41  Cumbria 30 41 
West Mercia 32 39  Nottinghamshire 21 42 
Northumbria 32 39  Cleveland 24 42 
London, City of 40 36  Norfolk 25 59 
Dyfed-Powys 40 36  excluding city of London
68 
 PEARSON 0.23183384   PEARSON 0.21008408 
 RSQ 0.05374693   RSQ 0.04413532 
This is a not a significant relationship This makes no difference 
  
Blue = forces disengaged from the PSU  
Yellow = forces still engaged with the PSU 
(Table 7.4)                                                                         (Home Office 2007) 
 
 
                                                 
68 The City of London has been excluded because of its unique demographic makeup, crime profile and 
size.    
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In the left hand column of Table 7.4 forces are ranked according to their overall 
‘sanctioned detection rate’69; in the right hand column forces are ranked according to 
their detection rate for sexual offences.  
As can be seen (table 7.4) there was no statistically significant relationship between 
high performance measured by rankings on overall detection rates and detection rates 
for sexual offences (p=0.05). However, some observations on the data are pertinent.   
 
 
The low rating on detecting sexual offences by West Yorkshire, disengaged from the 
PSU in 2004, was interesting as it demonstrated that PSU engagement70 had not 
improved the force’s ability to investigate and detect sexual offences. In fact Table 
7.3 shows that there has been a marked reduction in this force’s performance on the 
detection of sexual offences from 31% in 3004/5 to 25% in 2005/6.  The 
improvements in performance management and forensic management hailed by the 
PSU as the key to transforming the force’s performance have not had the same impact 
on the detection of sexual offences. Another two forces disengaged from the PSU, 
Cambridgeshire and Avon and Somerset are also ranked below the national average 
on their detection rates for sexual offences again indicating that PSU involvement had 
not improved their ability to detect crimes per sae. Of the forces who were still 
engaged with the PSU in 2004/05; Humberside and Northamptonshire had improved 
their overall detection rate during 2004/05 (Fig. 7.5) and remained close to the 
                                                 
69 ‘Sanctioned’ detections are those detections resulting in a charge, caution TIC. They exclude 
Detected No Further Police Action (DNFPA) and therefore controls for any distortion caused by 
‘gaming’ type practices involving this means of detection (see later chapter on ‘stitching’).   
70 PSU engagement is specifically designed to improve force performance on volume crime. Sexual 
Offences do not fall within the ‘volume crime’ category.  
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national detection rate for sexual offences whereas Nottinghamshire and Cleveland 
had not improved their overall detection rate during 2004/05 yet still remain high 
performers on the detection of sexual offences.  
 
The PSU used improvements on overall detection rates from 2003/4 to 2004/05 to 
demonstrate the positive impact of PSU interventions (Fig 7.5). It is noticeable how 
these rankings differ from the rankings on the detection of sexual offences (Table 7.4) 
 
 
(Fig. 7.5)                                                                   (PSU Annual Report 2004/5:3)71  
 
 
 
Rape of a Female: A review of police forces performance measured by their 
detection rates for the specific offence of rape of a female was undertaken by 
accessing offence specific data from the Home Office. The number of rape of a 
female offences recorded; the number of rape of a female offences ‘no crimed’ and 
the number of rape of a female offences detected, broken down by detection method 
                                                 
71 The PSU annual report for 2005/6 was not published in this format.   
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was accessed for the year 2005/0672. The first observation from the raw data was the 
variation between forces in the percentage of rapes of a female ‘no crimed’ (Table 
7.5): South Wales ‘no criming’ 3 per cent; Surrey 27 per cent and City of London 28 
per cent of recorded rape of a female. The distorting impact of ‘no crimes’ identified 
by Fiest et al (2007) still remained a factor and restricted the ability to analyse the 
data. 
 
2005/06 2005/06 2005/06 
Police Force Area  Offence  Offences 
recorded 
No 
Crimes 
% of 
Rapes No 
Crimed 
     
Avon & Somerset 
Rape of a 
Female 295 56 15.9 
Bedfordshire 
Rape of a 
Female 188 23 10.9 
Cambridgeshire 
Rape of a 
Female 193 8 3.9 
Cheshire 
Rape of a 
Female 165 47 22.2 
Cleveland 
Rape of a 
Female 158 21 11.7 
Cumbria 
Rape of a 
Female 73 11 13.1 
Derbyshire 
Rape of a 
Female 253 34 11.8 
Devon & Cornwall 
Rape of a 
Female 361 15 3.9 
Dorset 
Rape of a 
Female 166 45 21.3 
Durham 
Rape of a 
Female 129 15 10.4 
Dyfed-Powys 
Rape of a 
Female 79 6 7.0 
Essex 
Rape of a 
Female 352 66 15.7 
Gloucestershire 
Rape of a 
Female 145 6 3.9 
Greater Manchester 
Rape of a 
Female 769 133 14.7 
Gwent 
Rape of a 
Female 112 19 14.5 
Hampshire 
Rape of a 
Female 618 80 11.4 
Hertfordshire 
Rape of a 
Female 197 66 25.0 
Humberside 
Rape of a 
Female 323 48 12.9 
Kent 
Rape of a 
Female 413 27 6.1 
Lancashire 
Rape of a 
Female 299 45 13.0 
Leicestershire 
Rape of a 
Female 287 33 10.3 
Lincolnshire 
Rape of a 
Female 169 15 8.1 
                                                 
72 No crimes data was only accessed up until 2005/6. Hence the reason for examining the data for 
2005/6.  
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London, City of 
Rape of a 
Female 5 2 28.5 
Merseyside 
Rape of a 
Female 356 36 9.1 
Metropolitan Police 
Rape of a 
Female 2,249 0 0 
Norfolk 
Rape of a 
Female 209 22 9.5 
North Wales 
Rape of a 
Female 156 22 12.3 
North Yorkshire 
Rape of a 
Female 134 14 9.4 
Northamptonshire 
Rape of a 
Female 152 32 17.3 
Northumbria 
Rape of a 
Female 325 40 10.9 
Nottinghamshire 
Rape of a 
Female 236 61 20.5 
South Wales 
Rape of a 
Female 193 6 3.0 
South Yorkshire 
Rape of a 
Female 294 25 7.8 
Staffordshire 
Rape of a 
Female 267 13 4.6 
Suffolk 
Rape of a 
Female 192 22 10.2 
Surrey 
Rape of a 
Female 135 50 27.0 
Sussex 
Rape of a 
Female 399 54 11.9 
Thames Valley 
Rape of a 
Female 425 65 13.2 
Warwickshire 
Rape of a 
Female 75 24 24.2 
West Mercia 
Rape of a 
Female 212 44 17.1 
West Midlands 
Rape of a 
Female 856 118 12.1 
West Yorkshire 
Rape of a 
Female 558 36 6.0 
Wiltshire 
Rape of a 
Female 138 28 16.8 
National 
Rape of a 
Female 13327 1533 10.3 
 
(Table7.573)                                                                                (Home Office 2008)  
 
In order to control for the distorting influence of ‘no criming’ the number of ‘no 
crimes’ was added to the number of recorded rapes of female and the ‘sanctioned’ 
detection rate re-calculated. Police forces were then sorted in ascending order based 
on their detection rate for rape of a female where the impact of ‘no crimes’ is not 
controlled for (detection rate minus ‘no crimes’) and then sorted in ascending order 
based on their detection rate when ‘no crimes’ are controlled for (Detection rate plus 
‘no crimes’). The ‘no crimes’ data on the Metropolitan Police Service was not held by 
                                                 
73 The percentage of recorded rapes ‘no crimed’ is calculated on the number of no crimes as a 
percentage of recorded rapes plus ‘no crimes’.  
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the Home Office and therefore the Metropolitan Police Force’s detection rate for rape 
of a female uncontrolled for ‘no crimes’ is included in both columns74.  The only 
statistically significant relationship found was between the percentage of rape of a 
female ‘no crimed’ and the detection rate for rape of a female minus ‘no crimes’, 
excluding City of London and the Met as outliers (or because in the case of the Met. 
no data was available) However this was no more than a weak association with only 
10% of variance explained (Pearson test), the statistical correlation between these two 
variables is shown at Fig. 7.6:  
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slope: 0.99783193 
intercept: 
-
11.4499172 
  
r-squared: 0.09940564 
  
degrees of freedom: 39 
  
P-value: 0.04465136 
 
(Fig 7.6)                                                                                 (Home Office 2007) 
 
                                                 
74 This is itself an example of ‘numerical gaming’ as the Home Office is deprived of the ability to 
assess all forces on an equal footing.  
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 The impact of ‘no criming’ on forces rankings on the detection of rape of a female is 
shown at Table 7.6   
 
2005/06  2005/06
Police Force 
Area Detection Rate minus no 
crimes  
Police Force 
Area 
Detection 
Rate plus No 
Crimes 
     
London, City of 0  London, City of 0
Devon & 
Cornwall 14.1  Dorset 12.3
Dyfed-Powys 15.2  Devon & Cornwall 13.5
Dorset 15.6  Dyfed-Powys 14.1
Leicestershire 16.0  Warwickshire 14.1
Sussex 18.0  Leicestershire 14.3
Merseyside 18.2  Sussex 15.8
Warwickshire 18.6  Merseyside 16.5
Hampshire 19.2  Hampshire 17.0
Gloucestershire 19.3  North Wales 17.4
Kent 19.4  Lincolnshire 17.9
Lincolnshire 19.5  Kent 18.1
North Wales 19.9  Thames Valley 18.3
West Yorkshire 20.6  Bedfordshire 18.4
Cambridgeshire 20.7  Avon & Somerset 18.5
Bedfordshire 20.7  Gloucestershire 18.5
Norfolk 21.0  Norfolk 19.0
Thames Valley 21.2  Humberside 19.1
Durham 21.7  West Yorkshire 19.3
South Yorkshire 21.8  Essex 19.3
Humberside 21.9  Durham 19.4
Avon & Somerset 22.0  Cheshire 19.8
Staffordshire 22.5  Nottinghamshire 19.8
Essex 23.0  Cambridgeshire 19.9
Suffolk 23.4  South Yorkshire 20.0
National 24.9  Suffolk 21.0
Nottinghamshire 25.0  Northamptonshire 21.1
North Yorkshire 25.4  Staffordshire 21.4
Cheshire 25.4  Surrey 21.6
Northamptonshire 25.7  West Mercia 21.8
Northumbria 25.8  National 22.3
West Mercia 26.4  North Yorkshire 22.9
Greater 
Manchester 28.3  Northumbria 23.0
Derbyshire 28.8  
Greater 
Manchester 24.1
South Wales 29.5  Hertfordshire 25.0
West Midlands 29.6  Derbyshire 25.4
Surrey 29.6  Wiltshire 25.9
Metropolitan 
Police 31.1  West Midlands 25.9
Wiltshire 31.1  South Wales 28.6
Hertfordshire 33.5  Lancashire 30.8
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Lancashire 35.5  
Metropolitan 
Police 31.1
Gwent 36.6  Gwent 31.2
Cleveland 36.7  Cumbria 32.1
Cumbria 36.9  Cleveland 32.4
 
(Table 7.6)                                                                     (Home Office 2007) 
 
The next stage was to examine the relationship between the detection rate for rape of 
a female and forces overall detection rate: Table 7.7 shows forces sorted in ascending 
order by their detection rate including ‘no crimes’ for rape of a female for the year 
2005/06: Table 7.8 shows forces sorted in ascending order by their overall detection 
rate for the year 2005/06.  
 
 
Police Force Area Offence 2005/06 2005/06 
  
% Rape of Female 
Det.+ No crimes % Overall Det.Rate 
    
London, City of 
Rape of a 
Female 0 39.5 
Dorset 
Rape of a 
Female 12.3 28.4 
Devon & Cornwall 
Rape of a 
Female 13.5 25.3 
Dyfed-Powys 
Rape of a 
Female 14.1 39.6 
Warwickshire 
Rape of a 
Female 14.1 23.7 
Leicestershire 
Rape of a 
Female 14.3 28.7 
Sussex 
Rape of a 
Female 15.8 26.0 
Merseyside 
Rape of a 
Female 16.5 24.7 
Hampshire 
Rape of a 
Female 17.0 20.9 
North Wales 
Rape of a 
Female 17.4 29.0 
Lincolnshire 
Rape of a 
Female 17.9 24.8 
Kent 
Rape of a 
Female 18.1 23.6 
Thames Valley 
Rape of a 
Female 18.3 26.6 
Bedfordshire Rape of a 18.4 22.6 
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Female 
Avon & Somerset 
Rape of a 
Female 18.5 23.3 
Gloucestershire 
Rape of a 
Female 18.5 28.8 
Norfolk 
Rape of a 
Female 19.0 24.8 
Humberside 
Rape of a 
Female 19.1 20.3 
West Yorkshire 
Rape of a 
Female 19.3 25.5 
Essex 
Rape of a 
Female 19.3 26.1 
Durham 
Rape of a 
Female 19.4 23.3 
Cheshire 
Rape of a 
Female 19.8 25.6 
Nottinghamshire 
Rape of a 
Female 19.8 21.2 
Cambridgeshire 
Rape of a 
Female 19.9 25.6 
South Yorkshire 
Rape of a 
Female 20.0 22.6 
Suffolk 
Rape of a 
Female 21.0 26.5 
Northamptonshire 
Rape of a 
Female 21.1 19.9 
Staffordshire 
Rape of a 
Female 21.4 25.4 
Surrey 
Rape of a 
Female 21.6 22.7 
West Mercia 
Rape of a 
Female 21.8 31.8 
National 
Rape of a 
Female 22.3 23.8 
North Yorkshire 
Rape of a 
Female 22.9 26.2 
Northumbria 
Rape of a 
Female 23.0 32.1 
Greater Manchester 
Rape of a 
Female 24.1 23.5 
Hertfordshire 
Rape of a 
Female 25.0 22.4 
Derbyshire 
Rape of a 
Female 25.4 25.7 
Wiltshire 
Rape of a 
Female 25.9 26.7 
West Midlands 
Rape of a 
Female 25.9 25.5 
South Wales 
Rape of a 
Female 28.6 22.1 
Lancashire 
Rape of a 
Female 30.8 29.4 
Metropolitan Police 
Rape of a 
Female 31.1 18.0 
Gwent 
Rape of a 
Female 31.2 27.0 
Cumbria 
Rape of a 
Female 32.1 29.7 
Cleveland Rape of a 32.4 24.0 
 257
Female 
Relationship between rape detection rate plus no crimes and overall detection rate 
Pearson -0.03879      
RSQ 0.001505      
 
(Table 7.7.)                                                                       (Home Office 2007) 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 7.7 indicates that there is no clear statistical relationship between the detection 
rate for rape of a female and the overall force detection rate. However it is worth 
observing that none of the forces subject of PSU interventions appears in the bottom 
10.    
 
Police Force Area Offence 2005/06 2005/06 
  
% Rape of a Female 
Det. 
% Overall 
Det.Rate 
    
Metropolitan Police 
Rape of a 
Female 31.1 18.0 
Northamptonshire 
Rape of a 
Female 21.1 19.9 
Humberside 
Rape of a 
Female 19.1 20.3 
Hampshire 
Rape of a 
Female 17.0 20.9 
Nottinghamshire 
Rape of a 
Female 19.8 21.2 
South Wales 
Rape of a 
Female 28.6 22.1 
Hertfordshire 
Rape of a 
Female 25.0 22.4 
Bedfordshire 
Rape of a 
Female 18.4 22.6 
South Yorkshire 
Rape of a 
Female 20.0 22.6 
Surrey 
Rape of a 
Female 21.6 22.7 
Avon & Somerset 
Rape of a 
Female 18.5 23.3 
Durham 
Rape of a 
Female 19.4 23.3 
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Greater Manchester 
Rape of a 
Female 24.1 23.5 
Kent 
Rape of a 
Female 18.1 23.6 
Warwickshire 
Rape of a 
Female 14.1 23.7 
National 
Rape of a 
Female 22.3 23.8 
Cleveland 
Rape of a 
Female 32.4 24.0 
Merseyside 
Rape of a 
Female 16.5 24.7 
Lincolnshire 
Rape of a 
Female 17.9 24.8 
Norfolk 
Rape of a 
Female 19.0 24.8 
Devon & Cornwall 
Rape of a 
Female 13.5 25.3 
Staffordshire 
Rape of a 
Female 21.4 25.4 
West Yorkshire 
Rape of a 
Female 19.3 25.5 
West Midlands 
Rape of a 
Female 25.9 25.5 
Cheshire 
Rape of a 
Female 19.8 25.6 
Cambridgeshire 
Rape of a 
Female 19.9 25.6 
Derbyshire 
Rape of a 
Female 25.4 25.7 
Sussex 
Rape of a 
Female 15.8 26.0 
Essex 
Rape of a 
Female 19.3 26.1 
North Yorkshire 
Rape of a 
Female 22.9 26.2 
Suffolk 
Rape of a 
Female 21.0 26.5 
Thames Valley 
Rape of a 
Female 18.3 26.6 
Wiltshire 
Rape of a 
Female 25.9 26.7 
Gwent 
Rape of a 
Female 31.2 27.0 
Dorset 
Rape of a 
Female 12.3 28.4 
Leicestershire 
Rape of a 
Female 14.3 28.7 
Gloucestershire 
Rape of a 
Female 18.5 28.8 
North Wales 
Rape of a 
Female 17.4 29.0 
Lancashire 
Rape of a 
Female 30.8 29.4 
Cumbria 
Rape of a 
Female 32.1 29.7 
West Mercia 
Rape of a 
Female 21.8 31.8 
Northumbria 
Rape of a 
Female 23.0 32.1 
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London, City of 
Rape of a 
Female 0 39.5 
Dyfed-Powys 
Rape of a 
Female 14.1 39.6 
Relationship between rape detection rate plus no crimes and overall detection rate 
Pearson -0.03879      
RSQ 0.001505      
 
(Table 7.8)                                                                       (Home Office 2007) 
 
Whilst the relationship between overall detection rates and the detection rate for rape 
of a female was found not to be statistically significant, Table 7.8 does indicates the 
degree to which some force’s place on the league table moved considerably when the 
criteria for success is changed from performance on less serious volume crime to 
performance on the detection of the generally more serious category of sexual 
offences. The most noticeable is Cleveland the highest ranked force in terms of 
detecting rape of a female yet a poor performer on overall detections. The widely 
differing position of the Metropolitan Police is also worthy of note.  
 
The difficulties experienced in analysing police performance on the investigation of 
serious offences of sexual assault and rape of a female demonstrates the limitations of 
the performance framework. However the wide variations between forces caused by 
different levels of ‘no criming’ corroborated HMIC/HMcpsi’s (2007) conclusions.  
 
 
In order to investigate further the possible impact of ‘skewing’ on the investigation of 
rape and child abuse the internal reviews of these offences conducted by the West 
Midlands Police, following the national report on rape investigations (HMIC/HMcpsi 
2002) and the findings of the Laming Inquiry (2003) following the death of Victoria 
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Climbie and the Bichard Report (2004) into the murders of Jessica Chapman and 
Holly Wells in Soham, were examined. The aim of this exercise was to identify any 
lack of focus or under-resourceing (skewing) in the force’s approach to investigating 
these offences. Poor investigations/quality failures would be one indicator of 
‘skewing’.  The presence of such factors, were identified by Chatterton (2008) as 
symptoms of ‘skewing’: 
 
“In contrast with the ideal, the everyday reality of GO [General Office] 
CID work is represented by the resort to unprofessional coping tactics 
(which are a mirror image of what the organisation does at a formal 
level), delayed investigations which can result in discontinued cases, 
intelligence packages that are never actioned, serious crimes that are not 
investigated and known offenders who are a threat to public safety, 
committing crime with impunity. (2008:xi) 
 
 
 
The HMCPS/HMIC Report on the Joint Inspection into the Investigation and 
Prosecution of Cases Involving Allegations of Rape (2002) resulted in forces 
reviewing how they investigated such offences. A review of rape and attempted rape 
investigations recorded between 1st January and 30th June 2003 by West Midlands 
Police was conducted. Ninety three cases, representing a 20% sample of cases were 
reviewed. The case papers relating to 13 reported offences could not be located and 
some cases were still ongoing, so a final sample of some 73 cases were examined. 
The main findings are as follows: 
 
 24 of the 93 cases examined were not recorded within the 72 hours 
stipulated by the NCRS  
 
 In 18 of the cases examined easily identifiable lines of enquiry were not 
followed up. 
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 In 26 cases the investigation fell below the basic standard expected due to 
poor interviewing, inappropriate gender of the officer undertaking the 
interview, failure to take DNA from the offender. 
 
 Little evidence of direct supervision and where there was (22 cases) this 
did not extend beyond sergeant level. 
 
 55 offenders were known to the victim, 42 were arrested and 16 charged. 
 
 Of the 73 cases reviewed only eighteen resulted in a charge and of those 
only 2 involved an offender who was unknown to the victim i.e. ‘stranger 
rapes’.  
 
 Of the 11 offenders known to the victim but not arrested only three were 
identified as suspects on the relevant documentation and only two of those 
subsequently appeared on the pertinent computer database. 
 
 Of the 93 cases reviewed 39 remained ‘undetected’. In fourteen of the 
undetected cases named offenders had been arrested and interviewed but 
there was insufficient evidence to support a charge and these remained 
correctly classified as undetected.  
 
 The cost of submitting exhibits to the Forensic Science Laboratory appear 
to have been a factor in deciding which exhibits should be submitted.                     
 
(West Midlands Police: 2003 Unpublished) 
 
 
Whilst it may be the case that the poor standards reported in this document were not 
the result of ‘skewing’ associated with the influence of Performance Management 
Interviewee E stated the standard of investigation of this category of offence was 
deteriorating: 
 
“Certainly my knowledge of cases of certainly DV, child abuse and sexual 
assault, you know files that I have looked at, the quality of investigation 
has been very poor and straightforward investigative practice I would 
argue would have been matter of course in years gone by, shortcuts were 
taken, and what seemed to creep in were officers were making decisions 
about whether a case was going to go anywhere.” (Interviewee E) 
   
Interviewee E also stated this was linked to the impact of the particular performance 
management framework operating at that time: 
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“The lack of ownership by line management was a problem and because 
they didn’t fit, certainly the child abuse side did not fit into the 
performance culture there was a lack of attention to them because they 
weren’t counting their performance, it wasn’t accountable”.  (Interviewee 
E)  
 
 
The Laming Report (2003) and Bichard Report (2004) resulted in UK police forces 
reviewing their child protection procedures and intelligence systems.  In the West 
Midlands ACPO officers were checking on their force’s ability to identify serial sex 
offenders:    
 
“The question was what is the situation with rape and could he be 
confident that we didn’t have a serial rapist on the area?  I said I don’t 
think we can be confident of that.” (Interviewee E) 
 
 
The position in regard to rape was answered by the report referred to earlier (WMP 
2003 unpublished). The review of Child Protection procedures conducted by the West 
Midlands Police identified similar findings to that uncovered by the audit of rape 
investigations. The report identified: 
 
 Vulnerabilities in Strategic direction, ownership and training. 
 
 An increasing number of cases involving the death or serious injuries to 
children in which the force was found wanting. 
 
 Further failings could result in the force encountering many Civil Claims. 
 
 Under-staffing of Child Protection Units: The report recommended an 
increase of 20 police officers which included supervisory officers. 
 
 The standard of investigation in 22% of cases from a sample of 563 live 
cases were found to be unsatisfactory. 
 
 Non-Compliance with NCRS: 35% of cases which should have been 
allocated a crime number did not have one.    
    (West Midlands Police. June 2004:unpublished) 
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This report, like the review of rape investigations, reflected badly on a force which 
marketed itself as the ‘best performing metropolitan force’ in the country: 
 
“Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary gives West Midlands Police 
‘top marks’ in a new report which gave a baseline assessment of all 43 
police forces in England and Wales” (WMP Press Release 14.6.2004) 
 
 
Again Interviewee E noted that quality failings within child protection units started to 
occur after the drive to achieve Government targets became embedded (circa 1999): 
 
“The latter part 8 reviews75 that I did certainly showed failings within our 
child protection units, previously failings (pre Climbie) tended to be outside 
the units,……. Yes there was a pattern of failure by all officers really but 
what I found originally was that the quality within the Child protection units 
was higher” (Interviewee E)  
 
Interviewee E again attributed these failings to an organisational focus on achieving 
the targets the force was being judged upon i.e. ‘skewing’: 
 
“The quality of service can suffer because if everything is down to, for 
say, detections then if the easiest offence counts for the same, has got the 
same tick in the box, as a very complex offence then the work entailed in 
investigating for instance a rape, all the work involved in that, is not 
taken into account if you are counting that against a theft from vehicle or 
a burglary which are arguable a more straightforward offence. For me 
the main thing is quality of service. Also if there is pressure to perform in 
terms of the staff elements of bullying can come, for wants of a better 
word, pressure perhaps even bullying to reach targets, which can also be 
dangerous because if officers feel they have got to get their quota perhaps, 
certainly, the quality of the investigation can go out the window” 
(Interviewee E) 
 
                                                 
75 These multi agency reviews ‘serious case reviews’ are conducted after the suspicious death of a child 
with a view to identify and address any apparent weaknesses in the service provided.  
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The weaknesses identified in the internal report dated June 2004 were to become 
apparent from a review of the circumstances leading up to the death of J.L.M. Bn. 
2.2.03 who was murdered on 6th August 2004, (3 months after the report).     
 
J.L.M. was 6 months old when she died as a result of being beaten to death in her 
home on 5th August 2004.  
 
“She suffered horrific injuries to her face, bruised and swollen eyes, 
bruised face, bruising to the left side of her body and bruising from a 
hand print on her thigh. She had extensive retinal haemorrhages in both 
eyes and the base of her skull was fractured.” (Birmingham Area Child 
Protection Committee: Part VIII Review Nov 2005:2)  
 
In August 2004 her mother’s twenty six year old boyfriend was jailed for her murder.  
The judge recommended a minimum sentence of 28 years.  
 
The Serious Case Review (Part 8 Review)conducted under the provisions of Chapter 
VIII of ‘Working Together to Safeguard and Promote the Welfare of Children’ found 
a catalogue of failings in the identification and monitoring of the offender who was 
clearly a risk to women and children by virtue of his previous violent offending 
behaviour:  
 
“The male partner of JLM’s mother was a catalyst in a whole series of 
domestic violence incidents throughout the county dating back over five 
years. This involved various women, who were all single mothers, 
vulnerable and an easy target for a man who would resort to violence 
within weeks and even days of forming a relationship. Very often the 
violence would escalate and involve the children of the women.”  
(Birmingham Area Child Protection Committee Part VIII Review Nov 
2005:2)  
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Her killer had been convicted of a serious assault on a three year old girl in March 
2002 and was sentenced to three years imprisonment. However there was a failure by 
the Probation Service to note that by his conviction he was a Schedule 1 Offender 
under the provisions of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933. The Police 
recorded his conviction on the Police National Computer (PNC) as an assault against 
the girl’s mother thus failing to recognise his Schedule 1 status due to the assault on 
the child. His status as a dangerous offender, who should have been monitored by the 
Multi Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA), was again missed by the 
Probation Service on his release. The result: 
 
“He was not monitored, his access to children was not recognised and he 
moved about the city from relationship to relationship without the 
authorities realising he had access to children and he was continuing his 
very violent lifestyle with partner after partner” (Birmingham Area Child 
Protection Committee Part VIII Review Nov 2005:2)  
 
 
During this period his behaviour came to the notice of Social Services and a Health 
Visitor but no Sec 47 Investigation76 was initiated in respect of the allegations of child 
abuse. However some 6 weeks prior to the death of J.L.M. an assault on a previous 
partner and child was reported to the police. This case was dealt with by one of the 
force’s Child Protection Teams and the lack of action was to prove critical: 
 
“The Police had spoken to him on numerous occasions in attempts to coax 
the offender into the police station, rather than take positive action to 
arrest him. Each time he agreed he would surrender but failed to do so. 
The Police chose not to circulate him as wanted on the Police National 
Computer (PNC). Just prior to JLM’s assault, the police stopped the 
offender in an ordinary vehicle check. He was checked on the PNC but 
was not wanted. He was allowed to proceed. Within the next few days 
JLM was assaulted and died as a result” (Birmingham Area Child 
Protection Committee Part VIII Review Nov 2005:2)  
                                                 
76 This would have led to a multi agency investigation and review. 
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Had the offender been circulated as wanted he could have been arrested when stopped 
and this may have led to his incarceration, as in addition to the nature of the offence 
for which he was sought he was also in breach of his prison release licence.  
    
The Review’s findings mirrored many of those uncovered by both Lord Laming 
(2003) and Sir Michael Bichard (2004): 
 
“The Review has identified numerous issues where systems have broken 
down. There were several occasions where there was a lack of exchange of 
information between agencies, checks made with incorrect details so 
computer systems gave wrong answers, agency staff dealing with issues 
without Child Protection awareness training therefore not realising the 
importance of identifying and raising concerns.”   (Birmingham Area 
Child Protection Committee Part VIII Review Nov 2005:2) 
 
 
The police failings in the case resulted in the West Midlands Police referring the 
matter to the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) for investigation. 
The IPCC made a public announcement that it would extend its investigation into how 
the force handled domestic violence and child protection cases in general: 
 
“The Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) is to investigate 
West Midlands Police following the death of a toddler. I am keen to 
ensure that this investigation covers not just the consideration of any 
culpability of individual officers, but every aspect. This includes the role 
and effectiveness of the force’s child protection procedures.”(BBC 
12.1.06) 
 
 
The findings of the IPCC are discussed later in the chapter on the police regulators.  
However in 2006 HMIC were to comment on the staffing levels of Child Protection 
units, an indication of ‘skewing’: 
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“While the force has established a clear accountability framework and 
policy for the investigation of child abuse, the highly devolved nature of 
the organisation has led to an inconsistent approach by some OCUs on 
issues such as staffing levels, supervisory ratios and workloads. HMIC 
has received reports of workloads in excess of 150 cases per officer per 
year, more than double the national benchmark of 60 cases per year. 
OCU commanders would be assisted in determining resource levels for 
these units by clearer guidance and firmer management by the force on 
acceptable workload levels for officers working in this high-risk area.” 
(HMIC/ WMP 2006:48) 
 
 
 
 
6. CHAPTER CONCLUSION: 
 
Coleman et al (2007), HMIC (O’Connor 2005) and HMIC/HMcpsi (2007) indicated a 
fall in performance in relation to the prevention and detection of serious crime. HMIC 
(1999); O’Connor (2005); Neyroud & Disley (2007); and Chatterton (2008) attributed 
this to ‘skewing’ in an attempt to improve overall detections rates with a view to 
improving performance against government targets. This was supported by the 
findings of the Home Affairs Committee (2007:11-12) which commented adversely 
on the ‘narrowing the justice gap’ performance indicators. The review of the official 
documents on the police response to serious crime in the form of ‘guns and gangs’ 
indicated that ‘skewing’ was impacting on some force’s ability to respond to this 
threat. However this was not universal and HMIC O’Connor commended GMP, Avon 
and Somerset and the MPS on their investment in the control of serious crime (HMIC 
2005). That said two of these forces, GMP and Avon and Somerset, were to be 
deemed poor performers by the Home Office and suffered the stigma of being 
subjected to PSU ‘engagement’. The experience of these forces may not act as an 
incentive for them or others to invest too heavily in the control of serious crime if this 
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is achieved at the expense of performance on less serious, but more numerous 
‘volume crime’. Such concerns have been expressed by senior officers:  
  
“It is all very well highlighting Level 2 vulnerabilities as an issue, but 
what about performance?” (HMIC 2005:8) 
 
The review of the performance statistics on sexual offences and rapes shows a fall in 
reduction of the number of offences detected but it would appear that much of this 
reduction in detections is due to the efforts to improve crime recording and detection 
procedures. However, the more recent data shows that the  differences in performance 
on the detection of sexual offences between forces remains wide and this is reflected 
in the variations in conviction rates for rape in 2004/5, varying as they do between 
0.86% for Gloucestershire to 13.79% for Northamptonshire77 ; published by the 
Fawcett Society (2007) (www.truthaboutrape.co.uk/stats.html). Not all of that 
variation can be attributed to different recording procedures and it is likely ‘skewing’ 
was a factor, a conclusion supported by HMIC/HMcpsi (2007): 
 
“Seven of the eight review sites showed a decrease in detection rates 
between 2000 and 2005, and, in most cases, this decrease was marked. In 
the remaining site, the improved detection rate was found to run parallel 
to improvements in investigation standards and the level of priority 
afforded to rape investigations locally, as well as to more robust 
management of cases and monitoring of performance” (2007:10).   
     
 
The presence of Cleveland and Nottinghamshire police forces, both of which were 
high performers when judged on their detection rates for sexual offences, on the list of 
forces subject of PSU ‘engagement’ again suggests there may be negative 
                                                 
77 Note Northamptonshire was the subject of PSU intervention as a result of being declared an 
underperforming force.  
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consequences for forces which invest too heavily in the investigation of more serious 
offences.  
 
A review of the documentation from the West Midlands Police also provided 
evidence of ‘skewing’ and demonstrated the consequences of such ‘gaming’ 
behaviour.  
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CHAPTER 8  
 
‘SKEWING 2’; THE GEOGRAPHICAL REDEPLOYMENT OF RESOURCES 
TO MATCH PRIORITIES: 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION:  
 
This chapter deals with the re-deployment of police resources, ‘skewing’, from 
problematic inner city areas where more serious, difficult to investigate crime, is 
prevalent to more affluent suburbs where performance can be enhanced by the 
successful investigation and detection of less serious crime. This factor was 
uncovered during the assessment of the impact of the community action in Balsall 
Heath Birmingham on the level of police resources allocated to the area (Patrick 
2003). Whilst the findings in relation to Balsall Heath were discussed briefly in my 
dissertation (Patrick 2004a) the wider implications of the evidence uncovered are 
discussed in this chapter. The findings do not challenge the fundamental objectives of 
the Government’s commitment to Neighbourhood Policing. They do however 
question the practicality of implementing such a policy on a universal basis. A 
specific review of the impact of the policy on the West Midlands Police is of 
particular value as this force pioneered Neighbourhood Policing. The Audit 
Commission included the West Midlands police experience of neighbourhood 
policing in their evaluation and recommended the concept based on evidence obtained 
from the force (Smith 2002). In this chapter the background to the issue of the 
distribution of public resources is outlined. The methodology employed is explained 
and then a largely case study approach, based on the data appertaining to the West 
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Midlands Police, is adopted in order to demonstrate how resources had been re-
distributed during the period of the study.    
 
 
 
2. BACKGROUND: 
 
In the 1970s Lineberry reviewed the evidence to support the hypothesis that the poor 
were systematically disadvantaged by the distribution of municipal public resources in 
the cities of the USA.  He reported: 
 
“the weight of evidence compels the conclusion that overt, measurable 
discrimination in the distribution in conventional city services has been 
overstated by anecdotal commentary and conventional wisdom.” 
(Lineberry 1976:186). 
 
 
His conclusions were in part influenced by the findings on the distribution of police 
resources which the evidence he reviewed suggested were allocated on a basis of need 
based on professional judgement: 
 
“It would therefore be an inefficient distribution of service resources to 
equalise protection in every neighbourhood regardless of whether the 
crime rate were high or low.  Many crimes in high-crime neighbourhoods 
would go unchecked, while a service “overkill” would appear in low-
crime areas.” (Lineberry 1976:190) 
 
  
However Felson & Ouimet (2007) Canadian study discovered that it was more 
difficult to solve crime in more deprived neighbourhoods as fear of intimidation, lack 
of motivation to become involved, etc., limited the evidence made available to 
investigators. This would suggest performance could be improved by redeploying 
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officers to areas where successful investigations are more likely to occur. The ‘what 
gets measured gets done’ (Rogerson 1995) effect on serious crime discussed in 
chapter 7 would also suggest that performance could be improved by redeploying 
officers dedicated to the investigation of more serious crime such as gun crime and 
gang related violence traditionally associated with deprived areas to the investigation 
of less serious crimes subject of performance indicators. It is therefore appropriate to 
review the distribution of police resources in order to assess if the relationship with 
deprivation remains biased in favour of deprived neighbourhoods as advocated by the 
Audit Commission (Smith K. 2002). Access to the information on the deployment of 
police resources has limited detailed analysis of this factor to the West Midlands 
Police.   
 
        
The debate on the distribution of police resources in the UK both at a national level, 
as forces compete for a greater slice of the funding available for policing, and at the 
local level, where police commanders argue for more resources for their local area, 
has been a feature of the police service since its inception.  However, the Police and 
Magistrates’ Courts Act 1994, enacted on 1 April 1995 introduced the basis on which 
police resources are currently determined.  This legislation gave Chief Constables 
discretion on how to spend their budget allocation. This allowed ratios of police 
officer to police support staff and constable to supervisory ranks to be determined 
locally.  In the case of the West Midlands Police it also provided funding for an 
additional one hundred and fifty police constables.  This increase in budget 
corresponded with a major re-organisation of the West Midlands Police as the Force 
reduced its Force Squads and disbanded its large divisions in favour of service 
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delivery via smaller Basic Command Units which were in turn made up of smaller 
‘sectors’ under the charge of an individual Inspector. The need to devise a means of 
re-distributing existing resources and allocating the additional constable posts became 
paramount in order to avoid the predictable conflict between local commanders. The 
force resolved the problem by adopting a Resource Allocation Formula based on a 
number of factors including demographics; deprivation; demand for service and 
reported crime levels. This solution followed the advice advocated by the Audit 
Commission: 
 
“A formula does not have to be perfect.  Models that give a good 
approximation to what would have emerged from ad hoc judgement may 
be good enough.  The advantage they offer is that they are simple to 
operate: their results are predictable, objective and even – handed; and 
they are capable of improvement” (Audit Commission 1991).  
 
A detailed analysis is provided by Mason (1995). The potential to improve detection 
rates by moving officers to areas where crime was easier to solve was not a factor in 
the rationale behind the redistribution.  The re-distribution of resources was then 
implemented in 1997: 
 
“By freeing up resources in the Service’s centre (the mounted unit, an 
administrative unit and drugs team were disbanded), nearly 800 
additional officers were re-allocated to local police stations.” (Smith K., 
2002) 
 
Whilst the distribution of Police resources has been challenged at a Macro level by the 
Metropolitan Police (FitzGerald, Hough, Joseph, & Qureshi:2003:108) the aim of this 
chapter is to examine the impact at the neighbourhood level to assess whether or not 
Lineberry’s conclusions are supported. 
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3. CHAPTER METHODOLOGY: 
 
Lineberry identified the methodological difficulties in assessing discrimination 
against the poor by evaluating resource allocation: 
 
“In particular it suggests that it will ordinarily be exceedingly difficult, 
using the normal methods and canons of evidence from the social 
sciences, to demonstrate constitutionally-proscribed discrimination 
against the poor.” (Lineberry 1976:181) 
 
In this chapter the change in distribution of Police resources was be examined to 
determine if any pattern could be identified.  To achieve this, the changes to the West 
Midlands Police Constable Establishment between 1997 and 2000 are shown by 
individual Basic Command Units (BCUs), twenty one of which constitute the force.  
These were then compared to the corresponding local authority’s (in the case of 
Birmingham the relevant wards) standing in the National Index of Deprivation 1998.   
The results of this were then overlaid onto maps showing the boundaries of the BCUs 
which were responsible for the Policing of Birmingham.  Changes to establishment 
being overlaid over maps which are shaded to show the enumeration districts which 
fell within the top 7% and 10% of deprived districts in England. This methodology 
was utilised by Fish & Bourner (2000) to demonstrate the relationship between crime 
and deprivation and the maps they used were adapted for the purposes of this 
research. 
 
Workload was also assessed by dividing the number of particular crime types 
recorded during 2001/02 i.e. Burglary; Robbery; Vehicle Crime; Gun Crime; Murder 
and Manslaughter; and total recorded crime by the constable establishment of each 
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individual BCU. These individual crime categories were also mapped by Birmingham 
BCUs showing the concentrations of particular crime types. (Patrick 2004: 
Appendices R-A3)  This provides a visual tool which can be used to correlate the 
relationship between the number of police officers and deprivation. The impact at the 
individual BCU level was provided by analysing the changes in crime and demand for 
service on a Birmingham inner city BCU (E3) which included the Balsall Heath 
neighbourhood. The analysis also allowed the impact of community based “Sector 
Policing” which provided the structural framework for “neighbourhood Policing” to 
be evaluated from a practitioner’s perspective. 
 
Sector policing is defined as “an area based approach to local policing.  This involved 
dividing Basic Command Units into small geographically defined ‘sectors’ in order 
to: 
 
 Achieve better knowledge and ‘ownership’ of an area/community by its 
individual police officers; and 
 End the traditional distinction between ‘community’ and ‘responsive’ 
policing – this has now been rolled into a single job. 
 
Within this structure, individual officers are also assigned a smaller area – their 
‘micro beat’ for which they have responsibility for community safety.”  (Audit 
Commission: K.Smith 2002)  
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4. RE-DISTRIBUTION TRENDS AT THE LOCAL AUTHORITY LEVEL: 
 
The changes in police constable (PCs) numbers from 1997 to 2000 are shown 
alongside the Local Authorities which make up the West Midlands Police area; the 
Local Authorities’ rankings on the national indices of multiple deprivation (National 
Statistics 200078) are also included (Table 8.1). 
 
                    Deprivation     Deprivation             1997      2000     Increase   Increase  
                    Rank by           Rank by      Av.       P.C.s     P.C.s    Number         %   
                    Employment    Income       Ward                                   
                                                                  Rank                      
 
B’ham.             1                       1              43        1999      2324        325            16% 
 
Sandwell         24                      9              11          463        543          80            17%          
 
Coventry         27                   20              75           571        631         34              6% 
 
W’hampton.   40                    24              33          463        500          37              8%                   
 
Walsall            42                    25              54          370        496        126            31% 
 
                                                 
78 Deprivation data sourced from the National Statistics website: 
www.statistics.gov.uk Crown Copyright material is reproduced with the permission of 
the controller. A full explanation of the indices of deprivation is provided at the 
National Statistics website. 
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Dudley             47                    34             142         345        435          90           26%           
 
Solihull            94                    97              262         245        315         70           28% 
 
West Midlands Police Area                                 4456       5244       788           17% 
 
 
(Table 8.1) 
 
The results shown at Table 8.1 demonstrate how the re-distribution of constables 
carried out in 1997 favoured Walsall, Dudley, and Solihull Authorities. However this 
relatively crude method of analysis does not take into account variations in levels of 
deprivation within the Local Authority areas. This factor was of particular relevance 
to Birmingham Local Authority where extremes in deprivation and affluence occur 
within the City boundaries. This factor and the size of the authority resulted in the 
type of aggregation which led to its low overall ranking on the indices of deprivation. 
However when the changes in constable numbers experienced by the nine Basic 
Command Units (BCUs) responsible for policing Birmingham were compared against 
their component Local Authority Wards, again ranked by their standing on the 
National Indices of Deprivation (National Statistics 2000) the favourable treatment of 
the more affluent wards was again discernible (Table 8.2). 
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CHANGES IN CONSTABLE ESTABLISHMENT(EST): BY BIRMINGHAM 
LOCAL AUTHORITY WARD AND CORRESPONDING BCUs BY: 
RANKING IN THE NATIONAL INDICES OF DEPRIVATION 2000 
 
 
The Police BCUs are assigned to the main two wards they are responsible for 
policing geographically. 
 
BCU      WARDS     DEP.          DEP.       1997    2000   CHANGE    CHANGE 
                                  RANK      SCORE    EST    EST    NUMBER           % 
 
 
D1           Aston                 27           76          233      266        33                     14%. 
              Nechells             144           66          
 
D2  Sutton New Hall    4,991          14           226     269        43                     19% 
          Kingstanding         425          54  
 
D3  Washwood Heath     186          64           235     304        69                     29%  
        Hodge Hill             1,173          39 
 
E1     Longbridge             867           44          206    272         66                     32% 
        Bartley Green          740           46           
 
E2       Billesley             1,197           39          201     250         49                     24% 
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         Kings Norton          884           44 
 
E3     Sparkbrook             33           75          197     215          18                     9% 
          Sparkhill               343           56   
 
F1      Ladywood             346           56          288     296            8                     3% 
         (City Centre)  
 
F2      Ladywood              346          56          202      228          26                   13%   
            Quinton              1,871           31 
 
F3     Handsworth            253          61          211      224          13                     6% 
              Soho                    159          65 
                      
(Table 8.2) 
 
The trend becomes more obvious when the change in officer numbers; actual (Fig. 
8.1) and percentage (Fig. 8.2) were overlaid on a map of Birmingham highlighting the 
enumeration districts by level of deprivation. 
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5. THE IMPACT OF THE REDISTRIBUTION ON THE INNER CITY AREAS 
IS ASSESSED. 
 
The mapping of changes in constable posts by BCU over the areas of high levels of 
deprivation shows a tendency for more affluent areas, with lower levels and 
concentrations of deprivation, to receive greater increases in the number of constables 
available for re-deployment.  The further away from the inner city neighbourhoods 
e.g. Handsworth, Aston; Sparkbrook; Sparkhill; Ladywood, which saw their constable 
establishment increase between 6% and 16%, the more likely the increase in the 
constables e.g. Sutton Coldfield 19%; Dudley 25% Solihull 28%; and Walsall 33%. 
 
The impact of ‘sectorisation’ also had a further dissipating effect on resources as the 
delivery of services at a smaller geographical level involved ensuring that each sector 
had sufficient officers to maintain minimum service cover  24 hours x 7 days per 
week . This ‘spreading of the jam’ limited the ability of BCUs to concentrate their 
resources in the most deprived neighbourhoods within their policing boundaries. 
The large 32% increase in the E1 BCU establishment was in part due to the BCU 
taking responsibility for the policing of the Rubery area transferred from the West 
Mercian Constabulary circa 1997. 
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(Fig 8.1) 
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(Fig. 8.2) 
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6. POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS: 
 
The make up of the Divisions prior to re-organisation provides some explanation for 
the apparent disparity between more affluent and deprived areas. Outer Divisions i.e. 
Dudley; Walsall and Solihull were made up of two sub-divisions therefore after re-
organisation the divisional staff were split two ways to staff the two BCUs which 
were based on the previous sub-divisional boundaries. Divisions with three sub-
divisions split divisional personnel three ways. However, the evidence from the two 
Wolverhampton BCUs (G1 & G2), which saw their establishments increase by only 
4.5% and 11.6% respectfully, suggests this factor is not as relevant as might have 
been expected.  Wolverhampton, although rated lower in the overall rankings on 
deprivation than Walsall, has more wards which are ranked deprived than Walsall i.e. 
the total spread of deprivation is greater.  When Birmingham divisions, which were 
all made up of three sub-divisions prior to re-organisation, are analysed the trend 
towards favouring the more affluent areas is re-affirmed (Figs.8.1 & 8.2).  
One explanation is that the formula used to distribute officers is skewed in favour of 
the more affluent neighbourhoods.  The work of Hope; Karstedt and Farrall at Keele 
University may provide an explanation for this phenomenon. This research has 
discovered that although deprived neighbourhoods suffer higher levels of crime their 
propensity to report incidents to the police is lesser than more affluent areas. (Hope; 
Karstedt, and Farrall 2004).  Whilst the formula employed by the West Midlands 
Police is weighted to take account of democratic factors including deprivation it may 
be that the impact of differential reporting rates was not fully appreciated when the 
formula was devised. 
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Another explanation could be related to the style of policing which impacts on the 
recording of demand for service.  This is based on the author’s experience of working 
with the community activists in the Balsall Heath area during the period 1994 – 2000 
when the residents took to the streets in large numbers to challenge the drug dealers; 
pimps; street sex workers and kerb crawlers who were intimidating the community 
(Patrick 2004b).  During the inception of a collaborative approach to working with the 
community activists, following the initial disorder, agreement was reached that the 
community volunteers who had formed an accredited ‘street watch’ scheme would 
desist from calling the police on the 999  system to report non-emergency incidents.  
An alternative system of recording incidents on log sheets and submitting these to the 
police was devised.  This procedure coupled with enhanced lines of communication 
between the police and community and joint operations reduced crime levels and the 
recorded calls for service. Unfortunately this arrangement circumvented the police 
call recording mechanisms and therefore was omitted from the calculations on 
demand for service which in turn influenced the number of resources allocated to the 
BCU when it was formed in 1997. (Patrick 2004a:103-106) Successful 
implementation of Neighbourhood Policing is likely to result in similar outcomes as 
residents pass on their concerns to community constables directly as opposed to 
through the formal call handling arrangements. This could then manifest itself as a 
reduction in recorded demand for service in turn leading to a reduction in resources.  
 
 
 
 
 
 285
7. WORK LOAD ANALYSIS BY BIRMINGHAM BCUs BY CRIME TYPE: 
 
It may of course be argued that prior to re-organisation the inner city neighbourhoods 
benefited unfairly from the previous allocation of resources. This factor is explored by 
correlating visually the relationship between the number of crimes investigated and 
the number of officers available to deal with them.  
 
The following maps provide a visual representation of the distribution of BCU total 
constable establishment by crime type. The work load measure was obtained by 
dividing the number of crimes recorded during the year by the number of constables 
allocated to the BCU.  The concentration of crimes is provided by the differential 
shading at enumeration district level. 
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(Fig. 8.3) 
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(Fig. 8.4) 
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(Fig. 8.5) 
The apparently high concentration of crime in the left hand segment of the D2 BCU is 
an anomaly caused by the size of the enumeration district which relates to Sutton 
Park. The small population in this area is skewing the data. 
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(Fig. 8.6) 
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(Fig. 8.7) 
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(Fig. 8.8) 
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Workload Analysis Supports Re-distribution to More Affluent Districts.  
 
When total crime (Fig. 8.3) was analysed the distribution of resources appeared to 
favour the inner city areas with the more affluent areas showing higher crime rates per 
officer than the inner city areas; Sutton Coldfield 80.19 crimes per officer compared 
to Handsworth’s 59.17 crimes per officer.  A similar situation is apparent when 
analysing residential burglaries (Fig. 8.4) where the more affluent areas again 
appeared to be losing out. One option is to move more officers into these areas from 
the inner city areas, which ironically would have improved the Force’s performance 
on its neighbourhood renewal target based on “reducing domestic burglary by 25 per 
cent by 2005, with no local authority district having more than three times the 
national average rate” (A New Commitment to Neighbourhood Renewal: National 
Strategy Action Plan 2001:35).  The situation on vehicle crime (Fig. 8.5) appears 
more equitable across the board. However, when the more serious categories of crime, 
robbery and theft from the person (Fig. 8.6) are analysed then the trend reverses 
with inner city areas recording higher incidence rates per officer.  Gun crime (Fig. 8. 
7) and homicide (Fig. 8. 8) also concentrate in the inner city areas and the ratio of 
officers to offences appears to discriminate against the deprived areas thus supporting 
the work of Hope et al (2004).  It should however be taken into account that a central 
murder incident unit dealt with the most serious incidents such as murders, but this 
unit utilised local CID officers in the investigation of the incidents and a series of 
murders or serious incidents would decimate a local CID department leaving few 
experienced CID officers to investigate local routine crime. 
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8. THE LOCAL PERSPECTIVE: 
 
Whilst the mapping of the resource changes is informative and provides visual 
evidence of ‘skewing’, it does not provide a feel for the impact of the changes at the 
local level.  By looking at the experience of the inner city BCU which covered the 
Balsall Heath area of the city it may be possible to gauge the impact of those changes.  
It is particularly useful as this BCU had been part of an earlier divisional resource 
review in 1994 as the division which it formed a part of re-arranged its 3 sub-
divisional boundaries.  Birmingham Police Divisions followed the tradition of 
splitting the city into ‘cake like’ slices with each division sharing a mix of inner and 
outer city areas.  This provided divisional commanders with the flexibility to 
concentrate divisional resources in the areas of greatest need.  It also allowed them the 
option of creating larger specialist units or squads which could be deployed 
proactively if a particular risk needed addressing or a serious incident occurred  
anywhere on the division. As a general ‘rule of thumb’ proactive units both Divisional 
and Force tended to concentrate their attentions on the inner city areas.  The Balsall 
Heath79 sub-division had traditionally received close attention from the Serious Crime 
Squad; Drug Squad; Vice Squad (Force and Divisional) and the Regional Crime 
Squad, all of which were based near to the area.   
 
The resource analysis carried out prior to the divisional re-alignment of boundaries in 
1994 concluded that the resource requirements for the day to day policing of the three 
sub-divisions; inner city Balsall Heath (E3); residential Kings Heath (E2) and mixed 
residential Bournville (E1); were roughly the same and it was on this basis that the 
                                                 
79 The BCU was not called the Balsall Heath BCU but for the purposes of this research naming it as 
such reduces confusion.  
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officers were allocated. The Division maintained a number of officers centrally who 
carried out the call handling; administration; file preparation; enquiry office staffing;  
events planning; a small plain clothes unit 1 Sgt and 6 Constables to deal with vice 
issues and a large pro-active Crime Unit which investigated serious crime on the 
division.  The crime unit was based on the Balsall Heath area and the plain clothes 
unit dealt mainly with the vice problem concentrated on the Balsall Heath 
neighbourhood.  This situation persisted until April 1997 when the divisional 
resources and additional force resources were re-distributed, as per the formulaic 
solution referred to earlier, and Basic Command Units were created.  From the Balsall 
Heath perspective the BCU gained 18 constables who were deployed to cover call 
handling; reactive CID and other functions necessary to maintain the day to day 
routine service needs. An internal review of the resource allocation model conducted 
in 2001 (West Midlands Police unpublished) concluded that a minimum establishment 
of 237 constables was necessary to make a BCU viable i.e. able to maintain its 
infrastructure and provide a basic 24 x 7 service. The Balsall Heath (E3), BCU’s 
constable establishment was 218 at this time, 19 below viability80.  The proactive 
element previously provided by the Divisional Crime Squad and Plain Clothes Dept 
was lost.  By contrast the other two BCU’s, gained 49 (Kings Heath) and 66 
(Bournville) extra constables respectively, although the main beneficiary (E1) did 
have to take on the extra responsibility for policing a residential estate transferred 
from West Mercia Constabulary. 
 
The reduction in this proactive support from Divisional and Force levels severely 
limited the Balsall Heath (E3) BCU’s ability to mount proactive investigations into 
                                                 
80 Three out of the four Command Units policing the inner city areas of Birmingham had constable 
establishments below the 218 viability threshold.   
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serious crime (One large drugs operation was funded by raising monies from hiring a 
uniform constable to the local bus company.) 
 
The reason for this disparity in resources appeared again to be linked to the recorded 
demand for service as opposed to assessment of need based on demographic factors.  
A close analysis of the service demands placed on each of these three BCUs (Patrick 
2004:103-106) revealed that overall demand increased the further out from the inner 
city the policing area was located. However the reverse was the case when serious 
incidents i.e. those requiring an immediate police response increased were examined. 
These findings supported Hope et al’s conclusion that more serious crime/incidents 
occur in the more deprived areas (Hope et al 2004). 
 
 
9. 1999: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT FILLS THE GAP 
 
In 1999 the West Midlands Police was successful in its bid to the Home Office for 
funds for an additional 534 officers made available under the Government’s Crime 
Fighting Initiative, which aimed to increase the number of uniformed officers  
“on the beat”.  These officers, made available in three phases, were deployed centrally 
to specific geographical areas. Interestingly in the first two phases none were 
deployed to the Sparkbrook ward which although the second most deprived ward in 
Birmingham was enjoying relatively low levels of crime as a result of the contribution 
being made by the community groups and volunteers in the Balsall Heath 
neighbourhood which formed part of the ward . 
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The overall deployment of the crime fighting teams occurred over a period of three 
years and their numbers were not included in the calculations the maps (Figs 8.1 – 
8.8) were based upon. These additional resources were deployed as follows (table 8.3 
West Midlands, Table 8.4 Birmingham):  
 
CRIME FIGHTING TEAM OFFICERS ASSIGNED BY LOCAL AUTHORITY 
AREA 
                   Deprivation     Deprivation    Average         Distribution of the   
                   Ranked by       Ranked by      Ward             Neighbourhood Crime 
                   Employment    Income             Rank            Fighting Teams 
 
 
B’ham.             1                      1                     43                         258 
 
Sandwell         24                      9                    11                           40          
 
Coventry         27                   20                    75                           68 
 
W’hampton.   40                    24                    33                           48 
 
 
Walsall            42                    25                    54                           48 
 
Dudley             47                    34                  142                           24 
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Solihull            94                    97                   262                          16 
 
 
West Midlands Police total to date:                                           502  
 
(Table 8.3) 
 
 
CRIME FIGHTING TEAM OFFICERS BY BIRMINGHAM BCU’S 
 
The Police BCU are assigned to the main two wards they are responsible for 
policing geographically. The wards are ranked according to their standing (DEP. 
RANK) and point score (DEP SCORE) in the national index of deprivation. The 
lower the rank and higher the score the more deprived the area.   
 
 
BCU      WARDS              DEP.      DEP.              Neighbourhood Crime Fighting 
                                           RANK   SCORE          Officers  
 
D1           Aston                     27            76                                     32 
              Nechells                 144            66          
 
D2  Sutton New Hall       4,991            14                                     20 
          Kingstanding            425            54  
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D3  Washwood Heath        186            64                                     30 
        Hodge Hill                1,173            39 
 
E1     Longbridge                867            44                                     16 
        Bartley Green             740            46           
 
E2       Billesley                1,197            39                                      18 
         Kings Norton             884            44 
 
E3     Sparkbrook                 33            75                                     28 
          Sparkhill                    343           56   
 
F1      Ladywood                  346           56                                     41  
         (City Centre) 
 
F2      Ladywood                  346           56                                     29 
            Quinton                 1,871            31 
 
F3     Handsworth                253           61                                     44 
              Soho                        159           65 
 
(Table 8.4) 
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The impact of the deployment of the crime fighting team officers went someway 
towards off-setting the effect of the distribution of mainstream officers: 
 
“The additional resources are having an impact. Because the Teams have 
more time to get to know their area, they can act as ‘guardians’ for the 
community. This can take the form of a facilitator/advocacy role for the 
local community – in securing improvements in the services run by other 
organisations.  Or it can simply improve behind the scenes relations with 
partner agencies, which in turn, can lead to more effective problem 
solving.” (Audit Commission; K.Smith 2002)  
 
The force was also prescriptive about the nature of their duties e.g. deployment as a 
full time covert unit would not be permitted. They were therefore of limited value as a 
response to armed and mobile criminals, although if effectively utilised as a part of a 
multi-agency response they could be effective in preventing the conditions which lead 
to such forms of criminality: 
 
“around this time there was less emphasis on plain clothes work.  I 
think all this stuff about high profile is great but if you’re not there 
and you can’t be everywhere all the time and if I was a criminal I 
would be quite happy to have high profile police all the time 
because I know where the enemy is.” (Interviewee F) 
 
 
 
 
10. CHAPTER CONCLUSION: 
 
Lineberry’s observation that it is difficult methodologically “to demonstrate 
constitutionally-proscribed discrimination against the urban poor” (Lineberry 
1976:181) is supported.  However by mapping the trends in the distribution of police 
resources and overlaying them on maps showing the level of deprivation it is possible 
to overcome some of the complexities involved. 
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Lineberry’s inability to support by measurement of patterns of service delivery, 
“Claude Brown’s unscientific but forceful hypothesis that ‘Harlem was being fucked 
over by everyone” (Lineberry 1976:183) is challenged.  The evidence presented in 
this study suggests that inner city deprived communities in Birmingham were being 
systematically discriminated against by the police resource distribution model which 
reflected a much earlier class based approach to policing the urban poor: 
 
“The police of nineteenth century London literally patrolled the boundary 
between respectability and disreputability; for most arrests were made, 
not in the “rookeries” that cradled the “dangerous classes”’ but at the 
margins between these areas and their more respectable neighbours” 
(Miller 1977)  
  
The Audit Commission’s suggestion (Audit Commission 1991) that the employment 
of a resource allocation formula brings transparency to the distribution of police 
resources is supported.  It can be seen that the use of a formula allows the leadership 
of a police force or other responsible agency to model or predict the outcome of any 
planned re-distribution. 
 
The Audit Commission’s support (Smith K. 2002) for the way in which the West 
Midlands Police had re-distributed its mainstream resources is challenged.  The 
evidence demonstrates that far from supporting the UK Government’s policy on 
Neighbourhood Renewal by concentrating resources in deprived neighbourhoods the 
opposite has occurred i.e. a trend towards: 
 
“an inefficient distribution of police resources to equalise protection in 
every neighbourhood regardless of whether the crime rates were high or 
low.” (Lineberry 1976:190)  
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The Audit Commission’s recommendations (Smith K. 2002) on the concept of 
deploying  dedicated teams of  police officers to deprived neighbourhoods is not 
challenged however this approach cannot be assessed in isolation from the delivery of 
mainstream policing services. The concept of concentrating police resources in the 
most needy i.e. most deprived neighbourhoods is advisable and echoes the warnings 
from the United States: 
 
“Unwired poor communities began to resemble areas of the Third World, 
with a burgeoning informal economy taking the place of lost jobs.  This 
informal neighbourhood economy includes off-the-books enterprises.  
And the most profitable informal enterprise is the business of drugs …..to 
many observers, economic segregation is creating an underclass of mainly 
urban blacks and Hispanics who are not sharing in the benefits of 
economic expansion.  Coinciding with this economic transformation we, 
are witnessing a re birth of the youth gangs in many small and medium 
sized cities” (Hedgdorn 1998:165). 
 
 
The rise in gun and gang related crime in the inner city areas of Birmingham 
discussed in the previous chapter supports Hedgdorn’s warning. However the 
deployment of officers to the more affluent suburbs had a positive impact on the 
residents living in those areas and certainly shaped the opinion of the West Midlands 
Police in the eyes of one of the interviewees: 
 
“There are more officers about so from a professional position I know 
that the numbers of crimes being reported by officer is less.” (Interviewee 
C) 
 
The increased number of officers available to investigate and detect crime in the less 
deprived areas is likely to have contributed to the force’s performance against 
government targets as crime in more affluent areas or small communities is more 
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likely to be solved than in communities with greater levels of deprivation. This is 
supported by the higher detection rates achieved by rural forces in the UK and the 
quantitative research carried out by Felson & Ouimet in Canada (2007). The 
difficulties encountered in encouraging witnesses to come forward and give evidence 
in the case of the murder of Letisha Shakespeare and Charlene Ellis on 1st Jan 2003 in 
Birmingham reinforces these findings. The greater visibility of officers in the suburbs 
was also likely to have had a positive influence on the survey results reflected in the 
British Crime Survey which excludes those most likely to feel the negative impact of 
a re-deployment of officers away from the more deprived neighbourhoods: 
 
“it [the BCS] has found it increasingly difficult to reach the people who 
are most likely to be victims of crime - and violent crime in particular. 
This is especially true of young men living in high crime inner city areas; 
but the BCS also misses out other increasingly important categories of 
victims including the homeless, people who don't speak English and 
anyone aged under 16” (FitzGerald: The Guardian 20.7.2006) 
 
  
The commitment of the Home Office to Neighbourhood Policing as the universal 
means of delivering police services needs to be tempered with a realisation that such a 
policy could result in resources being spread too thin, possibly, as was the case in the 
West Midlands in 1997, at the expense of the most deprived communities where 
serious crime is most prevalent. However not all forces have followed the trend set by 
the West Midlands Police; the Metropolitan Police Service demonstrably did the 
opposite in response to the post 9/11 terrorist threat strengthening its specialist units 
which were primarily deployed within the central London area. However as has been 
noted previously their performance was poor in comparison to the West Midlands 
Police. That said all forces were required to review and revise their resource 
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deployment arrangements in order to comply with the Government’s Neighbourhood 
Policing Strategy81. A force by force analysis utilising the mapping methodology 
presented in this chapter has not been possible due to capacity and access issues 
although such an exercise may have proven illuminating. Certainly the limited 
information on Nottinghamshire Constabulary discussed in the chapter on serious 
crime (chapter 8) demonstrated that a re-deployment of officers on a geographical 
basis had curtailed the force’s ability to respond to the rise in gang and gun related 
crime in the inner city areas of Nottingham. However, evidence is already emerging 
that the Neighbourhood Policing strategy is creating resource difficulties as 
Chatterton & Bingham’s82 review of Neighbourhood Policing Teams (NPTs) 
discovered: 
“Despite the fact that it has yet to be fully implemented in the forces we 
visited, it is significant that there is already strong evidence of heavy 
resource implications.” (Chatterton & Bingham 2006:101) 
 
“Neighbourhood policing is clearly not a cheap product. Our concern is 
that entering the market to buy it at this stage and the pressure to get it 
installed, is already resulting in police commanders leaving the 24/7 
response teams to pick up the bill. The price will increase once ‘ring 
fencing’ occurs and if, as is likely, sanction detection targets are stretched 
and OCUs have to achieve them without the resources of the NPTs ……. 
The balance has shifted too far, too quickly, towards neighbourhood 
policing and the NPTs.” (Chatterton & Bingham 2006:112) 
 
 
Chatterton and Bingham’s (2006) findings supports the evidence presented in this 
chapter. 
 
                                                 
81 Policing: Building Safer Communities Together. (2003). Home Office. London: HMSO 
Building Communities, Beating Crime. A better police service for the 21st century. (2004). Home 
Office. London: HMSO 
 
82 This study was based on interviews and focus groups and did not look at the geographical 
distribution of resources although it did focus on the redistribution of officers by roles particularly 
response and neighbourhood officers. 
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CHAPTER 9: 
 
‘STITCHING’: PREVENTING LACK OF EVIDENCE ACTING AS AN 
IMPEDIMENT TO PERFORMANCE               
 
1. INTRODUCTION:  
 
HMIC (1999) conclude that the fabrication of evidence by officers seeking to secure 
the conviction of a suspect was largely in the past. This form of behaviour is 
sometimes referred to as ‘stitching an offender up’ or ‘fitting them up’ and is referred 
to in this chapter as ‘stitching’ which is used to categorise the different forms this type 
of ‘gaming’ manifests itself in. Whilst the leaked Met. Police report (Guardian 
13.9.99) suggested the use of oppressive interviewing techniques was still a problem, 
the Courts appeared to be capable of identifying this problem and defendants were 
being acquitted as a result. So the safeguards appeared to be effective in relation to the 
risk of conviction. However this example does raise questions about the effectiveness 
of custody officers who are responsible for ensuring suspects rights are observed and 
checking that there is sufficient evidence to support a charge. Wilson et al (2001) 
indicated that custody officers were still allowing breaches of the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) which outlines the rights of suspects and the duties of 
custody officers. This suggested that other forms of ‘stitching’ may still be evident in 
cases which did not involve a court appearance but still resulted in a detection for 
performance purposes. This may take the form of charging a suspect when there is 
insufficient evidence to support the charge (HMIC 1999) cautioning a suspect (Tait 
1994) or informally warning a suspect (Ditchfield 1976), again without sufficient 
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evidence to secure a conviction. Wilson et al (2001) outlined ‘stitching’ type 
behaviours involving the abuse of Detected No Further Police Action (DNFPA) 
which are administrative procedures allowing an offence to be shown as detected 
without any formal  legal sanction being applied. Procedures which do not involve 
evidence being presented to court are the focus of examination in this chapter. Access 
to the relevant documentation and statistics meant that the chapter tends to focus on 
the West Midlands Police although the literature suggests this force is not alone in 
experiencing the types of ‘stitching’ practices outlined. Methodological difficulties in 
gaining evidence of coercion or the fabrication of evidence prevented this type of 
‘stitching’ behaviour being explored further.   
  
 
 
 
 
2. CHARGING WITHOUT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE: 
 
HMIC (1999) made adverse comment on the practice of charging suspects with a 
serious offence when the evidence supported a less serious offence: 
 
“There were also examples of charging drug offenders with possession 
with intent to supply, or having a ‘class A’ drug, despite the fact that 
ultimately the evidence was only likely to allow a conviction for a lesser 
offence.” (HMIC 1999:19) 
 
 This type of ‘stitching’ was motivated by a desire to meet specific targets relating to 
‘drug dealing’ by charging a suspect who was found in possession of more than one 
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‘portion’ of a drug with an offence of possession with intent to supply i.e. ‘drug 
dealing’. The decision to charge with the more serious offence, being based on the 
supposition that the presence of more than one ‘portion’ of the illegal substance meant 
that the drug was not just for personal use.  Whilst the criteria on what quantity of 
drugs should constitute for personal use thus justifying a possession offence as 
opposed to a possess with intent to supply is subject to debate between the police and 
the Crown Prosecution Service the offence the suspect was charged with determined 
the offence ‘detected’. If the case was subsequently ‘down graded’ to possession at 
court the detection for the more serious offence would still count; hence the incentive 
to charge with the more serious offence.  Whilst this practice did not appear to have 
been uncovered by HMIC during their inspection of the West Midlands Police 
interviewee D commented: 
 
“There was a propensity to charge with minimum evidence, these were 
the days when you could get away with charging and just bungle it off to 
CPS to let them sort it out but you got your detection.” (Interviewee D) 
 
 
The impact of the introduction of the requirement to obtain CPS advice prior to 
charge in 200383 caused a marked reduction in the number of suspects charged with 
possession of controlled drugs with intent to supply which is categorised by the Home 
Office under ‘trafficking in controlled drug’. This is evident in the reduction in 
charges for this type of offence post 2003 (Fig. 9.1). 
                                                 
83 Custody officers were required to seek CPS advice prior to charging an offender with an offence. 
This would result in the CPS deciding whether a drugs offence amounted to a possession or the more 
serious possess with intent to supply. 
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West Midlands Police: Charges for Trafficking in Controlled 
Drugs
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(Fig 9.1)                                                                             (Home Office 2008) 
 
 
3. DETECTED NO FURTHER POLICE ACTION (DNFPA) & ‘STITCHING’ 
 
 Ditchfield (1976) had noted the impact of alternative methods of disposal on the 
overall detection rate. These in the main, involved ‘informal warnings’ when a police 
officer would informally ‘advise’ an offender for a minor offence, usually where the 
victim did not want any formal action to be taken and/or in the opinion of a senior 
officer it was not in the public interest to instigate court proceedings.  This type of 
detection is referred to by Wilson et al (2001) as Detected No further Police Action 
(DNFPA).  Although these procedures were devised as a means of diverting those 
who were caught in minor infractions of the criminal law from the criminal justice 
system it resulted in people who would not normally have been dealt with officially 
coming within the ‘net’ as police sought to improve their performance by recording 
such offences as detected. Further pressure to record these informal warnings as 
detections on police local crime recording systems was also created by the impact of 
the NCRS, and prior to that ‘prima facie’ crime recording standards, which required 
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officers to record reported minor offences as crimes. Informal warnings provided a 
means of ‘balancing the books’: offence recorded, offence detected.  
 
However the procedure can be abused either by issuing an informal warning for a 
more serious offence thus avoiding the work involved in pursuing a case which 
should rightly have appeared before the courts or informally warning a suspect when 
their was insufficient evidence to justify this action i.e. ‘stitching’. Whilst detections 
obtained in this way have to be approved by a senior officer, there is no routine 
appeals procedure against such an action, although the recipient may make a formal 
complaint against the police if they believe the warning was not justified.     
Domestic violence incidents are an area where ‘informal warnings’ can be used 
inappropriately either to avoid taking ‘positive action’; a policy adopted by most 
forces, requiring officers to pursue the arrest and prosecution of a suspect without 
placing the onus on the victim for instigating such action, (sometimes referred to as a 
State prosecution).  The inappropriate use of an ‘informal warning’ in these 
circumstances is usually accompanied by a ‘down-grading’ of any assault/injuries to 
common assault thus justifying the means of disposal on the grounds that it was for a 
minor offence.  Officers would attend the scene and in cases where the victim did not 
wish the case to proceed to court the offender would be warned about their conduct. 
Both parties signed the officers pocket note book to that effect and the offence was 
recorded as a crime, usually common assault, and detection claimed. The offender’s 
details were recorded on the police crime recording system although their details 
would not be recorded on the Police National Computer (PNC). This procedure 
differs from formal cautions or the equivalent for juveniles as these are recorded on 
the PNC.  
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In 2002 the West Midlands Police ‘devalued’ informal warnings by re-categorising 
them as ‘non-sanctioned’ detections thus removing them from the detections which its 
Command Units’ performance was judged. This policy decision preceded the Home 
Office which introduced the same policy in 2003. The impact of this decision on the 
West Midlands Police recording and detection of assaults is shown at Fig. 9.2.  
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(Fig 9.2)                                                                                         (Home Office 2008)  
 
Fig 9.2 shows that in 2002/3 the mix of minor (Common Assaults) to more serious 
assaults (Assaults Other Wounding; the Home Office category for assaults involving 
Actual Bodily Harm) changes. This indicates that officers had recorded assaults as 
more serious categories therefore justifying their detection by charge, summons or 
formal caution, which are sanctioned detections, with a positive value within the 
adjusted performance framework. Equally it could be the case that assaults were being 
categorised prior to 2002/3 as the less serious common assault in order to justify a 
detection no further police action. The change from the use of informal warnings 
(DNFPA) categorised by the Home Office as ‘other means of detection’ to disposal 
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by charge or caution is evident from Fig 9.3 (Common Assaults) and Fig 9.4 
(Wounding and Other Assaults). 
West Midlands Police: Common Assaults Detected by Means of 
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(Fig 9.3)                                                                                         (Home Office 2008)  
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(Fig 9.4)                                                                                     (Home Office 2008) 
It is not possible to state whether the marked change from a propensity to detect  
assaults by ‘informal warnings’ prior to 2002 was due to under-classification of the 
assault in order to gain an ‘easy’ detection or the re-categorisation of assaults to more 
serious offences is evidence of ‘stitching’ motivated by the desire to obtain a 
‘sanctioned’ detection. However it does suggest ‘gaming’ is responsible for the 
changes reflected in the statistics. It also demonstrates the speed at which officers 
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adjusted their behaviour in response to changes in the performance indicators. Such a 
rapid adjustment indicates the organisational nature of the phenomenon and suggests 
some form of co ordination and direction by management. The same tendency was 
noted by one of the officers interviewed by Chatterton (2008):  
 
“The police service is criminalising people. A so-called crime’s been 
reported so you have to crime it in accordance with the National 
Crime Recording Standards. You can’t get rid of it. There’s an 
offender so the way you resolve it is by cautioning him because the 
senior management don’t want an undetected violent crime.” (Chatterton 
2008:43)  
 
Chatterton also noted, like Tait (1994), that cautions were being used inappropriately 
e.g. where the evidence did not justify a charge: 
“The use of cautions in cases, where this is not strictly permitted, 
illustrate how close to the wire some officers are operating: 
‘Take the use of cautions, for instance. If we can’t get a charge we 
will get a caution for that person so we don’t lose the sanction 
detection. That applies even if they have already been cautioned 
and are strictly not eligible for another caution because that gives 
us the sanction detection. So we’re helping the figures along even 
though, in my view, it’s morally wrong.” (Chatterton 2008:48) 
 
However, Detected No Further Police Action (DNFPA) procedures did not just apply 
to informal warnings for minor offences, the procedures also catered for other 
circumstances where a prosecution or other formal sanction was inappropriate or 
impossible to pursue, for example where a suspect had died prior to a disposal 
decision being made. Again such procedures present an opportunity for ‘stitching’. 
One particular procedure is the ‘inflammatory consequences’ rule (Home Office 
Counting rule D584). This allows for offences to be shown as detected when the 
                                                 
84 In April 2003, the so-called ‘inflammatory consequences’ detections rule was removed. This meant 
that detections in which the injured party had asked the police not to speak to a named perpetrator 
could no longer be counted as administrative detections .(Dodd et al 2003:105) 
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victim does not wish the matter to be pursued further by the police and fears reprisals 
if the police alert the suspect to the fact that the victim has been in contact with them 
e.g. where the police have attended a reported assault and the offender has left the 
scene.  
 
The ‘inflammatory consequences’ procedure is summarised as follows: 
 
 Victim reports an offence 
 Officer records the details as a crime report 
 Victim refuses or is unable to give evidence at court  
 Victim fears retribution if the suspect is alerted to the fact the police have 
been informed 
 Victim signs a record to confirm they do not wish the police to take any 
further action and do not wish the suspect to be confronted 
 A senior police officer reviews the details recorded in the crime report and if 
satisfied that an offence has occurred and there is sufficient evidence to 
charge the suspect the crime report can be shown as detected.  
 
The use of the ‘inflammatory consequences’ rule was being employed in the West 
Midlands Police: 
 
“General rule for detections offender must be interviewed. However if 
interviewing an offender was likely to cause serious repercussions to the 
victim. So you’ve got some OCUs who are using that to conclude on a 
detection basis, mainly domestic related incidents or incidents where the 
parties knew each other, friends, associates but largely the warning bells 
were around domestic oriented incidents where clearly that approach 
should not be taken i.e. you take positive action against the offender.” 
(Interviewee D) 
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However, the West Midlands Police was also using the ‘inflammatory consequences’ 
rule to record as detected serious offences such as rape and like Nottinghamshire 
Constabulary (Wilson et al 2001) abuses of the procedure were apparent: 
  
“Fourteen of the 19 ‘write offs’ examined were judged to be outside the 
criteria laid down by the HOCR, a failure rate of 74%......Those offenders 
with no previous convictions now have a ‘local criminal record’ about 
which they are unaware” (West Midlands Police 2001:unpublished) 
 
The review of rape investigations, from which this quote was extracted, took place 
before the decision to re categorise DNFPAs as ‘non-sanctioned’ detections which 
removed the performance incentive to abuse this process. However the risks inherent 
in the misuse of this procedure are apparent from the following case:  
 
C.M. 7TH MAY 1999 – DIED 7TH JANUARY 2000. 
 
 
C.M was 8 months old when he was murdered. At the time of his death he had at least 
sixty bruises on his body two broken ribs and a fractured skull consistent with being 
held by the ankles and swung against an object such as a wall.  
 
His mother’s boyfriend was convicted of his murder at Birmingham Crown Court on 
15th December 2000 and sentenced to life imprisonment with a recommended 25 
years minimum. The judge His Lordship Mr Stanley Burton commented: 
 
“He could not conceive of a worse case of child cruelty. The pictures of 
which will haunt this court for many years, perhaps always.”  
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C.M’s mother was convicted of manslaughter and sentenced to two years 
imprisonment. 
 
The case, although horrific, appeared straightforward, however during the 
investigation the mother maintained she was being held against her will.  An 
intelligence check on her boyfriend revealed a history of violence. The check also 
uncovered a previous recorded crime of ‘Kidnapping’ which was shown as detected. 
When the case papers were examined this report was found to be detected DNFPA. 
The circumstances of the case were that an eighteen year old woman alleged that she 
had been forced into a car at knifepoint by C.M’s subsequent killer, who was known 
to her. She was taken to a flat where she had been held against her will for two days. 
This occurred on 15th May 1999 six months before the murder of C.M. Although the 
victim attended the local police station to report the matter she stated she did not wish 
to pursue the matter at court. The report was recorded as a crime and a brief statement 
taken from her: 
 
“At 2350 hours on Monday 17th May 1999 I attended Thornhill Road 
Police Station to reported that I had been kidnapped and held against my 
will at a flat in Edgbaston. This incident happened on Saturday 15th May 
1999 up until Monday morning. The man who kidnapped me is [name 
provided] and he lives at [address provided] which is the address he took 
me to.  I have thought about this a lot and have made the decision that 
under no circumstances will I attend court to give evidence. I have my 
own personal reasons for this and do not want to discuss them further. 
The Police have explained their procedures to me and the support that I 
will receive however I still do not wish to take this matter further.” 
(Evidence presented at Birmingham Crown Court 29th November to 15th 
December 200085)  
 
                                                 
85 The trial transcript can be obtained from Marten Walsh Cherer  martenwc@aol.com. Cost approx 
£6,000 
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On the 18th May 1999 the case papers were closed as detected on the authorisation of 
a Detective Chief Inspector “W/off D5 HO”. This was a sanctioned detection under 
the then Home Officer Counting Rule D5 where a senior officer decides that there is 
sufficient evidence to charge the offender however the victim is unwilling to support a 
prosecution. The offender is not challenged about the offence because this would put 
the victim at risk of serious harm. The circumstances were reviewed by interviewee C 
who commented: 
 
“The actual format of the ‘write off’ is almost a composite, you can get 
these off a computer, it’s a bit like MOs ‘some person or persons 
unknown’ we just know it by heart.” (Interviewee C) 
 
 
This was not the first time the author had seen a crime report from this police station 
for such a serious offence being ‘written off’ as detected with such scant evidence. 
This information elicited the following response from the interviewee: 
  
“Oh my goodness and no one’s been interviewed, no one’s even been 
locked up. Slippery slope isn’t it? Because the message goes out to all 
staff, ‘this is the way we do things round here.” (Interviewee C). 
 
 
Although the crime report supported C.M’s mother’s defence it did not prove crucial 
as the murder investigation team were able to prove conclusively that she had ample 
opportunities to leave the flat with all her children. Her conviction reflected this fact. 
However this outcome did not alter the fact that approximately six months prior to the 
murder of C.M. the police had information about the criminal activities of the 
offender which they had not pursued.  A Detective Chief Inspector accepted on the 
basis of evidence, which lacked any corroboration or sufficient details, that C.M’S 
subsequent killer was responsible for kidnapping. Subsequent events suggest this may 
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have been the case but it could just as easily have been a malicious allegation. 
Interviewee C encapsulated the concerns which the case raised: 
    
“That’s a serious offence, my immediate response is, why is that person 
locking up young women like that? Are there others for example? You’d 
tell me he’s a pimp. So OK where did he take her? Is it a brothel? Are 
other people being held there? There is a real nightmare scenario there 
and on the basis of someone reporting it a crime report is completed, then 
it is withdrawn; then it is written off and shock horror! No-body’s seen 
the individual concerned. So the suspect has not been seen and therefore 
you don’t know whether the suspect has been seen. Therefore you don’t 
know whether this has happened as it is reported or not, and then it is 
‘written off’ saying that the named individual is responsible for it. Well its 
amazing isn’t it.” (Interviewee C)  
 
From a performance perspective the procedure gives the appearance of efficiency as a 
difficult and potentially costly investigation is carried out with the minimum of 
investment and appears as solved in the statistical returns:  
  
“This cost the time it took to fill in the report and go to the scene86 and 
take the statement. This cost three hundred quid or something: Appalling 
really.” (Interviewee C) 
 
 
Interviewee C went on to compare the circumstances to the type of ‘stitching’ 
associated with older forms of abuse of process:  
 
“Yes this just smacks of the old serious crime squad. We know who did it, 
therefore we’ll set them up to do it, or we’re convinced they did it. It’s 
even better; you don’t even need to speak to them. Wha, there’s no need 
to even have dustbin liners87 or anything. Mad!” (Interviewee C) 
 
 
                                                 
86 In the case referred to no officer attended the scene so the costs could be less than the estimate made 
by the interviewee.  
87 One of the allegations against the Serious Crime Squad was that they suffocated suspects by placing 
plastic bags over their heads in order to extract confessions. 
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Detections by DNFPA were deemed non sanctioned detections by the Home Office in 
2002 and strict guidance on the conditions by which these detections could be claimed 
were introduced: 
 
“For an offence to be detected under the new guidance, it required 
sufficient evidence to charge, an interview of the offender and notification 
to the victim” (Simmons et al. 2002:70). 
 
These changes appeared to be bedded in by 2003/4 (Feist et al 2007:80).  
However, the pursuit of ‘non-sanctioned’ detections, mainly DNFPA informal 
warnings, still appeared to be an issue in some forces and was raised as such by the 
Federation (2007) and ACPO: 
 
“Clive Wolfendale, deputy chief constable of North Wales Police, 
admitted that many of the crimes listed as “detected” by the force were 
little more than minor jostling among late-night revellers. His force has 
this year logged a total detection rate of 43% of which 14% - or about a 
third – is attributed to non-sanctioned detections.” (Sunday Times 
29.10.06)     
 
“Adrian McAllister, deputy Chief Constable of Lancashire police and 
who is leading a review by ACPO to be submitted to the Home Office said 
that in some cases police forces were losing sight of “common sense” by 
marking such cases as solved or detected” (Sunday Times 29.10.06)    
 
However, informal warnings had their advantages as it allowed officers to use their 
discretion by warning a minor offender as opposed to invoking a criminal sanction. 
The recording of the encounter as a detection enabled the officer’s actions to be 
acknowledged and assessed. The offender’s details were recorded on the local police 
crime recording system as opposed to the Police National Computer and were 
unlikely to be cited in the event of any future criminal records check for employment 
or other purposes if they only related to a minor misdemeanour. The risk is that 
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offences will be re-categorised as more serious offences in order to justify a 
sanctioned detection. This could have been the case in the West Midlands Police as 
assaults were recorded as more serious offences in order to justify a caution or charge. 
The same type of behaviour could also occur in relation to use of Fixed Penalty 
Notices where more serious offences are preferred in order to justify a sanctioned 
detection. This form of ‘stitching’ was raised by officers at the Federation Conference 
in 2007: 
 
“The classic is that officers are asked to consider arresting/issuing fixed 
penalties for Public Order Offences (Section 5 POA) rather than Drunk 
and Disorderly even if D. and D. is the more appropriate offence” (Police 
Federation 2007) 
 
This of course results in the offender’s details appearing on police data bases, checked 
if they subsequently apply for a job in a sensitive occupation or require a travel visa. 
A Public Order infringement is more likely to result in serious consequences than a 
mere record for drunk and disorderly.  
 
In 2006 and 2007 HMIC required forces throughout England and Wales to carry out 
an audit of detections.  ‘Non-sanctioned’ detections were one of the categories, 
subject of the checks, and forces were required to answer the following questions:  
    
“Compliance questions 1.  Has a ‘notifiable’ crime been committed and 
recorded in compliance with the Home Office Counting Rules? 2 Is there 
a record on the crime file of the verifiable information demonstrating that 
there was sufficient evidence to claim the non sanction detection? 3 Has 
the public interest test been properly applied? 4 Is there a verifiable 
record that the suspect has been made aware that a non-sanction 
detection has been attributed to them?   
 
The supporting evidence for each non-sanction detection that the auditor 
will be looking for in relation to each record is as follows: Supporting 
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evidence 1 Evidence that the named person was responsible for the 
offence e.g. named by victim and/or witness, identification evidence, 
CCTV footage, forensic evidence etc. 2 Evidence of a reliable admission 
(interview carried out in compliance with PACE Code C) unless other 
compelling evidence exists (where there is no admission the sufficiency of 
evidence will need to be met through other evidence). 3 Where full 
investigations have not taken place, summaries of evidence including 
witness details, interviews and copies of pocket book entries or interview 
summaries. 4 For D4 detections, signed witness statements (MG11), 
pocket book entries or notes or other records where no witness signature 
is obtained and evidence of a refusal to give evidence and reasons for the 
refusal. 5 For D6 detections, a copy of the MG3 form outlining the 
prosecutors verification that there was sufficient evidence to charge.” 
                                                                          (Home Office 2006/7:25-26) 
 
 
In 2006/7 thirty three forces (including BTP) were graded ‘poor’ on the quality of 
their ‘non-sanctioned’ detections; no judgement was made on six forces (probably 
because they had discontinued the use of ‘non-sanctioned’ detections); three achieved 
a ‘fair’ grading and only two were judged to be ‘excellent’.  The results suggest 
‘stitching’ may have been prevalent in this area. The findings prompted ACPO to 
inform the Information Commissioner of some of the problems uncovered. The details 
are discussed in the later chapter on the role of the regulators.   
Detections obtained by ‘cautions’ for adult offenders were also subjected to audit 
checks and forces were required to answer the following questions:     
 
Compliance questions: 1 Has a notifiable crime been committed and 
recorded in compliance with the Home Office Counting Rules? 2 Is there 
sufficient evidence of the suspect’s guilt to meet the threshold test as 
contained in The Directors Guidance on Charging January 2005 (i.e. 
admission and corroboration obtained from information in the crime 
report or obtained during the course of the investigation)? 3 Has the 
suspect made a clear and reliable admission of the offence (interview 
carried out in compliance with PACE Code C) either verbally or in 
writing? 4 Is the suspect 18 years or over? 27 The supporting evidence for 
cautions that auditors will be looking for is taken from the Home Office 
Circular 30/2005. Auditors will be expecting each record to have the 
following associated information and one of the pieces of evidence marked 
as 4(a), 4(b), 4(c) or 4(d):  
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“Supporting evidence: 1 Evidence that the decision to caution has been 
made by the CPS for indictable only offences. 2 Evidence that the Gravity 
Factors matrix has been applied, taking account of aggravating and 
mitigating factors. 3 A signed caution acceptance proforma which should 
include the offenders’ personal details including occupation, details of the 
offence and the consequences of accepting a caution. 4(a) An admission 
during a tape recorded interview (interview carried out in compliance 
with PACE Code C). 4(b) A record of the admission in the officer's 
notebook and signed by the suspect as an accurate record. This could 
cover any statement made by the suspect on arrest, after being cautioned. 
4(c) A statement made by the suspect whilst in police detention (after 
being reminded they are still under caution) could be recorded in the 
custody record and signed by the suspect as an accurate record. 4(d) A 
contemporaneous interview (interview carried out in compliance with 
PACE Code C) under caution could be conducted in the absence of the 
suspect making a voluntary statement of admission, or for clarification 
where the statement does not meet the required evidential standard. The 
notes should be fully documented.” 
 
                                                                                 (Home Office 2006/7:26) 
 
The results were much more positive with only eight forces being graded ‘poor’ 
 
However the results for Fixed Penalty Notices for disorder (PND) were less positive 
with 28 forces being graded ‘poor’. Twenty two forces were also graded ‘poor’ on the 
audit of Cannabis Warnings another form of ‘caution’ (Home Office 2006/7).   
These results indicate ‘quality’ problems in relation to detections which do not 
involve the same level of scrutiny to which charges are subjected to by the courts and 
may well indicate the presence and level of ‘stitching’.      
 
4. CHAPTER CONCLUSION: 
 
Whilst the regulatory control measures involving the courts, introduced by PACE, 
may have been effective this chapter has shown that ‘stitching’, involving other 
means of  detecting offences was still possible. The scale of the problem appears from 
the evidence reviewed to be significant and the consequences potentially serious for 
the individuals subjected to such ‘gaming’ behaviour.   
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CHAPTER 10 
 
 
THE ROLE OF THE REGULATORY BODIES: 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION: 
 
 The use of independent auditors as a means of scrutinising the activities of those 
entrusted with the delivery of services provided on behalf of the state has been a 
feature of many forms of government (Day & Klein 1987). The police forces in 
England and Wales are inspected by a number of regulatory bodies charged by 
government with the task of scrutinising police activity. The identification and 
quantification of ‘gaming’ involved in this research has, in many cases, involved re-
tracing the steps of the regulatory bodies responsible for preventing such practices. 
This process and the evidence uncovered necessitated a third strand to the research 
design as the performance of each regulator was assessed in turn. This facilitated an 
assessment of their impact on the various types of ‘gaming’ identified. 
 
2. CHAPTER STRUCTURE: 
 
The response of each of the organisations with a responsibility for regulating police 
activity are reviewed in respect of the various types of ‘gaming’ behaviour uncovered 
during the research. This provides an insight into their role and how effective they 
have been in ensuring that the performance system was ‘game proof’. 
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3. THE HOME OFFICE:  
 
Consideration of the role of the Home Office concentrated on how successful the 
department had been in achieving their stated ambition of ensuring reliable and 
accurate data for comparative purposes. At a political level there was a clear 
commitment from the New Labour Government in 1997 to improve both the 
efficiency of the police service through performance management and evidence based 
practice. The introduction of the National Crime Recording Standard (NCRS) in April 
2002 also showed that there was a commitment to ensuring that the data on which 
decisions were made was accurate and reliable for comparative purposes: 
 
“The new Labour Home Secretary Jack Straw was only too aware of 
these statistical abuses when he took office in May 1997, and so he 
ordered new rules which would make previously non-notifiable offences 
notifiable once more” (Wilson et al 2001:66)  
 
The Government accepted the potentially damaging impact of large increases in 
recorded crime brought about by the introduction of the NCRS in April 2002. This 
was tempered by a greater reliance on the more favourable results from British Crime 
Survey (BCS) which showed a gradual reduction in crime levels until 2004 and the 
careful monitoring of the impact of the introduction of the NCRS which was 
responsible for the increases in recorded crime in caused the increases in recorded 
crime in 2002/3 (Simmons 2003).  
 
The response of Home Office ministers to allegations of ‘gaming’ which have 
frequently attracted media attention during the course of this research has been 
dismissive; examples include the response to the popular book ‘wasting police time’ 
(Copperfield 2006) which catalogued numerous ‘gaming’ practices and was discussed 
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in the House of Commons (Hansard 23.10.06) and the Police Federation sponsored 
report on the lack of focus on serious crime (Chatterton 2008) which featured on the 
ITV Tonight programme (12.11.07): 
 
“I respect their views. I just think they over-egg and exaggerate to make a 
point, sometimes to the detriment of the members and that’s not in their 
interests”. (BBC News 12.11.07) 
 
Whilst calling for further evidence to support the reports of ‘gaming’ made at the 
Federation Conference in 2007 (subject of Chatterton 2008), Police Minister Tony 
McNulty did accept that if government policy was driving perverse behaviour he was 
responsible for initiating the necessary change. However, in response to the 
allegations of ‘skewing’, he did point out that Chief Constables were responsible for 
operational issues such as staffing levels in specialist departments (ITV1 Tonight 
12.11.07). The chief executive of the National Policing Improvement Agency, 
publicly supported the Federation’s contention that the investigation of serious crime 
was suffering as a result of a focus on ‘easier to solve’ crimes i.e. ‘skewing’ 
(Neyroud, The Times 13.11.2007; Neyroud and Disley 2007).   
 
The Home Office has overall responsibility for the systems employed to measure 
crime and police performance. The two primary empirical measures used are Police 
Recorded Crime data and the British Crime Survey (BCS). The BCS sample size and 
frequency of interviews has been increased since 1997 in order to improve the 
reliability and relevancy of the data. However, the BCS sample is not fully 
representative of all social groups- notably excluding those under 16 years of age, 
those who own commercial property or those who live in shared accommodation – 
nurses, students and the elderly. It also fails to record multiple offences against the 
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same victim beyond a cap of 5 repeat offences which Farrell & Pease (2007) 
estimated reduced crime levels by over 3 million extra offences annually,  reducing 
the assessment of household crime by 15% and personal crime by 52%.  
 
Police crime recording procedures are overseen by the Home Office which decides 
how and what offences will be recorded. The inclusion of a number of minor offence 
categories in 1998 and the addition of new offences created by legislation and 
changes in how crimes are counted would seem indicative of a commitment to 
ensuring accurate data. The introduction of the NCRS in 2002 was designed to 
standardise crime recording across the country. However the Home Office did not 
introduce these measures in isolation and the NCRS was the product of lengthy 
negotiations with the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO), and other 
stakeholders. The failure to adopt a ‘prima facie’ crime recording standard in favour 
of the ‘balance of probability’ standard is a product of the compromises inherent in  
the negotiations involved in agreeing data recording methods and associated 
definitions. However one interviewee was critical of the outcome:  
  
“It was fudged at the national level, because the various forces which 
came together said we don’t agree with the seven principles1 because we 
don’t agree with that. West Midlands are fiddling the figures anyway 
with their detections, don’t believe what they say, we want officers to have 
some discretion around the way crime is recorded”. (Interviewee D) 
 
 
The day to day monitoring and advice on interpretation of the NCRS is co-ordinated 
by the Home Office. However during the period of this research the individual 
responsible for performing the NCRS ‘guardianship’ role (Registrar) changed from a 
                                                 
1 The seven principles of crime recording was the West Midlands Police ‘prima facia’ crime recording 
policy. 
 325
Civil Service statistician to a seconded police officer of Superintendent rank. 
Interpretation of the NCRS is also overseen by a steering group2 made up of 
representatives of the Home Office, ACPO, HMIC, Police Federation, Audit 
Commission, and Superintendent’s Association.   Responsibility for validating NCRS 
compliance was undertaken by the Police Standards Unit which set the compliance 
specification and then contracted the Audit Commission to undertake the data audit.  
 
Whilst the Audit Commission results suggest a general improvement in reliability of 
police recorded crime data (Audit Commission 2007) the limitations of those checks 
have been highlighted in the research outlined in chapters 4 & 5, on police crime 
recording practices.  The Home Office statisticians also carried out checks on the 
reliability of police recorded crime data as part of the BCS survey and included the 
results in the Annual Home Office Bulletins on Crime in England and Wales. These 
checks were utilised as a means of corroborating some of the findings referred to in 
this research. However the reports themselves became an interesting research subject 
in their own right as a trend became apparent from the way the results of those checks 
were reported. When problems with the reliability of police recorded data became 
apparent from the findings published in some annual bulletins it was noted that in 
some cases this information was omitted from the next Home Office Bulletin. The 
following examples demonstrate the trend: 
 
One way for the police to improve performance on the reduction of burglary is to 
categorise attempt burglaries as criminal damage to a dwelling (FitzGerald et al 
2002:140). One consequence of such a practice would be a change in the ratio 
between burglaries involving the theft of property and attempted burglaries as 
                                                 
2 Home Office National Crime Recording Steering Group 
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attempted burglaries would be categorised as criminal damage to a dwelling thus 
attempts would become a less of a percentage of substantive burglaries. At the same 
time it might also be anticipated that, with improvements in home security, the 
number of attempted burglaries would increase as better security foiled more burglars. 
Yet this was not the case; the Home Crime Bulletins included a table showing 
attempted burglaries as a percentage of burglaries as a distinct data set up until 
2002/03  (Simmons & Dodd 2003:65). When the percentage of attempts decreased, 
thus suggesting that there may have been a problem with police recording practice in 
this area (Table10.1). This data was not shown in this format in subsequent bulletins, 
although the raw data published allows for the calculation.       
  98/99   99/00    00/01    01/02    02/03    03/04    04/05 
Attempts as a  
Percentage of               13.6%   13.4%   13.6%     n/a     12.7% 
Burglary dwelling 
 
Table 10.1                                                                 (Simmons & Dodd 2003:653).  
 
Impact of Audit Commission Data Quality Checks on recorded crime: The 
difference in NCRS compliance levels on recorded crime levels between forces was 
the subject of an interesting data set in the 2004/5 Home Office Crime Bulletin 
(Nicholas el 2005:75) (Table 10.2). Not only did this show the increases in recorded 
crime experienced by forces graded ‘good’, on data quality by the Audit Commission,  
it also showed the differential impact compliance had on different crime types. Had 
this analysis continued it may have demonstrated the effectiveness of the Audit 
Commission’s work (e.g. if compliance grades from certain forces improved but no 
                                                 
3 It should be noted the figures for 2002/03 are based on data provided by 34 forces. Data for 2001/02 
are not currently available due to forces resubmission of figures for this financial year 
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increase in recorded crime occurred then it could have been inferred that the audit 
arrangements were being circumvented).   
 
 
(Table 10.2)                                                                             (Nicholas el 2005:75) 
 
 
The Home Office Bulletins have consistently included data from the BCS on the level 
of police recording of offences reported to them. This has traditionally been included 
in the section on reporting trends. In the 2005/6 Bulletin (Walker et al 2006) this data 
indicated that the police propensity to record crimes reported to them was reducing 
thus reversing the previous year’s trend and challenging the Audit Commission’s 
reported improvements in the reliability of police recorded data (Audit Commission 
2006). 
 
The table of results published showed the marked difference in recording rates for 
different offences (Table 10.3). This information corroborated the findings outlined in 
chapter 5; that an interpretation of the ‘balance of probability’ element of the  NCRS 
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was enabling police forces to return to an evidential crime recording standard and that 
police recorded crime data was becoming less reliable:  
 
 
(Table 10.3)        (Walker et al 2006:54) 
 
In the 2007 Home Office Bulletin the table was omitted and a rather more general 
interpretation of the data provided instead:  
 
“The numbers of crimes recorded by the police are influenced both by 
changes in the reporting of crime by the public and changes in the rules 
and practice for recording crimes by the police. Indexed trends show that 
the numbers of offences being recorded increased noticeably between 
2001/02 and 2003/04, despite both numbers of crimes and numbers of 
reported crimes (as measured by the BCS) falling. However, this appears 
to be settling down and, since April 2004, the trends have become more 
consistent.” (Walker et al 2007:26) 
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The commentary on the detections data included in the annual Home Office Bulletin 
was also interesting e.g. in the 2003/4 bulletin (Dodd el al 2004) comment was made 
on the rise in the percentage of TICs: 
 
“Just under half of detections for theft from a motor vehicle (part of the 
theft and handling category) are due to TICs, compared to around one-
third of all burglary detections and one-quarter of fraud and forgery 
detections. Overall, 13 per cent of theft and handling detections were 
accounted for by TICs.” (Dodd et al 2004: 115) 
 
In view of the history of malpractice surrounding TICs (Young 1991; HMIC 1999; 
Wilson et al 2001) it would appear appropriate for Home Office statisticians to bring 
this trend to notice. However in later annual bulletins post 2004 the rise in the 
percentage of offences detected by TIC did not elicit comment although the data is 
still contained in the statistical tables. The rise in Fixed Penalty notices did however 
still elicit comment.   
 
Whilst such subtle changes in emphasis or omissions might have been made in order 
to make the Bulletin easier for the public to understand, in accord with the 
recommendations of the Statistics Commission (2006 incorporating Hope 2006), it 
may also be interpreted as an attempt to mask potential problems with the reliability 
of police data and the way in which performance on detections was being achieved.  
Whatever the reason for the changes or omissions outlined the suspicion of political 
or administrative interference was fostered in some quarters: 
 
“The central issue is the independence of the government statistical 
service. There can not be a proper public debate about how best to deal 
with crime unless the full facts are made readily available for all. But as 
things stand, it is simply too tempting for any political party to have 
control of the release of information about crime.” (Green 
www.Civitas.org.uk/2007)  
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These sentiments were reflected in the recommendations of the Statistics Commission 
(2006) 
“Recommendation 1: Responsibility for the compilation and publication 
of crime statistics should be located at arm’s length from the Home Office 
policy functions and with clear accountability within the evolving 
framework of the government statistical service.” (Statistics Commission 
2006:6) 
 
That said information or intelligence is made available to politicians, policy makers 
and practitioners in order assist understanding and/or direct action. In the case of the 
information, contained within the Home Office Bulletins, on the reliability of police 
recorded crime data little action appears to have been instigated to investigate further 
the reliability of the data of the forces reporting higher than average reductions in 
crime e.g. those forces operating ‘false reporting’ policies or Merseyside4 and the 
MPS in 2006/75. A repeat of the monitoring exercise conducted by Simmons (2003), 
which provided an explanation for the post NCRS rise in recorded crime, would have 
identified any change in the ratio of reported crime incidents to recorded crimes. 
Whilst this would have helped establish the reliability or otherwise of police recorded 
crime data one has to question whether there would be the political will to potentially 
prove that reported crime levels were being suppressed by the police. The problem 
with not responding to any potential risk is that the problem can escalate and/or 
become exposed by the media. This appeared to be the case with the Home Office’s 
response to the problems surrounding the deportation of foreign nationals following 
their release from prison (BBC 5.2.06) and the failure to process the backlog of 
records of UK nationals convicted of criminal offences whilst abroad (The Times 
                                                 
4 HMIC’s baseline report (2006:53) indicated management were encouraging officers to make use of 
the 72 hour NCRS rule to ensure crimes had actually occurred and were recorded correctly.  
5 The Audit Commission Met. specific report (May 2007) indicated a lowering of compliance rates.  
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Newspaper 3.3.07).  In both cases the Home Office appeared slow to react to 
emerging risks. 
 
The Government has also adopted an approach to inspection which rewards ‘high 
performing’ police forces with a ‘light touch’ inspection: 
 
“Delivering an inspection regime that continuously supports the frontline 
by aligning inspection and reducing requests to participate in inspections 
in other agencies. Delivering inspection that is joined up and 
proportionate to risk, so that good performers undergo less inspection 
and resources are concentrated on areas of greatest risk.” (Criminal 
Justice System Inspection Policy Unit; March 2005:6) 
 
 
This approach fails to take account of the possibility that ‘high performers’ may be 
relying on ‘gaming’ practices in order to improve performance. Certainly the abuse of 
TIC procedures in Salford, Greater Manchester, (discussed in chapter 6) was 
uncovered as a result of an exploration into why this Police Command Unit was 
performing well on detections. 
 
One of the interviewees interpreted failure to respond to statistical indicators of 
problematic behaviour as complicity: 
 
“I can’t believe from a police point of view, like the old ‘write offs’, 
everybody knows what’s going on. It’s just who’s willing to do something 
about it. It’s been around for a long, long time - we know what the 
problem is but is there a will to deal with it, and if they deal with it what 
are the consequences?  I mean depending on the timing it’s safer to ignore 
it and thrive on what they’ve achieved or perceived to have achieved and 
that’s what’s happening with performance driven by central 
government…..The level of knowledge up the food chain? I cannot say 
but you’ve only got to look at the figures to see and it’s obvious where the 
detections are coming from”. (Interviewee D) 
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It is somewhat ironic that the warnings indicated within the annual Bulletins have 
apparently been ignored as one interviewee indicated that Home Office civil servants 
were distrustful of the police: 
 
“Civil Servants, and by that I mean senior civil servants in the Home 
Office, had a very distorted view of what the police were like - they also 
felt that we were roughnecks. The police are roughnecks, they are a little 
bit vulgar; the police are ill educated -  I’m exaggerating and they would 
never say that but there is a very clear feeling that the police cannot be 
trusted to get on with the job because they will turn into roughneck 
thugs.” (Interviewee C) 
 
However the same interviewee also provided a possible explanation for the apparent 
lack of intervention: 
  
“So we have a regime now installed which to my mind has gone out of 
control: We have a labour government since 1997. The first three years, 
to me I thought, were excellent, The Crime and Disorder Act, some 
fantastic stuff which they had done in opposition, which they had 
prepared, done their homework and based on academic research, and it 
was good stuff. They got into the sand a little bit and now they are over 
revving because they filled up the Home Office, it is stuffed with officials 
who have not come from the Civil Service background but who have 
come in to save the police service.  It is an appalling scenario because 
these people are very intelligent, they have no idea about policing, they 
are zealots and they carry those very strong stereotype ideas of the police 
service….the doctrine is, the minister is right and we will deliver.” 
(Interviewee C) 
 
 
 
Certainly all the evidence reviewed in this research demonstrated that Performance 
Management was driving perverse behaviour and the regulators, for whom the Home 
Secretary is responsible, are failing to prevent or control the behaviour. Although it is 
unrealistic to expect a Minister to possess the level of specialist knowledge required 
to interpret the subtle warnings from the vast array of data available, and they are 
reliant on interpretation from their officers and advisors, they are ultimately 
responsible for any failings.   
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4. HER MAJESTY’S INSPECTOR OF CONSTABULARY (HMIC): 
 
 
The role of HMIC is outlined as follows:  
 
“To provide independent assurance to the public and Ministers about the 
safe and proper delivery of services and act as a catalyst for 
improvement, providing valuable information to inspected services, so 
that recommendations can be implemented and improvements to service 
delivery achieved.” (Criminal Justice System Inspection Policy Unit 
2005:5) 
 
HMIC also provides recommendations on the suitability of senior officers for 
promotion to ACPO positions and the awarding of honours. HMIC ostensibly enjoys 
a high degree of independence from both Government Ministries and the Police. This 
was acknowledged by the Government in their review of the Criminal Justice 
Inspectorates: 
 
“A fundamental principle of inspection is that it must be independent of 
service providers. The following characteristics are crucial to ensuring 
this independence: 
 
 the line of reporting and accountability should be from Chief Inspector 
direct to Ministers on inspection issues; 
 
 any inspectorate must be separate from the organisation which it 
inspects; 
 
 there must be no constraints on the ability of an inspectorate to carry 
forward a programme of inspections (announced or unannounced) in any 
part of the organisation within its remit provided only that the proposed 
inspections fall within its budget and statutory remit; 
 
 in deciding priorities for inspection, a Chief Inspector should consult with 
Ministers and Departments on the inspectorates proposed programme of 
work and strategy so that their legitimate concerns and expectations can 
be taken into account. 
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 any inspectorate must have full editorial control of its reports i.e. the 
freedom and confidence to report accurately on what it finds; 
 
 inspectorates should discharge their responsibilities in a manner 
compatible with and supportive of Government policy; but in the event 
that the Chief Inspector felt that a particular Government policy 
compromised the proper professional standards, efficiency or 
effectiveness of an inspected agency, it should be open to the inspectorate 
to state that publicly.” 
 
                                 (Criminal Justice System Inspection Policy Unit 2005:16) 
  
The methodology employed in this research has involved close scrutiny of HMIC 
documents in relation to forces which had experienced ‘difficulties’ or ‘events’ 
involving ‘gaming’ behaviour. In effect this has involved ‘tracing the steps’ of HMIC 
and other police regulators. This has provided an insight into the effectiveness of 
HMIC in preventing such behaviour and how it has responded when evidence of 
‘gaming’ has been identified.  HMIC’s response to the distinct forms of police 
‘gaming’ identified and discussed in chapters 4-9 is outlined as follows:  
 
 
4.1. ‘CUFFING’ 
 
Burrows et al (2000:37) indicated that Greater Manchester Police had introduced a 
‘prima facie’ crime recording standard in 1997 following the identification of 
problems by HMIC (see chapter 4). The Home Office research (Burrows et al 
2000:37) also contained an admission from senior officers from GMP that they had in 
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fact been ‘cuffing’ crime. However examination of the HMIC inspection report didn’t 
indicate that anything major was amiss other than the following comments: 
 
“An audit to test the quality of crime recording was carried out during 
the Inspection and raised a number of procedural issues. Her Majesty’s 
Inspectors recommend that the procedural issues raised in the crime 
recording audit report should be addressed (sent separately to the Force). 
(HMIC GMP 1997: 40) 
 
“The issues raised in the police national computer compliance audit 
report should be addressed (sent separately to the Force).” (HMIC 
1997:61) 
 
There is little to suggest there was a major problem of the scale indicated by Burrows 
et al (2000) and the force was deemed efficient by HMIC/GMP (1997:4). Sending a 
separate report on the issue is behaviour more associated with a professional body 
than an independent inspector and denies the public the opportunity to comment on 
the failings uncovered.  
 
The problems with police recording practices were identified in Nottinghamshire as 
early as 1985; Farringdon & Dowds (1985) reported that recorded crime rates in 
Nottinghamshire were being distorted by crime recording practices involving post 
sentence admissions. In 1996, some twelve years later, HMIC didn’t indicate any 
concerns about these practices following their inspection of Nottinghamshire: 
 
“The general conclusion was that the Force was generally ethically sound 
in its recording and administrative processes.” (HMIC Notts. 1996:18) 
 
However in 1997 a superintendent in the force made a formal complaint against the 
chief constable and his deputy (Investigated by officers from Bedfordshire 
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Constabulary). The complaint included the type ‘gaming’ behaviour identified by 
Farrington & Dowds (1985). HMIC acknowledged this development in their 1997 
inspection report: 
 
“An investigation is being conducted by the Chief Constable of 
Bedfordshire concerning allegations, from an ex-police officer, regarding 
the recording of crime and disposals. A number of anomalies have been 
discovered by that enquiry, by HMIC during the Inspection, and by the 
Force themselves following an audit earlier this year. It is disappointing 
that little action has been taken to address these anomalies save for the 
introduction in June 1997 of a new policy on crime recording and 
disposal, which has yet to influence behaviour. The Force need to embark 
upon an urgent project to ensure performance with integrity and the 
credibility of crime recording and reporting practices and statistics. 
Progress will be reviewed in six months. (HMIC Notts.1997:4) 
 
 
Nottinghamshire was granted its certificate of efficiency by HMIC in 1997: 
 
“The Force is led by a command team committed to continual 
improvement who recognise the challenges and the need for positive 
action in the ambitious programme to take the Force forward to the next 
millennium. The morale of the staff is generally good and there is a 
commitment to achieving performance related targets. In the professional 
view of Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary, Nottinghamshire 
Constabulary continues to provide an efficient and effective service to the 
public” (HMIC/Notts. 1997:4) 
  
HMIC’s Inspection report in 1998 makes the following reference to the Bedfordshire 
Inquiry: 
 
“Following criticism of crime recording processes considerable time and 
resources have been devoted to ensuring the new ‘crime model’ is ethical, 
accurate and quality controlled.” (HMIC Notts. 1998:4) 
 
The possible link between Nottinghamshire’s performance and the measures taken to 
ensure the integrity and accuracy of its data recording procedures was not made by 
HMIC: 
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“The Force performance is good in a number of areas but on present 
indicators it is too often behind the family of forces comparison. With the 
recent re-organisation and push towards greater devolvement there is a 
need to sharpen accountability and engender a greater performance 
focus”. (HMIC Notts. 1998:4) 
 
 
In 2001 another HMIC inspection of Nottinghamshire took issue with crime recording 
procedures:  
 
“Some minor problems were found during the Inspection and HMI 
suggests that the Force considers a more comprehensive audit of both 
crime and incident recording to gain an accurate view of performance.” 
(HMIC/Notts. 2001:25) 
 
 
Whilst it is impossible to gauge the scale of the problems uncovered from the above 
comment the sudden rise in recorded crime experienced in 2000/2001 (Fig. 10.1) 
might suggest it to have been more serious than reported.  
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(Fig. 10.1)                                                        (Home Office Bulletins 1999-2007)  
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The 1998/9 HMIC Inspection of the West Midlands Police commenced with a pre 
inspection audit. The confidential report outlining the nature and extent of the 
problems was submitted to the Chief Constable by HMIC and circulated to Chief 
Superintendents (HMIC/WMP Dec 1998 unpublished).  The content of that report has 
already been discussed (chapters 4, 5, and 6) and the findings were referred to in the 
published HMIC Inspection (HMIC/WMP 1999):  
 
“An audit undertaken by Her Majesty’s Inspector’s staff officers has 
identified that a number of reported allegations of crime were being 
recorded in a correspondence register rather than directly onto the crime 
system. The effect of these omissions was to give an inaccurate picture of 
the level of recorded crime and render crime pattern analysis and referral 
to victim support schemes less effective.” (HMIC/ WMP 1999:2) 
 
 
The extent of the ‘cuffing’ is played down by pointing out that the findings from the 
audit were based on a dip sample and therefore not statistically significant. As seen 
from the increase in recorded crime discussed in chapters 4 & 5 the extent of the 
problem was more widespread than can be deduced from the report. The thematic 
report on integrity (HMIC 1999) also makes reference to the miscellaneous registers 
but this report does not identify the force concerned. In the 2001 inspection report 
HMIC noted the 16% rise in recorded crime since the previous inspection. However 
HMIC did not indicate in their report that this was due to measures introduced to 
address the malpractice uncovered during the previous inspection, other than to state: 
 
“Crime increased by 16% in 1999/2000, some of which may be due to the 
introduction of policies and procedures to ensure the integrity of crime 
recording.” (HMIC West Mids. 2001:52)   
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In the 2004 baseline inspection6 of the West Midlands Police HMIC made a positive 
reference to the ‘false reporting policy’, discussed at length in Chapter 5 however no 
comment was made on the link between the introduction of the policy and the fall in 
overall recorded crime: 
 
“The Force has been a leading light in the national Street Crime Initiative 
and has undertaken much innovative work particularly with mobile 
phones and false reporting.” (HMIC/West Midlands 2004:16). 
 
 
The 2006 HMIC baseline inspection report on Merseyside Police does make reference 
to the crime recording practices being operated by the force: 
 
“The force is encouraging officers to maximise the 72-hours rule under 
NCRS to fully investigate the circumstances around reported crime. This 
will assist in the process of reducing the numbers of ‘non crime’ after the 
event and assist in the correct categorisation. However, this will leave a 
lag in the performance-monitoring process and possibly impact on NIM. 
In addition the force should ensure that only officers who are competent 
in NCRS are provided with this facility. (HMIC Merseyside 2006:53) 
 
This factor does not appear to have prompted any audit activity or intrusive inspection 
of the crime recording procedures and there is no explicit comment made on the 
possible connection between crime recording procedures, the reduction in crime and 
the low customer satisfaction rating (HMIC Merseyside 2006:53). However the 
following comment is recorded in the National Police Performance Assessment of 
Merseyside: 
 
“It has also delivered reductions in all crime areas, most notably 
reductions of over 20% for both violent offences and life-threatening and 
gun crime. The rates for both offences brought to justice and sanctioned 
                                                 
6 Baseline Inspections is the current term used to describe HMIC force inspections. 
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detections have increased, coupled with a large reduction in the rate of 
acquisitive crime. User satisfaction, however, has deteriorated.” 
(www.homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk/performance/2007). 
 
 
 
4.2. ‘NODDING’: 
 
The response of HMIC to the incidents involving ‘nodding’ in relation to ‘prison 
write offs and TICs (pre. and post sentence) was also noted as the research 
progressed. Burrows et al (2000) commented on the impact of Greater Manchester’s 
decision to cease ‘prison write offs’ in 1995: 
 
“GMP has decided to abandon ‘post sentence visits’, leading its clear up 
rate to fall from 34 per cent in 1993 to 18 per cent in 1997 (HMI report)” 
(Burrows et al 2000:37 footnote 40) 
 
Whilst HMIC noted the impact of that decision in the 1996 inspection of the force the 
rationale for the decision was hardly clear:  
 
“For good reasons, a decision has been taken to discontinue, at least for 
the present time, the former practice of making prison visits to obtain 
secondary crime detections from admissions by prisoners serving 
sentence. This will inevitably distort the apparent success rate of the 
Force in the near future, but HM Inspector understands the reasoning 
behind this decision which was largely concerned with identifying a more 
concrete statistical base upon which to judge the Force.” (HMIC/GMP 
1996:4) 
 
 
However, HMIC did not appear to support the total abandonment of ‘prison write 
offs’, as advocated by the action of the Chief Constable of GMP: 
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“HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary has recently circulated national 
guidelines for such prison visits which the Force is considering and should 
now be well placed to benefit from.” (HMIC GMP 1996: para. 3.3) 
 
Prior to the abuse of post sentence visits and TICs in Nottinghamshire, exposed in 
1997 (Wilson et al 2001), there was nothing in the HMIC inspection reports to 
suggest anything was amiss, in fact the following comment suggests they were 
encouraging the use of TICs as a means improving performance: 
 
“Her Majesty’s Inspector draws attention to the performance at 
Mansfield where primary detections include a large number of TIC 
(previously reported) offences. The Force should examine why officers are 
achieving success in securing admissions in respect of TIC offences and 
seek to spread good practice. By actively pursuing both means of 
detection there is scope to achieve further improvement in this area of 
performance.” (HMIC/Notts. 1996:19) 
 
The Mansfield police command unit was subsequently identified as one of those 
police units most reliant on abuses involving ‘nodding’ (Wilson et al 2001:64).  
One of the remedial measures introduced by Nottinghamshire to guard against the 
abuse of TIC procedures was the requirement to ensure TICs had actually been 
accepted by the offender at Court before a ‘detection’ was recorded for performance 
purposes.  However HMIC (2002) made comment on the adverse effect this 
procedure was having on the force’s performance and pointed out such measures were 
not a requirement of the Home Office Counting Rules: 
 
“Force policy indicates that TICs can only be shown as detected once the 
offender has appeared at court. The Counting Rules allow that such 
offences may also be shown as detected once the offender has 
unequivocally admitted the offence and has signed TIC forms to this 
effect. While the Force’s current approach is not criticised, it may be that 
Force performance in terms of detected offences is being adversely and 
unfairly affected, as the majority of forces avail themselves of the latter 
criteria. HMI notes, however, the relatively low rate of disposal by way of 
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offences TIC (9% compared to a MSF average of 13%) and acknowledges 
that a change in policy may not have a great impact. This is an area the 
Force may wish to explore further.” (HMIC/Notts 2001/2:25) 
 
 
Prior to this comment being made HMIC officers had encountered similar problems 
with ‘nodding’ in the West Midlands Police and Cleveland. These forces had also 
adopted similar preventative measures to Nottinghamshire.  In 1998 HMIC identified 
the process by which officers in the West Midlands Police were converting ‘prison 
write offs’ to TICs: 
 
“The audit also identified a substantial (150%) increase in the number of 
offences admitted which had been previously recorded (TICs). These 
admissions are made following interview with persons currently under 
investigation or in prison either on remand or serving a custodial 
sentence. Such admissions, following charge, are classified as primary 
detections even when that case is discontinued by the CPS. The Force 
needs to research trends in this area of activity.” (HMIC/West Mids. 
1999:2) 
 
However, HMIC sought to allay any concerns that such practices might be unethical:  
 
“Her Majesty’s Inspector does not suggest the Force has been unethical in 
using this method, since the current counting rules allow such TICs to be 
accepted as primary detections. He is concerned that this approach 
provides an emphasis on TICs but does not appear to apply the same 
emphasis to the quality of evidence – a similar concern expressed by CPS 
in relation to some cases where charges are preferred. There are national 
issues, which Her Majesty’s Inspector intends to resolve separately.”   
(HMIC WMP 1999:28-29) 
 
Whilst the facts relating to the problems uncovered during the inspection were 
included in the Inspection report (HMIC/West Mids. 1999) the unpublished report 
(HMIC/WMP 1998) does contain more detail, although one of the interviewees was 
of the opinion that the unpublished report was not as hard hitting as it could have 
been: 
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“I’d be very worried. I thought it [the HMIC report] was written with a 
very positive spin to it; the fact is we are focussing on a particular activity 
which is basically prison visits; but generally if you didn’t read that 
report carefully if you weren’t careful the actual little time bombs ticking 
away could be missed, I think.” (Interviewee C)  
 
Although action was taken by the force command team to ensure TICs presented at 
court were accepted by the defendant when sentenced, post sentence TICs still 
continued to be sought until soon after the incident on 7th October 2003, when a 
suspect produced from prison and the officers accompanying him were arrested on 
suspicion of offences involving the supply of drugs (see chapter 6).  
 
The significant reduction in detections following the incident in October 2003 does 
not elicit any explanation from HMIC in their 2004 Baseline Inspection of the West 
Midlands Police:   
 
“There is a very strong performance culture within West Midlands and 
overall in the last three years the Force has been very successful at 
reducing crime and increasing detection rates.” (HMIC WMP 2004: 8) 
 
This omission may be due to the inspection relying on annual performance data and 
analysis of the overall detection rate; the significant fall in the number of detections 
being masked by the fall in recorded crime, therefore minimising the impact on the 
overall detection rate. One of the interviewees highlighted the difficulties faced by 
HMIC when reviewing such a mass of statistical information: 
 
“Well they see them but they don’t see them. They don’t have all of this 
[the documents reviewed]; they don’t have the detailed knowledge of 
what’s going on in the Force; they don’t know about this case [the October 
2003 incident]; that isn’t how it works. HMIC, they don’t have the 
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resources; they are not on top of that sort of detail; it is an audit; it is a 
periodical inspection; a baseline assessment is done on the data provided 
by the force.” (Interviewee A)  
 
The links between the ‘sex for detections’ scandal involving Bedfordshire officers, 
which featured in the widely circulated free newspaper (Metro News 16.5.06:15), and 
the performance of Bedfordshire Police is not apparent from examination of the 
HMIC Baseline Assessments7 of the force: 
  
“The sanction detection rate changed very little in 2005/06 (compared 
with a rise nationally), and Bedfordshire ended the year just below the 
MSF [most similar force] average, with a rate of 23%. Significant effort 
has been put into increasing detection rates, and officers and police staff 
are acutely aware of the drive to improve on performance in this area.” 
(HMIC/Beds. Oct. 2006:40)  
 
Neither does the poor showing of Bedfordshire in the National Police Performance 
Assessments 2006/7 (www.homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk/performance) elicit any comment 
to explain the sudden fall in detections.  
 
 
The incident involving inducements in return for admissions involving Merseyside 
officers which came to public notice in 2007 (discussed in detail in Chapter 6) and the 
reduction in detections obtained via ‘other’ means of detection experienced by the 
force in 2006 also failed to elicit comment from HMIC in their Baseline Assessments 
although the fall in detection rates for burglary dwelling, vehicle crime and robbery 
are mentioned without any explanation being proffered. However the impact of this 
‘incident’ and any remedial action on the overall detection rate would be masked by 
                                                 
7 It is likely the investigation was ongoing at the time of the assessment. 
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the high number of detections obtained by cannabis warnings and fixed penalties for 
disorder. 
 
One of the weaknesses of the inspection process in relation to detection rates and their 
vulnerability to ‘gaming’ practices was the absence of any systematic national 
scrutiny or audit regime. This deficiency appeared to have been rectified by HMIC 
when they carried out an audit of detections for the years 2005/6 and 2006/7 (Home 
Office Nov.2006)  However the results of this audit were not made public, although 
Police Authorities were provided with a copy of the results on their own force only. 
This is a deviation from the policy of publication pursued by HMIC since 1991 and in 
marked contrast to the way the Audit Commission reports publicly on data quality.  
HMIC did however publish the results in the FOI section of their web site in response 
to an FOI request8. The poor results for TICs (Table 10.1) demonstrates the lack of 
internal scrutiny being applied to this area which is vulnerable to ‘nodding’.  The 
deterioration from the results in 2005/6 (Table 10.2) is also noticeable and supports 
the comments of one of the officers interviewed by Chatterton (2008): 
 
“It goes on year after year and it gets tougher and tougher. What people 
do under the performance culture they ‘housekeep’ but you can only 
housekeep to a certain extent and then the following year, particularly 
when you do well, you get even harder targets. You can’t housekeep like 
that any more and that gets you into a very difficult situation because you 
are on that train. You have got to do something else then and that is when 
it starts getting ethically and morally wrong. I think we’ve hit that stage 
now with the politics behind it all.” (Chatterton 2008:46)  
 
 
 
                                                 
8 This request did not form part of this research. 
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Force Data 
Testing 
 
Cautions 
(Adult) 
 
TICs 
 
PNDs 
 
Cannabis 
Warnings 
 
Non Sanction 
Detections 
 
Avon & Somerset Fair Good Poor Fair Good No judgement 
Bedfordshire Poor Poor Excellent Poor Fair Poor 
BTP Poor Fair Poor Poor Poor Poor 
Cambridgeshire Good Excellent Good Poor Fair No judgement 
Cheshire Poor Poor Poor Fair Poor Poor 
City of London Poor Poor Poor Poor Poor No judgement 
Cleveland Poor Poor Good Poor Poor Poor 
Cumbria Fair Fair Poor Fair Fair Poor 
Derbyshire Poor Fair Poor Poor Fair Poor 
Devon & 
Cornwall 
Por Poor Poor Poor Fair Poor 
Dorset Poor Fair Poor Poor Poor Poor 
Durham Poor Poor Poor Poor Poor Fair 
Dyfed Powys Fair Good Poor Poor Excellent Poor 
Essex Poor Poor Poor Poor Poor Poor 
Gloucestershire Poor Fair Poor Poor Poor Poor 
GMP Poor Good Poor Poor Poor Poor 
Gwent Fair Good Poor Poor Poor Poor 
Hampshire Poor Poor Poor Poor Poor Poor 
Hertfordshire Poor Good Poor Poor Poor Poor 
Humberside Good Excellent Fair Fair Poor Poor 
Kent Fair Good Poor Fair Poor Poor 
Lancashire Poor Fair Poor Poor Poor Poor 
Leicestershire Good Excellent Poor Good Good Poor 
Lincolnshire Good Excellent Fair Fair Poor Poor 
Merseyside Poor Good Poor Good Poor Poor 
MPS Poor Fair Poor Poor Poor Poor 
Norfolk Good Excellent  Poor  Fair Excellent No judgement 
North Wales Fair Excellent Fair Fair Fair Poor 
North Yorkshire Fair Good Poor Fair Excellent Poor 
Northamptonshire Poor Fair Poor Poor Poor Poor 
Northumbria Fair Fair Poor Poor Fair Poor 
Nottinghamshire Good Good Excellent Poor Good Fair 
South Wales Poor Fair Poor Poor Good Poor 
South Yorkshire Fair Fair Poor Poor Excellent Fair 
Staffordshire Excellent Excellent Excellent Excellent Excellent Excellent 
Suffolk Poor Fair Poor Poor Fair Poor 
Surrey Good Excellent Good Poor Poor Poor 
Sussex Fair Fair Poor Good Fair Poor 
Thames Valley Good Excellent Fair Good Excellent  Excellent 
Warwickshire Good Excellent Fair Fair Good No judgement 
West Mercia Fair Excellent Fair Poor Poor Poor 
West Midlands Fair Good Good Fair Poor No judgement 
West Yorkshire Fair Good Fair Poor Good Poor 
Wiltshire Fair Good Poor Poor Excellent Poor 
 
(Table 10.1)                                                                                  (HMIC 2008) 
Force Data 
Testing 
 
Charge 
 
Summons 
 
Cautions 
(Reprimands 
+ Final 
Warnings) 
 
TICs 
 
PNDs 
 
Formal 
Warnings 
for 
cannabis 
 
Avon & Somerset Poor Fair Fair Fair Poor Poor Poor 
Bedfordshire Fair Fair Fair Fair Fair Fair Poor 
BTP Fair Fair Good Poor Poor Poor Poor 
Cambridgeshire Good Excellent Excellent Fair Fair Fair Poor 
Cheshire Poor Fair Fair Poor Poor Fair Poor 
City of London Good Excellent Fair Fair Good Fair Poor 
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Cleveland Fair Fair Good Poor Poor Fair Fair 
Cumbria Good Excellent Good Poor Fair Fair Fair 
Derbyshire Good Excellent Excellent Fair Fair Fair Poor 
Devon & 
Cornwall 
Fair Fair Fair 
Fair Good Fair Poor 
Dorset Fair Fair Fair Good Poor Fair Poor 
Durham Good Good Excellent Good Fair Excellent Fair 
Dyfed Powys Good Good Good Fair Fair Good Excellent 
Essex Fair Fair Excellent Fair Good Good Poor 
Gloucestershire Poor Fair Fair Poor Poor Poor Fair 
GMP Poor Poor Poor Poor Poor Poor Poor 
Gwent Fair Fair Fair Poor Poor Fair Poor 
Hampshire Fair Fair Poor Poor Poor Poor Poor 
Hertfordshire Fair Good Fair Poor Poor Poor Poor 
Humberside Fair Fair Poor Poor Fair Fair Poor 
Kent Fair Fair No 
judgement Fair Fair Fair Poor 
Lancashire Fair Good Good Fair Poor Good Fair 
Leicestershire Fair Fair Fair Excellent Poor Fair Fair 
Lincolnshire Fair Excellent Poor Good Fair Fair Poor 
Merseyside Fair Fair Poor Fair Poor Fair Poor 
MPS Fair Excellent Poor Good Poor Good Fair 
Norfolk Good Excellent Fair Good Poor Fair Poor 
North Wales Fair Good Good Poor Poor Fair Poor 
North Yorkshire Excellent Excellent Excellent Excellent Fair Good Fair 
Northamptonshire Fair Fair Poor Poor Poor Poor Poor 
Northumbria Good Good Excellent 
Fair Fair Good 
No 
judgement 
Nottinghamshire Fair Good Fair Poor Fair Fair Poor 
South Wales Good Good Poor Good Poor Fair Fair 
South Yorkshire Good Excellent Good Fair Fair Good Good 
Staffordshire Good Good Poor Good Fair Good Poor 
Suffolk Fair Good Fair Poor Fair Fair Poor 
Surrey Fair Excellent Poor Poor Good Fair Poor 
Sussex Fair Fair Good Fair Fair Fair Poor 
Thames Valley Fair Fair Fair Poor Poor Fair Excellent 
Warwickshire Fair Good Poor Fair Fair Fair Poor 
West Mercia Fair Fair Fair Poor Poor Fair Fair 
West Midlands Good Excellent Poor Fair Fair Fair Poor 
West Yorkshire Good Excellent Fair Fair Good Good Fair 
Wiltshire Fair Fair Poor Poor Poor Fair Fair 
 
(Table 10.2)                                                                                      (HMIC 2008) 
 
 
4.3. HMIC’S RESPONSE TO ‘SKEWING’: 
 
Over a number of years HMIC have made comment on the negative impact of 
Performance Management on the prevention and investigation of serious crime: In 
1999 the low priority given to the investigation of rapes and child abuse was 
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highlighted in the thematic report on police integrity (HMIC 1999). In 2001 the 
inspection report on Cleveland contained a comment on the lack of focus on more 
serious crime: 
 
“Her Majesty’s Inspector acknowledges, however, that competing 
demands on resources requires a balanced approach to tackling volume 
crime and ‘premier league’ villainy. His view is that, so far, the balance 
has not been achieved in Cleveland.” (HMIC/Cleveland 2001:2). 
 
HMIC also went on to make the following adverse comment on the inspection regime 
itself and its effect on this aspect of policing: 
 
“the staffing of major incidents or sizeable investigations is no longer the 
exception but the norm. It is a resourcing issue that can easily be 
overlooked by scrutineers of police performance.” (HMIC Cleveland 
2001:2)   
 
Similar comments were recorded by HMIC in their inspection report on the West 
Midlands Police in 2001: 
 
“One consequence of such an ‘achievement focus’ can be 
that officers may look for the easy detections and ignore those more 
serious offences that require further investigation and HMI urges the 
Force to continue to guard against the commendable performance culture 
being allowed to skew operational activity.” (HMIC/WMP 2001:2) 
 
Such an observation preceded the deaths of Constable Malcolm Walker9, murdered on 
4th October 2001; and Letisha Shakespeare and Charlene Ellis, shot on 1st January 
2003. The link between performance management and the response to serious crime 
was discussed in chapters 7& 8. 
                                                 
9 Constable Walker was killed by ‘gang members’ who used a vehicle to deliberately crush him to 
death. 
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The scale and nature of the problems with the investigation of rapes and child 
protection was not apparent from an examination of HMIC annual baseline 
assessment for 2004. The force was graded ‘good’ in the category ‘Reducing Hate 
Crime and Crimes Against Vulnerable Groups’ including children and rape victims 
2004(HMIC West Mids. 2004:13).  However the need to improve rape investigations 
was mentioned in 2005: 
 
“The force has recognised that the investigation of rape offence crimes is 
in need of improvement, reflected in the 2004/05 performance figures and 
reinforced by the commissioning of a review into rape investigation across 
the force (2004).” (HMIC/WMP 2005:25) 
 
In 2005 the rating for ‘Reducing Hate Crime and Crimes Against Vulnerable Groups 
was again ‘Good’. (HMIC West Mids. 2005:10) There is nothing in these reports to 
indicate the problems highlighted by the internal report dated (June 2004) which pre-
dated the death of J.L.M. in August 2004(Part 8 Review November 2005) discussed in 
detail in chapter 7. However in 2006 HMIC graded the force as ‘Fair’ in this area and 
the issue of under-resourcing of Child Protection Units was commented upon 
(HMIC/West Mids. 2006:48).  
 
Two HMIC thematic reports; ‘Police Integrity’ 1999 and ‘Closing the Gap’ 
(O’Connor 2005) raised the negative impact of Performance Management on the 
investigation of serious crime as effort was ‘skewed’ towards ‘volume crime’. The 
review of Performance Management carried out by HMIC (2007) also implied that the 
focus of activity had moved in favour of the easier to measure volume crime at the 
expense of the more difficult to quantify serious crime:    
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“It is now necessary for HMIC to focus its inspection effort on those areas 
of policing that are not data-rich and where qualitative assessment is the 
only feasible way of judging both current performance and the prospects 
for improvement. This, together with the critical factor that HMIC should 
concentrate its scrutiny on high-risk areas of policing – in terms of risk 
both to the public and to the service’s reputation – pointed inexorably to a 
focus on what are known collectively as ‘protective services’. In addition, 
there is a need to apply professional judgement to some key aspects of 
leadership and governance, where some quantitative measures exist but a 
more rounded assessment is appropriate.”(HMIC 2007:4) 
 
 
 
4.4. HMIC’S RESPONSE TO ‘STITCHING’: 
 
The audit of detections in 2006/7 (Table 10.1) (HMIC 2008) including checks on the 
validity of non-sanctioned detections, including DNFPA (Detected No Further Police 
Action).  Whilst DNFPAs had been classified as non sanctioned detections from 2003 
onwards the audit revealed that suspect’s details were still being recorded on local 
police crime recording systems as responsible for offences without there being 
sufficient evidence to support such an action i.e. ‘stitching’. In some cases the suspect 
was unaware that this had occurred. This finding prompted the president of ACPO to 
write to the Information Commissioner on 13.2.07 to inform him of the potential 
breaches of the Data Protection Act involved in such cases: 
 
“The administration of ‘non sanctioned detections’ has been identified by 
HMIC as a risk to the service in that a proportion of the records on force 
systems are inaccurate (to varying degrees) and as such potentially in 
breach of the data protection act.” (ACPO letter to the Information 
Commissioner 13.2.2007 unpublished10) 
                                                 
10 The Information Commissioner advises organisation that it is good practice to publish on their web 
sites documents which have been released in response to FOI requests, if it is in the public interest to 
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The issue surrounded the recording of detections when there was insufficient evidence 
and/or the suspect had not been informed (discussed at length in chapter 9). The C.M. 
case (Chapter 9) highlighted the risks involved in such procedures. ACPO outlined 
the problems uncovered by the audit: 
 
“The nub of the issue faced by the service is that a proportion of the offences 
detected by non-sanction means fail the ‘administrative test’ in that they do 
not comply with HOCR. The most frequent errors are: 
 
 The sufficiency of evidence (this is a judgement issue with the HMIC and 
forces coming to a different view) to justify/support a non-sanctioned 
detection. 
 A failure to record whether the victim has been informed that the 
offence has been detected through non-sanctioned means, and 
 A failure to record that the suspect has been informed. 
 (ACPO letter to the Information Commissioner 13.2.2007 unpublished11) 
 
 
The correspondence dated 13.2.2007 went on to assure the Information Commissioner 
that discussions were being held with HMIC and the Home Office and that the 
necessary steps were being taken to ensure compliance with the Data Protection Act. 
Further correspondence from ACPO dated 10.4.2007 provided further assurances: 
 
“Please rest assured that the issues that have come to light as a result of 
the recent Association of Chief Police Officers’ and HMIC audits have 
been taken extremely seriously by the police service. To this end a series 
of meetings have taken place in fast time with all relevant parties, 
including the Home Office, to consider how best to address the concerns 
                                                                                                                                            
do so. The Information Commissioner has not yet published the above documentation released 
11.12.2007 (09.07.08)  
11 The Information Commissioner advises organisation that it is good practice to publish on their web 
sites documents which have been released in response to FOI requests, if it is in the public interest to 
do so. The Information Commissioner has not yet published the above documentation released 
11.12.2007 (09.07.08)  
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that you raised to which we are alive” (ACPO letter to the Information 
Commissioner 10.4.2007: Unpublished)      
 
 
Whilst the correspondence intimates that the Home Office was aware of the issue, it is 
impossible to establish from this documentary evidence the level of knowledge within 
the Home Office hierarchy. The correspondence from ACPO suggests the scale of the 
problem is minimal although the measures quoted are difficult to quantify. The 
serious nature of the offences is implied by reference to child protection procedures: 
 
“ACPO has reviewed a snapshot of disclosures for the period 2003 – 2005 
(for a range of ‘high risk’ offences). Whilst the process has (but for a 
handful of cases) worked effectively – clearly the issue of data protection 
has a bearing on the disclosure process. ACPO has taken the view that the 
disclosure of ‘intelligence and information’ associated with non-
sanctioned detections remains legitimate in the context of the Enhanced 
Disclosure Process and public protection in the wider context.”  (ACPO 
letter to the Information Commissioner 13.2.2007 unpublished)  
 
 
The response of the Information Commissioner is outlined later in this chapter. 
 
4.5. OVERALL OBSERVATIONS ON HMIC: 
 
 
HMIC conduct thematic reports on various subjects either at Government direction as 
was the case with ‘Closing the Gap’ (HMIC 2005) or in response to identified trends, 
as was the case with the Integrity report (HMC 1999), and the Joint Inspection with 
HMIcps into the low conviction rate for rape (2002 & 2007).  In the thematic report 
on integrity HMIC (1999) set themselves the task of addressing the tendency towards 
improving performance by engaging in the type of ‘gaming’ outlined in the report: 
 
“The core business of HM Inspector of Constabulary is to encourage and 
monitor continuous improvement by police forces, and the issue of 
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integrity is very much part of that process. Through inspection and day-
to-day contact, Her Majesty’s Inspector is confident HMIC will 
increasingly monitor integrity, the systems and the investigative and 
corrective measures for maintaining it, and Inspectors will become aware 
at an early stage of any failings. In the same way forces are urged to keep 
in view the human side of policing, HMIC, in its new role as ‘best value’ 
inspectors, will not lose sight of this important responsibility” (HMIC 
1999:69). 
 
The regular re-occurrence of the ‘gaming’ behaviours identified by HMIC (1999) 
reflects the impact HMIC have had on the problem. The failure to address ‘nodding’ 
and the abuse of the procedures associated with the conversion of ‘prison write offs’ 
into post sentence TICs is evidenced by the increase in reported cases involving the 
exchange of inducements for admissions/detections e.g. West Midlands 2003; GMP 
2004; Bedfordshire 2006; and Merseyside 2007. 
 
The return to an ‘evidential’ crime recording standard heralded by those forces 
adopting ‘false reporting policies’ has not stimulated any reaction from HMIC; the 
failure to stem the lack of focus on serious crime is evident from their own findings 
reported in ‘Closing the Gap’ (HMIC 2005) and their joint reports on the investigation 
of rape (HMIC/HMIcps 2002 & 2007). This may partly be due to a tendency to 
minimise the nature of their inspection results. The HMIC reports reviewed indicated 
that their reports included the bare facts but did not appear to explain fully the 
relevancy or interconnectivity of the various pieces of information. This makes it 
difficult for Police Authorities, media, and members of the public to interpret what are 
extremely complex documents12. Certainly the members of the West Midlands Police 
Authority at the time of HMIC Inspection in 1998/9 were unaware of the nature and 
scale of the problems uncovered during the inspection: 
                                                 
12 The Morris report on the MPS’s Professional Standards Dept highlighted the difficulties Police 
Authority members faced when interpreting complex systems and information. (Morris 2003)  
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“We definitely weren’t told anything significant” (Police Authority 
member13)   
 
This approach to the Police Authority hardly reflected HMIC’s stated expectation that 
Police Authorities should take on a greater role in maintaining integrity: 
      
“One theme of this Inspection has been the need for chief constables to 
have systems and procedures that enable them to be informed of the 
health of all aspects of integrity in their force. Her Majesty’s Inspector is 
of the view this should equally apply to the police authority. (HMIC 
1999:67) 
 
The ex-HMIC officers interviewed were of the opinion that this was not an exception: 
 
“So sometimes there were suspicions, yes on a number of occasions the 
draft report raised questions even made tentative conclusions which did 
not necessarily appear in the final report. Now that may have been 
because the HMI bottomed them out during this particular inspection or 
it may have been that politically they were not the sort of thing or 
questions which they wanted to publicise.” (Interviewee A) 
 
There was nothing in the documents reviewed to suggest that Ministers were informed 
of the extent of the problems being uncovered and the ex-HMIC staff officers 
interviewed, were of the view that problems unearthed during force inspections were 
not routinely brought to the attention of Ministers: 
 
“If it were some malpractice which turned up within a force then it would 
almost invariably be raised by the HMI with the Chief Constable with an 
expectation that it would be dealt with within the force and questions 
would be asked about what happened.” (Interviewee A) 
 
                                                 
13 Police Authority member declined formal interview but provided answer to this question by email 
18.9.2007) 
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In order to test the ability of lay members to interpret HMIC reports an experienced 
journalist was asked to review the HMIC internal report on the West Midlands Police 
(HMIC 1998 unpublished). He made the following comments: 
 
“My first act is, skip to the conclusion. Nothing jumps out at me. This 
looks like a tedious internal examination of bureaucratic processes. 
Because I’ve been handed the document I suspect there must be more to it 
than that. The first paragraph in the audit findings suggests to me that 
the force is failing to record crimes properly – and that implies that the 
West Midlands is a higher crime area than the police would have us 
believe. However the conclusion also states that this is based on a sample 
which is too small to be statistically significant. The thought- “well why 
bother?” crosses my mind, but spinning a story about apparently 
pointless inspections from this document doesn’t light my fire. My general 
news reporter’s head is now losing interest. I flick through the remaining 
chapters – convinced I’ve got something very boring on my hands. 
 
A quarter of crimes go unrecorded in Birmingham City Centre 
 
I have a story. I’m a touch dubious about it, however there’s enough here 
to make a case. I need to understand a little more about white reports and 
also PSV’s, TICs and OCU’s their crime managers and whether they are 
held accountable for crime stats. On their patch. 
 
But I’m on page 27 now – so I keep reading about TICs. This is also 
interesting. As I read on through the lists from page 30 to 35 the story 
appears to get better. Are the police doing two things at once – under 
recording crime rates (by 25%) and boosting convictions by getting 
people to admit crime they haven’t done?” (Journalist: Interviewee K) 
 
The journalist who reviewed the internal document went on to compose the type of 
news article he would have prepared if he had the report passed to him at the time: 
 
“West Midlands Police has been told to change the way it records crime 
after a confidential report warned that officers are claiming convictions 
where there is no evidence. 
 
The report found that the controversial technique of encouraging suspects 
to admit to other crimes, may be significantly distorting how many crimes 
the police can claim to have cleared up. 
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They call them Ticks [sic] – taken into consideration – a method where 
police will talk to a suspect about a whole range of crimes on top of the 
offences they have just been arrested for. This confidential report 
highlights one case where a suspect admitted to a further 86 offences, all 
them tics [sic]. However the suspect never made it to court – with the 
prosecution discontinued by government lawyers. 
 
What did happen though was that those 86 incidents remained on the 
police books as crimes solved, despite the fact that no one had gone to 
trial. In some cases, the report says, the police will even accept a tic when 
the evidence is clear that the suspect could not have committed the crime. 
 
This comes on top of further evidence in the document that the way the 
police keep their paperwork could be cutting the number of crimes 
actually recorded by 25%. 
 
Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary has now told the force to review 
the way officers interview suspects about Ticks [sic] and how the force 
checks whether each tick [sic] is a genuine crime detected or simply a 
convenient boost to police statistics.” (Journalist: Interviewee K)   
 
One of the interviewees was more explicit in his comments based on the information 
in the HMIC report (HMIC/West Mids. Dec. 1998 unpublished):  
 
“In here they do an audit of crime reports, it’s appalling there isn’t 
another word for it really.” (Interviewee A) 
 
 
When asked “What is the report telling you about the ethical standards operating in 
this force at that time? He replied: 
 
 
“Well they’re not very high are they; there are all sorts of things going on 
in this force which are contrary to never mind any laid down standards, 
they are totally contrary to any ethical system of recording or detecting 
crime.” (Interviewee A) 
 
 
The impact of such standards on the police officers themselves was commented on by 
another interviewee: 
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“Why are cops cynical? Because they are continually faced with mixed 
messages and you get police cynicism because they know the true story 
and yet they see the public image which is very different. So people get 
medals, press reports saying crime is going down, all that sort of stuff.” 
(Interviewee C) 
 
 
HMIC also acknowledge that some officers had little confidence in the inspectorate:  
 
 
“A perception was shared with the Inspection Team that some officers 
may be reluctant to raise issues with Her Majesty’s Inspectors, believing 
‘There’s no point in me telling them because they’re all friends of the 
chief constable anyway.’ This myth has to be dispelled by HMIC through 
actions, and seen to be so by police officers, support staff and special 
constables” (HMIC 1999:69) 
 
 
The evidence discussed in this chapter suggests that the officers’ perceptions were 
based on more than myth. Sir Michael Bichard identified the lack of impact of HMIC 
Inspections during his inquiry following the Soham murders and he criticised HMIC 
for their inaction: 
 
“I have no doubt that Her Majesty’s Chief Inspector of Constabulary 
(HMCIC), Sir Keith Povey, appreciates the critical part that HMIC can 
play in raising the performance of police forces across the country. I also 
believe that he understands how HMIC can perform that task most 
effectively. Nonetheless, I have already said that HMIC could and should 
have done more to identify earlier, and help address more effectively, the 
problems that existed in Humberside Police.  HMIC might also have 
focused earlier, nationally, on the issues of record retention, deletion and 
vetting. Humberside Police were inspected on several occasions during the 
period in question, and although comments were made about IT 
information systems and intelligence, at no time was the scale of their 
problems exposed. The fact that HMIC were able to reach clear views so 
quickly in their inspection in late 2003 underscores my conclusions.” (Sir 
Michael Bichard 2004:8-9) 
 
 
The review of HMIC documents conducted as part of this research supports Sir 
Michael’s assessment.  
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5. THE INFORMATION COMMISSIONER: 
 
 
The Information Commissioner oversees both compliance with data protection 
legislation and the Freedom of Information Act. The office is therefore of crucial 
importance of upholding the principle of accountability and transparency as the 
Freedom of Information Act converts government policy on public accountability into 
reality. When public bodies refuse to disclose information under the provisions of one 
of the exceptions contained within the Act the decision can be appealed to the 
Information Commissioner for consideration. If the Information Commissioner finds 
in favour of the appellant a disclosure notice can be served on the Public Body 
requiring them to disclose the information being sought. 
  
A request to obtain copies of the PSU’s reports on Nottinghamshire and West 
Yorkshire police forces under the provisions of the Freedom Of Information Act was 
refused by the PSU. This decision was referred to the Information Commissioner on 
26th July 2006. The grounds for appeal were based on two main points:  
 
1. If these forces were genuinely performing badly then informing the public 
why this was so would enable them to form an opinion about the 
effectiveness of those responsible for delivering the service and allow them 
to exert pressure on them to improve. This argument was consistent with 
the Government’s objective of informing the public about the 
performance of a public service, thus empowering them to hold those 
responsible to account. The refusal to make public the apparent failings 
of these two forces prevented such informed action occurring. 
 
2. If the PSU was encouraging these two forces to improve the statistical 
reflection of their performance by adopting the type of ‘gaming’ practices 
discussed in this thesis then the public had a right to know.  
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The matter was still being dealt with by the Information Commissioner’s office over 
two years after the referral (1.03.09). That said the intervention of the Information 
Commissioner does involve the Commissioner’s Office engaging with the Public 
Body subject of the appeal in order to understand the issues at stake prior to making 
an informed decision. This process is resource intensive and staffing difficulties may 
explain why the appeal had not been issued to a case worker over 12 months after the 
appeal was received. 
 
However as has already been highlighted, earlier in this chapter, problems with the 
use of non-sanctioned detections, particularly DNFPAs and the practice of recording 
crimes as detected without informing the suspect, had been brought to the Information 
Commissioner’s attention.  The initial response of the Information Commissioner 
dated 26.3.2006 to the revelations made by the president of ACPO indicated that the 
Commissioner’s staff had been consulted on crime recording rules in 2004 and had 
made it clear that individuals should be informed that they were considered suspects 
along with the reasons for this. The Commissioner voiced his concerns over the latest 
revelations: 
 
“Consequently I was disappointed to receive your letter (although I thank 
you for the courtesy of informing me). From my perspective I am most 
concerned that individuals were not being informed that they were 
considered to be the perpetrator of an offence even though this did not 
involve a legal process, especially if such information could be used in 
future Enhanced Disclosure relating to them. This clearly breaches the 
requirement of the first data protection principle that the processing of 
personal data must be done fairly. I am also worried by the sufficiency of 
evidence used. If a police force is going to label an individual as the de 
facto perpetrator then they must have a good objective reason for doing 
so. Not having this could lead to a record being viewed as inadequate or 
inaccurate (breaches of the third and fourth principles respectively).” 
(Information Commissioner 26.3.2006: Unpublished) 
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However despite these reservations the Commissioner declined at that stage to use his 
formal powers opting for a less confrontational approach: 
 
“I would prefer to work with chief officers to ensure compliance. I would 
like to know more detail about how this has come about and what action 
is being taken to ensure future compliance” (Information Commissioner 
26.3.2006: Unpublished)  
   
 
The Information Commissioner included the caveat that he may review his decision if 
a complaint was received about the breaches brought to his attention. The uncovering 
of unwarranted ‘stitching’ involving DNFPA procedures is likely to come to light 
during Part VIII Serious Case Reviews, which take place following the death of a 
child as a result of a crime. A number DNFPAs recorded without the suspect’s 
knowledge relate to domestic assaults or sexual offences which tend to be scrutinised 
during Part VIII Reviews. However the Information Commissioner’s decision in 
another case may well prevent such abuses coming to public notice: In the City of 
Plymouth vs. the BBC the Information Commissioner indicated that he would not 
support full disclosure of the information considered by the Part VIII review boards 
on the grounds that professionals should be able to share information openly at such 
reviews without the risk of public exposure. The decision related to a Multi Agency 
Part VIII Review14 carried out after the death of a child in the Plymouth area in 2005.  
The BBC appealed against the refusal by Plymouth City Council to disclose the full 
submissions made by the various agencies to the review. The Council maintained that 
the executive summary was sufficient for the purposes of informing the public of 
what had occurred and what the agencies involved intended doing in order to embed 
the lessons leaned into their future working practices. One of the grounds for non-
                                                 
14 Serious case reviews are commonly known as Part 8 Reviews, a reference to the fact they were 
established under part 8 of the ‘guidance’ document ‘Working Together to Safeguard Children’.   
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disclosure was made under the provisions of Section 36 of the Freedom of 
Information Act – prejudice to the conduct of public affairs. This is the same 
exemption relied upon by the PSU.  After careful consideration of the case 
(FS50082254 www.ico.gov.uk) the Information Commissioner upheld the decision of 
the Local Authority, maintaining that the making of the individual agency 
submissions public could result in less candid information being shared by public 
bodies in future Part VIII reviews and such behaviour  was not in the public interest: 
 
“The most effective and efficient way of incorporating the lessons learnt 
from these tragedies into working practices in order to increase the levels 
of protection afforded to children is to provide an environment in which 
professionals can freely discuss the circumstances of a case as honestly as 
possible. The established means of achieving this is the Part 8 Review and 
the Commissioner accepts this process would be compromised if 
professionals anticipated that reviews would be disclosed to the public. It 
follows that the public interest is best served by maintaining the 
exemption in order to preserve the best opportunity care agencies have in 
improving the protection they provide ” (FS50082254 www.ico.gov.uk 
2006:13)     
 
Whilst the Information Commissioner was satisfied in this case that the executive 
summary was an accurate reflection of what had occurred15  the decision set a 
precedent16 which shifted the balance towards professional confidentiality at the 
expense of public accountability. If this decision had been made prior to the 
commencement of this thesis then many of the documents utilised in the course of the 
research could have been withheld and/or delays imposed by the requirement to 
appeal the decisions to the Information Commissioner. It is to the credit of the Police 
Forces subject of this research, particularly the West Midlands Police, that they 
showed such commitment to the principles of accountability and transparency.  
                                                 
15 Not all the Part 8 Reviews examined as part of this research make it clear what had gone wrong.   
16 The case was quoted when a request for disclosure of the Part 8 review on the Troy Simpson case 
was requested. 
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The decision also makes the assumption that disclosure under the protective 
arrangements of Part VIII reviews  will lead to the remedial action required to prevent 
a repetition of the tragic events under review, as can been seen from the evidence 
presented in this thesis that assumption is not supported.  
 
The impact of the City of Plymouth vs. The BBC impacted on one part of this 
research. Anecdotal evidence indicated that quality failings had occurred in the way 
the police and other agencies had dealt with a case which resulted in the death of a 
baby found dead in a drain in Sandwell on 8.2.06 (BBC News 27.2.2007). A request 
was submitted to Sandwell Social Services for a copy of the Part VIII review into the 
circumstances surrounding the death. The initial response received on 19th Oct 2007 
made reference to the Information Commissioner’s decision in The City of Plymouth 
vs. The BBC: 
 
 “We are currently unable to provide a copy of the full Part 8 Review, as 
this is ongoing and the full report has yet to be completed. 
 
 In addition, you may be aware of the Information Commissioner enforces 
the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 (FOIA) and has 
the power to overturn decisions reached by public bodies to withhold 
information. 
 
 Of particular relevance to your enquiry is the decision reached by the 
Commissioner on 23rd August 2006, in respect of the disclosure of a Part 8 
Review commissioned by Plymouth’s Area Child Protection Committee. 
 
 The Commissioner investigated Plymouth City Council’s decision to 
withhold the full report, following an appeal by the BBC. The full 
decision notice (Ref. FS50082254) can be accessed via the Commissioner’s 
website. 
 
 The Commissioner upheld the decision reached by Plymouth City Council 
in this case. In particular, paragraph 67 of the decision notice states: 
 
 “The most effective and efficient way of incorporating the lessons learnt 
from these tragedies into working practices in order to increase the level 
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of protection afforded to children is to provide an environment in which 
professionals can freely discuss the circumstances of a case as honestly as 
possible. The established means of achieving this is a Part 8 Review and 
the Commissioner accepts that this process would be compromised if 
professionals anticipated that reviews would be disclosed to the public”       
 
 
(Sandwell Metropolitan Borough Council)  
 
The executive summary was released on 25th Oct 2008 (Sandwell LSCB17). The 
twenty recommendations suggested that serious failings had occurred but it was 
impossible to tell from the scant detail contained in the executive summary what these 
were. 
 
6. POLICE STANDARDS UNIT (PSU), NOW PART OF THE POLICE AND 
CRIME STANDARDS DIRECTORATE: 
 
 
The remit of the Police Standards Unit is to improve the performance of police forces 
on the detection and reduction of volume crime. Performance Management lay at the 
heart of the philosophy adopted by the unit: 
 
“The embedding of a performance-focused approach to policing has been 
a central element of the Government’s Police Reform programme. The 
Police Standards Unit has played a pivotal role in this work. Key 
components of the approach to shaping this performance drive have 
been: 
• Arriving at a more comprehensive and informed view of what comprises 
effective police performance through the development of the Policing 
Performance Assessment framework 
• A greater emphasis on assessments of force performance which are 
objective, independent and data driven 
• More use of comparative performance information which highlights 
variations in achievement between forces, Basic Command Units and 
their peer groups 
• An increase in the capability to access up-to-date performance data at 
both the national and local level.  
                                                 
17 The report is so deficient in information that there is no reference and the details of the child or the 
date of the child’s death are not included in the report. 
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• Quality assurance of data to ensure that data is reliable and valid 
comparisons can be made.” (PSU 2005:2) 
 
The Home Secretary can authorise the PSU to engage with forces which are deemed 
to be underperforming. The Police Performance Steering Group chaired by the 
Director of Policing Policy and comprising of representatives from ACPO and the 
Association of Police Authorities meets on a monthly basis to review the performance 
of forces. The criteria for engagement are as follows: 
 
“For a force to be considered for ‘engagement’, its performance data 
across a range of measures, including crime reduction, will have been 
flagged to the Steering Group, over a minimum of two successive quarters 
(a 6-month period), indicating that it is either performing at or near the 
bottom of its peer group for selected measures or has shown a significant 
decline in performance over the two periods. The Steering Group will 
then decide whether it is appropriate to commission a full force 
assessment to take account of the more qualitative aspects of performance 
and context of policing in that area.” (www.homeoffice.gov.uk/about-
us/freedom-of-information/relaesed-information 11.8.2005)    
 
 
Note the Steering Group did not monitor those forces which showed sudden 
improvements in performance, a sign, as can be seen from this research, of 
problematic behaviour. However, the PSU’s own performance was clearly gauged on 
its ability to improve the performance of police forces in general and those it engaged 
with in particular: 
 
“During 2004/5, the forces with which the Unit engaged reduced target 
(volume) crime by 23.2%, compared with 15.4% in the other forces in 
England and Wales. This is a significant achievement when one considers 
why we were engaged with those forces in the first place and is a 
particular testament to the efforts which the forces themselves put in to 
turning around performance.” (PSU 2005:2) 
 
 365
In order to gain an understanding of the unit’s impact in delivering improved 
performance the following graph was produced showing the relative improvement in 
crime reduction rates for the forces they had ‘engaged’ with (Fig .10.2):  
 
 
Fig. 10.2)                                                                                               (PSU 2005:3) 
 
As this research has revealed the marked statistical improvement in performance of a 
number of the  forces ‘engaged’ by the PSU corresponded with changes to their crime 
recording procedures as they moved back towards an ‘evidential’ crime recording 
standard; GMP have moved from a ‘prima facie’ standard to ‘balance of probability’; 
West Yorkshire had introduced a comprehensive ‘false reporting policy’ indicating an 
‘evidential’ standard; Cleveland, Nottinghamshire, Humberside, and Avon & 
Somerset  had all introduced some element of a ‘false reporting policy’; 
Northamptonshire and Cambridgeshire had not introduced a ‘false reporting’ policy  
and no evidence was available to suggest that they had changed their crime recording 
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standard although, as has been discussed previously, the ‘balance of probability’ 
standard does leave considerable room for manoeuvre and a move towards an 
‘evidential’ standard would not be detectable from the information in the public 
domain. 
 
In their 2005 annual report the PSU cited their engagement with West Yorkshire 
Police as an example of their success. The marked reduction in recorded crime 
following the introduction of a comprehensive ‘false reporting’ policy is evident from  
Fig. 10.3: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Fig. 10.3)                                                                   (Home Office 1999-2007) 
 
A copy of the documentation relating to the PSU’s engagement with West Yorkshire 
and Nottinghamshire forces was requested under the provisions of the Freedom of 
Information Act. After an initial blanket refusal from the Director some peripheral 
documentation was released following the Home Office internal appeal. This revealed 
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a need to improve forensic-DNA recovery for burglary and vehicle crime however the 
documentation contained a recommendation to West Yorkshire to increase TICs: 
 
“TIC’s and additional detections resulting from forensic investigations 
could be improved” (Policing Delivery Unit Assessment 14/4/03: 
unpublished) 
  
It is surprising that improved forensic examinations were not being related to arrests 
and charges which are more valuable in terms of controlling crime. TICs do not, in 
most cases, result in a judicial outcome in which the full facts of the case are fully 
disclosed to the court or indeed in some cases even placed before a court.  One 
possibility is that, while aware of the difficulties involved in securing convictions 
from forensic or DNA evidence alone, the PSU was suggesting the easier option of 
improving detection rates by post sentence TICs which is associated with ‘nodding’.  
When the number of TICs detected by West Yorkshire was examined for the period 
2001/2 to 2006/7 (Fig. 10.4) the marked increase from 2004/5 onwards was evident.  
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(Fig. 10.4)                                                                                       (Home Office 2008)  
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When West Yorkshire’s annual detection rate for sexual offences is examined (Fig. 
10.5) the reported improvement in the force’s overall performance had clearly not 
extended to the investigation of this particular category of offences.  
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(Fig. 10.5)                                                                               (Home Office 2008) 
 
Closer examination, of the recommendations made by the PSU, was thwarted by the 
refusal to release the pertinent documentation. The grounds for refusal were as stated: 
 
“For all of PSU’s existing and future engagements the disclosure of the 
documentation would prejudice the PSU’s ability to conduct effective 
work with under-performing forces……If forces find these assessments in 
the public domain, they will be understandably defensive to any critique, 
increasing dramatically the difficulties of the already sensitive 
engagement process. Release of this information could irrevocably affect 
the relationship between the service and PSU and could severely 
prejudice PSU’s capacity to help improve performance.”  (Home Office 
12.7.2006: Unpublished)    
 
This approach is in marked contrast to HMIC’s policy of publishing reports.  HMIC 
inspectors were also able to uncover evidence of malpractice during their inspections 
despite working under similar conditions to the PSU and in some cases lower ranking 
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officers brought to the attention of the inspectors the means by which performance 
was being enhanced e.g. the unofficial crime registers being operated in the West 
Midlands Police. This stance denied the public the opportunity to assess how the PSU 
was improving performance. Such a policy also prevents the public from assessing if 
improved performance was being achieved by re-defining or interpreting differently 
the crime recording standard; relying on TICs to improve the detection rate; and/or 
cutting back on the investigation of serious crime. 
 
 
 
7. THE AUDIT COMMISSION: 
 
 
 
The Audit Commission carried out data quality checks on behalf of the PSU which set 
the specification and extent of the audit. The audit itself was advertised to forces in 
advance, and the areas of scrutiny were also known. This could enable forces to 
rectify records likely to be checked; a factor acknowledged by the Audit Commission:  
 
“In some forces, considerable resources have been devoted to 
the retrospective checking of records, and in a few cases this work 
appears to have been concentrated on records expected to fall within the 
scope of the Audit Commission’s review. While every police authority and 
force should have in place a programme of internal audit, this should 
always be risk-based and designed to cover all units, BCUs and types of 
data on a sample basis rather than by focusing on the particular records 
likely to be scrutinised by the external auditor”. (Audit Commission 
2004:15) 
 
 
As discussed in Chapter 4 the mechanisms by which forces record crimes and 
incidents can make non-compliance easier to detect:  For example, the Met. Police 
received and ‘logged’ all calls from the public on its electronic call handling system 
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and then passed crime incidents which did not require the immediate attendance of an 
officer on to its crime recording centres. Any failure to record a crime could therefore 
easily be identified by the audit. By contrast forces which passed calls directly to 
crime recording centres had more opportunity to ‘cuff’ reports without the risk of 
detection by the audit. Whilst the limitations of this audit approach was highlighted in 
chapters 4 & 5, the Audit Commission was straightforward in the language it used to 
report on its findings as the following comment on the Met Police demonstrates: 
 
“Performance in relation to crime data is inconsistent. A good standard 
has been achieved for crime reclassification, a function undertaken 
centrally by the Data Accuracy Team. The standard of 'no criming' is 
poor having deteriorated from 'good' in 2006: this function is undertaken 
at BCUs and whilst reasons for non compliance vary, a lack of knowledge 
of Home Office Counting Rules was apparent. Overall, crime data has 
been assessed as fair.” (Audit Commission/MPS 2007:9)18  
 
 
Whilst the Audit Commission were not aware of ‘false reporting’ policies and their 
impact on the crime recording standard in 2006, when this part of the research 
was conducted, the auditors did uncover and report unfavourably on similar policies 
discovered during their audit of the Met. Police in 2007: 
 
“A number of local policies are in use, and whilst most comply with the 
relevant guidelines or standards, there is evidence of non compliant 
policies being implemented”. (Audit Commission/MPS May 2007:7)  
 
 
The Audit Commission also carried out data quality checks on the ‘incident’ 
categorisation as part of this audit of the Met, (recording ‘incidents’ inaccurately, e.g. 
                                                 
18 Unpublished but accessible on the MPA web site) 
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reported crimes as suspicious incidents, was one way of circumventing the crime 
audit checks19). The findings prompted the following comment: 
 
“The data is not yet of a sufficient standard of accuracy to merit sharing 
with partner agencies (such as crime and disorder reduction 
partnerships) but BCUs that we visited have NIM compliant tasking 
mechanisms in place and data sharing protocols which will facilitate the 
sharing and use of NSIR data when appropriate.” (Audit 
Commission/MPS May 2007:10) 
 
However the Audit Commission only placed the national report in the public domain. 
Local force specific reports had to be accessed directly via the Audit Commission or 
individual forces. There was also a problem with the aggregation of individual Police 
Command Unit results into the overall force ‘grade’. This could result in a form of 
‘definitional gaming’ (Jackson 2005) as low data compliance levels in Police 
Command Units where particular crime types are prevalent could be ‘masked’ in the 
aggregated data compliance results. This factor was acknowledged by the Audit 
Commission: 
 
“In 2003, there were 19 forces where the average gap between the 
compliance rate of the best-performing BCU and the weakest in recording 
crimes was more than 10 per cent, suggesting that not enough was being 
done to share good practice between BCUs. (Audit Commission 2004:11). 
 
 
Such non-compliance could have a disproportionate impact on force’s overall 
performance on crime reduction.  
 
 
The Audit Commission’s support for Neighbourhood Crime Fighting Teams, the basis 
for Neighbourhood Policing, involved an assessment of the West Midlands Police 
                                                 
19 The Audit Commission check incidents categorised as crimes against crime reports.  If an operator 
doesn’t indicate an incident is a crime the crime audit would not pick it up. 
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experience (Smith 2002). The methodology employed (primarily interviews with 
police officers) did not appear to take into account the wider impact on the 
distribution of resources (see Chapter 8 & Patrick 2004b).  
 
 
 
8. THE INDEPENDENT POLICE COMPLAINTS COMMISSION (IPCC): 
 
 
The IPCC took over from the Police Complaints Authority on 1st April 2004 with the 
aim of improving public confidence, as the chairperson Nick Hardwick was to 
comment: 
 
“The body will mark a fresh start for the complaints system and boost the 
public’s confidence in the service” (Police Review 19.3.2004:22) 
 
The IPCC has its own team of investigators and senior investigating officers in order 
to carry out its own investigations in more serious cases. However it can make an 
order to supervise or manage investigations carried out by outside forces. All police 
forces have to report complaints of a serious nature to the IPCC in order that they can 
decide the level of scrutiny they will apply. The referral of the J.L.M. case, (discussed 
in detail in chapter 7 ‘skewing’), to the IPCC and their stated objective of 
investigating the wider issues of how the West Midlands Police dealt with child 
protection and domestic violence incidents in general did provided an insight into 
their effectiveness. The investigation was, on the surface, fairly straightforward. The 
Part VIII review had already identified where the individual failings had occurred. 
The internal report on child protection procedures completed on 18th June 2004 
(WMP 2004 unpublished) rendered the force culpable for the underinvestment and 
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under management of their child protection units. A review of previous Part VIII 
reviews would have confirmed the trend referred to in the report dated 18th June 2004. 
The officers involved could avail themselves of the defence that they were under-
staffed and over worked and this had led to the failings identified in the Part VIII 8 
review. HMIC’s inspection report in 2006 (HMIC/West Mids. 2006:48) confirmed 
under-staffing in Child Protection Units.   
 
Reviews of individual cases of such seriousness have had a major impact on police 
practice and procedure in the past: Lord Macpherson’s report (1999) into the death of 
Steven Lawrence; Lord Laming’s inquiry (2003), following the death of Victoria 
Climbie, and Sir Michael Bichard’s inquiry (2004), following the Soham murders, 
being the most recent examples.  However the IPCC investigation did not criticise the 
West Midlands Police. The results of the investigation were released in a press 
statement from the IPCC in 2.4.2008 (three years after the child’s death): 
 
“No evidence of systematic failure, but scope for significant 
improvements…….Previous reports found shortcomings by several 
agencies concerned. Our investigation does however confirm that there 
was no serious misconduct by individual officers, no systematic failure in 
West Midland Police’s approach to child protection, and no evidence of 
failure by the police to pass on information to other agencies”. 
(www.IPCC.gov.uk/news/pr020408)  
 
Examination of the IPCC report (IPCC 9.6.08 unpublished) on the investigation 
carried out by a Detective Chief Inspector from the West Midlands Police revealed 
that the officers from the Family Protection Unit who had investigated the assault on a 
child which preceded the murder of J.L.M. had cited workload pressures for their 
identified failings. The investigating officer made the following comment: 
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“It is the opinion of the investigating officer that this delay was excessive 
and cannot be justified even in light of the extreme resource and 
workload pressures outlined by [details withheld] during interview.”  
(IPCC 9.6.08:23 unpublished)   
 
“It is clear that the excessive pressure of work within the team led to this 
officer being allocated an investigation that would not usually have been 
expected to own at this stage of [deleted] attachment.” (IPCC 9.6.08:23 
unpublished)   
 
A local command unit policy, which advised officers not to circulate suspects details 
until a certain level of evidence has been obtain was cited as the reason for the failure 
to circulate the named suspect as ‘wanted’ on the Police National Computer: 
 
“Suspects should only be circulated on PNC when there is sufficient 
evidence to support a substantive charge against them (pending 
interview) e.g. statement(s) from the IP and/or witnesses clearly 
identifying the offender, positive forensic evidence identifying the 
offender etc.” (IPCC 9.6.08:18 unpublished)   
 
The failure to circulate as wanted the known offender was commented upon 
unfavourably in the Part VIII Review of the case (see Chapter 7) and resulted in a 
missed opportunity to arrest the offender prior to the murder of J.L.M. However, the 
investigating officer was of the opinion that his arrest would not have prevented him 
being at liberty at the time of the murder: 
 
“However it is extremely likely that he would have been released on police 
bail following interview albeit with conditions attached to protect his 
three victims [details deleted] owing to the requirement to obtain other 
statements from witnesses.” (IPCC 9.6.08:20 unpublished)   
 
The option of informing the National Probation Service with a view to revoking his 
prison release ‘licence’ is not referred to specifically in the report. 
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The report also identified a failure to record, on the force incident recording system, 
the fact that a crime had occurred when the earlier assault was reported by a third 
party: 
 
“The information contained in the call clearly indicates that a domestic 
assault has occurred and that there is concern regarding the safety of the 
children with [offender named]. This information is not reflected in the 
wording of the log.” (IPCC 9.6.08:5 unpublished)   
 
It would appear the officers attending the incident were unaware a crime of assault 
had occurred and dealt with the incident as a ‘breach of the peace’ removing the 
offender from the scene.  
 
There in nothing in the documentation released to suggest that any audit of calls has 
taken place to check that crimes are not being recorded as such on the incident 
recording system therefore allowing officers to use their discretion at the scene to 
decide whether or not to record the incident as a crime or not i.e.’ cuffing’. Such a 
practice would, as has been discussed earlier in this chapter, circumvent the Audit 
Commission’s data quality checks. Failure to record reported assaults as crimes 
‘cuffing’ featured in the death of another child, N.M. referred to in chapter 4. 
 
The investigating officer did attach a copy of an internal West Midlands Police report, 
‘Child Protection Audit’, dated 15.3.04, completed by the ‘Climbie Implementation 
Project team’.  This report was not as direct or hard hitting as the report dated 18 June 
2004 (see chapter 8) which did not appear, from the evidence available, to have been 
 376
released to the IPCC20.  The report dated 15.3.04 did however highlight the problems 
with ‘arresting suspects by appointment’, which featured in the J.L.M. case: 
 
“The interviewing of offenders by appointment was found to occur as a 
matter of course on some CPUs….In terms of reinforcing the gravity of 
committing offences against children to offenders, interviewing by 
appointment potentially undermines this principle.” (IPCC/West 
Midlands Police 15.3.04:5 unpublished)   
 
The IPCC did, however, commission an independent report by an expert in the field 
of child protection (The Fox Report). The IPCC press release on the investigation 
concludes: 
 
“Neither the investigation of the handling of the J.L.M. case nor the wider 
independent review found evidence of systematic failures in WMP’s 
arrangements. However both shortcomings by individual officers in the 
case and significant scope for improved working arrangements were 
identified.” (www.ipcc.gov.uk/020408) 
 
The high workloads of Child Protection Units commented on by HMIC (HMIC West 
Mids. 2006:48) was not referred to although the increase in resources committed to 
Child Protection Units was referred to positively:   
  
“The actions taken and the resources committed by West Midlands Police 
demonstrates an open-minded approach to learning and improved 
working by a generally high-performing force, which is good news for the 
public of the West Midlands.”  (www.ipcc.gov.uk/020408).   
 
The positive portrayal of an increased allocation of resources after the ‘event’ under 
investigation was in marked contrast to the position taken by the inquiry into the 
                                                 
20 It is impossible to determine whether or not the investigating officer was aware of the existence of 
the report dated 18.6.04 addressed from the Detective Superintendent Child & Adult Protection, Crime 
Support to the Assistant Chief Constable (Crime). 
 377
Soham murders where post incident actions were viewed as evidence of pre-incident 
neglect (Bichard 2004:8-9). 
 
Whilst this was just one case, investigated by the IPCC, it did provide an opportunity 
to test the IPCC’s investigative ability against a set of known criteria, i.e. knowledge 
of the details of the case enabled comparison with their findings and conclusions. This 
was pertinent as at the time this research was concluding the IPCC was attracting 
criticism: 
 
“The Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) came under 
fire when a High Court Judge called its thinking ‘fatally flawed. Mr 
Justice Saunders made the criticism when considering R (Dennis) v 
Independent Police Complaints Commission CO/9140/2007, 6 May 
2008…..‘It is important that the functions of the [IPCC] are carried out 
properly to maintain public confidence in the system and the police force 
and to ensure if there are lessons to be learnt that that happens’ 
(www.lag.org.uk/27.6.08)    
 
         
“The IPCC, which was set up in April 2004 to replace a discredited Police 
Complaints Authority, was dealt a severe blow when more that 100 
members of the Police Action Lawyers Group (PALG) withdrew their 
backing from the commission and two of the group’s representative 
members…resigned from its advisory board this year” 
(www.lag.org.uk/27.6.08)            
 
 
  
The evidence reviewed in this research suggests such criticism was valid. 
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9. CHIEF OFFICERS OF POLICE:  
 
Although not a regulator in the formal sense the Association of Chief Police Officers 
does act as a professional body and set standards for service delivery in certain areas. 
It is therefore of value to review the reaction of chief officers to Performance 
Management and the potential encroachment on their operational independence.  
 
In 1978 Sir Robert Mark, the retired Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, 
warned of the dangers of political encroachment into the operational realms of 
policing: 
 
“Resistance to political encroachment on their operational freedom and 
exposure to the brunt of social change. By comparison with these two, 
crime is never likely to be more than the conventional costly nuisance it is 
today and terrorism, as today, in reality a comparatively insignificant 
issue. Freedom and public order, in the widest sense, must be the 
priorities for the police of tomorrow – and I mean free from domestic, not 
foreign masters.” (Mark 1978:290)  
 
 
 
John Alderson, the ex Chief Constable of Devon and Cornwall, and a pioneer of 
‘neighbourhood policing’ warned his fellow Chief Officers of the constraints a 
subscription to narrowly defined performance criteria would impose upon them: 
 
“Trapped as they are in the world of criminal statistics as proof of their 
efficiency, the police need to break out and seek other measurements of 
their success.”(Alderson 1979:7) 
 
 
The ex Chief Constable of Bedfordshire was to comment on the unwanted side effects 
of performance management in 2001:  
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“Experience in policing and of any other organisation where performance 
management techniques are used, powerfully shows that when robust 
performance management techniques come in the door, ethics tend to go 
out the window” (O’Byrne 2001)   
 
 
In 2003 this warning was to be repeated in a forthright manner by Peter Neyroud, then 
Chief Constable of Thames Valley, in the written evidence he presented on behalf of 
ACPO to the Parliamentary Committee on Administration. The following is an extract 
from the memorandum submitted to the committee: 
 
Q. “Is there a danger that targets and league tables that are badly drawn 
up and crudely managed will destroy morale and motivation on the front 
line – for instance by implying that professionals can’t be trusted? 
 A: Yes. “Policing for London” exposed the real erosion of trust in the 
organisation created by an even focus on performance measures and a 
real danger of “administrative corruption” (Parliamentary Select 
Committee on Public Administration 2003). 
 
Following the Police Federation of England and Wales’s Annual Conference in 2007, 
which brought the perverse effects of performance management into the media 
‘spotlight’, Bob Quick, the Chief Constable of Surrey, admitted that overall 
improvements in detection rates did not necessarily imply success, as such results 
were achieved by improving the detection of softer, easy to investigate crimes 
(London Evening Standard 20.10.07). This revelation was then followed by an 
acknowledgement from the Chief Executive of the National Policing Improvement 
Agency21 that serious crime was being neglected: 
 
“The professional view is that the one area in which we have not 
improved significantly over the last ten years is raising our level of 
performance in relation to the most serious crimes.” (The Times 
13.11.2007). 
 
                                                 
21 Peter Neyroud 
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He suggested the blame for this rested with the performance regime: 
 
“Because detecting a stolen milk bottle counts the same as detecting a 
murder….you get your points from, not necessarily milk bottles, but 
certainly mid-range, volume crime, rather than serious crime.” (The 
Times 13.11.2007).   
 
This public announcement was to stimulate the type of public response which earlier 
comments from the HMIC had failed to elicit:  
 
“This is a striking intervention from one of the most senior and 
experienced police officers in the country…..The public would expect the 
police to make it a priority to deal with serious crimes of violence.”   
(Richard Garside22 quoted in The Times 13.11.2007).   
 
 
However, Peter Neyroud did not outline the role his fellow ACPO officers had played 
in bringing about this state of affairs. The National Association of Retired Officers 
was not so reticent: 
 
“NARPO have provided evidence to Sir Ronnie’s review [HMIC 2008]. In 
that evidence we have highlighted the movement of the service away from 
a common sense approach to policing, allowing the use of discretion by 
police officers relying on their professionalism, training and experience, 
towards an over accountable, target driven, and bureaucratic service. The 
fact is that much of this bureaucratic burden has been imposed from 
outside the service with varying degrees of complicity from senior 
management” (NARPO Nov 2007:11)  
 
 
One of the interviewees was also to comment on the role of chief officers in 
maintaining ethical standards: 
 
                                                 
22 Director of the Centre for Crime and Justice studies at King’s College London 
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“A police force is shaped by its Chief Officer who then shapes the senior 
officers and sets a tone and that tone trickles its way down” (Interviewee 
C) 
 
 
HMIC placed a responsibility on chief officers to monitor and deter the perverse 
effects of performance management as the following extract from the good practice 
guide demonstrates: 
 
 Have all unethical crime recording practices been eradicated? 
 Are high volume crimes being unnecessarily pursued at the expense of 
proper investigation of more serious crime? 
 Is there a system for the chief officer team to be advised by the head of the 
CID of any inconsistencies or bad practice in crime recording, and 
investigation, particularly major crime investigation? 
 Is the standard applied for crimes detected upon the authorisation of a 
senior police officer only attributed to a particular perpetrator whose 
involvement is provable by evidence which, if given in court, would be 
likely to result in a conviction, commonly including at least an 
unprompted admission containing accurate features of the crime that 
only the perpetrator would have known?  
 Whilst embracing the concept of best value, is the ‘service’ side of 
policing, for example child protection and community and schools liaison, 
work still afforded a high priority? 
 Is there a genuine desire by chief officers to find out what is going on in 
their force?                                   
                                                                                      (HMIC 1999: Appendix A)  
 
 
Of course there is little or no incentive to be vigilant and no evidence emerged from 
this research to indicate that any sanctions were imposed on the chief officers of those 
forces where malpractice was uncovered or exposed: 
 
“There are a number of cases in recent years where Chief Constables and 
others have left the service under something of a cloud but actually can 
anybody identify any case where a Chief Constable has actually been held 
to account for things that’s he’s done or have gone wrong in their force. 
The closest you get is the Chief Constable of Humberside…at the end of 
the day he retired on pension.” (Interviewee A) 
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More junior officers tended to bear the burden of responsibility for any wrongdoing; a 
feature of policing identified by Smith & Gray (1983); Smith (1986); and Waddington 
(1999) and labelled by Ericson 1981) as “organisational hypocrisy”. Clearly in the 
case of the West Midlands prior to HMIC’s inspection in 1998 (HMIC 1999) senior 
management had their suspicions that ‘gaming’ was occurring as the following quote, 
from an Assistant Chief Constable in the West Midlands Police, implies: 
 
“An area of concern is under-recording. I can’t rule out people wanting 
to generate good figures.’ In that force, a separate method of recording 
those ‘difficult to detect’ crimes, was discovered.” (HMIC 1999:20) 
 
 
The findings of the HMIC inspection in 1998 had a marked impact on the force as 
ethical crime recording procedures were introduced. However whilst the procedures 
in relation to TICs in general were tightened the practice of seeking post sentence 
TICs continued, although they tended to be sought for selective offences such as 
vehicle crime and burglary which had become the focus of more refined detection 
targets. However the procedure was known to be fraught with risks: 
 
“It didn’t kick in immediately this fiddle, some OCUs were quicker than 
others, other OCUs were slower and some wouldn’t touch it with a barge 
pole, quite understandably, but you are back into this performance 
culture” (Interviewee D) 
 
It was clear problems with this type of detection were being brought to the attention 
of senior officers prior to the incident in October 2003 when officers were arrested 
during the operation in which drugs were passed to an offender released from prison 
into their custody: 
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“There was a reluctance to tackle them head on. I can think of two OCUs 
that Performance Review would regularly raise concerns about and they 
were pushed upstairs, highlighted to ACPO, and nothing ever happened.” 
(Interviewee D) 
 
 
Other more detached interviewees (Interviewees A; B; & C) were to take a more 
supportive view of the senior officers:  
 
“Well I think the force had been grabbed by the scruff of the neck and it 
had been shook up, but the nature of policing is that these things re assert 
themselves. There is a strong culture.” (Interviewee C) 
 
 
However, there was no evidence that managers at Command Unit level were being 
penalised for the ‘gaming’ practices uncovered:   
 
“The problem was as we went further down the time line dealing with 
those OCUs, dealing with those people on OCUs, the managers who were 
appearing to be abusing the rules to enhance their own performance. 
That was something I was always disappointed with because nobody was 
ever pulled up before him (the Chief Constable) or any other similar 
person to be disciplined, to be if you like smacked on the head and it was 
unfortunate that it wasn’t dealt with in the way it should have been.” 
(Interviewee D) 
 
 
Whilst the scale of abuse involving TIC procedures may have emanated from lower 
echelons of the service and failed to register alarm with senior management the 
introduction of ‘false reporting’ policies was a direct result of senior managerial 
decisions and force policies were ‘signed off’ by chief constables. Although the 
interviewees were all of the opinion that the policy would lead to crimes being 
‘cuffed’ some were conciliatory towards chief constables who introduced the policy: 
 
“You would want to say; they’re sufficiently experienced enough and 
knowledgeable to understand the consequences of each and every one of 
their policies; on the other hand they are initiating a policy which is 
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designed not to ensure that crime is accurately recorded but to ensure 
that crime is under-recorded. So, on both accounts you would want to say 
you have some concerns. I actually doubt if they really understand all of 
the implications of what they are saying here.” (Interviewee A) 
 
 
However, on the issue of where responsibility for the general levels of integrity within 
a force lay, the interviewees supported the position taken by HMIC (1999) that the 
ultimate responsibility lay with senior officers who set the ethical tone for the 
organisation.  Having completed a review of the documentation and performance data 
relating to the West Midlands Police the interviewee C was to conclude: 
 
“There is a tone within the organisation which is not healthy.” 
(Interviewee C) 
 
The problems uncovered by of detections (table 10.1 and 10.2) in relation to 
DNFPA/non sanctioned detections and revealed in the correspondence between 
ACPO and the Information Commissioner provides an illustration of the level of 
internal scrutiny applied by chief officers when adequate external arrangements are 
not sufficient.  
 
 
10. THE RANK AND FILE OFFICERS AND THE POLICE FEDERATION OF 
ENGLAND & WALES: 
 
 
One of the most powerful forms of regulation is self-regulation by those charged with 
the delivery of the service and in the case of police constables their authority derives 
from the Crown. So they are individually responsible for their own actions and, in 
theory, need not obey if ordered to do something unlawful by their superior officers. 
This in itself is a potential constraint on ‘gaming’ and one of the interviewees was of 
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the opinion that the ‘gaming’ practices prevalent within the police service of the 
1960s and 1970s would not be able to re-establish themselves because of the 
resistance they were likely to generate from a new generation of police officers: 
 
“I think it’s harder, it might be more attractive to senior officers but I 
don’t think there is the commitment of more junior officers to undertake 
those sorts of dubious activities. I think policing has changed in the last 
ten years, to the extent that many of the people who join it now join the 
service because it is a job they want to do other than a career they want to 
have and they are not prepared to put themselves out on limb as people 
were in the past.” (Interviewee A)  
 
 
Another interviewee was also to comment on the discomfort the pressure to engage in 
‘gaming’ had engendered in new recruits: 
 
“There is a strong culture in the police.  If that culture becomes 
dysfunctional, where everyone chases numbers, very rapidly the junior 
officers will be drawn into that culture and will become zealous in their 
probationary period to achieve the numbers that are required. Now that’s 
not a professional start to your career…… It is difficult for people in that 
position, for a PC to go to the Superintendent and say you’ve got it wrong 
Sir; for a probationer to go to a Superintendent and say ‘you are 
breaching human rights.’ (Interviewee C)  
 
 
One medium for junior officers to vent their frustrations and expose ‘gaming’ has 
emerged recently in the form of web chat rooms and one of those who made use of 
this communications channel was the constable who used the pseudonym  David 
Copperfield. He subsequently published his observations, which contained numerous 
examples of gaming, in book form (Copperfield 2006). This stimulated a rebuttal 
from the Police Minister in the House of Commons.  Another example was the 
virulent opposition to the Chief Constable of Essex, an exponent of performance 
management, who was the subject of a lengthy chat room discussion on the police 
 386
oracle web site (www.policeoracle.com/forum 6.7.2006) and again ‘gaming’ practices 
were exposed as the following entry demonstrates: 
 
“Discretion goes out the window and folks, mainly law abiding who have 
committed minor misdemeanours are being lifted for offences that are 
going nowhere. This of course allows prolific criminals to run round 
doing as they like. His latest trick is to remove officers from front line to 
custody blocks to obtain TICs – worthless detections just to get our det. 
rate up. Again, more officers off the front line getting ticks in the box 
from criminals who won’t be punished any more, and of no benefit to the 
victim.”   (www.policeoracle.com/forum 6.7.2006)  
 
 
Whilst such resistance could be expected from the rank and file of any organisation 
undergoing a process of change the reference to some of the ‘gaming’ practices 
discussed in this thesis suggested that the officers were highlighting genuine 
problems. When the performance profile of Essex Police was examined the officer’s 
observations were supported: TICs for the combined key performance offences of 
Burglary, Robbery and Vehicle crime doubled between 2004/5 and 2006/7, (Fig. 
10.6). The force’s poor grades ‘across the board’ on table 10.1 also supports the 
allegations made by the officers.   
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(Fig. 10.6)                                                                       (Home Office 2008) 
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Another example of officers exposing ‘gaming’ occurred in 2008 when a memo 
issued by an Inspector in Norfolk was leaked to the media.  “The whistleblower who 
released the document said police chiefs regularly discussed how to downgrade more 
serious offences” (Daily Mail 9.7.2008). In the memo the Inspector who wrote the 
memo is clearly instructing officers to adopt an ‘evidential’ crime recording standard 
(see chapter 4), as the following extract demonstrates: 
  
“We appear to be making things difficult for ourselves by ‘criming’ 
things which aren’t crimes…. One example is where a car window is 
found to be damaged, no entry to vehicle, no witnesses and no idea how it 
happened…..This has been recorded as criminal damage, even though 
there is no evidence to suggest it fits the definition. If there is no evidence 
of someone intending to destroy or be reckless then there is no 
crime…Please ask yourself if there is evidence of a crime or if it is more 
appropriate to deal with it in a different way?” (Daily Mail 9.7.2008)    
 
 
 
The Police Federation for England and Wales reflected their members’ concerns by 
raising the issue of ‘gaming’ in their Annual National Conference in 2007. Examples 
of ‘gaming’ were sought from members throughout England and Wales and these 
featured in the conference address on the topic. The presentation concentrated on the 
curtailment of officer’s discretion and the pursuit of minor offences which boosted 
performance. The issues surrounding TICs were not touched upon. This in turn 
stimulated media interest and the Policing Minister was required to respond. The 
Federation also commissioned two related pieces of research; Chattereton and 
Bingham (2006) evaluated the impact of Neighbourhood Policing on the ability of the 
service to provide ‘round the clock’ response policing. Chattereton (2008) evaluated 
the resilience of the ‘general’ CID to investigate serious crime. These two studies 
support the findings of this study in relation to the spreading of resources (Patrick 
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2004c) and the lack of investment in the control of serious crime both forms of 
‘skewing’. The Federation also took the opportunity to question the validity of 
recorded crime figures by highlighting the presence of ‘cuffing’:  
 
“Officers are being very innovative in the way that offences are recorded 
because so much pressure is being placed upon them by senior 
management who are having pressure placed upon them by the Home 
Office in order to make it appear to the public that crime is in fact 
reducing….In some parts of the country, Mr Gordon said, police were 
keeping crime figures low by encouraging people who had their mobile 
phones stolen to report them as lost”  (www.policeoracle.com 12.11.2007) 
 
 
Such instances of resistance from the rank and file to ‘gaming’ practices are at odds 
with the position of those who maintain police corruption is ‘bottom up’ exemplified 
by Tyre (1999).   
 
 
11. POLICE AUTHORITIES: 
 
 
The duty of a Police Authority is to ‘secure the maintenance of an efficient and 
effective police force for its area (Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, s. 106)  
However there was little evidence to indicate that they were effective in controlling 
the types of ‘gaming’ practices identified by this research. This lack of impact was 
commented on by one interviewee: 
 
“Police Authorities, I’m sometimes disappointed, it varies around the 
country, some are very pro-active and very good…….I’m sometimes a bit 
disappointed they don’t bite enough; disappointed police authorities are 
unwilling to sort of punch their weight within the partite arrangements.  
Chief Constables have seen themselves pushed back by central 
government the Home Office leg of the tripartite arrangement through 
performance management. It’s only with the proposed merger of forces 
when their very existence was threatened that the authorities baulked and 
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actually forced the Home Office to re consider its position.” (Interviewee 
C) 
 
Docking (2003) also noted that the public were largely unaware of the role of Police 
Authorities and questioned their effectiveness: 
 
 
“However many people were sceptical as to whether they were effective, 
largely because of their low profile.” (Docking 2003: vi) 
 
Greater Manchester Police Authority was the one exception to come to notice during 
the research. The force had not adopted a ‘false reporting’ policy (chapter 5) and an 
interview with the Police Authority’s information officer revealed that the Authority 
had taken an active stance against the policy because they felt it was contrary to the 
NCRS. The interview revealed the importance the authority placed on accurate data 
and the links to public satisfaction. However they were candid about the pressure 
government targets to reduce crime placed on the force: 
 
“we would rather see the true level of crime recorded because that means 
everyone gets dealt with better because they get treated better and the 
police also use better intelligence and they can ‘hot spot’ operations 
better. However, the Government, politically, the Home Office clearly 
don’t want crime to go up. So there is a constant tension between what the 
reality is” (Interviewee H). 
 
The Authority had also responded to the rise in detections through the use of fixed 
penalties and engaged with the force on a scrutiny exercise: 
  
“So at the moment we are looking at penalty notices for disorder (FPDs), 
that side of things because again it’s Government policy, but what is the 
impact on members of the Public out there? What is it doing to the 
statistics in that respect?  (Interviewee H) 
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However such commitment to quality control can have negative consequences and the 
Authority and the force were sensitive to the fact that they had been subjected to PSU 
‘engagement’. Interviewee H was unwilling to comment on the force’s stance on 
TICs.  
 
The Nottinghamshire Police Authority didn’t require the resignation of the Chief 
Constable after the media exposure of the revelations made by Superintendent Coles. 
The action taken to remove the Chief Constable of Humberside, following the 
Bichard Inquiry, was prompted by the Home Secretary not the Police Authority. In 
the case of the ‘gaming’ behaviours uncovered by HMIC (1998 unpublished) in the 
West Midlands it would appear that the scale and implications of the behaviour were 
not explained fully to the Police Authority. However the powers available to the 
Police Authorities are extremely limited. They appoint Chief Officers, although they 
are advised on their choice by HMIC and the Home Secretary, and they can dismiss 
Chief Officer subject to the approval of the Home Secretary. No other form of 
sanction is available to them, other than the somewhat draconian measure of 
dismissal. However they can chose not to renew the Chief Constable’s contract after 
the initial five year term.  
 
It is also clear from this research that the data presented to police authorities is 
complex and requires interpretation and this provides Chief Constables with a distinct 
advantage over their Police Authorities; an advantage which many chief executives 
have exploited: 
 
“if the chief executive is allowed to control the social distribution of 
information through secrecy and selective presentation of information, 
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then he can control the definition of the situation.” (Pfeffer & Salancik 
1978: cited in Pugh 1997:150). 
 
The ability of senior police officers to control information in order to set the criteria 
for debate was noted by Raine et al in their review of Policing Boards in 2006:  
         
“In particular, for effective public accountability, it is vital that the 
‘agent’ who is to be called to account by the community does not 
‘capture’ and dictate the basis on which accountability is framed.  In 
other words, for effective public accountability, it is essential that 
members of the community, as principals, are able to ask the questions 
and receive answers on the particular issues that matter most to them, 
rather than those that happen to preoccupy the agent.” (Raine et al 
2006:11) 
 
 
The Metropolitan Police Authority’s response to the negative Audit Commission 
report in May 2007 was to establish a Scrutiny Committee to work with the Deputy 
Commissioner on improving the situation. However the Met’s Poor results remained 
largely unpublicised until an article appeared in the London Evening Standard during 
the 2008 Mayoral campaign: 
 
“Parts of the Met are deliberately preventing Londoners from reporting 
crime to keep the figures down, an official report has found…Published 
crime statistics are “inaccurate” and sometimes “dishonest” and police 
have been “pressurised” to massage the numbers for political reasons, it 
claims.” (The London Evening Standard 18.4.2008)  
 
The reliability of the crime data did not feature in the controversy over the 
Commissioner’s productivity payment for 2007/8 which would have been partly 
based on the success in reducing recorded crime. In fact the apparent improvement in 
the performance of the MPS was used to bolster the Commissioner’s position 
following the outcome of the De Menezes Health and Safety trial: 
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“Sir Ian is important to the government because he is at the forefront of 
modernising the force, introducing neighbourhood policing strategies and 
shaking up old-fashioned police culture” (BBC News 22.11.2007).  
 
However, the improvement in the MPS’s performance in reducing crime could be 
accounted for by a return to an ‘evidential’ crime recording standard (chapter 4 & 5) 
which would explain the low Audit Commission rating. The improvement in 
detections is also assisted by an increase in TICs, particularly noticeable over the 
period 2005 – 2007 (Fig. 10.7). This could also be linked to the concerns raised by the 
Law in Action broadcast (BBC Radio 4 5.6.2007) when two of London’s leading 
criminal lawyers objected to the use of intelligence interviews by police officers to 
engage in unsupervised ‘conversations’ with their clients (the implications of this are 
discussed in detail in chapter 6).   
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(Fig. 10.7)                                                                            (Home Office 2008) 
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12. THE COMMISSION FOR RACIAL EQUALITY (CRE): 
 
 
The recent history of relations between the police and minority ethnic groups in the 
United Kingdom has been beleaguered by tension and mistrust highlighted in the 
reports by Lord Scarman (1981) and Sir William Macpherson (1999).  Both reports 
commented adversely on the organisational aspects of policing which contributed to 
an environment of mistrust. Lord Scarman concluded that a ‘crime fighting’ model of 
policing with its emphasis on the detection and prosecution of offenders had led to a 
breakdown in relationships with minority communities who believed insensitive 
policing was criminalising the community as a whole. This report led the police 
service to reassess its role and move towards an ‘order maintenance’ model, with an 
emphasis on service oriented consensual policing (Alderson 1979). The change in 
name of the Metropolitan Police Force to Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) and the 
introduction of the MPS’s PLUS23 programme are evidence of this shift in policing 
style. The Macpherson report concluded that “professional incompetence, institutional 
racism and a failure of leadership by senior officers” had led to the failings uncovered 
by the inquiry into the death of Stephen Lawrence. The term ‘institutional racism’, 
initially applied by Scarman to overtly racist policies and practices deliberately 
pursued by an organisation, was re defined by the Lawrence Inquiry as: 
 
“The collective failure of an organisation to provide an appropriate and 
professional service to people because of their colour, culture, or ethnic 
origin. It can be seen or detected in processes, attitudes and behaviour 
which amount to discrimination through unwitting prejudice, ignorance, 
thoughtlessness and racial stereotyping which disadvantage minority 
ethnic people. (Macpherson 1999: para. 6.34) 
 
                                                 
23 The PLUS programme was based on a report by Wolf Olins (1989), ‘A Force for Change’, 
commissioned by the MPS and was designed to ensure the whole ethos of public service was embraced 
by the MPS   
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The organisational element of ‘institutional racism’ led the British Government to 
place a legal duty on most public authorities in Britain to ensure that public services 
were free of ‘institutional racism’. The Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000, 
founded upon the Race Relations Act 1976, came into effect on 31st May 2002 and 
required public authorities to: 
 
“Monitor their functions and policies for any adverse impact on race 
equality. They are also required to assess the likely impact of any 
proposed policies on the promotion of race equality. This means that they 
will have to develop and adopt ethnic monitoring systems for the work 
they carry out to meet their legal responsibilities” (www.cre.gov.uk)  
 
 
In  2003 the police service was again the subject of critical review following the 
revelations of a BBC documentary ‘The Secret Policeman’ based on the experience of 
an undercover reporter who revealed “devastating comments and images of extreme 
racism within the police” (The Independent Newspaper 9.3.2005).   In response the 
Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) launched an inquiry (CRE 2005), headed by 
Sir David Calvert-Smith, in October 2003.  
 
The interim report noted the lack of progress in the implementation of the provisions 
of the RRAA (CRE 2004), a responsibility which lay firmly with the higher echelons 
of the service and formal action was threatened under the provisions of the RR (A) A 
2000: 
“Trevor Phillips, chairman of the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE), 
is to threaten Chief Constables with legal action for flouting race laws. He 
has notified David Blunkett, the home secretary, that he is ready to use 
his ultimate sanction after a formal CRE investigation discovered a 
catalogue of abuses in the police service in England and Wales” (The 
Sunday Times 13.6.2004)  
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However the final report (CRE 2005) was much more conciliatory towards Chief 
Officers of Police: 
 
“Willingness to change at the top is not transferred into action lower 
down, particularly middle-management where you find the ice in the 
heart of the service” (Sir David Calvert-Smith: Quoted in The 
Independent Newspaper 9.3.2005)  
 
It is unknown what brought about this sudden change in emphasis but it saw the focus 
of critical scrutiny shift from the senior echelons of the service, responsible for policy 
and direction, to the lower managerial tiers charged with delivery.  However as 
Lustgarten noted: 
 
“It is for those in charge of the organisation to change its ethos and 
working atmosphere, career rewards and disincentives, so that its 
members come to identify their interests, individually and collectively, 
with the desired behaviour. Training and effective management 
supervision to reinforce its strictures would be a central element in any 
reform strategy. (Lustgarten 1986:127)   
     
 
Whatever the reasons for this change in direction the lack of Race Relations Impact 
Assessments on False Reporting Policies in particular and Crime Recording 
procedures in general (chapter 5) suggests the strategy did not bring about the desired 
reform and implementing the more robust action suggested in the Interim Report  
(CRE 2004) may have been more effective.  
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13. CHAPTER CONCLUSION: 
 
The evidence reviewed in this chapter has shown that the official regulators of the 
Police; HMIC; Police Standards Unit; Independent Police Complaints Commission; 
Information Commissioner; have tended to deal with ‘gaming’ behaviours which are 
organisational in nature in an ‘in house’ manner thus avoiding the potential damage to 
the police service’s public image. This has invariably involved working with Chief 
Officers of Police to rectify any identified organisational issue as opposed to making 
the full circumstances and consequences of their findings public. This denies the 
citizenry and their elected representatives the opportunity to hold those responsible to 
account. This behaviour is much more akin to the workings of a professional body 
responsible for regulating its members. The persistence of ‘gaming’ practices both 
over time and spatially indicates the limitations of such an approach.            
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CHAPTER 11 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
The purpose of this thesis was to identify the nature and scale of ‘gaming’ behaviour 
in the police service in England and Wales and explore why such behaviour persisted. 
This involved the use of a number of empirical methods to measure the impact of 
various types of police ‘gaming’ practices. The extent and scale of the ‘gaming’ 
behaviour identified provided an opportunity to comment on the part played by police 
leadership in relation to the behaviour of the officers under their command. The 
research also facilitated an insight into the role of the police regulators and enabled 
their effectiveness to be judged.  
 
The specific types of ‘gaming’ behaviour; ‘cuffing’ (Chapters 4 & 5); ‘nodding’ 
(Chapter 6) ‘skewing’(Chapters 7 & 8) and ‘stitching’ (Chapter 9) were discernible in 
the literature24 reviewed and quantified in the thesis: Young (1990), Burrows et al 
(2000), FitzGerald (2001) referring to ‘cuffing’: Wilson et al (2001) to ‘nodding’: 
Rogerson (1995); Patrick (2004c); O’Connor (2005); Chatterton & Bingham (2006); 
Chatterton (2008) to ‘skewing’: and Holdaway (1979) and Tait (1994) to ‘stitching’.   
 
The presence of these specific types of ‘gaming’ and the scale indicated by the 
research supports Burrows et al’s (2000) assertion that such behaviours had re-
emerged with the introduction of Performance Management linked to New Public 
Management. This finding challenged HMIC’s assertion that the behaviour was not 
widespread but confined to small pockets (HMIC 1999). The thesis also clarified 
                                                 
24 The behaviour was clearly discernible in the literature reviewed although the terms used in this thesis 
may not have been applied. 
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Loveday’s question (1999) as to whether performance management would improve 
efficiency or lead to ‘gaming’ practices, motivated by a desire to give the false 
impression that performance had improved.  It was clear that ‘gaming’ had been the 
outcome and the scale of it made it impossible to rely on police statistics on recorded 
crime and detections to make any reliable assessment on whether Performance 
Management, in particular, or New Public Management, in general, had improved the 
efficiency of the police measured by these indicators.  
 
Whilst the results from British Crime Survey (BCS) over the period of the research 
(1997-2007) suggested overall crime was reducing, the BCS was limited in its scope, 
excluding under-16s and non-householders and curtailed its questions to specific 
offences.  The Home Affairs Committee (2007) were not convinced that there had 
been a marked improvement in police performance; concluding that an 11% increase 
in police officer numbers between 1997 and 2007 had not impacted significantly on 
the overall level of crime25 as indicated by the BCS. It was however acknowledged 
that significant reductions had been achieved in burglary and vehicle crime with the 
caveat that such reductions may have been influenced by factors beyond direct police 
enforcement activity. This thesis has shown that ‘gaming’ practices, including the 
‘skewing’ of police effort towards detecting minor crimes, has had a significant 
impact on the performance data thus confirming the concerns expressed by the Home 
Affairs Committee (2007).   
 
This thesis re-affirmed the warning about the un-reliability of police statistics 
articulated by Yin (1994) and supported the assertion by Kitsuse & Cicourel (1963) 
                                                 
25 The BCS measures crimes experienced by householders over the age of 16. It does not take into 
account commercial crimes such as shoplifting. 
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and Black (1970) that police statistics were of little value except as measures of police 
behaviour. This assertion was supported and formed the methodological foundations 
of the thesis.   
 
The scale of the ‘gaming’ behaviour identified was shown to have had a significant 
impact on the performance of a number of police forces. This research established that 
‘cuffing’ still persisted even after the introduction of the National Crime Recording 
Standard (NCRS) in April 2002. An indication of the extent to which ‘cuffing’ could 
impact on recorded crime rates was provided by HMIC (2000) who found, prior to the 
introduction of the NCRS, that on average 24 per cent of the crime recorded in force 
command and control incident logs went unrecorded in the corresponding crime 
systems. Reductions of this scale in recorded crime statistics were identified and 
attributed to ‘cuffing’ (chapter 5). In order to help address this issue the National 
Crime Recording Standard could be re-drafted from a ‘balance of probability’ 
standard to a ‘prima facie’ standard.  
 
 
‘Nodding’ was identified as responsible for an average of 30 per cent of all burglaries 
detected and 50 per cent of all vehicle crimes detected by TIC or ‘prison write off’ in 
those forces which were known to have taken encountered abuses of such 
administrative procedures. This was apparent from the performance data on detections 
by detection type prior to and post remedial action and is shown graphically in chapter 
6. Nationally the increased reliance on TICs as a means of detection for burglary and 
vehicle crime (Nichols et al 2007), both statutory performance indicators, may 
indicate the existence and scale of ‘nodding’ across England and Wales. Likewise 
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‘skewing’ (Chapters 7 & 8) and ‘stitching’ (Chapter 9) had a significant impact on 
force’s performance as measured by Government indicators.  
 
These four categories of ‘gaming’ behaviour could, together, be regarded as a 
‘Perverse Policing Model’ against which police forces could be compared. Whilst this 
may be considered to be an organisational ‘ideal type’ in a ‘Weberian’ sense, the use 
of the term ‘ideal’ is in itself perverse as the behaviour it refers to is far from ‘ideal’ in 
the ordinary sense of the word. It is also pertinent to note that the Perverse Policing 
Model like all ‘ideal types’ is a conceptual construction and does not exist in its purest 
form. Such an extreme would be difficult for police forces to conceal from the public 
and sustain. However forces which are able to utilise these ‘gaming’ methods to 
improve performance, i.e. the closer they are to the pure ‘Perverse Policing Model’, 
the more successful they will appear.  That said this carries with it the increased risk 
of scandals or ‘incidents/events’ of the nature discussed in this thesis becoming 
exposed.  
 
All four types of ‘gaming’ behaviour were present, in varying degrees, in the West 
Midlands Police during the period 1995 to 1999 and the force could be categorised as 
a ‘Perverse Policing Model’. The inspection carried out by HMIC (HMIC/WMP 
1998) uncovered ‘cuffing’ and ‘nodding’, however the measures introduced to curtail 
such behaviour proved neither adequate or long lasting thus demonstrating the 
resilience which R.J. in’t Veld’s (1996:36) and De Bruijn (2002 & 2007) noted was a 
feature of ‘gaming’. Certainly ‘nodding’ continued until October 2003 when abuses 
came to light with the arrest of a number of police officers and ‘cuffing’ re-emerged 
in 2004, with the introduction of a ‘false reporting’ policy. ‘Skewing’ in one form or 
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another proved more enduring with some re-allocation of resources towards the 
investigation of gun and gang related crime following the shooting of Charlene Ellis 
and Letisha Shakespeare on New Years Eve 2002. Increased investment in child 
protection units occurred after the death of J.L.M.on 5th August 2004. ‘Stitching’, 
involving abuse of the Home Office counting rules on detections which allowed 
senior officers to authorise suspects to be shown as responsible for alleged offences 
they had not been made aware of and for which there was not sufficient evidence to 
support a charge, stopped when such detections were devalued to non-sanctioned 
detections (Simmons et al 2003).  
 
The ‘spread’ of ‘police gaming’ both within the West Midlands Police and nationally 
supports Collier’s theory on competitive isomorphism (Collier 2005) and confirmed 
the views of Interviewee D who predicted that the ‘gaming’ practices prevalent in the 
West Midlands Police would spread. The lack of evidence provided by forces to 
support the introduction of ‘false reporting’ policies confirmed Collier’s (2006a) 
findings that Performance Management as opposed to knowledge/intelligence based 
systems, such as the National Intelligence Model, was driving police behaviour. The 
experience of ‘cuffing’ and ‘skewing’ reported by the Police Federation at their 
National Conference in 2006 and the Police Federation sponsored research by 
Chatterton & Bingham (2006) and Chatterton (2008) suggested ‘gaming’ behaviours 
were widespread throughout England and Wales. The evidence presented in this thesis 
demonstrates that the Police Federation; Chatterton and Bingham (2006) and 
Chatterton (2008) were not exaggerating or ‘over egging the cake’ as suggested by the 
Minister responsible for Policing.   
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The nature, scale and persistency of the ‘gaming’ practices identified supported De 
Bruijn’s (2002 & 2007) assertion that ‘gaming’ was a consequence of Performance 
Management systems.  It also re-affirmed the claim made by Argyris (1985) that 
management control systems based on performance indicators stimulate those subject 
to such controls to ever more inventive means of subverting the system. The police 
‘gaming types’ identified fell within the category of ‘gaming’ referred to as 
‘behavioural gaming’ (De Bruijn 2002 & 2007, Jackson 2005) which Jackson 
suggested was the most serious and damaging to staff morale (ibid 2005). The police 
‘gaming’ behaviour identified and described by Neyroud (2003) as ‘administrative 
corruption’ would certainly be considered corrupt according to the definitions of 
police corruption advocated by Klienig (1996a 1996b) and Newburn (1999) which 
take into account the motivation for the behaviour under question. The motivation for 
the types of gaming described in this thesis supports Chatterton’s conclusion that the 
objective was a desire to deceive by giving a false impression of improved 
performance (Chatterton 2008:40). The absence of any mitigation, other than a desire 
to achieve Government objectives at any cost, denies those involved of the ‘noble 
cause’ defence, proffered by officers who fabricated evidence in order to secure the 
conviction of those they were convinced were law breakers.   
 
On the question of whether such ‘gaming’ behaviour is driven by the actions of senior 
officers i.e. ‘top down’ or by a deviant culture embedded in front line staff i.e. 
‘bottom up’? The evidence suggests the phenomenon is certainly organisation in 
nature; the sudden and significant shifts in the performance profiles of forces known 
to have changed their data recording procedures indicated the scale of the behaviour. 
It also suggested that officer’s behaviour was susceptible to managerial action, either 
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to prevent ‘gaming’ behaviour or create the environment in which it could flourish. 
One interviewee provided an insight into the relationship between police leaders and 
the rank and file: 
  
“At the Chief Officer level they are pursuing a ruthless approach which 
then impinges on the officers who are delivering the service to the 
public…..If HMI or the Home Secretary kicks the Chief Constable the 
Chief Constable kicks their divisional commanders, eventually it’s the 
PC’s who are going to be kicked and they will kick the public and this is 
where you get these ridiculous stories where tickets are issued for 
ridiculous things: People being arrested for all sorts of nonsense because 
they feel their discretion is gone.” Interviewee C. 
 
It is clear from the evidence presented in this thesis that Performance Management 
systems confer senior officers with the means of exerting considerable pressure on 
junior officers to perform. Whilst written instructions to officers to engage in 
‘gaming’ practices were rare, the scale of the ‘gaming’ behaviour and the suddenness 
with which changes in the statistical patterns occurred suggested the presence of 
managerial direction. If the statistical patterns were the result of an uncoordinated 
collective response on the part of front-line operational officers one would have 
expected more gradual statistical patterns to emerge and more uniformity across the 
country as every force adjusted on a similar time frame. Instead it was apparent that 
forces which adopted particular policies suddenly deviated from the norm reflected in 
national performance data. The complaints from the junior ranks, subsequently 
championed by the Police Federation, indicated that a significant number were 
uncomfortable with ‘gaming’ behaviour and this was leading to ‘whistle-blowing’. 
This is hardly the actions of officers willingly engaging in ‘gaming’ behaviour and 
again supported Chatterton’s conclusion that the pressures were ‘top down’, i.e. senior 
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officers ‘playing performance games to mislead the public into thinking that the crime 
problem was being addressed successfully’ (Chatterton 2008:40).    
 
The involvement of chief officers in the introduction of the ‘false reporting’ policy26 
and the interpretation of the NCRS demonstrated how they had created an 
environment in which ‘cuffing’ could be re-established. Failing to challenge the rules 
by which ‘prison write offs’ could be converted into TICs was another example of 
chief officers allowing those under their command to exploit procedures in order to 
maintain ‘gaming’ practices. Young (1991) was of the opinion that senior officers 
were aware of police ‘gaming’, as they had had to master such methods to progress in 
the service and Ericson (1981) labelled this form of managerial behaviour 
‘organisational hypocrisy’: the likely consequences of the procedures are known but 
can be denied if they result in a scandal. Pfeffer & Salancik (1978) noted this made it 
extremely difficult to hold senior officers to account for the actions of individual 
officers. The scale of the ‘gaming’ behaviours measured in this thesis, coupled with 
the opinions of the officers interviewed suggested senior officers were either directly 
orchestrating the behaviour or turning a ‘blind eye’ to it. One interviewee made the 
following comment on where responsibility for police ‘gaming’ lay: 
 
“Forty-three Chief Constables and a collective blindness of people who 
know and are unwilling or maybe even unable ultimately to do anything 
about it because it is all driven by a performance culture which runs right 
the way through the force from the Chief Constable down to the most 
lowly constable who is now being assessed on the basis very much of their 
competency and their performance.” Interviewee A 
 
                                                 
26 Chief Officers ‘sign off’ force policies and instructions. 
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However the incentive for chief officers to introduce policies, procedures and 
practices designed to ensure probity is minimal, in fact there was a disincentive to 
taking such an approach. As has been evidenced, ensuring high ethical standards had 
a detrimental impact on performance and this in turn created the risk of sanctions in 
the form of PSU ‘engagement’.  In marked contrast high performance, achieved 
through the employment of ‘gaming’ techniques, was likely to result in ‘light touch’ 
inspections which in turn reduced the risk of detection. This led to a situation in which 
unethical behaviour was rewarded through productivity bonuses, promotions and 
honours whilst maintaining ethical standards of behaviour was punished.  The role of 
those regulators charged with preventing such ‘gaming’ practices is therefore critical. 
  
The thesis provided an insight into the various bodies charged with maintaining 
probity in police behaviour (Chapter 10) and revealed a general tendency to underplay 
the scale and nature of ‘gaming’ within the police service. The types of ‘gaming’ 
behaviour identified in the thesis were familiar to the Home Office (Burrows et al 
2000) and HMIC, the principal regulator of the police, (HMIC 1999).  HMIC made it 
quite clear the responsibility placed upon Chief Officers and Police Authorities to 
prevent such unethical behaviour (HMIC 1999 Appendix A). The evidence reviewed 
in this thesis indicated a number of examples where such standards had not been met, 
yet no examples could be found of Chief Officers being publicly sanctioned as a result 
of routine HMIC inspections. When ‘gaming’ behaviour was uncovered by HMIC, it 
appeared that they referred it directly to the Chief Constable to address as opposed to 
informing the Home Secretary or Police Authority with a view to holding the Chief 
Constable to account. One of the interviewees revealed something of this trait: 
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“So sometimes there were suspicions, yes on a number of occasions the 
draft report raised questions even made tentative conclusions which did 
not necessarily appear in the final report. Now that may have been 
because the HMI bottomed them out during this particular inspection or 
it may have been that politically they were not the sort of thing or 
questions which they wanted to publicise.” Interviewee A 
 
HMIC could not be accused of covering up ‘gaming’ as suggested by Bevan & Hood 
(2006) as the behaviour was referred to in the official published inspection reports. 
However the significance of the findings were not given due prominence and 
searching the inspection reports for the pertinent information signifying the presence 
of ‘gaming’ was like ‘looking for a needle in a haystack’. In none of the force 
inspection reports reviewed was ‘gaming’ behaviour referred to as ‘corrupt’.  
Likewise the significance of large fluctuations in the performance statistics was not 
explicitly linked to unethical or corrupt practice. This approach was in marked 
contrast to the approach taken by Sir Michael Bichard, at the public inquiry following 
the ‘Soham’ murders. Sir Michael held the Chief Constable of Humberside 
responsible for the failings of his force:  
   
“when the problems are of this scale in a function critical to effective 
policing, the importance of which had been highlighted nationally on 
several occasions by HMIC, then I do believe that senior management 
could and should have done more to identify and then deal with them. 
The nature of that responsibility has been described above. From March 
1999 at the latest, that was ultimately the personal responsibility of Chief 
Constable Westwood” (Bichard 2004:99).  
 
 
The behaviour of HMIC in this respect is more akin to the approach expected of a 
professional association rather than an independent auditor charged with bringing 
problematic issues to the electorate’s notice, in order that those responsible could be 
held to account.  This approach manifested itself in the joint action taken by HMIC, 
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ACPO and the Home Office in response to ‘stitching’ and associated breach of the 
Data Protection Act, uncovered as a result of the audit of non-sanctioned detections 
(HMIC 2007). The joint approach to the Information Commissioner demonstrated the 
nature of the relationship between ACPO and those charged with regulating and 
governing the police. The evidence presented in this thesis suggests the role of HMIC 
needs to be reviewed and one solution would be to make the Inspectorate directly 
accountable to Parliament as opposed to the Home Office. Careful consideration 
should also be given to continuing the practice of selecting H.M. Inspectors from the 
ranks of the current Chief Officers of Police. Those appointed to chair Public Inquires 
have demonstrated that the skills required to carry out such a scrutiny function are not 
restricted to senior police officers.   
 
However subscription to a ‘professional association’ type approach to regulation was 
not restricted to police regulators. The Information Commissioner’s stated desire to 
‘work with’ the police in order to resolve the problems associated with non-
sanctioned detection, as opposed to using his formal powers to expose the issue, was 
the most obvious example of  a regulator subscribing to an approach more associated 
with a professional association. Whilst the Information Commissioner did add the 
caveat that he would review the decision if any complaint was received from a 
member of the public, the example didn’t accord with the democratic principle of 
making malpractice public in order for those responsible to be held to account27.  This 
preference was also evident in the Commissioner’s decision in the BBC vs. Plymouth 
City Council (2005) case. The decision of the Information Commissioner to prevent 
                                                 
27 Publishing the documents on the problems encountered with non-sanctioned detections on the 
Information Commissioners web site may have provided an opportunity for the public to judge and 
comment upon the Commissioner’s decision on this matter. At the time of submission, Jan 2009, this 
had not occurred. 
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making public all the documents relating to the deaths of children subject of Part VIII 
reviews, on the grounds that such disclosure may result in professionals failing to 
disclose pertinent information (BBC vs. Plymouth City Council 2005), again denied 
the public the opportunity to judge the effectiveness of public servants dealing with 
the critical issue of child protection. 
 
The precedent set by the Information Commissioner in the BBC vs. Plymouth City 
Council needs to be challenged or overturned by legislation. To leave it as it is 
provides a screen behind which public servants can avoid being held to account. The 
fears the Information Commissioners articulated about professionals withholding 
information could be addressed by legislation designed to ensure open disclosure.  
The requirement to publish disclosures made under the provisions of the Freedom of 
Information Act 2000 should be made mandatory as opposed to ‘good practice’ and 
this requirement should apply to the Information Commissioner’s Office.   
 
The ability of the Independent Police Complaints Commission (IPCC) to investigate 
incidents which were linked to organisational factors also appeared limited. The 
investigation conducted by the IPCC following the death of baby J.L.M. (Chapter 7 
‘skewing’ and Chapter 10) does nothing to enhance public confidence in this 
regulator. However they have limited resources and information of an organisational 
nature may have been withheld from them. That factor could be curtailed by the 
introduction of legislation making it a criminal offence to withhold pertinent 
information from any investigation. The onus to prove that all reasonable steps had 
been taken to ensure compliance could be placed on Chief Officers of Police. 
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The Police Standards Unit appeared to be more concerned with improving 
productivity than ensuring probity and the reported improvements in the performance 
of forces following their involvement appeared to be influenced by ‘gaming’ 
behaviour (Chapter 10). The limitations of an audit approach to ensuring reliable 
police recorded crime data was evidenced in Chapter 4 & 5 and supported Argyris’s 
views on the failings of such an approach to management control (Argyris 1985).  
A less predictable approach to police force inspections should be adopted and the 
emphasis put on probity. The statistical patterns identified in this thesis could form the 
foundation for an intelligence led approach to police regulation as advocated by 
O’Neil (2002); Power (1997; 2003) and Goldsmith (2005). Whilst this research was 
based on identifying incidents of ‘gaming’ and then examining the impact on the 
performance statistics it would be a relatively easy task to reverse the process and 
identify the statistical patterns associated with the various types of ‘gaming’ and then 
seek the direct evidence of such practices. The regulatory ‘light touch ’approach 
to‘high performing force is questioned. The evidence presented in this thesis suggests 
‘high performers’ should attract closer attention from regulators.  
 
 
The failure of the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) (2005) to ensure police 
forces had carried out race relations impact assessments on their policies also 
questioned their resolve and effectiveness (Chapter 10).   
 
The limitations of the ‘professional association’ approach to police regulation are 
evident in the fact that the same ‘gaming’ behaviours re-occurred both spatially and 
 410
over time, thus creating a ‘boom and bust’ effect referred to by Braunstein (1999) and 
Neyroud and Beckley (2001). Day and Klein (1987) noted that this form of regulation 
was in direct contrast to the principles of democracy and instead of replicating the self 
regulating mechanisms of the market, where product cost and quality are inextricably 
linked. Police regulators had in effect created a situation where quality control was 
positively discouraged. In such an environment those individuals referred to as 
‘Knaves’ by LeGrand (2003); ‘reactive gamers’ or ‘rational maniacs’ by Bevan & 
Hood (2006:523) will prosper and progress to the highest positions, and in view of the 
practice of recruiting HMIC from existing Chief Officers, that will include the 
Inspectorate. So the system is self corrupting: 
  
“Well it institutionalises bad practice. Here you’ve got HMIC, an 
independent body saying look at this, all this is going on, the 
miscellaneous enquiry register, misuse of the registers, a complete lack of 
credibility in terms of crime reporting and yet people who have a real 
responsibility for this are actually being promoted in spite of all this and 
they get onto the most senior ranks in the service. Where is the impetus 
there for anyone to change; what it says to people is ‘this is alright this is 
the way the force expects us to operate.” Interviewee A 
 
 
 
 
At a structural level the research has shown that the Home Secretary is the dominant 
partner in the tri-partite arrangements of police governance setting priorities for Chief 
Officers of Police and Police Authorities alike, and enforcing failures to achieve 
performance targets through the direct intervention of the PSU: 
 
“What Chief Constables are concerned about is what government 
ministers think, because the landscape has changed. The landscape 
changed in 1994 with the Magistrates Courts and Criminal Justice Act 
that was further consolidated into the Police Act that was further changed 
in the Police Reform Act, to make Chief Constables much more 
accountable to the Home Secretary. So now rather than being creatures of 
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the Police Authority they are really always looking, not over their 
shoulder, but directly at the Home Secretary, because the Home Secretary 
can direct the Police Authority to suspend them and then dismiss them if 
necessary.”  Interviewee A 
 
Police Authorities were noticeable by their absence during the period researched in 
this thesis. The only exception, to come to notice, was Greater Manchester Police 
Authority which had directly intervened to challenge ‘false reporting’ policies: 
 
“Accountability is a bit of a myth really and in any way there is no 
democratic accountability because even the Police Authority is made up 
of a majority of elected councillors but not entirely of elected councillors 
and they are not elected to the Police Authority, they are elected to their 
local authority and then they serve on the police authority. It’s a very 
tenuous democratic accountability.” Interviewee A 
 
Whilst Loveday (1993 & 1994) advocated strengthening Police Authorities in order to 
curtail the growing power of central government it would take considerable resource, 
effort and expertise for them to effectively counter ‘gaming’ behaviour of the type 
described in this thesis. It should also be noted that police ‘gaming’ was a feature of 
policing prior to the demise of Police Authorities (Young 1990). Police Authorities 
are also reliant on the expertise of HMIC when dealing with these matters and it is not 
known to what extent HMIC briefed them when ‘gaming’ was uncovered.           
 
Jackson (1993) noted that any drop in performance was also likely to reflect badly on 
central government and Bevan & Hood (2006) identified that there was little incentive 
for Government to maintain standards, going so far as to suggest collusion in the form 
of turning a ‘blind eye’ to ‘gaming’.  Day and Klein (1987) also noted the possible 
conflict of interest when auditors were charged with ‘improving efficiency’ a point 
acknowledged by HMIC (1999). Certainly the evidence reviewed in this thesis 
 412
indicated that none of the partners to the tri-partite arrangement had any incentive to 
maintain probity and the regulators were de-facto reporting to Home Office. The very 
body responsible for driving performance management and improving outputs. This 
would suggest the concentration of power in the hands of Central Government needs 
to be curtailed. The sharing of power with Local Government appears to be the most 
appropriate solution and Loveday’s suggestion (1994) of aligning Police Basic 
Command Units (BCUs) with Local Authority boundaries and making BCU 
commanders directly accountable to locally elected councillors meets that 
requirement. However it does not fully address the issue of quality control and probity 
as local politicians and police commanders could still both benefit from ‘gaming’. 
This suggests some body separate from Central Government and Local Government 
should perform a scrutiny function and ensure local police commanders contribute to 
the control of more serious crime which does not feature in local priorities. A re 
invigorated Police Authority, responsible for the whole police area could perform that 
function with the necessary training and support. This would involve re-defining their 
role to that of quality control and they would need statutory powers to inspect and 
intervene if standards were not being met.  The contracts of employment for Chief 
Constables could include a specific requirement to take all reasonable steps to address 
and prevent the types of ‘gaming’ practices outlined in this thesis. This would provide 
the legal means by which those failing to achieve acceptable standards could be 
removed from office.  
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The widespread presence of police ‘gaming’ uncovered brings into question the 
nature of the relationship between the Police and the State and questions the notion of 
‘policing by consent’.  One might argue that ‘gaming’ has enabled the police to resist 
becoming an instrument of the State. However it could equally be argued that the 
forms of ‘gaming’ employed by the police to meet the demands of their political 
masters demonstrated that they are far from being a bastion against the growing 
power of a centralised State: 
 
“Take that false reporting policy to its logical conclusion; it is not 
acceptable. It is the State basically saying you are an underling and you’ll 
do as you are told and you cannot report that crime. Something wrong 
there.” (Interviewee C) 
 
The findings also challenged Neyroud and Beckley’s (2001) assertion that a 
commitment to Human Rights legislation and the rule of law would transform 
policing.   
 
The lack of ‘distance’ between central government and the police makes it difficult 
for any government, particularly one which had been in power for a lengthy period of 
time, to acknowledge and accept responsibility for a system which had in effect 
‘corrupted’ the police service. To do so would be to admit that improved police 
performance was underpinned by ‘gaming’ practices which resulted in victims being 
treated as suspects (‘cuffing’); mutually beneficial partnerships between offenders and 
police officers which involved the exchange of inducements for admissions 
(‘nodding’); reduced investment in the investigation of serious crime which resulted 
in a deterioration in the investigation of sexual offences, including rape, and child 
abuse (‘skewing’), and the labelling of citizens as criminals without sufficient 
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evidence to justify such action, in some cases without the individual’s knowledge 
(‘stitching’). This makes it extremely challenging for any government to address the 
failings of such a system without risking public confidence and damaging their 
prospects at the ballot box. However, to continue with such practices in a democracy 
with a free press and active opposition is likely to result in exposure, scandal and a 
loss of trust in both Government and the Police Service: 
 
“Ultimately the whole thing becomes so scandalous that it ends up with a 
Royal Commission and public inquiry and the Police get reformed and 
we’re off again.” (Interviewee C) 
 
It is only to be hoped that Government and/or those Chief Officers of Police 
responsible for curtailing the ‘gaming’ behaviour uncovered in this thesis do not 
abuse their considerable powers to prevent the exposure of such practices. 
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REVIEW OF THE RESEARCH METHODOLOGY: 
 
The methodology proved appropriate to the task. The approach was in many ways 
similar to a fraud investigation: once it was established ‘how’ the trick or deception 
was being formulated it became a relatively easy, though tedious, task to uncover the 
documents and patterns in the data sets to prove the case. The data and documents 
were made available under the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act 2000 
and this legal device proved a valuable asset. However the Information 
Commissioner’s decision in the BBC vs. Plymouth City Council (2005) case may 
limit this legislative tool in future research. The use of informed individuals to review 
and comment on the documentary and statistical evidence provided a counter to the 
risk of researcher bias and yielded a rich commentary on policing during the period 
under study.  The predominately quantitative approach provided the most convincing 
evidence by establishing the scale of the ‘gaming’ behaviour under study.         
 
 
 
FURTHER RESEARCH: 
This thesis provides a means of identifying those individuals who have engaged 
‘gaming’ behaviour. It would be of value to profile their careers to establish if and to 
what extent ‘gaming’ has been a feature in their career progression. Psychological 
profiling against the ‘ideal’ types of ‘gamers’ categorised by Le Grand (2003) and 
Bevan & Hood (2006) would be valuable contribution to an understanding of such 
behaviour.     
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APPENDIX A:   SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW FORM 
Impact of Performance Management: Semi Structured Interview. 
 
Interviewee  
Purpose:  
The purpose of the study is to evaluate the impact of New Public Management, the 
performance system by which the police are held to account, and the performance 
regime associated with it, on the Police Service in England and Wales. Although 
performance measurement has been a feature of policing since its inception in the UK, 
the mid 1990s has seen a more focused approach as central government encouraged 
police forces to be held to account for their performance against national and local 
targets.   
 
Disclaimer: 
The completed research will be placed in the public domain and interviews are 
conducted on the understanding that quotations will be made public.  Quotes will be 
attributed to “interviewee”: “police interviewee” or “retired officer”, which offers a 
degree of anonymity.  However, the interviewees are being selected because of their 
specialist knowledge and it would be a relatively easy task for those within the police 
service to identify the individual respondents. Your consent is therefore required for 
your responses to be used under these conditions. 
 
Consent: 
I agree to my answers/comments to be used under the above provisions. 
 
Yes/No  
 
Questions: 
 
If you are able to support your answers with specific examples this would be greatly 
appreciated. 
 
Q1. Can you please provide a short resume of your service history and relevant 
experience?   .  
 
Q2. What has been your experience of performance management during your career? 
 
Q3. How did Performance Management change policing?  
 
Q4. When did any changes you identified with performance management take effect? 
 
Q5. What advantages did you attribute to performance management? 
 
 
Q6. What disadvantages did you attribute to performance management? 
 
Q7. How did performance management impact on your specific role or roles (please 
specify) within the police service? 
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Q8. What concerns, if any, did you have about performance management?   
 
Q9. What was the role of senior management in relation to performance management? 
 
Q10. What do you think about the balance results or outputs and quality control?   
 
Q11. What was the effect of performance indicators on performance?  
 
Q12. How did the police force you were a member of improve or attempt to improve 
its performance on crime reduction?  
 
Q13. How successful were these strategies or tactics at reducing crime?  
 
Q14. How did the police force you were a member of improve or attempt to improve 
its performance on detections?   
 
Q15. How successful were these strategies and tactics at improving the detection rate?  
 
Q16. What impact did the following reports have on the police force you were a 
serving member of? 
 
The Macpherson Report on the investigation of the death of Stephen Lawrence? 
 
The Laming Report on the death of Victoria Climbie? 
 
The Bichard Report on the Soham murders? 
 
 
HMIC’s inspection report on the West Midlands Police December 1998? 
 
 
Q17. How did the Police Force you were a member of respond to the requirements of 
the Race Relations (Amendment Act) 2000 and the further demand from the CRE 
following screening of the ‘the secret policeman’ programme. 
 
Q18. What is your view on the ‘False Reporting Policy’? 
 
Q19. How do you think the ‘False Reporting Policy’ will impact on the relationship 
between the police and the public?  
 
Q20. How do you think the ‘False Reporting Policy’ will impact on minority groups?  
 
Q21. What potential dangers do you think the ‘False Reporting Policy, poses in 
relation to avoiding discrimination on the grounds of age; disability; gender; race; 
religion; or sexual orientation? 
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Q22. Do you think the ‘False Reporting Policy’ should have been subject to a Race 
Equality Impact Assessment under the provisions of the Race Relations Amendment 
Act 2000?  
 
Q23. How could the performance framework be improved? 
 
Q24. If you have any further comments on the impact of performance management on 
the police service, or the police force which you served in? 
 
Thank you for taking part in this research, your assistance is appreciated. If you wish 
to make any additions or amendments to your answers or advice on how the questions 
can be improved, please do not hesitate to contact me. 
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APPENDIX B: List of interviewees’ professional backgrounds and expertise. 
    
 
 
Interviewee A: HMIC; Retired in 1995; HMIC Staff Officer at the Central Office of 
HMIC from 1991-1995. 
 
Interviewee B: HMIC;  Retired Staff Officer at HMIC Central Home Office section 
1988 – 2001 with responsibility for Information technology issues. 
 
Interviewee C: ACPO; Joined police service 1976 Served in subject force until 1992 
when he transferred to another large metropolitan force.  Involved in PI from its 
introduction to the police service and is an exponent of the approach:  Retired in 2005, 
having achieved ACPO position.  
 
Interviewee D: Crime Policy; Detective Inspector: Crime Support Staff Officer 
retired 2005. 
 
Interviewee E: Child protection; Detective Inspector: Policy Officer for Child 
Protection 1995- 2005. Retired 2005. 
 
Interviewee F: Operational.  Joined the police service in 1973 - Retired 2005 having 
reached sergeant rank. Wide and varied operational experience including postings to 
Shoplifting Squads. 
 
Interviewee G: Diversity. Retired 2005 as Chief Inspector after 30 years service; 
Specialist experience as policy officer for diversity. 
 
Interviewee H: Performance Officer GMP: Greater Manchester Police Authority 
Performance Management Officer. 
 
Interviewee J: Fawcett Society: Member of staff at the Fawcett Society 
 
Interviewee K: Experienced Journalist and current affairs programme maker based in 
the Birmingham area. (HMIC Inspection report on West Midlands Police 1998 
Unpublished was sent to him without comment and he prepared a draft article he 
would have prepared if the document had come to his attention at the time of its 
circulation in 1998. 
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APPENDIX C: List of Documents reviewed or referred to by Interviewees. 
 
RP4: Monthly recorded crimes for West Midlands Police April 1996 – April 2005 
Interviewees; A, B, C, D, E, & G 
 
RP5.  An Audit Report by Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary completed on the 
West Midlands Police in December 1998. Interviewees A, B, and C. 
 
RP6.   Rape Audit conducted by the West Midlands Police Performance Review 
Department in 2001.  Interviewee C 
 
RP 7.  Child Protection and work volume and staffing implications report completed 
by West Midlands Police Performance Review Dept. March 2004.  Interviewee C 
 
RP 8.   Child Protection within the West Midlands Police.  18th June 2004.  
Interviewee C 
RP 9.   West Midlands Police Rape Investigation Review 1.1.2003 – 30.6.2003.  
Interviewee C 
 
RP 11. West Midlands Police Burglary Audit Report dated 27.1.2005. Interviewees A, 
B & C 
     
RP 12. Email from crime manager West Midlands Police dated 11.10.2004. 
Interviewees A, B, & C 
 
RP 14.  Force TIC Audit: West Midlands Police report dated 11.2.2004.                             
  Interviewee C. 
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APPENDIX D: 
 
Performance Profile West Mercia Constabulary 
 
West Mercia Constabulary introduced a policy ‘West Mercia Constabulary Guidance 
False Reporting of Offences Involving Property’ in August 2003. The force initially 
refused to disclose any details of the policy. However after the Appeals Panel 
reviewed my request the force disclosed the main provisions of the policy which 
relate to the identifiable trends in false reporting i.e. the trigger factors; late reporting; 
telephone reporting; non use of the emergency number; discrepancies in their account; 
lack of witnesses; lack of full description of suspect; and insurance purposes being the 
main reason for reporting.  The policy also indicated the types of offence most likely 
to be subject of a false report; theft of mobile phones for insurance purposes; theft of 
benefit funds; juveniles afraid of admitting to their parents that they had lost their 
phones; burglaries or theft of motor vehicles reported for insurance purposes; and 
theft of motor vehicles to avoid prosecution for motoring offences. They did release 
the paragraph on ethical reporting, noting the need to maintain public confidence and 
stating that the policy would ensure ethical reporting and investigation which ‘has 
transparency of process.’ They did not disclose the procedures which demonstrated 
how the policy complied with the National Crime Recording Standards, relying on the 
provisions of Section 31 Freedom of Information Act to withhold the information on 
the grounds that release would furnish individuals or groups with the opportunity to 
fully understand the police preventative measures and therefore be more effective at 
carrying out such crimes.   
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Table West Mercia Robbery ‘No crimes’ and Audit Commission grades. 
 
 
 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 
Total 
Robberies 
654 728 689 531 453 
Robberies 
No Crimed 
38 39 70 75 33 
% No 
Crimed 
5.49% 5.08% 9.22% 12.38% 6.79% 
No Crime 
Grade 
   Green 
 
Green 
(Excellent) 
Overall 
Audit Grade 
  Green Green Green  
(Good) 
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West Mercia Comment: The force adopted the NCRS in April 2001 (Simmons et al 
2003:86). The introduction of a comprehensive ‘false reporting’ policy corresponds 
with significant reductions in total recorded crime, volume crime and robberies. The 
number of robberies ‘no crimed’ increased significantly during the period 2002-2004 
and then reduced dramatically in 2005 after the Audit Commission commenced 
checks. The Audit Commission grades for both ‘no crimes’ and overall data quality 
do not indicate any problems.  
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APPENDIX E: 
 
Performance Profile West Yorkshire Police 
 
West Yorkshire Police indicated that they introduced a false reporting policy on 
03.09.2003 which applied to Volume Crime i.e. burglary; robbery and theft from the 
person and theft including vehicle crime.  The detailed instructions to officers is 
contained in a General information document which relates specifically to offences of 
theft of mobile phones, benefit monies and juveniles avoiding parental wrath when 
they have lost their mobile phones. The trigger factors are as per the Home Office 
street crime guidance. The ‘general information document is quite clear that its 
purpose is the detection of those seeking to false report crime not the recording of 
street crime allegations. However it suggests individuals seeking to report allegations 
that are over a day old should be encouraged to attend a police station or make 
arrangements for officers to visit them. It indicates that unwillingness to comply with 
these instructions should not prevent a crime report being recorded. The policy goes 
on to state those reports which are suspicious should be examined by a Detective 
Sergeant or Detective Inspector and where a false report is suspected the victim 
should be spoken to in person at the police station ,home address, place of  work, or 
over the phone by an experienced investigator. It also specifies that victims should be 
informed that during the investigation the police may examine phone records and 
CCTV coverage of the area where the offence purportedly occurred in order to 
corroborate their account. The policy is clear on the action to be taken when evidence 
shows conclusively that a report is false but does not specify how suspected false 
reports which do not result in a prosecution of some sort are disposed of in the 
incident recording or crime recording systems.  A second policy document on the 
action to be taken in respect of volume crime indicates that the force will actively 
screen reports of volume crime to identify false allegations and appropriate action will 
be taken against them.  It also goes on to encourage the development of local systems 
to identify and deal with incidents of false reporting of Volume Crime. 
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Robbery reports West Yorkshire
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Table: West Yorkshire Robbery ‘No crimes’ and Audit Commission grades. 
 
Comment: The force adopted the NCRS in February 2002 (Simmons et al 2003:90). 
Whilst the force received an overall ‘Amber’ grade from the Audit Commission in 
2003 the data quality grade was ‘red’. This resulted in the force addressing data 
 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 
Total 
Robberies 
5,674 4,947 3,738 2,196 2,531 
Robberies 
No Crimed 
33 94 108 62 34 
% No 
Crimed 
0.58% 1.86% 2.81% 2.75% 1.33% 
No Crime 
Grade 
   Amber Amber 
(Fair) 
Overall 
Audit Grade 
  Amber Amber Green 
(Good) 
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quality and in 2004 the Audit Commission made the following comment on the 
force’s improvement: 
 
“The Authority has demonstrated a clear commitment to the application of 
NCRS which appears to have cascaded down through the force. There is an 
excellent awareness of NCRS within divisions as a result of the force’s on-
going programme to communicate the importance of consistent crime 
recording and the implications of NCRS.  Officers are clearly moving away 
from the “evidential approach” to crime recording enabling the application of 
the “balance of probabilities” that is central to NCRS.” (Audit Commission 
July 2004:3) 
 
This would explain the peak in total recorded crime circa September 2002. The fall in 
total recorded crime and volume crime corresponds with the introduction of the ‘false 
reporting’ policy. The earlier fall in recorded robberies corresponds with the Street 
Crime Initiative when ‘false reporting’ practices were being introduced by the ten 
‘street crime’ forces of which West Yorkshire was one. The significant reduction in 
robberies ‘no crimed’ again corresponds with the commencement of the Audit 
Commission checks. 
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APPENDIX F: 
 
Performance Profile: Merseyside Police 
 
Merseyside Police indicated that they have an electronic link on their “What Works 
Reference Library” to the Home Office website with details of the Problem Solving: 
Practical Lessons from the Street Crime Initiative.  They also require those reporting 
benefit monies stolen to sign a declaration indicating that their report is genuine. All 
general enquiry offices are using these forms and it is hoped that this will deter this 
type of offence. An ‘Area Order’ in relation to benefit fraud was issued on 
10/09/2004. 
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Table: Merseyside Robbery ‘No crimes’ and Audit Commission grades.  
 
Comment: 
Merseyside’s total recorded crime profile does not match the trend displayed by the 
other three forces which have adopted ‘false reporting’ policies. However this may be 
due to the limited scope of the policy which relates to benefit monies only or the 
impact of late compliance with the NCRS reflected in their improved grades over the 
period 2003-2005. Simmons et al (2003:54) were unable to include Merseyside in the 
national NCRS impact assessment because incidents weren’t categorised until an 
officer had assessed the nature of the incident thus negating the methodology 
employed in the study. The force did however adopt the NCRS in April 2002. The 
recorded robbery trend follows that of the other ‘street crime’ forces showing a 
marked reduction in recorded robberies during the period when false reporting tactics 
were being introduced as part of the national initiative.  
 
An examination of HMIC baseline assessment (HMIC Oct 2006) does however reveal 
an interesting observation on the force’s application of the NCRS. 
 
“The force is encouraging officers to maximise the 72-hour rule under NCRS 
to fully investigate the circumstances around reported crime. This will assist in 
the process of reducing the number of ‘non crime’ after the event and assist in 
the correct categorisation. However, this will leave a lag in the performance-
monitoring process and possibly impact on NIM. In addition the force should 
ensure that only officers who are competent in NCRS are provided with this 
facility.” (HMIC Merseyside: Oct 2006:53) 
 
The 72 hour rule does comply with NCRS guidelines but this suggests officers are 
seeking evidence to substantiate the victims claim and then using their discretion to 
decide whether a crime has occurred or not as opposed to accepting the victims 
account.   
 
 
 
 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 
Total 
Robberies 
3,155 2,994 2,347 2,173 2,502 
Robberies 
No Crimed 
140 151 138 71 33 
% No 
Crimed 
4.25% 4.80% 5.55% 3.16% 1.30% 
No Crime 
Grade 
   Green Green 
(Good) 
Overall 
Audit Grade 
  Red Amber Green 
(Good) 
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APPENDIX G: 
 
Performance Profile: Cleveland Police 
 
Cleveland Police introduced a ‘false reporting’ policy on 04.04.2006 with specific 
reference to theft/robbery of mobile phones, with a mention of Benefit monies in a 
declaration which victims were required to sign indicating that the report was 
genuine?  In the introduction to the policy it states that victims may ‘believe that 
insurance on the mobile phone will only be valid if it has been lost in the course of a 
crime as opposed to lost. It also states in bold lettering that the evidence of the scale 
of the problem is anecdotal and that there is no published data on the proportion of 
robbery reports which are false. They use the term ‘thin’ to describe the research 
evidence.  The trigger factors are as per the street crime guidance. A caveat, warning 
that the guidelines may lead to a number of false positives is included and there is a 
reminder to officers of the NCRS, although the term balance of probability phrase is 
given prominence.  It is also indicated that the NMPCU has produced a ‘Reporting of 
Crime – Declaration document which victims are required to sign. The wording of 
this document is recommended as it meets the requirements of the NCRS in 
promoting a victim oriented approach to crime recording, whilst ensuring they are 
aware the offence as reported will be investigate robustly; and the consequences of 
false reporting. The policy requires a previous warning to be discontinued on the 
grounds that they may be dissuading genuine victims. So some form of ‘false 
reporting’ procedure appears to have been in operation prior to the formal adoption of 
the policy. 
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Cleveland Recorded Robberies
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
R
ec
or
de
d 
R
ob
be
ri
es
Cleveland Robberies
False Reporting 
Policy 4.4.2006
 
 
 
 
Table: Cleveland Robbery ‘No crimes’ and Audit Commission grades.  
 
 
Comment: this force experienced a reduction in total recorded crime in 2003/04 
although its overall NCRS compliance grade is poor for both 2003 and 2004. 
Improving its compliance grade to Green (Excellent) in 2005 corresponds with a 
marked increase in recorded crime. Recorded robberies show a marked reduction 
from late 2003 onwards (approx 12 months later than the ‘street crime’ forces) 
without any adverse affect from improved NCRS compliance. The introduction of a 
‘false reporting’ policy for robberies would, as has been seen with other forces 
adopting the policy, ensure compliance with the Audit Commission requirements and 
Cleveland was graded ‘green’ Excellent for data quality in 2006. 
Again the marked reduction in robberies ‘no crimed’ is noticeable after the Audit 
Commission checks in 2004.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 
Total 
Robberies 
1,264 1,434 1,355 898 715 
Robberies 
No Crimed 
6 24 22 38 11 
% No 
Crimed 
0.47% 1.65% 1.60% 4.06% 1.52% 
No Crime 
Grade 
   Red Green 
(Excellent) 
Overall 
Audit Grade 
  Red Red Green 
(Excellent) 
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APPENDIX H: 
 
Performance Profile: Humberside 
 
Humberside Police introduced a ‘false reporting of crime good practice guidance’ on 
01.07.2004.  The policy is introduced with the rider that research and statistics 
demonstrate that there has been an increase in false allegations of street crime. Two 
particular group are the main suspects; those reporting mobile phones stolen for 
insurance purposes and juveniles who are afraid to admit to their parents that they 
have lost their phones. Three ‘trigger factors’ are identified; non use of the 999 
system; victim unable to give full description of offender; report for insurance 
purposes. The policy indicates that the decision on whether an incident should be 
recorded as a crime must be made within 72 hours based on an auditable Crime 
Recording Decision Making Process, again the emphasis is placed on ‘balance of 
probability’ that a crime has occurred. Once recorded as a crime if the trigger factors 
apply victims are to be encouraged to attend the police station or arrangements made 
for an officer to attend their home or workplace. The policy explains that those reports 
believed to be false can be ‘no crimed’ and that it is vital that sufficient detail is 
recorded for the purposes of auditing by HMIC or Audit Commission. The delicate 
issue of what happens when a report is suspected of being false but there is 
insufficient evidence to prosecute is not dealt with specifically. There is also a heavy 
emphasis on compliance with the National Crime Recording Standard.  
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Humberside Recorded Robberies
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Table: Humberside Robbery ‘No crimes’ and Audit Commission grades.  
 
Comment: Humberside adopted the NCRS in April 2002 (Simmons et al 2003:42). 
The force was not one of the ten Street Crime Initiative forces; the later reduction in 
robberies occurs just after the formal introduction of a false reporting policy. The 
reduction in overall crime again occurs soon after the introduction of the false 
reporting policy. The Audit Commission overall grade has improved from Amber in 
2003 to Green (Excellent) in 2005 however the ‘no crime’ grade has remained 
constant at ‘amber’ (Fair). Only a small reduction in ‘no crimed’ robberies has 
occurred when the Audit Commission commenced checks in 2004 although the force 
is only graded ‘amber’ for this test. An increase in ‘no crimes’ corresponds with the 
introduction of a ‘false reporting’ policy for robbery in 1.7.2004.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 
Total 
Robberies 
1,182 1,813 1,896 1,262 1,185 
Robberies 
No Crimed 
28 44 85 94 65 
% No 
Crimed 
2.31% 2.37% 4.29% 6.93% 5.20% 
No Crime 
Grade 
   Amber Amber 
(Fair) 
Overall 
Audit Grade 
  Amber Amber Green 
(Excellent) 
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APPENDIX J: 
 
Performance Profile: Nottinghamshire: 
 
Nottinghamshire Police endorsed a guidance document advising officers on how to 
deal with false reports in April 2004 although it is likely the force would have  
introduced elements of ‘false reporting’ tactics during 2003 as part of the Street Crime 
Initiative. The policy appears from examination of their Policing Plan 2005/06 
(Policing our Communities: The Year Ahead 2005-2006:28) to have been extended to 
burglaries.  
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Table: Nottinghamshire: Robbery ‘No crimes’ and Audit Commission grades. 
 
Comment: Nottinghamshire adopted the NCRS in April 2001. Although the force 
was a member of the ten Street Crime Initiative forces the marked reduction in 
robberies does not occur until March 2003- April 2004. This is consistent with the 
other ‘Street Crime ‘forces reviewed which show a similar reduction in recorded 
robberies. The false reporting policy for street crime and theft of benefit monies is 
formally adopted in April 2004. This force’s Audit Commission grade improves from 
Amber during 2003 and 2004 to Green (Excellent) in 2005 and this corresponds with 
an increase in recorded crime in 2005-2006. ‘No crimes’ grades remain at good 
although the number of robberies ‘no crimed’ reduced after the Audit Commission 
checks commenced in 2004.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 
Total 
Robberies 
2,726 2,799 2,556 2,004 2,112 
Robberies 
No Crimed 
27 73 127 114 78 
% No 
Crimed 
0.98% 2.54% 4.73% 5.38% 3.56% 
No Crime 
Grade 
   Green Green 
(Good) 
Overall 
Audit Grade 
  Amber Amber Green 
(Excellent) 
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APPENDIX K:  
 
Performance Profile: Avon and Somerset: 
 
Avon and Somerset Constabulary commented in their response to the Survey: “Avon 
and Somerset have no such specific policy in existence. I am informed that over the 
years there may have been some guidance issued to officers in geographical areas of 
the constabulary, particularly in relation to matters such as the spurious reporting of 
some thefts of mobile phones, some robberies and some vehicle-related crimes. I am 
informed that these local guides would have been replaced by the Home Office 
Guidance on the false reporting of Street Crime.”  A search of the force’s web site 
indicated that the Bristol BCU had a dedicated unit established to investigate false 
reports28. The force’s response provided some analysis of the problem of false 
reporting which appeared to be relevant to their Bristol Basic Command Unit. The 
analysis indicated some practice involving delays in the issuing of crime numbers was 
being operated and that this was in part responsible for a reduction in false reports.   
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28 Partnership with People 2003/04 Bristol pg. 11 
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Table: Avon & Somerset: Robbery ‘No crimes’ and Audit Commission grades. 
 
Comment: Avon and Somerset adopted the NCRS in October 2000 although 
Simmons et al indicate the force made a concerted effort towards compliance in 2001 
(2003:8). Simmons et al also noted a marked reduction in robberies in 2002/03 which 
they were confident was due to a genuine reduction in this crime category: 
 
“Robbery – Robbery offences show a negative NCRS impact across all four 
quarters of 2002/03. Since NCRS implementation, the rise and fall in crimes 
has tracked incidents, which suggest that the reduction in robbery from April 
2002 represents a genuine and sustained fall. The Home Office has estimated 
that there has been a minus six per cent NCRS impact for 2002/03. Avon and 
Somerset estimated a negligible NCRS impact on robbery offences in the 
previous year.” (2003:8) 
 
The Forces overall Audit Commission compliance grade remains at Amber from 2003 
to 2005 and its ‘no crimes’ grade worsens from Amber in 2004 to red in 2005.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 
Total 
Robberies 
4,889 3,504 2,908 2,237 2,036 
Robberies 
No Crimed 
37 39 74 85 60 
% No 
Crimed 
0.75% 1.10% 2.48% 3.66% 2.86% 
No Crime 
Grade 
   Amber Red 
(Poor) 
Overall 
Audit Grade 
  Amber Amber Amber 
(Fair) 
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APPENDIX L: 
 
Performance Profile: City of London Police  
 
City of London Police indicated that they did not have a ‘false reporting’ policy 
although an ‘instruction’ had been issued to officers in March 2006 amended in 
October 2006 relating to the reporting of lost passports. The instruction required the 
recording officer to corroborate the victim’s identity prior to issuing any reference 
number which could be used to obtain a replacement. The force also released two 
posters which were displayed in their police stations advising members of the public 
that it is a criminal offence to falsely report an item stolen. They were unable to 
ascertain when these posters were first displayed. It is assumed their introduction 
corresponds with the marked reduction in recorded crime experienced in 3003/04. The 
posters indicate a predisposition to view all property as lost unless their evidence to 
the contrary: 
 
“It is not always clear, in respect of mislaid property, whether an item is lost 
or stolen. If the circumstances under which you report an item mislaid amount 
to a genuine loss of property, or on the balance of probabilities the property is 
more likely to have been lost than not, you will be asked to endorse your true 
feelings within the lost property register. However, if on the balance of 
probabilities it is more likely than not that the property has been stolen we 
WILL record the loss as a crime.” (Poster A: City of London Police Poster on 
public display)   
 
 “If the circumstances under which you report an item mislaid amount to a 
genuine belief that it is stolen or stolen with violence being used against the 
victim, a crime report will be taken from you and a crime reference will be 
allocated (Poster B: City of London Police) 
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City of London Recorded Robberies
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Table: City of London: Robbery ‘No crimes’ and Audit Commission grades. 
 
Comment: The City of London adopted the NCRS in April 2002 although the size of 
the force and the small number crimes and incidents reported meant that Simmons et 
al’s assessment of the NCRS impact was unreliable (2003: 52).  The force also 
indicated that it had increased its officer strength by 11 per cent which they felt had an 
impact on recorded crime and their ability to deal with it.  Whilst the force’s Audit 
Commission grades both overall and in relation to ‘no crimes’ remained consistently 
good the high number of ‘no crimed’ robberies is high in comparison with the other 
forces with some form of ‘false reporting’ policies.  The high percentage of robberies 
‘no crimed’ in 2004/05 (41.67%) masks an overall increase in reported robberies This 
could reflect a high proportion of ‘false reports’ consistent with the percentages 
quoted by other forces to the media. However the City of London is surrounded on all 
sides by the Metropolitan Police Service and frequently records crimes which 
occurred on the Metropolitan Police Service’s area thus necessitating ‘no criming’ of 
these reports when they are passed to the MPS for investigation.       
 
 
 
 
 
 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 
Total 
Robberies 
46 45 50 42 39 
Robberies 
No Crimed 
6 4 9 30 12 
% No 
Crimed 
11.54 8.16 15.25 41.67 23.53 
No Crime 
Grade 
   Green Green 
(Good) 
Overall 
Audit Grade 
  Green Green Green 
(Excellent) 
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APPENDIX M: GREATER MANCHESTER POLICE & ‘NODDING’ 
 
CRITICAL INCIDENT: Greater Manchester Police (GMP) discontinued prison 
write offs in 1995. 
Incident reported in the Guardian (Carter: The Guardian 4.6. 2004) which suggested 
post-sentence TICs were being sought by at least one Command Unit 
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(Fig 6.8)                                                                                      (Home Office 2008) 
Greater Manchester Police Theft From Vehicle Detections: Total 
& TIC
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(Fig. 6.9)                                                                              (Home Office 2008)  
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Greater Manchester Police Theft or Unauthorised Taking of 
Motor Vehicle Detections: Total & TIC
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(Fig. 6.10)                                                                               (Home Office 2008)  
 
 The graphs (Figs 6.8;6.9;6.10) demonstrate that whilst TICs have increased from 
2005/06 they still only account for a small proportion of the total detections for Theft 
or Unauthorised Taking of a Motor Vehicle and a minority proportion of the 
detections for Burglary Dwelling and Theft from Motor Vehicle.  Interestingly the 
increase in TICs occurs after the reported incident involving inducements at Salford 
(Carter: The Guardian 4.6. 2004) which indicated post sentence TICs were being 
sought by at least one Command Unit29. The increase in TICs also post dates the 
involvement of the Police Standards Unit with the Force (2002/03; Home Office/PSU 
2005).  
Comparing GMP with the National data for the period 2003-2007 it is evident that 
although GMP was increasing the percentage of Burglary Dwelling (Fig 6.11); Theft 
from Motor Vehicle (Fig 6.12); and Theft and Unauthorised Take of Motor Vehicles 
(Fig. 6.13) detected by TICs year on year, it was still detecting lower percentages of 
offences in these categories by TIC than the national percentage.       
 
                                                 
29 The GMP performance officer declined to comment on the use of TICs. 
 442
National GMP: Percentage of Burglary Dwelling Detected by 
TIC
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(Fig 6.11)                                                                                        (Home Office 2008) 
National and GMP Percentage of Theft from MV Detected by TIC
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(Fig 6.12)                                                                                        (Home Office 2008) 
 
National & GMP Percentage of Theft and Unauthorised Take of 
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(Fig 6.13)                                                                                        (Home Office 2008) 
 
The above analysis might suggest GMP took an executive decision 
in 1995 to discontinue the pursuit of post sentence detections in the form of ‘prison 
write offs’. Initially, it would appear, the force did not substitute ‘prison write offs’ 
with ‘post sentence TICs’. However their performance suffered as a result. In 2004 
there was an incident suggesting ‘post sentence TICs’ were being sought when abuses 
at the Salford command unit were uncovered (Carter: The Guardian 4.6. 2004) and 
the percentage of TICs forming part of the detection rate for key offences increased 
from 2004/5 onwards (although it remains below the national percentage level).   
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APPENDIX N: NOTTINGHAMSHIRE CONATBULARY & ‘NODDING’ 
 
CRITICAL INCIDENT: DESPATCHES PROGRAMME 1999 
 
 
Analysis of Nottinghamshire Constabulary’s detection data revealed the force post 
exposure (1999) continued to rely to a lesser extent on offences detected by TIC in the 
key crime categories of Burglary Dwelling (Fig. 6.14); Theft from Motor Vehicle 
(Fig. 6.15); and Theft of and Unauthorised Taking of a Motor Vehicle (Fig. 6.16) 
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(Fig. 6.14)                                                                                     (Home Office 2008) 
Nottinghamshire Theft From Vehicle Detections: Total & TIC
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(Fig. 6.15)                                                                                    (Home Office 2008) 
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Nottinghamshire Theft or Unauthorised Taking of a Motor 
Vehicle Detcetions: Total & TIC
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(Fig. 6.16)                                                                                 (Home Office 2008)  
The impact of that decision, like GMP’s, contributed to the force’s low performance 
when compared to the national detection rate. This is evident from the data on 
burglary detection rates (Fig 6.17).  
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(Fig. 6.17)                                                              (Home Office Bulletins 2001-2007) 
When the percentage of offences being detected as TICs are compared to national 
rates it is again evident Nottinghamshire continues to detect a lower percentage of key 
offences by TIC; Burglary Dwelling (Fig 6.18); Theft from Motor Vehicle (6.19); and 
Theft of and Unauthorised Taking of a Motor Vehicle (Fig. 6.20). 
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National and Notts. Percentage of Burglary Dwellings Detected 
by TIC
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(Fig. 6.18)                                                              (Home Office Bulletins 2003-2007)     
National & Notts. Percentage of Theft from MV. Detected by TIC
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Fig. 6.19)                                                              (Home Office Bulletins 2003-2007)     
National & Notts. Percentage of Theft of and Unauthorised 
Take of MV Detected by TIC
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(Fig. 6.20)                                                              (Home Office Bulletins 2003-2007)    
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Like GMP the action taken by Nottinghamshire Constabulary to prevent ‘nodding’ 
abuses involving ‘post sentence TICs’ and TICs had a detrimental impact on their 
performance and, like GMP, they were subject of PSU ‘engagement’ (Home 
Office/PSU 2005). 
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APPENDIX P: CLEVELAND CONSTABULARY & ‘NODDING’ 
CRITICAL INCIDENT: ALLEGATIONS AGAINST DETECTIVE 
SUPERINTENDENT MALLON 1998  
National & Cleveland Burglary Detection Rate
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(Fig. 6.21)                                                      (Home Office Bulletins 2002-2007) 
 
Compared to the National Detection rate for all burglaries (Fig. 6.21) Cleveland does 
not appear to be too far off the national burglary detection rate. However its 
performance in comparison to its family group30 of forces is poor.    
 
 
The reliance on TICs as a means of detection continued to be low as shown by Figs. 
6.22, Burglary Dwelling; 6.23 Theft from Vehicle; and 6.24 Theft and Unauthorised 
Taking of a Motor Vehicle.   
                                                 
30 Family group includes West Yorkshire; West Midlands; South Yorkshire; Merseyside and 
Northumberland (HMIC Cleveland 2005:5) 
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Cleveland Burglary Dwelling Detections: Total and TIC 
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(Fig. 6.22)                                                                               (Home Office 2008) 
Cleveland Theft from Vehicle Detections: Total & TIC
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(Fig. 6.23)                                                                               (Home Office 2008) 
 
Cleveland Theft or Unauthorised Taking of a Motor Vehicle 
Detections: Total and TIC
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(Fig. 6.24)                                                                               (Home Office 2008) 
 
Again the pattern is similar to GMP and Nottinghamshire; preventative measures 
introduced to reduce the risk of ‘gaming’ had a negative impact on force performance 
in key areas such as burglary and vehicle crime and like GMP and Nottinghamshire 
Cleveland also became subject of PSU ‘engagement’ (Home Office/PSU 2005). 
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APPENDIX Q: WEST MIDLANDS POLICE & ‘NODDING’ 
 
CRITICAL INCIDENT: OCTOBER 2003 ARREST OF OFFICERS WITH 
SUSPECT PRODUCED FROM PRISON 
 
 
The impact on the burglary detection rate (Fig. 6.25) demonstrated that the force 
detection rate for all burglaries remained above the national average until the incident 
in October 2003, thus demonstrating the extent the force was relying on what were in 
effect ‘prison write offs’. 
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(Fig. 6.25)                                                      (Home Office Bulletins 2002-2007) 
 The impact of the incident in October 2003 and the response to it is evident from the 
reduction in the number of detections for Burglary Dwelling (Fig. 6.26); Theft from 
Vehicle (Fig. 6.27); and Theft or Unauthorised Taking of a Motor Vehicle (Fig. 6.28).   
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West Midlands Burglary Dwellings Detected: Total & TIC 
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(Fig. 6.26)                                                                     (Home Office 2008) 
West Midlands Police Theft from Vehicle Detections: Total & 
TIC
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
20
00
/01
1
20
01
/02
20
02
/03
20
03
/04
20
04
/05
20
05
/06
20
06
/07Nu
m
be
r 
of
 T
he
ft 
fro
m
 V
eh
ic
le
s 
De
te
ct
ed
West Midlands Theft From
Vehicle Total Detections
West Midlands Theft From MV.
TIC
 
(Fig. 6.27)                                                                     (Home Office 2008) 
West Midlands Police Theft or Unauthorised Taking of a MV 
Detected: Total and TIC
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(Fig. 6.28)                                                                     (Home Office 2008) 
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 The marked shift in the percentage of offences detected by TIC is also evident when 
compared to the national trend; Fig. 6.29 shows the percentage of Burglary Dwellings 
Detected by TIC and Fig. 6.30 the percentage of Theft from Vehicles detected by 
TIC. 
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(Fig. 6.29)                                                                     (Home Office 2008) 
National & West Midlands Percentage of Theft from Vehicles 
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(Fig. 6.30)                                                                     (Home Office 2008) 
The dramatic drop in performance brought about by the one incident, is reflected in 
the above graphs, and indicates the scale of ‘gaming’, involving TICs, in the West 
Midlands Police prior to preventative action being taken. 
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APPENDIX R: BEDFORDSHIRE & ‘NODDING’ 
 
CRITICAL INCIDENT: MAY 2006 
 
 
Burglary Dwellings detected, (Fig. 6.31); Theft from Vehicle (Fig. 6.32) and Theft or 
Unauthorised Taking of a motor vehicle (Fig. 6.33) follows the same pattern of other 
forces experiencing similar ‘incidents’ involving ‘nodding’.  
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(Fig. 6.31)                                                                                (Home Office 2008) 
Bedfordshire Theft from Vehicle
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(Fig. 6.32)                                                                                (Home Office 2008) 
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Bedfordshire Theft or Unauthorised Taking of Motor Vehicle 
Detected: Total and TIC
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(Fig. 6.33)                                                                                (Home Office 2008) 
 
When the percentage of Burglary Dwelling (Fig.6.34); Theft from Vehicle, (Fig. 
6.35); and Theft or Unauthorised Taking of a Motor Vehicle, (Fig 6.36) detected by 
TIC are compared the national figures it is clear Bedfordshire has moved from above 
the national percentage rate to below the national percentage rate for Burglary 
Dwelling, (Fig. 6.34); and Theft from Vehicle (Fig. 7.35); Theft and Unauthorised 
Taking of a Motor Vehicle (Fig 6.36) is below the national rate although the marked 
reduction in 2006/7 is still noticeable after the incident reported in the media in May 
2006..    
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(Fig. 6.34)                                                                                     (Home Office 2008) 
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(Fig. 6.35)                                                                                     (Home Office 2008) 
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(Fig. 6.36)                                                                                     (Home Office 2008) 
 
In July 2007, following the publication of the annual police performance results, 
Bedfordshire Constabulary was declared Britain’s worse performing police force( The 
Times 9.10.07). The Chief Constable (Bedfordshire Police 2007) attributed the fall in 
detections to the diversion of resources to protective services, a requirement placed 
upon the force by central government. However one would have expected such a 
requirement to have a similar impact on national detection rates. This is not the case. 
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The most likely cause of the fall in performance is the impact of the scandal involving 
the Luton officers. There is no evidence from HMIC inspections or Police Authority 
reports on Bedfordshire to indicate whether the force management team has imposed 
certain requirements on the obtaining of TICs. The fall in detections could therefore 
be due to officers refraining from such practices in the light of the dismissal of the 
Luton officers. 
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APPENDIX S: MERSEYSIDE & ‘NODDING’ 
 
CRITICAL INCIDENT:  BBC 6.6.2007 
 
A fall in detections for burglary dwelling ,(Fig. 6.37); theft from vehicle, (Fig. 6.39); 
and theft or unauthorised taking of a motor vehicle, (Fig. 6.39) was expected to be 
evident in 2005/6 and 2006/7 following the exposure of the incident involving 
‘nodding’ type behaviour (BBC 6.6.2007). 
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(Fig. 6.37)                                                                                (Home Office 2008) 
Merseyside Theft From Vehicle Detections: Total & TIC
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(Fig. 6.38)                                                                                (Home Office 2008) 
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Merseyside Theft or Unauthorised Taking of a Motor Vehicle 
Detections: Total & TIC
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(Fig. 6.39)                                                                                (Home Office 2008) 
A review of the make up of Merseyside’s detection rate offered an explanation. 
Detections categorised as ‘other’, which would include ‘prison write offs’, increased 
dramatically in Merseyside for the key offences of Burglary Dwelling; Theft from 
Vehicle and Theft or Unauthorised Taking of a Motor Vehicle in 2004/05 then 
reduced significantly in 2005/6 (Fig. 6.40). Although these ‘other’ detections would 
be regarded as ‘non-sanctioned’ detections on Home Office performance tables they 
could be used for local marketing purposes to demonstrate an increase in detections. It 
could be that the force was using ‘prison write offs’ and the ‘gaming’ practices related 
to this procedure.  
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(Fig. 6.40)                                                                                (Home Office 2008) 
 
Whilst the administrative procedures being abused in Merseyside as a means of 
improving the detection rate were slightly different from the other forces reviewed, it 
is evident that the large fluctuations in the detection rate experienced by this force are 
linked to changes in administrative procedures, not improvements in investigative 
techniques or other factors. It is likely those procedures were exploited to engage in 
‘nodding’. 
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APPENDIX T: THE METROPOLITAN POLICE SERVICE & ‘NODDING’ 
 
SIGNIFICANT INCIDENT: BBC Radio 4 Law in Action 5.6.07 
 
 
Improvements linked to increases in TICs are evident: Burglary Dwelling, (Fig. 6.9); 
Theft from Vehicle, (Fig. 6.10); and Theft or Unauthorised Taking of a Motor 
Vehicle, (Fig. 6.11). 
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(Fig. 6.9)                                                                                (Home Office 2008) 
Met. Police Theft from Vehicle Detections: Total & TIC
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(Fig. 6.10)                                                                                (Home Office 2008) 
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Met. Police Theft or Unauthorised Taking of MV Detections: 
Total & TIC
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(Fig. 6.11)                                                                                (Home Office 2008) 
 
The increase in the numbers of offences in all three categories detected by TIC was 
evident from 2004/05 onwards. In the case of Burglary Dwelling and Theft from 
Vehicle this corresponded with an increase in the total number of these offences 
detected. In the case of Theft or Unauthorised Taking of a Motor Vehicle the overall 
number of offences detected fell. In all three crime categories the number of offences 
reported had been falling over the period so whilst this may explain the reduction in 
Theft or Unauthorised Taking of a Motor Vehicle detected the explanation does not 
hold true for Burglary Dwelling and Theft from Vehicle. A Home Office counting 
rule on detections does however offer an explanation for this anomaly. Unauthorised 
Taking of a Motor Vehicle i.e. where an offender takes a car on a temporary basis for 
a ‘joy ride’ etc. is a summary offence on which the limitation for proceedings expires 
after six months. Offences admitted by suspects six months after the commission of 
these offences cannot be prosecuted. Home Office counting rules also classify such 
offences detected six months after the offence as non-sanctioned detections. The same 
is not true of Burglary Dwelling and Theft from Vehicle. This may explain why Met 
officers are not seeking to detect such offences as TICs. 
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When the percentage of Burglary Dwelling (Fig. 6.12); Theft from Vehicle, (Fig 6.13) 
and Theft or Unauthorised Taking of a Motor Vehicle, (Fig. 6.14) detections detected 
by TIC are analysed it is evident the Met. Police are following the national trend and 
relying heavily on TICs to improve their performance on detections.    
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(Fig. 6.12)                                                                                (Home Office 2008) 
National & Met. Police Percentage of Theft from Vehicle 
Detections Detected by TIC
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(Fig. 6.13)                                                                                (Home Office 2008) 
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National & Met. Police Percentage of Theft or Unauthorised 
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(Fig. 6.14)                                                                                (Home Office 2008) 
 
The Met. Police were clearly improving their performance by the use of offences TIC 
and whilst it is unknown whether these involve pre or ‘post sentence TICs’ it is 
known that defence solicitors were voicing concerns about unsupervised contact 
between police officers and offenders during ‘intelligence’ interviews. This is a 
symptom associated with abuse of TIC procedures. Unlike the other forces studied no 
major scandal had come to light and the reliance on TICs continued. 
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